IN RE: Cameron S.1 (2011)

Memorandum of Decision on Petition to Terminate Parental Rights

On September 20, 2011, the Department of Children and Families (DCF) filed the pending petition to terminate the parental rights (TPR) of Desiree M. and Christopher S. to their minor son, Cameron, who was born on June 10, 2005.   Thereafter, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b–129(a),² the court caused summons to be issued to the respondent father by personal service and to the respondent mother by publication in the Hartford Courant for them to appear on October 20, 2011, on which date neither parent appeared.   This court then confirmed that abode service had been made on the respondent father and that notice had been provided to the respondent mother by publication in the Hartford Courant on October 4, 2011.   As DCF submitted military affidavits showing that neither parent was in the military services of this country, defaults were entered against both parents for failing to appear and enter a plea.   See Practice Book §§ 34a–1,³ 10–18,⁴ and 35a–8.⁵

The petition was assigned for trial before this judge on December 1, 2011, at which time the DCF social worker and attorney and the attorney for the minor child were present;  but neither of the respondent parents appeared.   Thereafter, DCF presented testimony from DCF social worker Alison Siroka and offered the TPR social study and permanency plan social study dated June 1, 2011 into evidence, all of which the court found credible and persuasive.   The court also stated its intention to take judicial notice of all orders in the court file, including the specific steps,⁶ all memoranda of court hearings in the court file, and the affidavit submitted in support of the Order of Temporary Custody (OTC).   The court is not aware of proceedings pending in any other court regarding the custody of this child, and this court has jurisdiction.   The court has carefully considered the petition, the evidence and testimony according to the standards required by law.   The matter is now ready for decision, and the facts found herein were established by clear and convincing evidence.

I

ADJUDICATORY DECISION

Trial of a petition to terminate parental rights has two phases, adjudication and disposition.   In the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, the court must make separate determinations as to reasonable efforts and the statutory grounds for termination.

A

EFFECT OF DEFAULTS

Practice Book § 32a–2(a) provides that child protection proceedings, including petitions for termination of parental rights, are civil matters.⁷  See also In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 634, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004);  In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253, 822 A.2d 1009 (2003).   As in other civil matters, “[t]he entry of a default constitutes an admission by the defendant of the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint”;  DeBlasio v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 186 Conn. 398, 400, 441 A.2d 838 (1982);  and thereby conclusively establishes that the petitioner has prevailed on each of the elements at issue in the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding.   Commissioner of Social Services v. Smith, 265 Conn. 723, 732–33, 830 A.2d 228 (2003) (respondent in child support proceeding who fails to respond to pleadings “is deemed to have judicially admitted the underlying facts of the support petition”);  see also Bank of America, FSB v. Franco, 57 Conn.App. 688, 693, 751 A.2d 394 (2000).   Under Practice Book § 35a–8, when a party is defaulted for failing to appear in a TPR proceeding, the court may then take evidence and render judgment.   In view of the gravity of the TPR issues at hand, however, the court has considered the petitioner's evidence on the specific adjudicatory grounds alleged.

B

REASONABLE EFFORTS

Terminations of parental rights under § 17a–112(j) on non-consensual grounds, as has been pleaded for the respondents here, require the court to find whether

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent;  and

There is clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the child with the parent, unless the court finds that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.8

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence as follows:

1. Reasonable efforts to locate

a. Respondent mother

The court file shows that DCF located the respondent mother and served her with an order of temporary custody and a neglect petition in September 2010 and that she appeared on several occasions in connection with that petition.   The evidence shows that in April 2011 she entered an inpatient drug treatment program at the APT Foundation in Bridgeport pursuant to an order of the criminal court and was actively participating in treatment there for her mental health and substance abuse issues until she did not return from an approved pass in August.   Since then her exact whereabouts have been unknown;  although she has told the DCF social worker that she is staying with friends in the Bridgeport area, she has refused to give the exact location where she has been staying.   There is an active arrest warrant for her and, while she has promised the social worker on at least one occasion that she would turn herself in, she has failed to do so.   It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate her.

b. Respondent father

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate the father.   It confirmed his address in telephone conversations with him and served with the TPR petition at that address;  and the DCF social worker had telephone contact with him both before and after the filing of the petition.

2. Reasonable efforts to reunify

a. Respondent mother

On September 16, 2010, Cameron and his siblings were taken into DCF custody on a 96–hour hold pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–101g,⁹ ratified four days later by an order to show cause under General Statutes § 46b–120 signed by superior court judge trial referee Wollenberg ¹⁰ and sustained by the court, Keller, J., on September 24, 2010,¹¹ because his parents were both then incarcerated and the grandparents who had been taking care of the children told DCF that they did not want to do so any longer.   DCF already knew that Ms. M. had significant mental health problems because she had been a ward of DCF after being sexually abused at least twice as a child and had been diagnosed then with depression and oppositional defiant disorder.   After her release from incarceration, DCF referred Ms. M. to a variety of programs and services to help her regain custody of Cameron.   These included parenting education classes and individual counseling at Intercommunity Mental Health Services in East Hartford.   She attended only two of the parenting classes and was discharged in late December 2010 after missing the next three classes.   After she also missed her first two scheduled appointments for individual therapy, she was discharged from counseling as well, but in late January 2011 she scheduled an intake appointment, which she later missed after being again arrested and incarcerated at the end of that month.   She completed an intake for family therapy with Cameron on December 29, 2010, but her January incarceration prevented her from attending any of those sessions.   She was also referred for a substance abuse evaluation, which she completed on December 6, 2010, at which time she provided a drug urine that tested positive for marijuana.   It was recommended that she attend individual and group therapy to address the substance abuse and mental health issues, but she did not follow through on those recommendations until she was placed in the inpatient program at the APT Foundation in April.

