Pamela Beckstein v. Allstate Insurance Company (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE # 104

FACTS

On October 5, 2010, the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, filed a motion to strike and a memorandum of law in support of the motion.   On October 19, 2010, the plaintiff, Pamela Beckstein, filed an objection to the motion to strike and a memorandum of law in support of her objection.   The defendant moves to strike count two of the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts necessary to support a claim of bad faith.

The plaintiff alleges the following facts in count two of her complaint.   The defendant insured the plaintiff for personal injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an uninsured or underinsured motorist.   While the policy was in effect, the plaintiff was involved in a car accident with an underinsured motorist that was caused by the underinsured motorist's negligence.   The plaintiff resolved her claim with the underinsured motorist and subsequently sent a demand for policy coverage to the defendant.   The plaintiff provided the defendant with a notice of the settlement with the underinsured motorist as well as copies of all relevant medical reports, medical bills and the settlement package.

Ten months after the plaintiff sent her demand for coverage, a claims representative for the defendant offered the plaintiff $10,000 to settle her claim.   The defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to diligently review and process the plaintiff's claim, failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards to promptly investigate and resolve claims, failing to pay or offer policy limits when the evidence warrants such a payment, failing to effectuate a prompt, fair and equitable settlement of the plaintiff's claim and compelling the plaintiff to institute litigation in order to recover the amounts due to her under her underinsured motorist policy.

DISCUSSION

“The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ․ the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003).  “[F]or the purpose of a motion to strike, the moving party admits all facts well pleaded.”  RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp., 231 Conn. 381, 383 n.2, 650 A.2d 153 (1994).   Accordingly, “[i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  American Progressive Life & Health Ins. Co. of New York v. Better Benefits, LLC, 292 Conn. 111, 120, 971 A.2d 17 (2009).   In ruling on a motion to strike, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).  “In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997).

The defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a claim of bad faith because the plaintiff does not allege that the defendant had a sinister motive or a dishonest purpose.   Further, the defendant asserts that the requisite motive or purpose cannot be inferred from the plaintiff's allegations.   The defendant argues that, under either of the standards utilized by the Superior Court, the plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support her claim of bad faith.   The plaintiff responds that she sufficiently alleges a cause of action for bad faith under either of the standards utilized by the Superior Court.   The plaintiff argues that, when construed in the light most favorable to her, the complaint contains sufficient allegations that the defendant had a dishonest purpose or malice and that the defendant acted knowingly or willfully.

The parties are in agreement with respect to the law that governs this issue.  “To constitute a breach of [the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing], the acts by which a defendant allegedly impedes the plaintiff's right to receive benefits that he or she reasonably expected to receive under the contract must have been taken in bad faith ․

“Bad faith has been defined in our jurisprudence in various ways.   Bad faith in general implies both actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties, but by some interested or sinister motive ․ Bad faith means more than mere negligence;  it involves a dishonest purpose ․ [B]ad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and it may include evasion of the spirit of the bargain ․” (Citation omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)  Keller v. Beckenstein, 117 Conn.App. 550, 563-64, 979 A.2d 1055, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 913, 983 A.2d 274 (2009).

“[T]here is a split of authority among Superior Courts as to what factual allegations are sufficient to constitute the element of bad faith ․ The first line of cases requires specific allegations establishing a dishonest purpose or malice ․ In alleging a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, courts have stressed that such a claim must be alleged in terms of wanton and malicious injury [and] evil motive ․

“The second line of cases generally holds parties to a less stringent standard.   For instance, in Algiere v. Utica National Ins. Co. [Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 04 0569670 (February 7, 2005, Jones, J.) ] the court, in denying the defendant's motion to strike, noted that, ‘[a]lthough the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant acted in bad faith or with a sinister motive[,] she has alleged facts sufficient to reasonably infer that an improper motive or reckless indifference of the interest of others existed.   The plaintiff has alleged that the defendant has knowingly, willfully, deliberately and repeatedly ignored the workers' compensation commission orders;  such continued defiance is unlikely to be attributable to an honest mistake or mere negligence.’  “ (Citations omitted;  internal quotation marks omitted.)   Chapman v. Georgine Realty, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001346 (August 29, 2008, Bellis, J.).

In the present case, the plaintiff fails to allege a claim for bad faith under either standard.   Even when construed in the manner most favorable to sustaining legal sufficiency, the plaintiff fails to allege or imply a dishonest purpose or a sinister motive.   The allegations contained in the plaintiff's bad faith claim center around the defendant's alleged failure to engage in various activities.   The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant affirmatively acted with an improper motive and the court cannot infer an improper motive based on the stated allegations.   The plaintiff makes no allegations with respect to fraud, a design to mislead or a dishonest purpose.   The plaintiff does allege that the defendant neglected to fulfill its contractual obligations under the insurance policy, but the plaintiff does not allege that the failure was prompted by a sinister motive.   Even under the less stringent standard observed by some judges of the Superior Court, the plaintiff fails to allege the kind of knowing and deliberate “continued defiance” that would be necessary to infer an improper motive.   Accordingly, the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for bad faith.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the defendant's motion to strike count two is granted.

Martin, J.

Martin, Robert A., J.