Michael Hall v. Justyna Hall (2010)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

This dissolution of marriage action between the plaintiff, Michael Hall, and the defendant, Justyna Hall, came before the court by a writ, summons and complaint returnable to the court on November 3, 2009.   The matter was tried on October 6-8, 2010.   The plaintiff was represented by attorney Joseph E. DePaola and the defendant was represented by attorney Lisa A. Magliochetti.   The court appointed Sue A. Cousineau as guardian ad litem (GAL) for the minor child.

Both parties submitted claims for relief.   Regarding custody, the plaintiff seeks joint legal custody of the minor child with the defendant's residence being the child's primary physical residence.   Concerning his parental responsibilities, he is prepared to adopt the recommendations of the GAL, with the exception of her recommendation for continued supervised visitation.   He proposes to terminate supervised visitation after he has completed the parenting education class.   Regarding financial support, the plaintiff does not wish to receive or pay alimony, proposes to pay child support in accordance with the guidelines, seeks $15,000 from the defendant representing equity from the marital home and seeks one-half of the value of the defendant's 401k.

The defendant seeks joint legal custody of the minor child, primary residence and final decision-making authority.   The defendant's detailed parenting plan differs from the plaintiff's proposal in important respects, with a focus on anger management therapy, counseling and supervised visitation for the plaintiff for a two-month period following the completion of anger management therapy and counseling.   By way of financial orders, the defendant proposes the following:  that she receive child support in accordance with the guidelines and regular payments on a child-support arrearage of $3,116;  that neither party pay the other alimony;  and that she retain sole ownership of the marital home and her retirement assets.

In rendering this decision and making ensuing orders, the court has carefully considered the statutory criteria in General Statutes § 46b-56 ¹ regarding custody, General Statutes § 46b-56c as to educational support orders, General Statues § 46b-66a as to the conveyance of real property, General Statutes §§ 46b-81 and 46b-82, regarding the assignment of the marital estate and alimony, respectively, General Statutes § 46b-84 as to support and medical insurance for the minor child, General Statutes § 46b-62 regarding attorneys fees, the case law as it has developed regarding these matters and other relevant federal and state laws regarding the issues that confront the court.   The court has considered the parties' arguments, proposed findings of fact and proposed orders.   Additionally, the court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and the witnesses at the time of trial.   There were numerous full exhibits, each of which was examined by the court.

I

FINDINGS OF FACTAJurisdictional Findings

The plaintiff husband and the defendant wife were married on September 15, 2006, in Cromwell, Connecticut.   The plaintiff has resided continuously in Connecticut for at least twelve months preceding the date of filing the complaint.   The court has jurisdiction over the marriage and the parties.   The parties have one son, Caden, age nineteen months.   The family has not received public assistance.

For the reasons discussed hereinafter, the court finds that the marriage between the parties has broken down irretrievably and there is no hope of reconciliation.

B

Parties

The plaintiff husband is thirty years old.   He was discharged honorably after serving as an infantryman in the United States Army from 1997 through 2001.   Thereafter, he attended the Center for Culinary Arts for eighteen months, graduating in January 2003.   He briefly lived in California, returning in the spring of 2003.   He was unemployed until he obtained a job at Central Steakhouse where he was employed from August 2003 until February 2004.   He held a number of other culinary jobs through November 2007, when he opened Metro Catering, LLC. As seed money for the new enterprise, he utilized approximately $6000 of marital savings.   He has been employed as a salaried marketing associate for Sysco since February 10, 2010, earning a gross wage of $1,000 per week.   In November 30, 2009, the court entered orders that provided for child support in accordance with the guidelines in the amount of $114 per week, as well as a $50 per week contribution for day care.   The court finds that the plaintiff's net weekly wage is $753 per week.   The plaintiff is in good health.

