IN RE: Caroline A–S.1 (2011)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

These actions are brought by The Department of Children and Families (“DCF” or “Petitioner”) seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological mother and the biological father of Caroline A–S. (hereinafter referred to as “Caroline A–S.” or “child”) and Anthony A–S. (hereinafter referred to as “Anthony A–S.” or “child), or collectively “children.”   The biological mother of these children is Yaneyky A–S. (hereinafter referred to as “Yaneyky A–S.” or “Mother”).   Ricardo B. is the putative father of Caroline A–S.;   Carlos D. is the putative father of Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S;  Jose T. is the putative father of Anthony A–S.;   and John Doe is the putative father of Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. (hereinafter referred to individually as “Putative Father” of a particular child or “Putative Fathers” collectively).

On 2/18/09, DCF invoked an Administrative 96–Hour Hold on behalf of the children.

On 2/20/09, DCF filed a motion for an Order of Temporary Custody and Petition of Neglect on behalf of the children.   The Order of Temporary Custody was granted on 2/20/09, and was subsequently sustained on 2/29/09.

On 9/4/09, the children were adjudicated neglected and committed to the care and custody of the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families until further order of the Superior Court for Juvenile Matters at Hartford.   Final steps were ordered.

On 2/23/10, neuropsychological and interactional evaluations of Mother were ordered.

On 3/15/10, after trial, an order was issued approving the Permanency Plan of Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption and finding that DCF had made reasonable efforts to reunify.

Also, an order was made removing maternal grandmother as a party from the case.

On 6/10/10, Petitions for the Termination of Parental Rights were filed.

On 7/8/10, the plea date for the Termination of Parental Rights Petition, confirmation of service on Carlos D. and Ricardo B. was made, and defaults for failure to appear were entered for them.

On 7/22/10, the plea date for the Termination of Parental Rights Petition, confirmations of service on respondent Mother, Jose T. and John Doe were made, Mother was advised of her rights, entered pro forma denials and putative fathers, Jose T. and John Doe were defaulted for failure to appear.

On 8/30/10, and again on 11/1/10, case status conferences were scheduled and Mother failed to appear on both occasions.

Thereafter, a termination of parental rights trial was scheduled for 11/1/10, and continued to 1/19/11 and 1/21 / 11 because the court ordered neuropsychological and interactional evaluations of Mother were not yet available.

On 1/19/11, the court convened for trial and counsel for Mother requested a continuance and represented that Mother might have given birth and was unable to attend.   The trial was continued to 2/9/11, at which time the trial commenced.   Thereafter, the trial was continued to 3/22/11 and completed.   At trial, four exhibits (A–D) were entered and two witnesses testified for DCF.

The court finds that there is no action pending in any other court affecting custody of this child and that this court has jurisdiction in this matter.

The grounds of the Petition for TPR as to Mother, Yaneyky A–S. are Failure to Rehabilitate;  and as to putative Fathers, No Ongoing Parent/Child Relationship and Abandonment.

The court has applied the burden of proof applicable to the Termination of Parental Rights, has reviewed the Neglect Petition and the social studies and exhibits that were submitted in evidence.   The court has utilized the applicable legal standards in considering the evidence and the testimony of any witnesses.

I

FACTUAL FINDINGSA. Background, Facts Substantiating Allegations of Neglect and Termination

This family has a history with DCF dating back to 2007 due to Mother's limited parenting skills, unresolved mental health issues, substance abuse, cognitive limitations, transience, condition of the home and unstable employment.

Caroline A–S. was born to Mother and an unknown father on 9/9/04.   Carlos D., an alleged maternal uncle, was named the Putative Father by Mother.   He was defaulted by the court for failure to appear on the plea date of 4/2/09.   During the neglect proceedings another Putative Father of Caroline A–S. was named—Ricardo B. The court granted DCF's oral motion to cite in Ricardo B.

Anthony A–S. was born to Mother and an unknown father on 3/31/07.   Ramon, also known as Miguel P. was named as a putative father.   He was reported to be the son of Maria G., a woman who was a purported maternal aunt.   Ramon, who would have been about 16 at the time of Anthony's conception, is reported to have lived in one of the bedrooms of maternal grandmother's apartment, the same apartment in which Mother was residing.   Paternity testing revealed that Ramon is not the father of Anthony A–S. Nonetheless, the fact that he was considered as a putative father, due to his age and his alleged, but false relationship with Mother, is troubling.

Mother reported to Dr. Rabe during a competency examination that she was sexually abused by Ramon P., as well as his two brothers, Jose and Jonathan, whose last names were not disclosed.

Jose T. was also named as a father.   His whereabouts are unknown.   He was defaulted by the court for failure to appear on the plea date of 4/2/09.

John Doe has also been cited in by the Department.   He failed to appear on the plea date, was defaulted and an adjudication and disposition were entered.

Mother gave birth on 5/21/09 to another child, Thalia.   She was removed by DCF and tragically passed away shortly thereafter.

As referenced above, one or more of the putative fathers were relatives of Mother and/or represented as being relatives of Mother, but later proven not to be blood related.   There was critical testimony by the DCF investigation worker that Mother appeared to be unconcerned as to the ramifications of incest on herself and her children.   Family members were aware of the victimization of Mother by relatives, but did not intervene to protect her.

