Richard Perrigo v. Brie Hurd et al. (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF DECISION # 135

On November 29, 2011, the court, Roche, J., issued an order and memorandum of decision denying a motion for summary judgment filed by defendant, Zeller Tire Company, Inc. On December 6, 2011, the defendant filed a motion for clarification of decision, requesting that the court clarify three aspects of its memorandum of decision.   The court will address each in turn.

First, the defendant seeks clarification of the final paragraph of the decision, requesting that the court explain and expound on its decision that the use of a passenger plate, as opposed to a dealer or repairer's plate, is not merely a procedural deficiency.   The defendant seeks this clarification “in light of the court's discussion earlier in the decision apparently adopting the defendant's interpretation of the statute that ‘or’ is used in a disjunctive manner such that the statute applies whether the dealer loans a car or a plate or both.”  (Emphasis in original.)

The court found that the defendant's use of passenger plates, as opposed to dealer or repairer plates, raised an issue as to the defendant's compliance with the substantive requirements of General Statutes § 14–60.   In other words, the use of passenger plates in the present case creates an issue as to the application of General Statutes § 14–60.   In contrast, some courts have found that a failure to properly execute the temporary loan agreement or failure to obtain the proper documentation, as is required by General Statutes § 14–60, is merely a procedural deficiency, and immaterial to whether the statute applied to the factual scenario.   See Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 02 0097746 (January 29, 2003, Aurigemma, J.) (33 Conn. L. Rptr. 731) (holding that because the driver had insurance, factual issues as to whether or not a form agreement was filled out or signed by the driver were immaterial and insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment);  Slossar v. Taylor, 30 Conn.Sup. 131, 134, 305 A.2d 289 (1972).   In Slossar v. Taylor, supra, 134, the court found that the failure to receive proof of liability and property damage insurance did not “affect the question of coverage.”   Rather, such a violation was a “disciplinary matter to be considered by the motor vehicle commissioner under § 14–64.”  Slossar v. Taylor, supra, 134.

Second, the defendant “seeks clarification from the court as to how the title of the statute is in any way determinative of the issue since the statute title is not germane to the interpretation of the statute.”

The court did not rely on the title of the statute in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment.   The court notes, however, and counsel should be aware that “[a]lthough it is recognized that headings or titles of legislation are not conclusive, they may, nonetheless, be valuable aids to construction and legislative intent.”  In re Cameron C., 103 Conn.App. 746, 753, 930 A.2d 826 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008);  see Burke v. Fleet National Bank, 252 Conn. 1, 13, 742 A.2d 293 (1999) (“[a]lthough the title of a statute is not determinative of its meaning, we often have looked to a statute's title as some evidence of that meaning”).

Finally, the defendant seeks clarification of the court's conclusion:  “As such, the use of passenger plates raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Zeller can take advantage of the immunity provided by the statute.   This issue(s)(sic) bears on the question of coverage.”   The defendant “does not understand what ‘coverage’ the court is referring to, insurance coverage or the coverage of the statute.   If the use of a private plate effects insurance coverage, it does not appear that dispute raises [sic] to the issue of material fact with regard to the applicability of the immunity granted by the statute.   It appears that the court accepts the premise of the Cooke [sic] decision that the statute does provide immunity if the garage keeper complies with it.”

“Coverage” as used by the court in its memorandum of decision means coverage of the statute, not insurance coverage.   The use of passenger plates, as opposed to dealer or repairer plates, bears on the issue of whether General Statutes § 14–60 applies.

As to the defendant's assertion concerning the court's acceptance of the premise of Cook v. Collins Chevrolet, Inc., 199 Conn. 245, 506 A.2d 1035 (1986), this court does accept the premise that General Statutes § 14–60 provides immunity when the garage keeper complies with the statute.   In the present case, there is a question as to whether the defendant, by use of passenger plates, complied with the statute and, thus, a question as to whether the defendant is afforded the immunity provided by the statute.

BY THE COURT,

Roche, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.