To help maintain the parent-child bond while Cameron was in DCF custody, the department offered Ms. M. regular supervised visitation, but she was inconsistent in attending the visits.   After she was incarcerated in January 2011, Ms. M. had one visit with her children at the York Correctional Institution and she then said that she did not want her children to see her while she was incarcerated.   Upon her placement at the APT Foundation facility in April, DCF resumed monthly visitations, but Cameron missed the May and June visits because of a school field trip and foster family vacation.   In February of this year Cameron had begun insisting that he did not want to see his mother, and in June he refused to attend any more visits with her.   All visitation ended thereafter, although he did see his mother for an hour and a half during the court-ordered psychological evaluation in June 2011, during which Ms. M. became “overwhelmed with interacting with her three children.”   Permanency Plan social study, at 16.

This and the other evidence offered at trial establish clearly and convincingly that DCF made reasonable efforts to reunify Ms. M. with Cameron by offering her services to address the reasons her son was removed from and remained out of her custody.   Her failure to return from the pass from the APT Foundation in August 2011 also proves clearly and convincingly that she was unwilling to benefit from those reunification efforts.

b. Respondent father

Although specific steps were ordered at the OTC hearing and at commitment to enable Mr. S. to gain custody of Cameron, he has informed DCF that he is not willing to participate in any services and does not wish to provide care for Cameron at this time.   The evidence proves clearly and convincingly that he is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts.

C

STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

As grounds for terminating the respondents' parental rights, the petition alleges, pursuant to General Statutes § 17–112(j)(3),¹² failure to rehabilitate on the part of both respondents and abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship on the part of the respondent father.   To prevail here as to either parent, DCF must prove at least one of these statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.   See In re Juvenile Appeal (84–BC), 194 Conn. 252, 258, 479 A.2d 1204 (1984);  In re Michael B., 49 Conn.App. 510, 512, 714 A.2d 1279, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 919, 722 A.2d 807 (1998).

Under Practice Book § 35a–7(a), in the adjudicatory phase of the proceeding, “the judicial authority is limited to evidence of events preceding the filing of the petition or the latest amendment, except where the judicial authority must consider subsequent events as part of its determination as to the existence of a ground for termination of parental rights.”   See In re Anthony H., 104 Conn.App. 744, 757, 936 A.2d 638 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 920, 943 A.2d 1100 (2008).   In the adjudicatory phase of this proceeding, the court has considered evidence (i) prior to the adjudicatory date on the allegations of failure to rehabilitate, abandonment and no ongoing parent-child relationship, and (ii) through the close of evidence on the issue of whether the degree of rehabilitation of either parent is sufficient to foresee that either one may assume a useful role in Cameron's life within a reasonable time and whether it would be detrimental to Cameron's best interest to allow further time for a parent-child relationship to develop between him and Mr. S.

1. Failure to rehabilitate— § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)

Cameron was adjudicated neglected and committed to DCF on March 22, 2011, after the respondent father had been defaulted for failing to appear and plead and the respondent mother entered a written plea of nolo contendere to a count of neglect by conditions injurious to Cameron's well-being under General Statutes § 46b–120(8).¹³  General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B) authorizes terminating parental rights to a child previously found to have been neglected if a parent fails to achieve such a degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, the parent could assume a reasonable position in the life of that child.  “Personal rehabilitation as used in [§ 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ․ [The statute] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent's] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ․ [The statute] requires the court to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [he] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [he] can assume a responsible position in [his] child's life.”   (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924, 742 A.2d 364 (1999).

“[I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [his] ability to manage [his] own life, but rather whether [he] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the child at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Amneris P., 66 Conn.App. 377, 384, 784 A.2d 457 (2001).  “Terminating a parent's rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate;  it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying [the child] a safe permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the] biological [father] ․ continues to be incapable of providing such a home for [the child].”  In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Sup. 468, 477, 722 A.2d 300 (1997), aff'd, 51 Conn.App. 376, 721 A.2d 1255 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902, 732 A.2d 177 (1999).  In re Joseph W., 121 Conn.App. 605, 997 A.2d 512 (2010).  “What is a reasonable time is a factual determination that must be made on a case-by-case basis,” depending on the age and needs of the particular child.  In re Shannon S., 41 Conn.Sup. 145, 154, 562 A.2d 79, aff'd, 19 Conn.App. 20, 560 A.2d 993 (1989).

In conducting the inquiry as to whether the department has proven a respondent's failure to rehabilitate by clear and convincing evidence, the trial court must consider:

the respondent's rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child;  and

whether the prospects for rehabilitation can be realized within a reasonable time given the age and needs of the child.

