Thomas Hinkel, Jr. et al. v. Paul Hinkel et al. (2011)

RULING RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# # 110, 114)

The plaintiffs, Thomas S. Hinkel, Jr., and Marjorie A. Sbano–Mathisen, brought claims against the estate of Evelyn Hinkel.   Defendants Paul and Mary Ellen Hinkel (“defendants”) ¹ move for summary judgment (# 110), arguing that there are no genuine issues of material fact with regard to their claim that the plaintiffs' action is barred by the statute of limitations.   The plaintiffs object to the motion, arguing that they filed a timely claim with the fiduciary of the estate and, when the claim was rejected, they commenced this action in a timely manner.

This matter came before the court and was heard on October 3, 2011.   For the reasons stated below, the defendants' motion for summary judgment and Charles J. Groppe's adoptive motion for summary judgment are denied.

I

FACTS

The plaintiffs are the children of the late Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., and a wife to whom Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., was married prior to his marriage to Evelyn Hinkel.   The defendants are the children of Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., and Evelyn Hinkel.   The plaintiffs allege that on February 2, 1962, their father, Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., presented Evelyn Hinkel with a two-page letter.   According to the plaintiffs, Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., signed the letter and, on February 4, 1962, Evelyn Hinkel also signed the letter.   The plaintiffs allege that the letter was a binding contract that imposed reciprocal duties on Thomas and Evelyn Hinkel.   The plaintiffs claim that the letter reflected an agreement between Thomas and Evelyn Hinkel that they would execute wills that contained two key provisions:  first, each party would leave all of his or her property to the other and, second, the survivor would leave all of his or her property equally to the four children.

The plaintiffs claim that Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr., died on June 2, 1968, and, pursuant to the agreement, left his entire estate to Evelyn Hinkel.   According to the plaintiffs, Evelyn Hinkel thereafter created four separate trusts, each of which was funded with assets derived from Thomas S. Hinkel, Sr.'s estate.   Evelyn Hinkel died on July 29, 2008, and her will was admitted to probate by the probate court on May 18, 2010.   That will named her children, i.e., the defendants, as co-executors of the estate.   It did not give the plaintiffs equal shares in the estate.

On June 23, 2010, the plaintiffs made claims against the estate, each in the amount of $1,400,000.   A state marshal served the claim on the co-executors on July 8, 2010.   When the co-executors did not immediately respond to the claim, plaintiffs' counsel sent a notice to the co-executors on October 4, 2010;  the claims were thereafter rejected by letter dated November 1, 2010.²  On–February 14, 2011 the plaintiffs delivered their writ, summons and complaint to a state marshal for service.

This case presents the relatively unusual situation in which the parties are in agreement with regard to which facts are relevant to the issues now before the court.   Those facts, specifically, are the dates on which various events took place relative to the Evelyn Hinkel estate.   The following are the dates relevant to the issues now before the court:

1. Evelyn Hinkel's date of death:  July 29, 2008;

2. Evelyn Hinkel's will admitted to probate and defendants appointed as fiduciaries:  May 18, 2010;

3. Plaintiffs' claims filed:  July 8, 2010 (one year, 344 days after Evelyn Hinkel's death and 47 days after defendants appointed as fiduciaries);

4. Plaintiffs' claims rejected:  November 1, 2010 (117 days after the plaintiffs' claim was filed);

5. This action commenced:  February 16, 2011 (108 days after the plaintiffs' claim was rejected).

The issues presented in the motions for summary judgment involve the correct interpretation and operation of two interrelated statutes:  General Statutes §§ 45a–363 and 45a–375.

II

DISCUSSIONAStandard of Review

“The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law ․ and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact ․ In order for a motion for summary judgment to be granted properly, the moving party must demonstrate that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ․ [A] summary disposition [must] ․ be on evidence which a jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve and ․ where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the [summary judgment].”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Farrell v. Twenty–First Century Ins. Co., 301 Conn. 657, 661–62, 21 A.3d 816 (2011).