In December 2008, DCF received a report of neglect through C.H.S. where Mother was a patient at the time.   She had previously been diagnosed at C.H.S. with bipolar disorder and alcohol dependency and was deemed to be mentally challenged.   Maria G., who was reported to be a maternal aunt, but was later proved not to be, had custody of Mother's children as Mother was unable to care for the children on her own.   C.H.S. further reported that Mother was inconsistent with taking her medications and that there were concerns about the living conditions and supervision of the children.

Mother has a history of suicidal ideations and of self-mutilation by cutting.   She was hospitalized prior to the adjudication date on three occasions due to her depression and suicidal ideation but she was not compliant with C.H.S.

Mother admitted to using marijuana and alcohol while caring for her children.   When the DCF social worker went to the home after receiving the initial report, the home was dirty.   There were cat feces on the floor.   Mother and her children were living in an apartment without heat and hot water.   There were two bedrooms in the apartment;  Mother and the children slept in one room on two beds pushed together.   Ramon, also known as Miguel P. slept in the other bedroom.   Maria G. slept on the couch in the living room.   There were other adults living in the house on mattresses in the living room but their identity is unknown.

DCF was aware that Maria G. had been living in Mother's home since 2007 when it was agreed by the Department and Maria G. that Mother would not parent the children alone without Maria G. being present to supervise the children.   The reliability and credibility of Maria G. is doubtful.   She claimed to be Mother's conservator, but no evidence was found to substantiate this claim.   She also claimed to be Mother's maternal aunt, but this claim is false.   She reported to DCF that she did live with Mother, but upon investigation, DCF had reason to believe that Maria G. lived in the apartment next door to Mother and not with her.

The children were removed in February 2009 after DCF received a call from the Hartford Police Department who had been informed by Maria G. that Mother had left the state with the children.   Within a few days, she returned to the state with Anthony A–S. Due to concerns regarding Mother's ability to care for the children and to provide adequate supervision, the children were removed.

As of the date of the petition, Mother and the children were living in a home that was filthy—cat feces on the floor, and no heat or hot water.   The children were living with strangers and drug use had occurred in the home.   Mother was not consistently taking her medications;  she was not participating in therapy to address her mental health needs, and she was not receiving treatment on a consistent basis to address her alcohol dependency.

B. Mother, Yaneyky A–S.

Yaneyky A–S., a Hispanic female, was born to Rafaela S. and an unidentified father in the Dominican Republic on June 9, 1985.   She has had a strained relationship with her mother and they have both had no contact with her father since her birth.   As a child she was neglected by maternal grandmother who reportedly prostituted her during her youth.   Yaneyky A–S. is the youngest of three children, but does not have a close relationship with her siblings and has not maintained contact with them.

Since age 7, Yaneyky A–S. was raised in the Virgin Islands by maternal aunt, Milagros C. She moved to Connecticut in 2005 with Maria G., whom she initially identified as her maternal aunt, but who was subsequently found not to be a blood relative.   She later alleged that Maria G. had taken advantage of her by not protecting her from the family members living in the home, and that she had been sexually abused by at least six different men while living in Maria G.'s home.   She identified one of these men as Maria G.'s husband and her son, Ramon P. It was later learned that Maria G. was not a blood relative of mother.

Both Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. are believed to be a product of incest.   It is unclear if Mother understands this due to her cognitive limitations.

Yaneyky A–S. attended school in the Virgin Islands and dropped out in the seventh grade.   She has expressed an interest in obtaining her GED.

Yaneyky A–S. is currently in a relationship with a man by the name of Juan G., who resides in New York. She claims to travel to New York every weekend to visit with him and in 2010 gave birth to his child.   Although Juan G. has four children, only one of his children resides with him.   He does not have plans to move to Connecticut.

On 1/13/09, Yaneyky A–S. was present for an intake at ADRC Latino (Alcohol and Drug Recovery Center) and she was recommended for an outpatient group.   She had admitted to using marijuana and alcohol while caring for her children as these substances made her calm and relaxed.

Yaneyky A–S. had participated in mental health treatment through Community Health Services (CHS).  However, she had difficulty attending treatment on a consistent basis.   She did not attend treatment from November 2008 through January 2009, and stopped attending mental health services and medication management appointments from December 2009 until February 2010 despite numerous attempts by CHS staff to reengage her in treatment.   She was discharged as unsuccessful from CHS in February 2010.   She subsequently had an intake at Hartford Behavioral Health (HBH) in March 2010.   She was assigned a clinician through HBH in May 2010.

Mother is currently diagnosed with bipolar disorder and depression and was previously on medication, but stopped taking the medication when she was pregnant.   She has been hospitalized on three separate occasions due to her depression and suicidal ideations.   She also has a history of cutting behaviors, post partum depression, sexual abuse, physical neglect issues and abandonment as a child.

C. Putative Fathers, Jose T., Carlos D., Ricardo B. and John Doe.

All putative Fathers are whereabouts unknown and Mother reports not maintaining contact with any of them.

