Jamie Hightower v. Cindy Hightower (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE (# 135)

FACTS

On October 1, 2010, the plaintiff, Jamie Hightower, filed a six-count complaint against the defendants, Cindy Hightower, the Prudential Insurance Company of America and ING Life Insurance and Annuity Company.¹  In her complaint, the plaintiff is seeking to determine what interest, if any, she has in the proceeds of various life insurance policies held by her deceased husband, Matthew Hightower.   The complaint alleges that the defendant, an ex-wife of the deceased, was named as a beneficiary under the life insurance policies along with the deceased's children.   The complaint further alleges that prior to his death, the deceased took substantial affirmative steps to change the beneficiary designation from the defendant to the plaintiff.   The defendant filed her answer, counterclaim and cross claim on May 17, 2011.

In her counterclaim, the defendant is seeking contribution and/or indemnification, payment for use and occupancy and an accounting under General Statutes § 52–404, in regards to the property, 19 Maple Terrace, Waterford.   The counterclaim alleges that as part of their marriage dissolution agreement, the deceased was to refinance and remove the defendant as an obligor on the property and in consideration the defendant would quitclaim her interest in the property.   The counterclaim alleges that the defendant did quitclaim her interest;  the deceased, however, failed to refinance and remove her as an obligor;  and, the plaintiff has obtained a legal and/or equitable interest in the property by living there since her marriage to the deceased and is being unjustly enriched by obtaining her interest without paying adequate consideration.

On June 10, 2011, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike the counterclaim on the ground that the counterclaim does not arise out of the same transactions as the complaint.   The defendant filed her opposition to the motion to strike on September 28, 2011 and the plaintiff replied on September 30, 2011.   The matter was heard at short calendar on October 3, 2011.

DISCUSSION

“[A] plaintiff can [move to strike] a ․ counterclaim.”  Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1978).  “[A] counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of the defendant against the plaintiff and on which the defendant might have secured affirmative relief had he sued the plaintiff in a separate action ․ A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a cause of action and may properly be used to challenge the sufficiency of a counterclaim.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Lax, 113 Conn.App. 646, 649, 969 A.2d 177, cert. denied, 292 Conn. 907, 973 A.2d 103 (2009).   A motion to strike “admits all facts well pleaded;  it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Doe v. Yale University, 252 Conn. 641, 694, 748 A.2d 834 (2000).

In support of her motion to strike, the plaintiff argues that her complaint relates solely to one transaction:  the substantial steps that the deceased took to change the beneficiary of the life insurance policies;  whereas, the counterclaim relates to two transactions:  the deceased's alleged breach of his dissolution agreement and the plaintiff's continued residence at 19 Maple Terrace, Waterford.   The plaintiff argues that the evidence needed to prove the complaint is completely different than the evidence necessary to prove the counterclaim.   Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's arguments made in opposition are outside the complaint, making it an improper speaking motion, and judicial economy does not warrant allowing the current counterclaim simply because witnesses may be the same in either case.

In opposition, the defendant argues that there are three transactions at issue in both the complaint and the counterclaim, including:  (1) the defendant's marriage to the deceased, (2) the defendant's divorce from the deceased and (3) the death of the deceased.   Furthermore, the defendant argues that all parties served and appearing in the underlying matter have information that is necessary and material to the resolution of all claims and that judicial efficiency requires that all claims be heard in a single action to avoid redundant discovery and piecemeal litigation.

“In any action for legal or equitable relief, any defendant may file counterclaims against any plaintiff ․ provided that each such counterclaim ․ arises out of the transaction or one of the transactions which is the subject of the plaintiff's complaint ․” Practice Book § 10–10.   The transaction test “is a common-sense rule designed to permit the joinder of closely related claims where such joinder is in the best interests of judicial economy ․ The transaction test is one of practicality ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   JP Morgan Chase Bank, Trustee v. Rodrigues, 109 Conn.App. 125, 131, 952 A.2d 56 (2008).  “[R]elevant considerations in determining whether the ‘transaction test’ has been met include whether the same issues of fact and law are presented by the complaint and the [counter]claim and whether separate trials on each of the respective claims would involve a substantial duplication of effort by the parties and the courts.”  South Windsor Cemetery Assn., Inc. v. Lindquist, 114 Conn.App. 540, 547, 970 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 293 Conn. 932, 981 A.2d 1076 (2009).   “[T]he underlying purposes of Practice Book [§ 10–10] are judicial economy, avoidance of multiplicity of litigation, and avoidance of piecemeal disposition of what is essentially one action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Conservation Commission v. Price, 193 Conn. 414, 433, 479 A.2d 187 (1984).

In the present case, both the complaint and counterclaim arise out of the same transaction:  the death of the deceased.   The plaintiff withdrew her complaint on October 31, 2011, rending the court's inclination to fuller analysis unnecessary.   Practically, the complaint and the counterclaim involve factual overlap as both relate to the deceased's intent and actions during the time period between his divorce from the defendant and his death.   Judicial economy is served by trying these actions together because both actions center around the same parties and their relationship with the deceased and the witnesses will most likely be the same, providing similar evidence.   The parties dispute the deceased's intent and substantial steps with regard to changing the beneficiary designation, and resolution of this dispute will have an affect on both actions.   Accordingly, the complaint and counterclaim arise out of the same transaction and the plaintiff's motion to strike must be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's motion to strike is denied.

Cosgrove, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. For the purposes of this memorandum, “the defendant” will refer to Cindy Hightower, individually, as the Prudential Insurance Company of America and ING Life Insurance and Annuity Company are not parties to this motion..  FN1. For the purposes of this memorandum, “the defendant” will refer to Cindy Hightower, individually, as the Prudential Insurance Company of America and ING Life Insurance and Annuity Company are not parties to this motion.

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.