B

Statute of Limitations

The defendants, and Groppe, each raised the statute of limitations as their second special defense.³  It is permissible to seek summary judgment on the ground that a cause of action is time-barred.  Doty v. Mucci, 238 Conn. 800, 806, 679 A.2d 945 (1996).   The two statutes primarily relevant to the issues presented are General Statutes §§ 45a–375 and 45a–363.

General Statutes § 45a–375 provides that “[c]laims shall be subject to the following provisions:  (a) If any person against whom a claim exists dies within thirty days prior to the date the applicable statute of limitations on such claim would otherwise expire, a period of thirty days from the date of the appointment of his fiduciary shall be allowed within which to present such claim. (b) The running of any limitation period applicable to the claim of any person, shall, provided such claim was presented to the fiduciary prior to expiration of the applicable period of limitations, be suspended from the time of presentation of such claim until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in section 45a–360, provided upon such rejection, such person may commence suit or file an application as provided in section 45a–363. (c) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section, no claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of such estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim, including any period of limitation established pursuant to section 45a–357, would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur. (d) With respect to any claim arising after the death of a decedent, no claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate but within (1) two years from the date the claim arose or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim, including any period of limitation established pursuant to section 45a–357, would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur.”

General Statutes § 45a–363 provides:  “(a) No person who has presented a claim shall be entitled to commence suit unless and until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part, as provided in section 45a–360. (b) Unless a person whose claim has been rejected (1) commences suit within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim, in whole or in part, or (2) files a timely application pursuant to section 45a–364, he shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent or any creditor or beneficiary of the estate, except for such part as has not been rejected.   If such person dies within thirty days from the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced or an application is filed, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit or to file the application provided for in section 45a–364.   If such person dies more than thirty days but within one hundred twenty days from and including the date of the rejection of his claim and before suit is commenced, his fiduciary shall be allowed a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of his death within which to commence such suit.”

C

Defendants' Position

The defendants' analysis of the relationship between General Statutes §§ 45a–363 and 45a–375 may be summarized as follows:  A claim must be filed, at the latest, within two years of the death of a decedent.   However, if a claim is presented to a fiduciary within that two-year period, the running of the “two-year clock” stops until the claim is rejected.   Once the claim is rejected, the “two-year clock” is restarted and, once two years from the decedent's death (minus the time the claim was under consideration) has passed, no suit can be filed.

The defendants claim that the plaintiffs first became eligible to bring this action as of November 1, 2010, the date on which the defendants rejected the claims that the plaintiffs had submitted to them.   See General Statutes § 45a–363(b).  According to the defendants, once the plaintiffs' claims were rejected, the plaintiffs then had two options.   The first option was to commence suit within 120 days of the rejection of their claims.  General Statutes § 45a–363(b)(1).   Their second option was to file an application with the probate court to have the rejection reviewed by that court.  General Statutes § 45a–364.   The defendants contend that a failure to pursue one of the latter two options will bar plaintiffs from recovery from a fiduciary, an estate, or any creditor or beneficiary of an estate.  General Statutes § 45a–363(b)(2).   In the present case, the plaintiffs pursued the first option, filing this action on February 16, 2011, which was 108 days after the rejection of their claim.

The defendants argue that the plaintiffs' suit was untimely, noting that General Statutes § 45a–375(c) provides that suit cannot be commenced against a fiduciary unless it is brought within two years of the decedent's death or the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to the claim would otherwise have expired, whichever comes first, “[e]xcept as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section.”   It is undisputed that the plaintiffs' action was filed on February 16, 2011, more than two years after the decedent's death on July 29, 2008.   Thus, the defendants claim, the only remaining question is whether the plaintiffs' cause of action is saved by the provisions of either General Statutes §§ 45a–375(b) or 45a–375(d).