D. Child, Caroline A–S.

Caroline A–S. is a Hispanic female who was born on September 9, 2004 in Saint Croix, Virgin Islands.   Mother reported no complications during her delivery.   Caroline A–S. is Mother's first child and although she is meeting the majority of her developmental milestones, she has speech and academic delays.   Mother reports a close bond with her.

Caroline A–S's immunizations are up-to-date as her last physical was on 3/12/10 at Community Health Services.   Her most recent dental evaluation was in March 2011.   She had numerous cavities upon placement and has had over six appointments for cavity fillings.   Caroline had a rash that started on her vaginal area and her back and continued to spread to other areas of her body.   On 2/23/10 she was prescribed Hydrocortisone 2.5% and Benadryl for the rash.   She was seen by the UCONN Dermatology clinic on 4/14/10 and her skin is now clear of the rash.

Caroline is receiving therapy through the Village for Families and Children (VFC) to address some concerning behaviors (i.e. avoidant behaviors).   She has exhibited some difficulties following directions and will cry when asked to do something.   The therapist continues to work with Caroline A–S. to enable her to verbally express her feelings.   She has been diagnosed with Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).  Dr. Carlos Salguero, psychiatrist at the VFC, completed a psychiatric evaluation of Caroline on 10/20/10, and noted the following:

Caroline is a six-year-old female who has been living in the foster home of Mrs. [ ] for one year and a half.   Prior to living in this foster home, it appears that she was severely traumatized and one can observe the after affects of such conditions by the behaviors she is exhibiting characterized by fear, possible flashbacks, concerns about having to go sleep, and separation anxiety.   It may well be said that this child suffers from a case of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Chronic.   When one looks at the other symptoms such as separation anxiety, distractibility, one should think about it in the context of the broader picture of PTSD. This child is currently trying to adjust to living with her foster mother and developing basic trust and she continues to be afraid of being taken away and returning to a very precarious type of life, full of neglect and fear.   It can be hypothesized that when she sees her mother, she is re-traumatized, as she would develop memories of the time she was neglected or abused.   It will be important to think about the therapeutic value of weekly visitations with her mother unless there is a therapeutic component to it.

Caroline is repeating Kindergarten due to significant academic delays in the prior school year.   She attended summer school and she appears to have benefitted from it.   Although she continues to have some academic delays, she is making progress.   She is a very enthusiastic learner and is always proud of her accomplishments.   Her foster parents report that Caroline A–S. is a bright student and does her homework when asked.

E. Child, Anthony A–S.

Anthony A–S. is a Hispanic male who was born on March 31, 2007 in Hartford, Connecticut.   He is Mother's second child and is thriving in his current placement and meeting his developmental milestones.

Anthony A–S's immunizations are up to date as his last physical was on 4/01/10 at Community Health Services.   He has a history of eczema which is currently under control, but is otherwise healthy.   His last dental examination was in March 2011.

Anthony presented with the following behaviors in the foster home:  tantrums, frequent crying, high level of activity, difficulty sleeping, and difficulty following directions, listening.   The foster parents have worked with the Foster and Adoptive Support Team (FAST) to address how to manage these behaviors.   Although the behaviors had improved over several months, Anthony A–S. began exhibiting some of the same behaviors after he went to respite for a week.   He was subsequently referred to the Village for Families and Children and is now receiving play therapy.   The foster parents report that Anthony A–S.'s behaviors have improved in that he is able to listen to what is being asked of him and able to follow directions.

Anthony A–S. is attending preschool at CRT Head Start Program.   He transitioned well into this program and exhibited good behavior for approximately five months.   However, he began to be aggressive and non-compliant in school.   A meeting was held to discuss his behaviors and strategies to manage them.   Anthony A–S.'s behaviors have improved in school.   Speech services were offered and his speech has improved.

F. Relative Resources

There were no licensable relatives among those reviewed by DCF.

G. Present Situation

Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. have weekly visits with mother at My People's Clinical Services.   These visits are supervised by Amy R. She has observed that Mother has difficulty being consistent with disciplining the children.   She spends a great deal of time with Anthony A–S. who tends to present Mother with more of a challenge.   She is not able to identify when Caroline A–S. does something wrong as she mainly focuses on Anthony A–S.'s negative behaviors.   Although Caroline A–S. seems to enjoy the visits with Mother, she has avoidant behaviors following her visits.   The foster parents report that she will begin to cry when asked to do something (i.e. brush teeth, get dressed etc.).   There have been no noted changes in Anthony A–S.'s behaviors either prior to or after visits with Mother.   Mother has not been consistent with visiting the children since 10/13/10 and recently missed 8 out of 14 visits.

Anthony A–S. and Caroline A–S. are currently in the same foster home in which they were placed on 2/18/09.   They appear to have a positive connection to this family as well as their extended family members.   The children refer to their foster parents as “Pane and Tata,” the same names the foster parents' biological children call them.   Caroline A.-S. stated that she likes living in this home because the foster parents are very nice to her and they take care of her and her brother.   She identifies her foster siblings as her “brothers.”   Anthony A–S. is especially attached to the foster father and enjoys going on outings with him.   The foster parents are interested in adopting the children if they become legally free for adoption.