“The statute requires the court to find by clear and convincing evidence that the parent's level of rehabilitation is less than that which would encourage a belief that he or she can assume a responsible position in the child's life within a reasonable time.  “In re Shyliesh H., 56 Conn.App. 167, 173, 743 A.2d 165 (1999).  “Thus, the trial court's inquiry requires the determination of both the present and past status of the child, and obtaining a historical perspective of the respondent's child caring and parenting.”  Id. The crux of the adjudicatory ground of failure to rehabilitate is whether a parent has sufficiently addressed the problems and deficiencies in parenting that led to state intervention in the family so that the parent can, considering the age and needs of the child, assume a responsible position in the child's life, or will be able to do so in the reasonably foreseeable future.

a. Respondent mother

Cameron is a child with special needs, having repeatedly exhibited severe behavioral problems.   In 2009, DCF had referred him to Intercommunity Mental Health for family therapy with Ms. M. after receiving reports that Cameron was having significant behavioral problems.   He was so aggressive and threatening to his brother and foster mother in his first placement after the OTC that he was removed from that home in February 2011.   He also began displaying sexually inappropriate behavior at school and his next (and current) foster home after being sexually abused by a child on the school bus in May 2011.   He was removed from a preschool summer program on July 22, 2011, after hitting, kicking and fighting with peers and attempting to stab another child with a pair of scissors;  and he was then in the CARES unit at the Connecticut Children's Medical Center for three days.   A few days later he was discharged from another summer camp program after an aggressive outburst and was hospitalized at the Institute of Living for several days.   Although the TPR social study reports that he “has made significant progress with his behavior” in his current foster placement and since he began attending a partial hospitalization program (PHP) at the Community Child Guidance Clinic, the social study also states that his therapist believes he suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  With his history of hyperactivity, aggression, and oppositional behavioral problems, Cameron needs a steady and consistent caretaker, not one overwhelmed with her own problems.

After a psychological evaluation conducted in June 2011, Dr. Franklin concluded that “due to [Ms. M.'s] past history of sexual abuse, untreated mental health and substance abuse history, ․ [she] would not be able to parent Cameron ․ given her current mental health and emotional status.”   The TPR social study reports that while inpatient at the APT Foundation between April 29 and August 4, 2011, Ms. M. was “actively participating in programs” and “able to address her mental health and substance abuse needs.”   Her refusal to return to that program, however, prevented her from continuing to make progress toward addressing those issues so that she might assume a responsible position in Cameron's life within a reasonable time.   A fugitive from criminal authorities since then, she has not been available to assume care of her child since early August of this year.

This and the other evidence offered at trial prove clearly and convincingly that as of the adjudicatory date Ms. M. had not gained the ability to care for Cameron and his specific needs.   Between the time of the OTC in September 2010 and April 2011 she refused on several occasions to participate in treatment programs necessary to address her mental health and substance abuse problems.   Dr. Franklin's conclusion after the psychological evaluation he conducted in June 2011 that Ms. M. was not then ready to assume parental responsibilities because of her history of substance abuse and mental health problems is persuasive evidence that she was not then capable of assuming a responsible position in Cameron's life.   Although she made some progress after going inpatient as ordered by the criminal court, her flight from the APT Foundation facility in August repeated the same unwillingness to address the problems leading to Cameron's removal that she had shown previously.

One day after the TPR petition was filed on September 20, 2011, Ms. M. told the DCF social worker over the telephone that she was living in Bridgeport with friends but she refused to provide the social worker with her address.   The social worker encouraged her to meet with DCF but, as reported in the social study, “she indicated that she was in a ‘bad place’ and was unable to meet.”   A month later, on October 28, she again contacted the DCF social worker, said that she still wanted to reunify with Cameron, and promised to turn herself in, but she then did not do so and remains a fugitive.

The failure to rehabilitate ground for termination of parental rights does not require a court or child to wait forever for a parent to decide to undertake or resume the treatment necessary to become able to care for the child.   The statute instead directs the court to determine whether the level of rehabilitation achieved by a parent as of the adjudicatory date and time of trial encourages a belief that the parent could, within a time that is reasonable in view of that child's age and specific needs, assume a reasonable position in the life of that particular child.   The severity of Ms. M.'s parenting deficiencies revealed in Dr. Franklin's psychological evaluation, her flight from the treatment program in August and her unwillingness since then to resume treatment show a refusal on her part to address the problems that led to Cameron's removal and refute any possibility that she can, within a reasonable time, assume a reasonable position in Cameron's life, in view of his age and needs.   Whether she will ever resume treatment is completely speculative.   The evidence thus proves clearly and convincingly that any rehabilitation she may have achieved while in treatment falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some reasonable time in the future, she can assume a responsible position in Cameron's life.   This ground for terminating Ms. M.'s parental rights to Cameron has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

b. Respondent father

After Ms. M. was arrested and incarcerated on September 14, 2010, the maternal grandmother's sister took Cameron to the home of his paternal grandmother, where his father was also residing.   When DCF learned the next day that Ms. M. had been incarcerated, a DCF investigator contacted the maternal grandmother to ask about the whereabouts of the children and learned that the mother's family had “decided that the children should stay with paternal relatives, as the children's fathers need to be held accountable for their children and should be able to raise them.”   OTC affidavit, p. 4. The DCF investigator spoke the next day to the paternal grandmother, who said that “she did not want to keep Cameron in her home as she did not want to become involved with the department” and that the mother's “relatives are trying to force Mr. S. to care for Cameron.”   She also told the DCF investigator that Mr. S. “is not mature enough to handle the everyday responsibilities of caring for a child ․ and he wants to keep Cameron only until Mother gets out of jail.”  Id., 4. Later in the day the DCF investigator spoke with Mr. S., who said that “he was not financially stable to care for Cameron.   He further stated that his work hours prevent him from caring for Cameron on a full time basis.”  Id., 7.