The defendants believe that the saving provision of Section 45a–375(d) clearly does not apply because the action was brought more than two years from the date on which the claim arose, i.e., the date of the decedent's death.   The defendants argue that the only remaining basis on which the plaintiffs can avoid summary judgment is if their claim is saved by General Statutes § 45a–375(b).  The latter section serves to toll the statute of limitations otherwise provided in General Statutes § 45a–375(c) during such time that a fiduciary is considering the merits of claims that were timely submitted to a fiduciary.   The parties agree that the fiduciaries considered the plaintiffs' claims for a total of 117 days before rejecting the claims.

Next, the defendants reason that the plaintiffs had two years from the date of the decedent's death to file this action, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 45a–375(c) or (d), plus 117 days pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–375(b), which permits a claimant to bring an action as provided in General Statutes § 45a–363.   By adding 117 days to the two years that passed after Evelyn Hinkel died (July 29, 2008), the defendants calculate that the last day for the plaintiffs to bring this action was November 23, 2010.   Thus, under the defendants' interpretation of the statutory scheme, the plaintiffs had twenty-two days after their claims were rejected to bring this action.

The defendants acknowledge that General Statutes § 45a–363(b) provides that a person whose claim was rejected must commence suit “within one hundred twenty days from the date of the rejection of his claim,” but argue that the tolling period which exists while the fiduciaries consider the claim can only be added to the two-year statute of limitations provided under General Statutes § 45a–375(b).  The defendants argue that the end of the tolling period cannot be the point when a new 120–day clock starts to run.   They argue that such an interpretation would lead to “absurd results” because a claimant could file a claim on the last day of the two-year period, have the claim rejected on the same day, and still bring an action for up to another 120 days.   In the present case, if the latter approach were to be taken, the plaintiffs could have brought their claim as late as February 28, 2011.⁴

The defendants argue that this court should read seemingly conflicting statutes in a manner that leads to a harmonious and consistent body of law, and that statutes should not be read in a manner that renders any word in a statute to be superfluous, void or insignificant.  Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, 259 Conn. 131, 157–58, 788 A.2d 1158 (2002).   The defendants contend that any reading of the relevant statutes which concludes that the plaintiffs' action was timely filed would only frustrate the goal of the statutory scheme providing for the speedy administration of decedents' estates.

D

Plaintiffs' Position

The plaintiffs' analysis of the relationship between General Statutes §§ 45a–363 and 45a–375 may be summarized as follows:  A claim must be filed, at the latest, within two years of the death of a decedent.   However if a claim is presented to a fiduciary within that two year period, the running of the “two-year clock” stops.   Once the claim is rejected, the claimant then has 120 days to file suit.

The plaintiffs acknowledge that ordinarily a suit must be filed within two years of the death of the decedent pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–375(c).  The plaintiffs note, however, that General Statutes § 45a–363(a) prohibits a claimant from commencing suit until his or her claim has been rejected.   The plaintiffs argue that the statutory scheme of General Statutes § 45a–363(a) and General Statutes § 45a–375(c) contemplates a scenario in which a timely-filed claim can prevent the filing of a suit for two years and 120 days after the death of the decedent.⁵  See note 2, supra.

The plaintiffs argue that the statutory scheme is not ambiguous and should be given its plain meaning pursuant to General Statutes § 1–2z.   The plaintiffs assert that they filed their claim in a timely manner after the fiduciary was appointed;  the fiduciary considered the claim until the plaintiffs pressed him to address it;  and when the fiduciary finally rejected their claim, they filed suit within 120 days as contemplated by General Statutes § 45a–363(b).

III

ANALYSIS

The issue presented by the defendants' motion appears to be an issue of first impression.⁶  At the request of the court, both parties researched the applicable legislative history relative to the interplay between General Statutes §§ 45a–363 and 45a–375.   Both parties concluded, and the court agrees, that the issue now before the court was not discussed in the legislature when it debated the bills that led to the current statutory scheme.

Under the defendants' theory, as applied to this case, a suit is timely even if filed as much as two years and 117 days after the death of the decedent.   Nonetheless, the defendants express the concern that if the court were to accept the plaintiffs' logic, suits could be brought even later than two years and 117 days after a decedent's death, frustrating the legislature's desire to administer estates in a speedy manner.   See Kubish v. Zega, 61 Conn.App. 608, 620, 767 A.2d 148, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 949, 769 A.2d 62 (2001) (the purpose of General Statutes § 45a–363 “is to encourage the timely settlement of decedents' estates”).   In the present case, the plaintiffs brought their action two years and 194 days after the decedent's death.