As noted, Mother has not been present at trial on occasion and her whereabouts have been unknown.   On 1/19/11, she failed to appear and her counsel filed a motion for a continuance to 2/9/11, which was granted by the court.   There were reports at that time that Mother had given birth but no one offered certain evidence in that regard.   At the trial on 2/9/11, Mother appeared and evidence was taken.   At the conclusion of the proceedings, a continuance was granted to 3/22/11 to accommodate the appearance of Dr. Christina L. Ciocca, Psy.D., court evaluator.   On 3/22/11, Dr. Ciocca testified for the Department.

Yaneyky A–S. is in a relationship with Juan G. who is the father of her new baby.   Juan G. resides in New York and has no plans on moving to Connecticut.   Evidence was presented on 3/22/11 that Mother had gone to the Dominican Republic or was in New York with Juan G. and her newborn child.   It was uncertain whether the child was born in the United States or in the Dominican Republic.   However, it appeared that Mother had left her newborn child with Juan G. in the Dominican Republic.   No additional information was forthcoming with regard to Mother's whereabouts with her newborn child.

Mother is receiving therapy through Hartford Behavioral Health, but she has not met with her clinician for some time.   DCF is not aware that Yaneyky A–S. is participating in any services at the present time.

Yaneyky A–S. receives $500 per month from SSI due to her mental health diagnoses and approximately $200 per month in food stamps from public assistance.   She has her own apartment in the south end of Hartford and her rent is $550 per month, excluding utilities.   Maternal grandmother and her boyfriend help to pay her utilities.

II

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION

The court must determine whether the proof provides clear and convincing evidence that a pleaded ground exists to terminate Mother, Yaneyky A–S.'s and Putative Fathers' rights as of the date of the filing of the petition.

A. Reasonable Efforts Finding

Unless a court has found in an earlier proceeding that efforts to reunify are no longer appropriate, in order to terminate parental rights DCF initially must show by clear and convincing evidence that it “has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the children with their parents, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parents are unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts.”  C.G.S. Sec. 17a–112(j)(1).   “Reasonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible.”  In re Jessica B., 50 Conn.App. 554, 566, 718 A.2d 997 (1998).

DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Yaneyky A–S.

Reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Yaneyky A–S. and Putative Fathers are no longer appropriate because of Mother's inability to gain insight into her substance abuse, limited parenting skills, unresolved mental issues, transience, and her proven inability to rehabilitate and to provide the care that the children require.

Reasonable efforts to reunify the children with Putative Fathers, Ricardo B., Carlos D., Jose T. and John Doe are no longer appropriate because they were unable and/or unwilling to engage in services due to being whereabouts unknown for most of the time that the children have been in DCF custody.

The parents are unwilling or unable to benefit from efforts because they have been unable to show progress in their rehabilitation with regard to their afore-mentioned inability to correct deficiencies or are whereabouts unknown.

DCF has been involved with this family since 2007.   The presenting problems with Mother were identified as unresolved mental health issues, poor judgment, inadequate and unstable housing, parenting issues and unstable employment.

Reasonable and active efforts were made to prevent removal of the above-named children and/or to reunify them with Yaneyky A–S. See Exhibit A, paragraph 5.

Mother is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification services in that she has failed to demonstrate progress and insight regarding the neglect and removal of her children.   She has failed to show sufficient progress regarding her mental health issues, her ability to maintain stable and appropriate housing and employment, and her ability to improve her parenting skills so that her children could safely return to her care.

B. Grounds for the Termination:  Failure to Rehabilitate—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(1)—as to biological Mother, Yaneyky A–S.

The Commissioner has alleged as a ground for termination that Mother has failed to rehabilitate herself after her children had been adjudicated as neglected.   This ground for termination, based upon a prior adjudication of neglect and a failure of personal rehabilitation, is clearly articulated in our statutes.  Conn. Gen.Stat. § 17a–112(j)(3)(B)(1) states in part that:

[t]he Superior Court ․ may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the child under the age of seven years ․ has been found by the Superior Court ․ to have been neglected ․ and the parent has failed to achieve such degree of personal rehabilitation as would encourage the belief that within a reasonable time, considering the age and needs of the child, such parent could assume a responsible position in the life of the child.

“Personal rehabilitation as used in [Section 17a–112] refers to the restoration of a parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent.”  “․ [The statute] requires the trial court ․ to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she] has achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her] [children's lives.]”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted).  In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).”  ․ [I]n assessing rehabilitation, the critical issue is not whether the [parent has] improved [her] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she] has gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the children at issue.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001);  In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005).

Whether the age and needs of the children would support allowance of further time for the parent to rehabilitate must also be considered.  In re Luis C., supra, 210 Conn. 157, 167–68, 5545 A.2d 722 (1989).   The reasonableness of the time period within which rehabilitation is sought to be accomplished is a question of fact for the court.  In re Davon M., 16 Conn.App. 693, 696, 548 A.2d 1350 (1988).   Also, in determining whether further allowance of a reasonable period of time would promote rehabilitation, a court can consider efforts made since the date of the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights.  In re Sarah M., 19 Conn.App. 371, 377, 562 A.2d 566 (1989).