Since the OTC in September 2010, Mr. S. has consistently and repeatedly refused to make himself available to take care of Cameron or to show to the DCF that he is able to do so.   He told the DCF social worker in October 2010 that he did not wish to be involved in Cameron's life or to cooperate with DCF. He did not attend parenting classes ordered in the preliminary specific steps at the OTC or make himself available for DCF to assess his home and household.   A child of Cameron's young age and with this child's behavioral problems needs a parent or guardian who will shower him with love and attention and devote himself or herself to meeting Cameron's needs.   Many parents hold jobs and still take care of children, just as do many parents who face financial hardship, but Mr. S. has told DCF he was unwilling to assume such a role.   His own mother believes he is not mature enough to assume full-time responsibility for Cameron.   Some parents are immature, but with help and guidance from others, including DCF, can grow into the role of a fit parent;  but Mr. S. has refused to participate in the parenting classes or accept other services from DCF that could aid in that process.   These facts, plus his affirmative declarations that he is unwilling to assume a responsible role in Cameron's life, along with the other evidence proven at trial, prove clearly and convincingly that as of the adjudicatory date and at the time of trial, that he had not sufficiently rehabilitated himself to a degree that would encourage a belief, as of either date, that he could assume a responsible position in Cameron's life either then within a reasonable time.   This ground for terminating Mr. S.'s parental rights to Cameron has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Additional grounds as to respondent father

a. Abandonment— § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)

A second ground in the TPR petition for terminating Mr. H.'s parental rights alleges, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A), that as of the adjudicatory date he had abandoned Cameron.  “In adjudicating a petition to terminate parental rights on the ground of abandonment, the court's focus is on the parent's conduct.”  In re Jaime S., 120 Conn.App. 712, 994 A.2d 233 (2010).

A lack of interest in the child is not the sole criterion in determining abandonment ․ General Statutes [Rev. to 1995] § 17a–112(b)(1) [now § 17a–112(j)(3)(A) ] defines abandonment as the [failure] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child ․ Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts, and financial support are indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child ․ Abandonment occurs where a parent fails to visit a child, does not display love or affection for the child, does not personally interact with the child, and demonstrates no concern for the child's welfare ․

In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The statute requires DCF to show by clear and convincing evidence that a parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in the welfare of his or her child.  “Maintain implies a continuing, reasonable degree of concern,” “not ․ a sporadic showing of the indicia of interest, concern or responsibility for the welfare of a child.”  Id., 18.   “The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing, and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.

The evidence here shows that Mr. S. meets all the statutory criteria for abandonment.   He told the DCF social worker that he had occasionally seen Cameron and dropped out of high school to help Ms. M. support Cameron, but Ms. M. told the social worker that she had recently kept Cameron away from Mr. S. “as he would always refuse to help her financially with Cameron.”   OTC affidavit, at 5. Even if Mr. S.'s claims as to those circumstances before the OTC were true, however, since Cameron was taken into DCF custody Mr. S. has shown absolutely no love for, concern about, or interest in his child.   In fact, he has affirmatively disclaimed any of these feelings for Cameron, refused to take care of him or have contact with him, and met none of the aforementioned parental duties toward him.   He has shown absolutely no interest, concern or responsibility toward his child.   This ground was proven by clear and convincing evidence.

b. No ongoing parent child–relationship— § 17a–112(j)(3)(D)

The third ground set forth in the petition for terminating Mr. S.'s parental rights alleges, pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D), that there is no ongoing parent child-relationship between Cameron and him and that allowing further time for such a relationship to develop would be detrimental to Cameron.   Under this section, the court must “undertake a two-pronged analysis.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists, and second, the court must look into the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.”  In Re John G., 53 Conn.App. 12, 22, 740 A.2d 496 (1999).  “In considering whether an ongoing parent-child relationship exists, the feelings of the child are of paramount importance ․ The ultimate question is whether the child has no present memories or feelings for the natural parent.”  (Citations omitted.)  In re John G., supra at 23.   This standard contemplates a relationship that has some positive attributes.   In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).

“To satisfy the second prong [of the analysis], the trial court [is] required to determine whether it would be in the child's best interest to allow additional time for the establishment of a parent-child relationship ․ The ‘best interest’ standard, therefore, does not become relevant until after it has been determined that no ongoing parent-child relationship exists.”   (Citation omitted.)  In re Kezia M., 33 Conn.App. 12, 22, 632 A.2d 1122, cert. denied, 228 Conn. 915, 636 A.2d 847 (1993).   The factors to be considered in deciding whether it would be in the best interest of a child to permit further time for a relationship with his parent to develop include “(1) the length of stay with the foster parents, (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the foster parents, (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural parent and (4) the nature of the child's relationship to his or her natural parent.”  (Id.)

Although Christopher S. was present at the hospital for Cameron's birth, since then he has had only occasional contact with his son although the evidence does not reveal whether this was his choice or the mother's.   Ms. M. told a DCF social worker investigator on September 16, 2010, that Cameron had not seen his father for three months.   Mr. S. told the investigator that same day that Ms. M. “only allows Cameron to visit when she says it is okay.   He stated he does not know why she does this and that he has never taken her to court to establish visitation or custody of Cameron.”   OTC affidavit, at 7. Mr. S. probably saw Cameron during the two days that Cameron stayed with his paternal grandmother, with whom Mr. S. was also residing, but he has not seen Cameron since then.   DCF social worker Sroka testified at the TPR trial that Cameron has no memory of his father and when asked about his father by name, he did not know who he was.   Instead, he refers to Warner H., who is the father of his brother and sister, lived with Ms. M. and the children until an arrest for domestic violence in March 2010, and visited with Cameron after the OTC, as his father.   Cameron has told the DCF social worker and other people that he wants nothing to do with his biological parents and wants to be adopted by his current foster mother (and she wants to adopt him as well).

