Joseph LaMonica v. Darcy McIntire (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant has moved to strike the Second Count of the Plaintiff's Revised Complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 10–39 et seq.   Through its memorandum, the defendant claims that the Second Count of the said complaint is legally insufficient in alleging some degree of statutory recklessness arising out of a motor vehicle accident.   The Court is relying on Practice Book § 10–25 which allows the plaintiff to plead in the alternative, sounding in both negligence and recklessness.   Robbins v. Gondek, 2008 Conn.Super. Lexis 650 5–6 (March 18, 2008);  Hand v. Moore, 2005 Conn.Super Lexis 2647 (September 26, 2005) [40 Conn. L. Rptr. 83].   The allegations rely on the statutory provision 14–295 which turn on the violations of C.G.S. Section 14–222 and 14–227(a).   The allegations contained in the Second Count are not unique or so specific that they do not in some degree overlap the earlier count of the complaint sounding in negligence only.  Vitale v. Kowal, 101 Conn.App. 691, 698 (2007);  Harley v. Indian Spring Land Co., 123 Conn.App. 800, 831, (2010).   However, the allegations contained in this Second Count are on their face legally sufficient to survive the defendant's Motion To Strike and therefore the defendant's Motion To Strike the Second Count of the said complaint is hereby denied.

BY THE COURT,

Roche, J.

Roche, Vincent E., J.