Several aspects of the clear and convincing evidence in this case compel the conclusion that Yaneyky A–S. has yet to achieve a sufficient “level of rehabilitation ․ which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her children's lives].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Sarah Ann K., 57 Conn.App. 441, 448, 749 A.2d 77 (2000).   See In re Alejandro L., 91 Conn.App. 248, 259, 881 A.2d 450 (2005);  In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 665, 769 A.2d 718, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950, 769 A.2d 61 (2001).   The credible evidence in this case, presented through the TPR social study and exhibits, clearly and convincingly establishes that Yaneyky A–S. has not achieved CGS § 17a–112(j)(3)(B1) rehabilitation.   The court credits the DCF reports which show that Yaneyky A–S. has been unable to achieve her rehabilitation.

Ground B1—Failure to Rehabilitate as to Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. by biological Mother, Yaneyky A–S.

See Section I, Factual Findings, and Section II, Reasonable Efforts.

Yaneyky A–S. has been informed by the court and DCF that in order to be successfully reunified with her children she needed to consistently engage in services and demonstrate adequate progress and insight with regard to her ongoing issues of mental health;  engaging in appropriate and consistent treatment;  maintaining appropriate and adequate housing;  securing legal income;  enhancing her parenting skills;  demonstrating an understanding of basic care for her children;  maintaining a meaningful relationship with her children and demonstrating that she is aware of and understands her children's needs, and that she could address those needs should the children be placed in her care.

Specific Steps, ordered by the court on 2/27/09 and 6/12/09, to facilitate the return of the children to Mother's care have not been complied with.   See Exhibit A, pages 14, 15, 16 and 17 for a full explanation of non-compliance.

Mother has her own significant needs that she has to meet before she can take on the responsibility of two young children and a newborn.   She requires the assistance of others to meet her own needs.   She will not be able to assume a responsible position in the lives of her children within a reasonable time period.

Caroline A–S. is 6 years old and Anthony A–S. is 4 years old.   They are completely dependent on a responsible adult caregiver for their wellbeing, including, but not limited to their educational, developmental, emotional, medical and social needs.   Anthony A–S. has a speech delay and requires special education services as well as assistance with socialization.   He has challenging behaviors and requires a caregiver who is able to provide consistency, structure and limits.   Caroline A–S. has academic delays and mental health needs which requires additional assistance by a competent adult to provide her with the added supports she needs.

C. Grounds for the Termination:  Abandonment—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(A)—as to Putative Fathers, Carlos D., Ricardo B., Jose T. and John Doe.

This ground is established when the child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the welfare of the child.   Sporadic efforts are insufficient to negate the claim of abandonment.   The test for determining abandonment of a child for purposes of termination of parental rights is not whether a parent has shown “some interest” in his or her child, but rather, whether the parent has maintained any reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 36, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).

Attempts to achieve contact with a child, telephone calls, the sending of cards and gifts and financial support are indicia of “interest, concern or responsibility.”  In re Migdalia M., 6 Conn.App. 194, 209, 504 A.2d 533 (1986).

“The commonly understood general obligations of parenthood entail these minimum attributes:  (1) express love and affection for the child;  (2) express personal concern over the health, education and general well-being of the child;  (3) the duty to supply the necessary food, clothing and medical care;  (4) the duty to provide an adequate domicile;  and (5) the duty to furnish social and religious guidance.”  (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kezia M, 33 Conn.App. 12, 17–18, 632 A.2d 1122 (1993);  In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 53, 720 A.2d 1112 (1998).

GROUND A—Abandonment as to Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. by Carlos D., Putative Father.

Father has not seen his children in a lengthy period of time.

Father has not provided financial support for his children.

Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his children.

Father has never acknowledged his children's birthdays or other special days.

Father has never participated in his children's education or shown an interest in his children's health or welfare.

Father has not inquired about his children or requested visitation.

GROUND A—Abandonment as to Caroline A–S. by Ricardo B., Putative Father.

Father has not seen his child in a lengthy period of time.

Father has not provided financial support for his child.

Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his child.

Father has never acknowledged his child's birthday or other special days.

Father has never participated in his child's education or shown an interest in his child's health or welfare.

Father has not inquired about his child or requested visitation.

GROUND A—Abandonment as to Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. by John Doe, Putative Father

Father has not seen his children in a lengthy period of time.

Father has not provided financial support for his children.

Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his children.

Father has never acknowledged his children's birthdays or other special daysSU11⌑Father has never participated in his children's education or shown an interest in his children's health or welfare.

Father has not inquired about his children or requested visitation.

GROUND A—Abandonment as to Anthony A–S. by Jose T., Putative Father

Father has not seen his child in a lengthy period of time.

Father has not provided financial support for his child.

Father has never sent cards, gifts or letters to his child.

Father has never acknowledged his child's birthday or other special days.

Father has never participated in his child's education or shown an interest in his child's health or welfare.

Father has not inquired about his child or requested visitation.