The thirty-two-year-old defendant wife is an only child who moved to the United States with her mother from Poland at the age of eighteen.   She completed one-and-a-half years of high school in Meriden, Connecticut and began working as a dental assistant soon thereafter.   She attended two years of technical college, but did not obtain a degree.   She has worked since 2001 as a dental assistant for the same professional, earning a gross weekly wage of $741.   The court finds that her total net weekly income is $547.   She is in good health.

Throughout the four-year marriage, both parties made contributions to the acquisition, maintenance preservation and improvement of the marital assets, including real estate.   While the plaintiff's economic contributions from employment were often greater than that of his wife throughout the marriage, the defendant, nevertheless, made financial contributions from her employment earnings.   She was the primary homemaker for the family and Caden's primary caretaker.   Moreover, the plaintiff was often responsible for exhausting financial resources on misguided purchases and investments.

C

Marital Property

The current marital estate has an approximate gross value of $66,841.   As to the marital home at 117 Blackstone Village, Meriden Connecticut, which is owned by the defendant, the court finds it has a fair market value of $95,000.   With an outstanding mortgage of $62,402, the property's net equity is $32,598.   On October 25, 2001, five years before the marriage, the defendant purchased the condominium for $74,700 after making a deposit in the amount of $1,000.   The defendant resided at the condominium with her mother and stepfather from October 2001, to November 2003.   Shortly after the defendant purchased the condominium in 2001, her mother and stepfather advanced her the sum of $12,000, which was utilized to renovate and re-furbish the interior of the condominium.   The plaintiff lived in the condominium from the time he returned from California in January 2003, until he left the marital home and moved in with his parents in July 2009.

D

Additional Assets and Liabilities

The plaintiff owns a 2008 Jeep Cherokee with a value of $17,000 and a loan balance of $24,000.   He has been eligible to participate in his employer's 401k since August 10, 2010.   It has a nominal value at this time.   He owns a baseball card collection worth approximately $3,000.

The defendant does not own a motor vehicle, but operates a 2009 Acura TL that was purchased by her mother for $30,000 utilizing some of the defendant's funds.   It is subject to a loan of $10,291.   The defendant claims a fifty percent equitable interest in the vehicle worth $9,855.   She has a Wachovia checking account worth $200.   The defendant has a 401k plan with her present employer which has a value of $20,862.   At the time of her marriage in September 2006, its value was $10,905.

The parties have significant short-term liabilities in their individual names.   The plaintiff owes $71,313 in a combination of credit card debt and personal loans to his friends and relatives.   The vast majority of this debt is the result of his unsuccessful attempt to launch the Metro Catering business.   The defendant has an obligation to Chase Bank for credit card charges totaling $12,197 associated with legal fees in this case.

E

Causes for the Dissolution of Marriage

The parties are both intelligent, hard-working people who lived together for seven years, four years as a married couple.   For the most part, they enjoyed a good relationship.   The defendant is a conservative, frugal and disciplined individual who ultimately found that she could not abide the plaintiff's lack of fiscal discipline ² and risk taking.   She believes the plaintiff has significant issues concerning his alcohol use, and characterizes him as a self-centered individual who has exercised little patience with her and their son.   The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the defendant is hyper sensitive to any type of alcohol consumption, and he adamantly denies that he hides his occasional alcohol consumption or that he abuses alcohol.   He argues that the defendant suffered from postpartum depression, and that it affected her emotional stability.   The plaintiff attributes the majority of their problems to the failure of his catering business, which he started in the interest of improving his family life.   After their son was born on May 29, 2009, both parties reassessed their commitment to each other.   Caden's colicky behavior in the first few months after his birth proved to be a tipping point, and the plaintiff moved into his mother's home seven weeks after Caden's birth.   The defendant filed for divorce in August 2009, but withdrew the complaint after the couple reconciled.   Ultimately, reconciliation failed and the plaintiff filed for divorce on October 16, 2009.

