Ann Jackson v. Shavoughn Mann et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This is a summary process action for possession of the subject premises at 66 Sterling Street, Third Floor–Back Room, Hartford, CT. On December 5, 2011, the parties appeared before the court for trial on the amended one-count complaint.   The defendants appeared through counsel but were physically absent from the proceedings.   The plaintiff alleges nonpayment of rent due on June 7, 2011.   The defendant, in an answer with special defenses, denies certain of the plaintiff's claims and asserts special defenses that no rent is due and equitable relief.

SUMMARY PROCESS–GENERALLY

The courts of this state have consistently held that “[S]ummary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Bristol v. Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, 284 Conn. 1, 5 (2007).  “Summary process statutes provide a prompt hearing and final determination ․” Id., at 5–6.  “Summary process is intended to ․ provide an expeditious remedy to the landlord seeking possession.”  HUD/Barbour–Waverly v. Wilson, 235 Conn. 650, 658 (1995).   The ultimate issue in a summary process action is the right to possession.   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Tinaco Plaza, LLC. v. Freebob's Inc., 74 Conn.App. 760, 766–67 (2003).

“Summary process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy ․ It enables landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense which, under the common-law actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully holding over their terms ․ Summary process statutes secure a prompt hearing and a final determination ․ Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must be narrowly construed and strictly followed.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  St. Paul's Flax Hill Co-operative v. Johnson, 124 Conn.App. 728, 733 (2010)

EQUITY

“Equity does not necessarily mean full compensation to the plaintiffs.   Equity is [j]ustice administered according to fairness as contrasted with the strictly formulated rules of common law ․ the term ‘equity’ denotes the spirit and habit of fairness, justness, and right dealing which would regulate the intercourse of men with men ․ [e]quity takes into consideration fairness to both the plaintiff and the defendant.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Krasowski v. Fantarella, 51 Conn.App. 186, 199 (1998), cert.denied, 247 Conn. 961 (1999).  “It is fundamental that anyone going into equity and asking its aid submits to the imposition of such terms as well-established equitable principles require ․ (Internal citations omitted.)   Village II at Glen Lochen v. Burnham, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV 07–4034048 (June 4, 2010, Peck, J.) [50 Conn. L. Rptr. 85].  “As he is seeking equity he must do equity.”  Caramini v. Telegulias, 121 Conn. 548, 553 (1936).

BURDEN OF PROOF

“While the plaintiff is entitled to every favorable inference that may be legitimately drawn from the evidence, and has the same right to submit a weak case as a strong one, the plaintiff must still sustain the burden of proof on the contested issues in the complaint and the defendant need not present any evidence to contradict it.”  Lukas v. New Haven, 184 Conn. 205, 211 (1981).   The general burden of proof in civil actions is on the plaintiff, who must prove all the essential elements of their cause of action by a fair preponderance of the evidence.  Gulycz v. Stop & Shop, 29 Conn.App. 519, 523, cert. denied.  224 Conn. 923 (1982).   Failure to do so results in judgment for the defendant.  Id. “[W]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged.”  Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308 (1998).

STANDARD OF PROOF

The standard of proof in summary process actions, a fair preponderance of the evidence, is “properly defined as the better evidence, the evidence having the greater weight, the more convincing force in your mind.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cross v. Huttenlocher, 185 Conn. 390, 394 (1981).

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE CLAIM

To prevail on a claim for nonpayment of rent, the plaintiff must establish, by a fair preponderance of the evidence, the following essential elements:  (1) a rental agreement;  (2) that the plaintiff is the lessor or owner of the premises;  (3) the address of the subject premises;  (4) the amount of rent due to the plaintiff from the defendant;  (5) when the rent was due to the plaintiff;  (6) the date of nonpayment;  (7) The service of the notice to quit, as well as its service date and termination date;  and (8) that the defendant is still in possession.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–15a et seq.

THE PLEADINGS

“Pleadings should be direct, precise and specific ․ the court should not have to mathematically dissect the pleadings in order to understand them.”   (Citation omitted.)  Vigue v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 147 Conn. 305, 306, 160 A.2d 484 (1960).

“The admission of the truth of an allegation [in a] pleading is a judicial admission conclusive on the pleader.”  Jones Destruction, Inc. v. Upjohn, 161 Conn. 191, 199 (1971).  “Factual allegations contained in pleadings upon which the case is tried are considered judicial admissions and hence irrefutable as long as they remain in the case ․ An admission in pleading dispenses with proof, and is equivalent to proof.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 345, 766 A.2d 400 (2001).   It is the full equivalent of uncontradicted proof of these facts by credible witnesses ․ and is conclusive on the pleader.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Days Inn of America, Inc. v. 161 Hotel Group, Inc., 55 Conn.App. 118, 126, 739 A.2d 280 (1999);  see Connecticut Hospital for the Insane v. Brookfield, 69 Conn. 1, 4, 36 A. 1017 (1897).   An admission by answer carries all reasonable implications of fact and legal conclusions arising from it.  Guiel v. Barnes, 100 Conn. 737, 743, 125 A. 91 (1924).