D. Grounds for Termination:  No Ongoing Parent–Children Relationship—General Statutes § 17a–112(j)(3)(D) as to Putative Fathers, Carlos D., Ricardo B., Jose T. John Doe

This ground alleged by DCF requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is no ongoing parent-child relationship, which means “the relationship that ordinarily develops as a result of a parent having met on a day-to-day basis the physical, emotional, moral and educational needs of the child and to allow further time for the establishment or reestablishment of such parent-child relationship would be detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

This statutory definition, as it has been interpreted in case law, requires a finding that “no positive emotional aspects of the relationship survive.”   In re Jessica M., 217 Conn. 459, 470, 586 A.2d 597 (1991).  “It is inherently ambiguous when applied to noncustodial parents who must maintain their relationship with their child through visitation.”  Id., 459;  In re Valerie D., 223 Conn. 492, 531, 613 A.2d 748 (1992).   Although the ultimate question is usually whether the child has any present memories or feelings for the natural parent, the existence of a loving relationship or a “psychological parent” relationship with one other than the natural parent does not, of itself, establish the no ongoing parent-child relationship ground for termination.  In re Jessica M, supra, 473–75.

Unlike the other nonconsensual grounds to terminate parental rights, the absence of a parent-child relationship is considered a “no fault” ground for termination.   To establish this ground requires the trial court to make a two-pronged determination.   First, there must be a determination that no parent-child relationship exists;  and second, the court must look to the future and determine whether it would be detrimental to the child's best interest to allow time for such a relationship to develop.   The absence of a parent-child relationship can be demonstrated in situations where a child has never known his or her parents so that no relationship ever developed between them, or where the child has lost that relationship so that despite its former existence, it has now been completely displaced.  In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 177 Conn. 648, 670, 420 A.2d 875 (1979).

Judicial interpretation has imposed a requirement that a child have “present memories or feelings” for the parent, and “at least some aspects of these memories and feelings are positive” to overcome this ground.  In re Jessica M., supra, 217 Conn. 475;  In re Juvenile Appeal (84–6), 2 Conn.App. 705, 709, 483 A.2d 1101, cert. denied, 195 Conn. 801 (1984).   The existence of positive feelings usually depends on the viewpoint of the child.  In re Rayna M., 13 Conn.App. 23, 35, 534 A.2d 897 (1987).   As the Appellate Court recently noted, “the feelings of the child are of paramount importance.”  In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595, 602 (1999).  “Feelings for the natural parent connotes feelings of a positive nature only.”  Id.

Ground D—No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship as to Putative Father, Carlos D.

1.  Paragraph 1 through 6 of Ground A as to Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. by Carlos D. are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

2. Father has not seen the children since they came into DCF care in February 2009.

3. The children would not recognize their Father.

4. Father is a stranger to the children.

5. The children have no positive memories of their Father.

6. To permit additional time to develop a parent-child relationship will not be in the children's best interests due to the children's age and the Father's proven unwillingness to come forward in a timely manner to address the circumstances which led to the children's removal.   Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. cannot establish a positive connection with Father given his lack of involvement and lack of visitation.

Ground D—No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship as to Putative Father, Ricardo B.

1.  Paragraph 1 through 6 of Ground A as to Caroline A–S. by Ricardo B. are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

2. Father has not seen his child since she came into DCF care in February 2009.

3. Caroline A–S. would not recognize her Father.

4. Father is a stranger to his child.

5. Caroline A–S. has no positive memories of her Father.

6. To permit additional time to develop a parent-child relationship will not be in the child's best interests due to the child's age and the Father's proven unwillingness to come forward in a timely manner to address the circumstances which led to the child's removal.   Caroline A–S. cannot establish a positive connection with Father given his lack of involvement and lack of visitation.

Ground D—No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship as to Putative Father, Jose T.

1.  Paragraph 1 through 6 of Ground A as to Anthony A–S. by Jose T. are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety

2.  Father has not seen his child since his child came into DCF care in February 2009.

3. Anthony A–S. would not recognize his Father.

4. Father is a stranger to his child.

5. Anthony A–S. has no positive memories of his Father.

6. To permit additional time to develop a parent-child relationship will not be in the child's best interests due to the child's age and the Father's proven unwillingness to come forward in a timely manner to address the circumstances which led to the child's removal.   Anthony A–S. cannot establish a positive connection with Father given his lack of involvement and lack of visitation.

Ground D—No Ongoing Parent–Child Relationship as to Putative Father, John Doe

1.  Paragraph 1 through 6 of Ground A as to Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. by John Doe are hereby incorporated by reference in their entirety.

2. Father has not seen the children since they came into DCF care in February 2009.

3. The children would not recognize their Father.

4. Father is a stranger to the children.

5. The children have no positive memories of their Father.

6. To permit additional time to develop a parent-child relationship will not be in the children's best interests due to the children's age and the Father's proven unwillingness to come forward in a timely manner to address the circumstances which led to the children's removal.   Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S. cannot establish a positive connection with Father given his lack of involvement and lack of visitation.

Summary of Adjudicatory Findings

This court has found that the Commissioner has proved the following adjudicatory grounds by clear and convincing evidence:  Mother, Yaneyky A–S., has failed to rehabilitate after a prior court finding of her having neglected her children and Putative Fathers, Carlos D., Ricardo B., Jose T. and John Doe having abandoned their children and having not developed an ongoing parent-child relationship with their children.