Under these facts and the others proven at trial, it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that no ongoing parent-child relationship existed as of the adjudicatory date between Cameron and Mr. S., who has never cared for Cameron or assumed the role of father in Cameron's life.   In addition, it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence, both as of the adjudicatory date and at the time of trial, that allowing further time for the establishment or reestablishment of an ongoing parent-child relationship would be detrimental to Cameron's best interest.   Mr. S. has affirmatively stated that he does not want to be part of Cameron's life, and there is absolutely no reason to think he will ever change his mind.   Waiting for such an unlikely event would be detrimental to Cameron's best interest.   This ground for termination of Mr. S.'s parental rights has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.

II

DISPOSITION

“A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ․ If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase.   In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child.”  (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).   Unlike the adjudicatory phase, on disposition the court may consider information through the close of the evidentiary hearing.   In the dispositional phase of this case the court has considered the evidence and testimony related to circumstances and events up to and including December 1, 2011, the date upon which the evidence was taken in this matter.

A

REQUIRED STATUTORY FINDINGS

In making the dispositional decision in a non-consensual case, “the court is mandated to consider and make written findings regarding seven factors” specified in General Statutes § 17a–112(k).¹⁴  See, e.g., In re Tabitha P., 39 Conn.App. 353, 664 A.2d 1168 (1995).  “[T]hose ‘seven factors serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be proven before termination can be ordered ․ There is no requirement that each factor be proven by clear and convincing evidence.’   “ In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 46–47 (2009).   As required by the statute, the court has considered the statutory factors and makes the following written findings with regard to the department's petition to terminate the respondents' parental rights, and the court has considered these findings in determining that it is Cameron's best interest to terminate the parental rights of his biological parents.  In re Quanitra M., 60 Conn.App. 96, 758 A.2d 863, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 903, 762 A.2d 909 (2000).

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent”— § 17a–112(k)(1).   As noted above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to both parents to enable them to regain custody.

2. “Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended”— § 17a–112(k)(2).   As discussed above, DCF made reasonable efforts to reunite Cameron with his parents pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

3. “The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order”— § 17a–112(k)(3).   At the time of the OTC, the court entered preliminary specific steps for each parent to gain custody of Cameron and entered amended steps for the mother at the time of commitment.  (It is not clear from the record whether any amended specific steps were ordered for Mr. S. at the time of the commitment.)   Those orders were as follows:

Keep all appointments set by or with DCF. Cooperate with DCF home visits, announced or unannounced, and visits by the child(ren)'s court-appointed attorney and/or guardian ad litem.

The mother kept all of her appointments with DCF until she left the APT Foundation in August 2010, and since then has not been willing to have any in-person contact with DCF. The father met twice with DCF social workers, but thereafter was uncooperative.

Keep whereabouts known to DCF and your attorney.

Ms. M. complied with this order until she fled the APT Foundation, but since then she has not been willing to tell DCF where she was.   Mr. S. complied with this order.

Visit child(ren) as often as DCF permits and demonstrate appropriate parent child interaction during visits.

Ms. M. was sporadic in visiting with her children in the fall of 2010, but after missing several visits she made all scheduled visits in December 2010 and January 2011.   When she did visit, however, she was sometimes late or had difficulties providing all the children with appropriate attention.   After she was rearrested in January 2011 she had one supervised visit at York Correctional Institution but then said she did not wish her children to visit her while she was in jail.   After being placed at the APT facility in April 2011, she requested that visitation be reinstated, but Cameron missed the first two visits and thereafter refused to visit with her.   During the short time that Cameron spent with her and his siblings for the psychological evaluation in June, Ms. M. became overwhelmed.   The father refused all visits.

Participate in parenting and individual counseling and make progress toward the identified treatment goals.

The amended specific steps entered at the time of the neglect adjudication and commitment ordered Ms. M. to participate in parenting, family and individual counseling with the goals of (i) understanding the developmental and emotional needs of her children, (ii) gaining insight into the impact of domestic violence (which had occurred between her and the father of her two other children) on her and the children, (iii) demonstrating the ability to meet the children's emotional and behavioral needs, and (iv) addressing her substance abuse needs.   She was referred to Intercommunity Mental Health for individual therapy and parenting classes but failed to complete either one.   She completed an intake for family therapy with Cameron on December 29, 2010, but her January incarceration prevented her from attending any of those sessions.   She did not comply with recommended treatment for her substance abuse and mental health issues until placed at the APT Foundation in Bridgeport in April, but her departure from that facility interrupted the progress she was making.   The preliminary specific steps ordered Mr. S. to attend parenting counseling to increase his parenting skills, but he refused to cooperate with DCF.

Accept and cooperate with in-home support services referred by DCF and make progress toward treatment goals.

Not applicable.

Do not use illegal drugs or abuse alcohol, submit to random drug testing, submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow treatment recommendations.