During the reconciliation period, the plaintiff continued to live at his mother's home while visiting with and caring for Caden at the marital home on a regular basis.   On one or two occasions, he took Caden to his parents' home for several hours.   Just after Thanksgiving 2009, the defendant refused the plaintiff's request to have access to Caden outside of the marital home and sought to restrict his access without a third party present.   Thereafter, the plaintiff went weeks at a time without seeing Caden.   The matter was referred for a custody evaluation on February 26, 2010, without long-term access orders.   Until the hearing on May 3, 2010, which resulted in orders for the plaintiff to have third-party supervised access with Caden at the mother's residence every Tuesday, Friday and Sunday, the father did not see his son.   He engaged in a self-defeating refusal to enjoy his child's company by rejecting offered access for almost six months.   The plaintiff felt victimized and did not believe his wife was being held accountable by the court system.   The plaintiff justified his conduct as a principle stand against unwarranted intrusion, but as found by Judge Vitale on May 6, 2010, “the plaintiff has allowed his apparent hostility toward the defendant to influence and undermine his separate and important relationship with his son ․ [and] this nearly six months self-imposed absence has caused the plaintiff to become like a stranger to his own child.”   As a consequence, the court, Vitale, J., ordered that before unsupervised visitation could commence, the plaintiff was required to participate in either an anger management group or individual therapy to specifically address his anger and obtain an evaluation to assess his need for alcohol abuse treatment.

Since May 6, 2010, the plaintiff has tempered his anger, reassessed his self-defeating behavior and made an earnest, though not complete, effort to modify his aggressive and argumentative style.   He has enjoyed regular supervised visitation with Caden, engaged in counseling and learned to prioritize his son's interests.   The GAL recommends and the court agrees, that for a period of time the father's parenting must be supervised and evaluated.   While there is no question that the plaintiff adores Caden, and has his son's best interests at heart, his experience parenting an infant has been limited in scope.   He needs to participate in parenting classes specifically geared towards the developmental needs of children of a similar age.   If the family was intact and the plaintiff had not lost so much parenting time with his son he might have learned by now how to feed, play with, comfort, console and parent a young child.   More importantly he would have an appreciation of the limits of his existing knowlege.³

These concerns, however, do not require an order of sole custody at this time.   Gaining experience and having the responsibility of actively participating, in good faith, with the mother in the decision making process will enhance the defendant's parenting abilities and serve Caden's best interests.

II

ORDERS

Based on the foregoing finding of facts, the court orders the following:

1. The marriage of the parties is dissolved on the basis of irretrievable breakdown.

2. Custody and Parenting Time.

a. The parties shall share joint legal custody of Caden.   Caden's primary place of residence shall be with the defendant.   The responsibility of joint custody requires each parent to discuss in good faith with the other issues basic to the best interests of their children.   Neither party shall make a unilateral decision or take unilateral action regarding significant nonemergency matters affecting the health, education or care of Caden.   Included in the category of decisions that require mutual discussion and agreement are such matters as the residence of the child, selection of schools and summer camps, participation in athletic and extracurricular, activities, participation in religious organizations and activities, choice of child care providers (excluding babysitters), medical, dental or psychological treatment other than ordinary and common care, trips of more than 100 miles in distance one-way not escorted by either party, any financial obligations to be mutually born, and general rules of conduct, such as protected activities, curfews and household obligations.   This list is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the nature and temper of the court's intentions regarding the parties' co-parenting obligations to each other.   If the parties are unable to agree, the defendant shall have final decision making authority.

b. The plaintiff shall have primary parenting time on Tuesdays and Fridays from 5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and on Sundays from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. Said parenting time shall take place at the defendant's residence and shall be supervised by the maternal stepgrandfather, Angel Rivera, or another supervisor of the GAL's choosing.

c. The plaintiff shall participate in parenting classes specifically geared towards the developmental needs of children of similar age to Caden.   The plaintiff shall notify the defendant in writing (e-mail acceptable) with the name, location and contact information for the class he chooses.   He shall sign releases allowing the defendant and the GAL to verify his attendance and successful completion of the program.