III

DISPOSITION

Except in the case where termination is based on consent, if grounds have been found to terminate parental rights applying the appropriate standard of proof, the court must then consider whether the facts as of the last day of trial establish, by clear and convincing evidence after consideration of the factors enumerated in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k), that termination is in the child's best interest.   If the court does find that termination is in the child's best interest, an order will enter terminating parental rights.

A. C.G.S. § 17a–112(k) Criteria

The court has found by clear and convincing evidence that the statutory grounds alleged by DCF for the termination of parental rights have been proven.

Before making a decision whether or not to terminate Yaneyky A–S., Carlos D., Jose T. and John Doe's parental rights, as they did not consent, the court will consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in C.G.S. § 17a–112(k).  In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345, 355, 641 A.2d 378 (1994).

These criteria and this court's findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows:

1. “The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered or provided to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunify these children with their Mother.   Services were ordered in a timely manner and were appropriate for the circumstances at hand.

Considered carefully, the clear and convincing evidence shows that DCF offered timely, appropriate and comprehensive services to the respondent parent to facilitate her reunification with her children and made reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children.  In re Victoria B., 79 Conn.App. 245, 258–60, 829 A.2d 855 (2003).

Based on this clear and convincing evidence of the circumstances now present in this case, the court finds that Yaneyky A–S. is unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  CGS § 17a–112(j)(1).   Her serious issues clearly and convincingly make her unable and/or unwilling to benefit from reasonable reunification efforts.  In re Tyqwane V., 85 Conn.App. 528, 535–36, 857 A.2d 963 (2004).

Mother has been provided with many services to rehabilitate and return her children to her care and the referrals were made in a timely manner to facilitate a successful reunification.   She was referred to services multiple times to encourage cooperation.   Putative Fathers have not been offered services as they have not presented themselves to the Department to inquire about their respective child's well-being and have been whereabouts unknown since the inception of the petitions.

2. “Whether DCF has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.”

This court finds that the clear and convincing evidence in this matter proves that the children's Mother is presently unable and/or unwilling to benefit from such reunification services as was contemplated by the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended.

DCF has previously offered multiple services to Mother.   Putative Fathers have not been offered services as they have not presented themselves to the Department to inquire about their respective child's well-being and have been whereabouts unknown since the inception of the petitions.

3. “The terms of any court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all the parties have fulfilled their obligations of such order.”

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that Mother has failed to comply with most of the steps ordered by the court.   Putative Fathers have not been offered services as they have not presented themselves to the Department to inquire as to their respective child's well-being and have been whereabouts unknown since the inception of the petitions.

4. “The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to his parents, any guardian of such child's person and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control of the child for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties.”

The children have been able to exhibit only limited bonding with their Mother, due to her substance abuse and reluctance to accept her role as a parent, and the unavailability of Putative Fathers.   The children have developed a strong bond with their foster parents with whom they have lived since their removal by DCF. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt these children.

Since Putative Fathers have not been available at all, the children were unable to bond with them.

5. “The age of the children.”

Caroline A–S. is 6 years 7 months old.

Anthony A–S. is 4 years old.

6. “The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent's circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return to such child's home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent provided that the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child.”

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not made realistic and sustained efforts to conform their conduct to minimally acceptable parental standards.

The clear and convincing evidence indicates that the parents continue to be transient and virtually unemployed;  they lack interest in their children;  and they have refused to co-operate with DCF or programs presented.

The court finds by clear and convincing evidence, that the parents have not made the changes necessary in their lifestyles that would indicate that they would be safe, responsible and nurturing parents for their children.   To permit the children to return to the parents' care would compromise the safety of the children.

Putative Fathers' whereabouts are unknown and they do not offer future lifestyles that would benefit their children.

7. “The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent.”

This court finds by clear and convincing evidence that no unreasonable conduct by DCF, foster parents, the Department of Correction or third parties prevented Yaneyky A–S. and the Putative Fathers from maintaining a relationship with their children, nor did their economic circumstances prevent such relationship, although the limitations and restrictions inherent in the foster care system remained in effect.

B. Best Interest of the Children—C.G.S. § 17a–112(j)(2)

The court is next called upon to determine whether termination of Yaneyky A–S.'s and Putative Fathers' parental rights to these children would be in their best interests.²  Applying the appropriate legal standards ³ to the clear and convincing facts of this case, the court finds this issue in favor of the State of Connecticut and DCF.

In determining whether termination of Yaneyky A–S.'s and Putative Fathers' parental rights would be in the children's best interests, the court has examined multiple relevant factors, including the children's interests in sustained growth, development, well-being, stability and continuity of their environment;  their length of stay in foster care;  the nature of their relationship with their biological parents;  and the degree of contact maintained with their biological parents.⁴  In re Alexander C., 60 Conn.App. 555, 559, 760 A.2d 532 (2000);  In re Shyina B., 58 Conn.App. 159, 167, 752 A.2d 1139 (2000);  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).   In a matter such as this, the court is further called upon to balance the children's intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their parents.   See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998) (the child's physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity).