(For mother only.)   Ms. M. submitted to a substance abuse evaluation in November 2010 but failed to follow through with treatment recommendations until being placed at the APT facility.   The evaluation disclosed that she had used marijuana.   She left that program before completing her treatment.

Cooperate with recommended service providers recommended for parenting individual family counseling, in-home support services, and or substance abuse treatment and sign releases allowing DCF to communicate with the providers.

Ms. M. initially cooperated with referrals for substance abuse evaluation and parenting and individual therapy.   She then failed to attend the latter two consistently and was discharged, and she did not participate in recommended mental health and substance abuse treatment until going inpatient at the APT Foundation.   While there she did cooperate with her treatment and was making progress until she did not return from a pass in August 2011.   She provided the appropriate releases.   Mr. S., on the other hand, refused to cooperate with any service providers or to sign releases.

Cooperate with court-ordered evaluations.  Ms. M. complied with an order for a psychological evaluation.

No such order was entered for Mr. S.

Secure and maintain adequate housing and legal income.

Ms. M. moved three times between October and December 2010.   After being evicted from her own housing in October, she lived with her boyfriend for two months and then with her mother until the mother went into an inpatient drug program.   Ms. M. told DCF that her mother had transferred a section eight certificate to her but never provided DCF with verification of that claim.   She had a job at a local grocer for two months from October to December 2010 but was unemployed thereafter.   Since leaving the APT Foundation she has been unwilling to provide DCF with any information about her whereabouts, residence, employment, or sources or amounts of any income.   Mr. S. lives with his mother and told DCF he has a job but did not verify the latter.

Obtain restraining or protective order and make appropriate safety plan to avoid further domestic violence.  (For mother only.)

As of the date of the permanency plan social study in June 2011 DCF believed she had complied with this order by obtaining and complying with a restraining order against the father of Ireonna and Warner.   There was no further evidence offered.

Identify changes in household composition.

Ms. M. complied with this requirement until she fled the APT Facility but since then has not been willing to say with whom she resided.   Mr. S. has complied.

No further involvement in the criminal justice system.

After Ms. M. left the APT Foundation, an arrest warrant was issued for her and remains outstanding.   There is no evidence of any involvement on Mr. S.'s part with the criminal justice system.

Cooperate with child's therapy.  (For mother only.)

Ms. M. complied and attended an intake for family therapy with Cameron in January 2011.   This was not applicable to Mr. S.

Supply names and addresses of grandparents and of persons the parent would like DCF to consider as a placement resource.

Both parents provided the names of grandparents and identified certain relatives as placement options.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of his person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties”— § 17a–112(k)(4).   Cameron has no positive feelings or emotional ties toward either of his parents, wants to be adopted by his current foster parent, with whom he is closely bonded, and tells everyone he has already been adopted by her.

5. “The age of the child”— § 17a–112(k)(5).   Born on June 10, 2005, Cameron is six and one-half years old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return him to his home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child”— § 17a–112(k)(6).   Initially the mother Desiree M. made few efforts to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in Cameron's best interest to be reunited with her.   She visited with him infrequently and did not follow through on the parenting classes, counseling or substance abuse treatment to which she had been referred;  but after she entered the inpatient program at the APT Foundation she began making progress on addressing her own problems until she left that facility in August.   The father Christopher S. made no efforts to adjust his circumstances in order to gain custody of Cameron.   He would not visit Cameron, cooperate with DCF, or participate in services to which DCF referred him.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent”— § 17a–112(k)(7).   There is no evidence that, since Cameron came into DCF custody, anyone interfered with the ability of either parent to have a meaningful relationship with Cameron.   There is some suggestion in the evidence that prior to the OTC Ms. M. had restricted Mr. S.'s access to Cameron, but there is insufficient evidence as to whether her conduct was reasonable or not.   There is no evidence that Ms. M.'s economic circumstances affected her ability to have a meaningful relationship with Cameron.   Although Mr. M. said to the DCF social worker that he could not take care of Cameron because of his financial situation and work schedule, that claim is not credible, and there was no evidence that his economic circumstances affected his ability to have a meaningful relationship with Cameron.   Instead, the better evidence firmly establishes that his own desire not to be a part of Cameron's life was the reason for that lack of relationship.

B

BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD— § 17a–112(j)(2)

The final element of the termination of the parental rights statute, § 17a–112(j), requires that, before granting a petition for such termination, the court must find “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․” The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child's welfare.   In determining whether terminating the respondent parents' parental rights would be in Cameron's best interest, the court has considered various factors, including his interest “in sustained growth, development, well-being, and in the continuity and stability of [his] environment”;  Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16, 490 A.2d 996 (1985);  his age and needs;  the length and nature of his stay in foster care;  the lack of contact with or relationship with his birth parents;  the potential benefit or detriment of him with his biological parents;  his genetic bond to each birth parent;  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999);  and the seven statutory factors and the court's findings thereon.   The court has also balanced Cameron's intrinsic need for stability and permanency against the potential benefit of maintaining a connection with his biological parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Cameron had a history of serious behavior problems even before being taken into DCF custody in September 2010 and was, in the words of the Permanency Plan social study, “out of control when he was removed from his Mother's care.”   Permanency Plan social study, at 12.  “He has been noted as being physically aggressive, refusing to follow adult directions, using profanity and struggling with his concentration.”  Id. After removal he was so aggressive in his first foster home that he was moved to another placement, where he has been since February 2011.   He has not shown the same level of aggression in that home, but at school and camp he continued to lose self-control, as noted above.   He has gradually done better, however, due in large part to the patience and dedication of his current foster mother, who, realizing that her previous training and experience had not adequately prepared her to care for a child with Cameron's level of needs, underwent more training in order to improve her parenting skills and upgrade her DCF license.   Since he began attending the partial hospitalization program in September 2011, he has made more strides in dealing with his aggressiveness and impulsivity.