The plaintiffs argue that it is the defendants' theory that is more likely to lead to absurd results.   The plaintiffs offer the following hypothetical situation.   A decedent dies on July 1, 2009, and the fiduciary is not appointed until June 29, 2011.   If a claimant submits a claim on June 30, 2011, which is rejected on July 1, 2011, then the claimant would have only one day in which to file suit.   Such a scenario would be inconsistent with a legislative scheme that otherwise leads to the administration of estates in a manner that is both timely and orderly.

Although the plaintiffs' interpretation of the relevant statutes does permit more delay in administering an estate than does the defendants' theory, the delay is not significant.   The defendants' theory accepts a 117–day extension of time, beyond the two years after the decedent's death, in which to file suit but rejects the 194–day “extension” sought by the plaintiffs.   If the plaintiffs' interpretation is correct, the additional seventy-seven (77) days available to them is hardly significant when compared to the amount of time required to address almost any timely-filed suit.

When construing a statute, the court's “fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature ․ In other words, we seek to determine in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply ․ [The] court's primary guide as to the issue of statutory interpretation is the language of the operative statutory provisions.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Murray v. Connecticut Dept. of Administrative Services, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 10 6003197 (August 23, 2011, Owens, J.T.R.) (52 Conn. L. Rptr. 433).   The legislature “is always presumed to have created a harmonious and consistent body of law.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Spears v. Garcia, 263 Conn. 22, 32, 818 A.2d 37 (2003).   “[T]he legislature is presumed to know all the existing statutes, the judicial interpretation of them, and the effect that its action or nonaction will have on them.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Collins v. Colonial Penn Ins. Co., 257 Conn. 718, 750, 778 A.2d 899 (2001).

Turning to the relevant statutes, the court finds that a three-step, plain language analysis resolves the question presented.   First, General Statutes § 45a–375(c) provides:  “Except as provided in subsections (b) and (d) of this section, no claim may be presented and no suit on such claim may be commenced against the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent, or any creditor or beneficiary of such estate but within (1) two years from the date of the decedent's death or (2) the date upon which the statute of limitations applicable to such claim, including any period of limitation established pursuant to section 45a–357, would otherwise have expired, whichever shall first occur.” ⁷  (Emphasis added.)   Thus, the two-year statute of limitations provided in General Statutes § 45a–375(c)(1) is subject to, and subordinate to, the exceptions provided in General Statutes §§ 45a–375(b) and (d).

Second, General Statutes § 45a–375(b) expressly permits a claimant to “commence suit or file an application as provided in section 45a–363.”   Thus, the limitations set forth in General Statutes § 45a–375(c) contemplate and accept the possibility of the commencement of a suit as provided in General Statutes § 45a–363.

Third, General Statutes § 45a–363(b) permits a claimant, upon rejection of his claim, to commence suit within 120 days from the date of the rejection of his claim.

Reading the plain language of General Statutes §§ 45a–363 and 45a–375, and reading them together in a common sense fashion, requires the conclusion that when a claim has been filed in a timely manner—as it was in this case—and when that claim has been rejected pursuant to General Statutes § 45a–360(c)—as it was in this case—then the claimant has an additional 120 days to file suit—as they did in this case.

For all of the foregoing reasons, Paul and Mary Ellen Hinkel's motion for summary judgment is denied.   Charles J. Groppe's adoptive motion for summary judgment is also denied.   So ordered.