Under such scrutiny, the clear and convincing evidence in this matter establishes that it is not in the children's best interest to continue to maintain any legal relationship with their parents.

The clear and convincing evidence also shows that the children's parents have failed to gain insight into becoming safe, nurturing and responsible parents for the children.   The clear and convincing evidence shows that their judgment and conduct remains questionable, and has not improved since the children were taken into DCF care.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their recalcitrance concerning referrals clearly and convincingly shows that without commitment to consistent substance abuse treatment, as well as individual and parenting counseling, it is likely that they have extinguished what little chance they ever had to be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for any child.

An additional factor to consider in this case is time.   The clear and convincing evidence demonstrates the children's pressing need for permanence and stability.   Unfortunately, much time would be required for Mother and Putative Fathers to show that they have forsaken substance abuse, addressed their issues, undertaken the necessary counseling and succeeded in it, established themselves in the community and shown that they were capable of being safe, nurturing and responsible parents to their children.

These children cannot delay their need for permanence and stability in exchange for their parents' uncertain future.

Based upon the parents' behavior and performance so far, this court cannot foresee them ever having the ability or the opportunity to be able to follow the regimen necessary for these children to maximize their abilities and achievements.

The clear and convincing evidence shows that the time needed for the parents to attempt to rehabilitate and establish themselves in the community as safe, nurturing and responsible parents, if that were possible, is time that their children cannot afford.

The parents' performance clearly and convincingly shows that they lack the attributes and characteristics necessary to fulfill valid parental roles.   Their conduct clearly and convincingly shows that it is unlikely that they will ever be able to conform their behavior to appropriate norms or be able to serve as safe, nurturing and responsible parents for their children.

Our courts have recognized that “long-term stability is critical to a child's future health and development ․” In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 709, 741 A.2d 873 (1999).   Furthermore, “[b]ecause of the psychological effects of prolonged termination proceedings on young children, time is of the essence” when resolving issues related to the permanent or temporary care of neglected children.  In re Alexander V., 25 Conn.App. 741, 748, 596 A.2d 934 (1991), aff'd, 223 Conn. 557, 613 A.2d 780 (1992);  see also In re Juvenile Appeal (84–CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983).   The court is obliged to agree with DCF and concludes that the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the children are entitled to the benefit of ending, without further delay, the period of uncertainty as to the availability of their parents as caretakers.

Having balanced the children's individual and intrinsic needs for stability and permanency against the benefits of maintaining a connection with their parents, the clear and convincing evidence in this case establishes that the children's best interests cannot be served by continuing to maintain any legal relationship to their parents.  Pamela B. v. Ment, supra, 244 Conn. 313–14.

Accordingly, with respect to the best interests of the children as contemplated by CGS § 17a–112(j)(2), by clear and convincing evidence, and based upon all of the foregoing, including the testimony and evidence presented, the court finds that termination of the parental rights of Yaneyky A–S., and Putative Fathers, Carlos D., Ricardo B., Jose T. and John Doe is in the best interests of the children.

IV

CONCLUSION

The court having considered all statutory considerations and having found by clear and convincing evidence that grounds exist for termination of parental rights, further finds upon all the facts and circumstances presented, that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate the parental rights of Yaneyky A–S., the biological Mother of Caroline A–S. and Anthony A–S.;   and Carlos D., Ricardo B., Jose T. and John Doe, Putative Fathers of the children.   Accordingly, it is ordered that their parental rights to these children are hereby terminated.

It is further ordered that the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families be appointed the statutory parent for these children for the purpose of securing an adoptive family and a permanent placement for these children.

The statutory parent is ordered to file the appropriate written reports with the court, required by state and federal law, which show the efforts to effect the permanent placement of these children.

BY THE COURT,

WOLLENBERG, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”.  FN2. The final element of the termination of parental rights statute, CGS § 17a–112(j), requires that before granting a duly noticed petition for such termination, the court must find, “by clear and convincing evidence ․ (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child ․”

FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000)..  FN3. “Termination of parental rights means the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and the child's parent or parents ․ Termination of parental rights is a most serious and sensitive judicial action.  In re Barbara J., 215 Conn. 31, 44, 574 A.2d 203 (1990).”  (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Steven N., 57 Conn.App. 629, 632, 749 A.2d 678 (2000).  “[T]he question ․ to be decided in a dispositional phase is whether it is in the best interests of the child to sever the parent-child relationship.   That is different from the question of who should have custody of the child if termination of parental rights is determined to be in the best interests of the child.   See Practice Book § 33–5.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Carissa K., 55 Conn.App. 768, 776, 740 A.2d 896 (1999).  “In making this determination, the trial court can consider all events occurring prior to the date of the dispositional hearing, including those occurring after the filing of the termination petition.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Kasheema L., 56 Conn.App. 484, 488, 744 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 252 Conn. 945, 747 A.2d 522 (2000).

FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999)..  FN4. “[T]he genetic bond shared by a biological parent and his or her child, although not determinative of the issue of the best interest of the child, is certainly a factor to consider.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816, 740 A.2d 484 (1999).

Wollenberg, William L., J.T.R.