He has not been willing to visit with his parents of siblings for several months.   He has repeated said that he wants to be adopted by his foster mother.   His father is unlikely ever to become a resource for him, and his mother's current flight from justice raises doubts about her willingness or ability ever to take care of him.   His parents are not ready to take care of him now or in the foreseeable future.   The current foster mother, on the other hand, meets his need for stability, a loving and nurturing environment, and permanence.   Under these and the facts and circumstances established at trial, it has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of Desiree M. and Christopher S. is in Cameron's best interest.

III

ORDERS OF TERMINATION

The court having considered all the statutory criteria and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for the termination of each respondent's parental rights and having determined, upon all of the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the child's best interest to terminate the parental rights of each respondent parent, it is therefore

HEREBY ORDERED:

The parental rights of Desiree M. and Christopher S. to Cameron S. are terminated.   The Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent for Cameron pursuant to General Statutes Section 17a–112(m) so that he may be placed for adoption.   In securing the adoption, the court urges the department to give first preference to the present foster parent.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a–112(o) and Practice Book Section 35a–14(g), the statutory parent shall file a written report on the case plan for Cameron, the permanency plan, and the status of the child with the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford on or before January 11, 2012, at 9:00 a.m. and every three months thereafter.   This court last approved a permanency plan on October 20, 2011.   A motion for review of permanency plan must be filed on or before July 19, 2012, and a hearing on such plan shall be held on August 30, 2012, at noon.

The department is ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing when any adoption is finalized.

Pursuant to an agreement between the Chief Court Administrator and the Chief Probate Court Administrator, the clerk of the Probate Court that has jurisdiction over any subsequent adoptions of this youth is ordered to notify the clerk of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford in writing of the date when said adoption is finalized.

BY THE COURT

STEPHEN F. FRAZZINI

JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT

FOOTNOTES

FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child, or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128 ․”.  FN2. General Statutes Section 46b–129 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “(a) ․ Upon the filing of such a petition, except as otherwise provided in subsection (k) of section 17a–112, the court shall cause a summons to be issued requiring the parent or parents or the guardian of the child, or youth to appear in court at the time and place named, which summons shall be served not less than fourteen days before the date of the hearing in the manner prescribed by section 46b–128 ․”

FN3. Practice Book Section 34a–1 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) The provisions of Sections 8–2, 9–5, 9–22, 10–12(a) and (c), 10–13, 10–14, 10–17, 10–18, 10–29, 10–62, 11–4, 11–5, 11–6, 11–7, 11–8, 11–10, 11–11, 11–12, 11–13, 12–1, 12–2, 12–3, 13–1 through 13–11 inclusive, 13–14, 13–16, 13–21 through 13–32 inclusive, subject to Sections 34a–20, 17–4 and 17–21 of the rules of practice shall apply to juvenile matters as defined by General Statutes § 46b–121.”.  FN3. Practice Book Section 34a–1 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) The provisions of Sections 8–2, 9–5, 9–22, 10–12(a) and (c), 10–13, 10–14, 10–17, 10–18, 10–29, 10–62, 11–4, 11–5, 11–6, 11–7, 11–8, 11–10, 11–11, 11–12, 11–13, 12–1, 12–2, 12–3, 13–1 through 13–11 inclusive, 13–14, 13–16, 13–21 through 13–32 inclusive, subject to Sections 34a–20, 17–4 and 17–21 of the rules of practice shall apply to juvenile matters as defined by General Statutes § 46b–121.”

FN4. Practice Book Section 10–18 provides as follows:  “Parties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the judicial authority may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.”.  FN4. Practice Book Section 10–18 provides as follows:  “Parties failing to plead according to the rules and orders of the judicial authority may be nonsuited or defaulted, as the case may be.”

FN5. Practice Book Section 35a–8 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”.  FN5. Practice Book Section 35a–8 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(b) If a parent fails to appear at the initial hearing and no military affidavit has been filed, the judicial authority shall continue the proceedings prior to entering a default for failure to appear until such time as the military affidavit is filed, provided if the identity of the parent, after reasonable search, cannot be determined, then default may enter and no military affidavit is required.”