BY THE COURT,

John A. Danaher III

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Charles J. Groppe (“Groppe”) is a defendant in this case;  he is a trustee and not a member of the Hinkel family.   He has adopted, in its entirety, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 114).   The court recognizes that the plaintiffs object to Groppe's motion for summary judgment.   All references to the “defendants” are references to Paul and Mary Ellen Hinkel unless otherwise noted..  FN1. Charles J. Groppe (“Groppe”) is a defendant in this case;  he is a trustee and not a member of the Hinkel family.   He has adopted, in its entirety, the defendants' motion for summary judgment (# 114).   The court recognizes that the plaintiffs object to Groppe's motion for summary judgment.   All references to the “defendants” are references to Paul and Mary Ellen Hinkel unless otherwise noted.

FN2. A claim must be presented within 150 days from the appointment of the first fiduciary.  General Statutes § 45a–356.   In this case the fiduciary was appointed nearly twenty-two months after Evelyn Hinkel died.When a claim is filed, a fiduciary has ninety days to act on the claim.   General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  If the fiduciary fails to do so, as was the case here, the claimant may give notice to the fiduciary to act.   General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  The fiduciary then has an additional thirty days to act on the claim and if he does not act within that time period, the claim is deemed rejected.  General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  In this case, the fiduciary rejected the claim three days before it would have been deemed rejected under General Statutes § 45a–360(c)..  FN2. A claim must be presented within 150 days from the appointment of the first fiduciary.  General Statutes § 45a–356.   In this case the fiduciary was appointed nearly twenty-two months after Evelyn Hinkel died.When a claim is filed, a fiduciary has ninety days to act on the claim.   General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  If the fiduciary fails to do so, as was the case here, the claimant may give notice to the fiduciary to act.   General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  The fiduciary then has an additional thirty days to act on the claim and if he does not act within that time period, the claim is deemed rejected.  General Statutes § 45a–360(c).  In this case, the fiduciary rejected the claim three days before it would have been deemed rejected under General Statutes § 45a–360(c).

FN3. A claim that the applicable statute of limitations bars a cause of action is properly pleaded as a special defense.  Practice Book § 10–50..  FN3. A claim that the applicable statute of limitations bars a cause of action is properly pleaded as a special defense.  Practice Book § 10–50.

FN4. The plaintiffs' claim was actually brought on February 16, 2011, which was 108 days after their claim was rejected..  FN4. The plaintiffs' claim was actually brought on February 16, 2011, which was 108 days after their claim was rejected.

FN5. Reciprocally, therefore, the statutory scheme permits the filing of a suit as much as 120 days after the two-year statute of limitations would otherwise apply, i.e., approximately two years and four months after the death of the decedent..  FN5. Reciprocally, therefore, the statutory scheme permits the filing of a suit as much as 120 days after the two-year statute of limitations would otherwise apply, i.e., approximately two years and four months after the death of the decedent.

FN6. Both parties argue that their position is supported by this court's decision in Riendeau v. Grey, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 10 6002202 (August 11, 2010, Danaher, J.).   However, Reindeau did not squarely present, and therefore did not resolve, the issue now before the court..  FN6. Both parties argue that their position is supported by this court's decision in Riendeau v. Grey, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 10 6002202 (August 11, 2010, Danaher, J.).   However, Reindeau did not squarely present, and therefore did not resolve, the issue now before the court.

FN7. The defendants suggest that perhaps Evelyn Hinkel violated the alleged letter agreement when she created the trusts in 1979 and 1999 if the magnitude of the assets transferred to such trusts rendered her unable to equalize the distributions to the defendants and the plaintiffs.   However, Evelyn Hinkel could have received an influx of assets from various unpredictable sources after the trusts were created.   Therefore, the plaintiffs could not have filed suit until Evelyn Hinkel died, since she could have potentially equalized the trusts at any time up until her death..  FN7. The defendants suggest that perhaps Evelyn Hinkel violated the alleged letter agreement when she created the trusts in 1979 and 1999 if the magnitude of the assets transferred to such trusts rendered her unable to equalize the distributions to the defendants and the plaintiffs.   However, Evelyn Hinkel could have received an influx of assets from various unpredictable sources after the trusts were created.   Therefore, the plaintiffs could not have filed suit until Evelyn Hinkel died, since she could have potentially equalized the trusts at any time up until her death.

Danaher, John A., J.