Practice Book section 10–19 states that “[e]very material allegation in any pleading which is not denied shall be deemed to be admitted, unless such party avers that he or she has not any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief.”  Connecticut Practice Book § 10–19 (2011).  “An opponent's admission merely relieves a party of the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the factual allegations admitted ․ The [party] still [must] prove that he was entitled to the relief sought.”  (Citation omitted.)   Reese v. First Connecticut Small Business Investment Co., 182 Conn. 326, 329, 438 A.2d 99 (1980).

SPECIAL DEFENSES

“[A] special defense is not an independent action;  rather, it is an attempt to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint to demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Valentine v. LaBow, 95 Conn.App. 436, 447 n. 10 (2005), cert. denied, 280 Conn. 933 (2006).   The defendants have the burden of proving the allegations in their special defenses by a fair preponderance of the evidence.   Lodovico v. Mihalcik, superior court, judicial district of Hartford at Hartford, Docket No. CV–07–50130991 (August 17, 2010, Rittenband, J.T.R.).

THE PROCEEDINGS

“The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Cavoli v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906 (2005).  “It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ․ it is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence ․” (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540 (2000).  “The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact].”  Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123 (1981).   “[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530 (1977).

“[T]he trier is free to juxtapose conflicting versions of events and determine which is more credible ․ it is the trier's exclusive province to weigh the conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses ․ the trier of fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness ․ the trier can, as well, decide what—all, none, or some—of the witnesses testimony to accept or reject.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  State v. Osborne, 41 Conn.App. 287, 291 (1996).   The trial court's function as the finder is to draw whatever inferences from the evidence or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.”  In re Christine F., 6 Conn.App. 360, 366, cert. denied, 199 Conn. 808 (1986).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court has weighed all the evidence and assessed the testimony and credibility of the witnesses and reaches the conclusions set forth herein by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

1. On or about April 15, 2010, the plaintiff, as landlord, and the defendants, as tenants, entered into an oral weekly rental agreement for the use and occupancy of the subject premises.   The weekly agreement continued through service of the notice to quit;

2.  The plaintiff is the owner of the subject premises;

3.  The subject premises are:  66 Sterling Street, Third Floor–Back Room, Hartford, CT;

4.  The agreed upon weekly rental was $150.00 payable on the first day of each week;

5.  The defendants are a married couple;

6.  The defendants have not made a weekly rental payment to the plaintiff since April 23, 2011;

7.  The April 23, 2011 weekly rental payment was for less than the agreed upon payment amount;

8.  The defendants failed to pay the rent due on June 7, 2011, within the time allowed by law.   See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 47a–15a;

9.  On June 17, 2011, the plaintiff had a Notice to Quit Possession served on the Defendants to vacate the premises on or before June 24, 2011;

10.  The time given in the notice to quit possession for the defendants to vacate the premises has passed, yet the defendants have not vacated the premises and remain in possession;

11.  Other than the two married defendants, the only other occupant of the third floor-back room for the relevant time period was the plaintiff's uncle, Carl.

Additional facts will be discussed as necessary.

The court finds that the plaintiff has established all the essential elements of her case by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

FIRST SPECIAL DEFENSE

The Defendants assert in their first special defense that no rent is due as the plaintiff was running an “illegal,” unlicensed roominghouse, and that the lack of a license constitutes a material hazard to the health and safety of the occupants.   The court makes these additional factual findings:

1.  The defendants have failed to establish that the plaintiff was running a roominghouse;

2.  The defendants have failed to establish that any condition within the premises constituted a material hazard to the health and safety of the occupants so as to excuse the payment of rent;

The defendants have failed to prove their first special defense by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

SECOND SPECIAL DEFENSE

The defendants assert equitable relief from forfeiture as a second special defense.   There was evidence offered in support of this special defense.   Additionally, the defendants' counsel, at oral argument, opted not to address the claim.   Further, the defendants absented themselves from the proceedings.

Accordingly, the court finds that the defendants have failed to establish a claim for equitable relief from forfeiture.

In the absence of testimony establishing a present arrearage, the court declines to address the issue through its own calculations.

WHEREFORE, The Court enters judgment for immediate possession of the subject premises in favor of the plaintiff.   The Court orders a final stay of execution through December 13, 2011.

BY THE COURT

Hon. Vernon D. Oliver

Oliver, Vernon D., J.