FN6. General Statutes Section 46b–129(b) provides that, upon issuance of an ex parte order of temporary custody, “the court shall provide to the commissioner and the parent or guardian specific steps necessary for each to take to address the ex parte order for the parent or guardian to retain or regain custody of the child or youth.”  Practice Book Section 33a–6(d) similarly provides that “Upon issuance of an ex parte order or order to appear, the judicial authority shall provide to the commissioner of the department of children and families and the respondents specific steps necessary for each to take for the respondents to retain or regain custody of the child or youth.”  General Statutes Section 46b–129(c)(6) directs the court, after the preliminary hearing on an order of temporary custody to “order specific steps the commissioner and the parent or guardian shall take for the parent or guardian to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth;  ․” Practice Book Section Sec. 33a–7 similarly provides that “(a) At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody or order to appear, ․ the judicial authority shall:  ․ (8) ․ order specific steps the commissioner and the respondents shall take for the respondents to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth;  ․” General Statutes Section 46b–129(j) directs that “Upon finding and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or abused, the court may commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children and Families ․ The court shall order specific steps that the parent must take to facilitate the return of the child or youth to the custody of such parent ․”.  FN6. General Statutes Section 46b–129(b) provides that, upon issuance of an ex parte order of temporary custody, “the court shall provide to the commissioner and the parent or guardian specific steps necessary for each to take to address the ex parte order for the parent or guardian to retain or regain custody of the child or youth.”  Practice Book Section 33a–6(d) similarly provides that “Upon issuance of an ex parte order or order to appear, the judicial authority shall provide to the commissioner of the department of children and families and the respondents specific steps necessary for each to take for the respondents to retain or regain custody of the child or youth.”  General Statutes Section 46b–129(c)(6) directs the court, after the preliminary hearing on an order of temporary custody to “order specific steps the commissioner and the parent or guardian shall take for the parent or guardian to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth;  ․” Practice Book Section Sec. 33a–7 similarly provides that “(a) At the preliminary hearing on the order of temporary custody or order to appear, ․ the judicial authority shall:  ․ (8) ․ order specific steps the commissioner and the respondents shall take for the respondents to regain or to retain custody of the child or youth;  ․” General Statutes Section 46b–129(j) directs that “Upon finding and adjudging that any child or youth is uncared-for, neglected or abused, the court may commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children and Families ․ The court shall order specific steps that the parent must take to facilitate the return of the child or youth to the custody of such parent ․”

FN7. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”.  FN7. Practice Book Section Sec. 32a–2 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “All hearings are essentially civil proceedings except where otherwise provided by statute ․”

FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”.  FN8. General Statutes Section 17a–112(j) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  “The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to locate the parent and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of section 17a–111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, ․”

FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–101g provides in relevant part as follows:  “(c) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or his designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from his surroundings and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety, the commissioner, or his designee, shall authorize any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child's parent or guardian.   The commissioner shall record in writing the reasons for such removal and include such record with the report of the investigation conducted under subsection (b) of this section.”.  FN9. General Statutes Section 17a–101g provides in relevant part as follows:  “(c) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or his designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from his surroundings and that immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's safety, the commissioner, or his designee, shall authorize any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child's parent or guardian.   The commissioner shall record in writing the reasons for such removal and include such record with the report of the investigation conducted under subsection (b) of this section.”

FN10. General Statutes Section 46b–120 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:”(b) If it appears from the specific allegations of the petition and other verified affirmations of fact accompanying the petition and application, or subsequent thereto, that there is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child or youth is suffering from serious physical illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical danger from the child's or youth's surroundings, and (2) that as a result of said conditions, the child's or youth's safety is endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's or youth's safety, the court shall either (A) issue an order to the parents or other person having responsibility for the care of the child or youth to appear at such time as the court may designate to determine whether the court should vest the child's or youth's temporary care and custody in a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or suitable agency pending disposition of the petition, or (B) issue an order ex parte vesting the child's or youth's temporary care and custody in a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or suitable agency..  FN10. General Statutes Section 46b–120 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:”(b) If it appears from the specific allegations of the petition and other verified affirmations of fact accompanying the petition and application, or subsequent thereto, that there is reasonable cause to believe that (1) the child or youth is suffering from serious physical illness or serious physical injury or is in immediate physical danger from the child's or youth's surroundings, and (2) that as a result of said conditions, the child's or youth's safety is endangered and immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child's or youth's safety, the court shall either (A) issue an order to the parents or other person having responsibility for the care of the child or youth to appear at such time as the court may designate to determine whether the court should vest the child's or youth's temporary care and custody in a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or suitable agency pending disposition of the petition, or (B) issue an order ex parte vesting the child's or youth's temporary care and custody in a person related to the child or youth by blood or marriage or in some other person or suitable agency.

FN11. The OTC was sustained by agreement by agreement on the mother's part and without prejudice to the father..  FN11. The OTC was sustained by agreement by agreement on the mother's part and without prejudice to the father.

FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides in pertinent part as follows:“(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․”.  FN12. General Statutes Section 17a–112 provides in pertinent part as follows:“(j) The Superior Court ․ may grant a petition filed pursuant to this section if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ (3)(A) the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of the child;  (B) the child (i) has been found by the Superior Court or the Probate Court to have been neglected or uncared for in a prior proceeding, or (ii) is found to be neglected or uncared for and has been in the custody of the commissioner for at least fifteen months and the parent of such child has been provided specific steps to take to facilitate the return of the child to the parent pursuant to section 46b–129 and has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child;  ․ (D) there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day to day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child;  ․”

FN13. General Statutes Section 46b–120 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(8) A child or youth may be found “neglected” who ․ (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally ․”.  FN13. General Statutes Section 46b–120 provides in pertinent part as follows:  “(8) A child or youth may be found “neglected” who ․ (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally or morally ․”

FN14. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”.  FN14. General Statutes Section 17a–112(k) provides as follows:  “Except in the case where termination is based on consent, in determining whether to terminate parental rights under this section, the court shall consider and shall make written findings regarding:  (1) The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent;  (2) whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended;  (3) the terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order;  (4) the feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child's parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties;  (5) the age of the child;  (6) the efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to, (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child;  and (7) the extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

Frazzini, Stephen F., J.