LLC v. Estephanie Valencia (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

The defendant, Estephanie Valencia, filed this timely motion for attorneys fees pursuant to Practice Book § 11–21, following dismissal of the summary process action brought by the plaintiff, Centrix Management Company, LLC.

BACKGROUND

The plaintiff commenced the underlying summary process action seeking to recover possession of the premises known as 1437 Willard Avenue # 3, Newington, Connecticut from the defendant.   The plaintiff's notice to quit advised the defendant that her lease was terminated for the following reasons:  “1. NON–PAYMENT OF RENT. 2. LAPSE OF TIME. 3. ORIGINALLY HAD THE RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE TO OCCUPY OTHER THAN UNDER A RENTAL AGREEMENT OR LEASE BUT SUCH RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE HAS TERMINATED.   The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to terminate the tenancy by legally sufficient service of the notice to quit.

At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the defendant offered a letter from the plaintiff, dated February 25, 2010, obtained in the course of discovery, which advised the defendant that she would “receive very shortly, a Notice to Quit Possession” if she didn't pay $840 and her $50 late fee for February 2010.   The court found that the letter rendered the notice to quit dated January 15, 2010 equivocal which together with the State Marshal's return of service which attested that the notice to quit was served in New Britain rather than Newington deprived the court of jurisdiction and the action was dismissed.

Following dismissal of the action, the defendant brought this motion for attorneys fees pursuant to General Statutes § 42–150bb.   The defendant seeks attorneys fees in the amount of $2,880.00 at a rate of $300.00 per hour for the defense of the action.

The parties have submitted memoranda of law in support of their respective legal arguments concerning the defendant's request for an award of attorneys fees.   The defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of her motion.   The plaintiff objected to the defendant's supplemental memorandum as being filed after the date ordered by the court, which objection was overruled.

ATTORNEYS FEES

“Connecticut adheres to the ‘American rule,’ which provides that attorneys fees and ordinary expenses and burdens of litigation are not allowed to the successful party absent a contractual or statutory exception.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Young v. Vlahos, 103 Conn.App. 470, 479, 929 A.2d 362 (2007), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 913 (2008).   Since the defendant has not claimed any contractual exception, the defendant must establish a statutory exception.

The defendant relies on the provisions of General Statutes § 42–150bb in support of his claim for a statutory award of attorneys fees.

DISCUSSION

This court has recently considered and ruled on the applicability of General Statutes § 42–150bb to summary process actions.   This court found in Plainville Housing Authority v. Galka, NBSP–051029,Superior Court, Housing Session at New Britain (December 17, 2010), that the legislative history reveals that legislature did not intend the words “contract or lease” as used in General Statutes § 42–150bb to include rental agreements in summary process actions.   Rather than recite the body of the thirty-one-page decision in this memorandum, the court makes reference to and adopts the reasoning in Plainville Housing Authority v. Galka, a copy of which is attached hereto.

In accordance with the foregoing, the court finds that the defendant's claim for attorneys fees does not fall within the ambit of § 42–150bb and its provisions do not inure to her benefit.   Accordingly, the defendant's motion for attorneys fees is denied.

So ordered,

Gilligan, J.

Gilligan, Robert G., J.