d. Upon successful completion of the program, the plaintiff's primary parenting time shall move to his residence or other setting of his choosing (within a reasonable driving distance from the defendant's home) and be supervised for a period of one month by a independent parenting coach/educator for at least two visits per week, and the other visits shall be supervised by an independent supervisor such as the AMPS program.   The plaintiff shall notify the defendant in writing (e-mail acceptable) with the names and contact information of the coach/educator and the supervisor.   The plaintiff shall sign releases allowing the coach/educator and the supervisor to speak and report to the defendant.   For this schedule, the defendant or her designee shall provide the transportation of Caden to and from the plaintiff's parenting time.

e. After this one-month period, the plaintiff's parenting time shall be unsupervised.   For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

f. When Caden is two years old, the father's primary parenting time shall be every other Saturday and Sunday from noon to 5:00 p.m. and every Tuesday from 5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and every other Friday preceding the defendant's weekend from 5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

g. When Caden is twenty-eight months old, the plaintiff's Saturday and Sunday parenting time shall expand to 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

h. When Caden is thirty-two months old, the plaintiff's Saturday and Sunday parenting time shall expand to 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

i. When Caden is three years old, the plaintiff's primary parenting time shall be every other weekend from Saturday at 10:00 a.m. until Sunday at 5:00 p.m. and every Tuesday from 5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. and every other Thursday preceding the defendant's weekend from 5:30 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

j. When Caden begins school, the plaintiff's primary parenting time shall be every other weekend from Friday after school, or 5:00 p.m. if there is no school, to Sunday at 5:00 p.m., and every Tuesday from 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m. For this schedule, the defendant shall deliver Caden to the plaintiff at the start of his parenting time, except for the times when the plaintiff picks Caden up at school, and the plaintiff shall deliver Caden back to the defendant at the conclusion of his parenting time.

k. Holidays:  holiday access shall commence after the plaintiff has begun unsupervised parenting time.

i. Mother's Day shall be with the defendant and Father's Day shall be with the plaintiff from Sunday at 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.

ii.  Thanksgiving:  The parties shall alternate this holiday, with the defendant having even years and the plaintiff odd years from 10:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m.

iii.  Christmas:  After the plaintiff has obtained overnight access with Caden, the parties shall alternate Christmas from December 25 at 11:00 a.m. to December 26 at 11:00 a.m. and Christmas Eve from 4:00 p.m. until December 25 at 11:00 a.m., with the plaintiff having Christmas Eve in even years and the defendant having Christmas Eve in odd years, and the plaintiff having Christmas in odd years and the defendant having Christmas in even years.   Until the plaintiff has obtained overnight access with Caden, his Christmas access each year shall be on December 25 from 11:00 a.m. until 4:00 p.m.

iv.  Halloween:  the parties shall alternate this holiday, with the defendant having Halloween on even years and the plaintiff having Halloween on odd years.   Halloween access shall be from 3:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. if it is not visiting party's evening.

l. The parties are free to make adjustments to the times of the parental access in Caden's best interest.

m. Nothing in these orders prevents either party from seeking a modification of the order based on reports from the professionals involved in the visitation process.

n. Neither parent shall speak to or in ear shot of the minor child about the other parent in a negative manner.

o. The plaintiff shall not consume any alcohol twelve hours prior to or during any parenting time he is exercising with Caden.

p. The defendant shall inform the plaintiff in writing (e-mail acceptable) of the date, time, doctor's name, purpose and location of any doctor's appointments that are scheduled for Caden as soon as scheduled or as soon as possible if already scheduled, and the plaintiff may choose to attend if he wants.   The defendant shall keep the plaintiff informed weekly in writing (e-mail acceptable) of any information he may need to facilitate his visitation with Caden.

3. Child Support.   The plaintiff will pay to the defendant child support in the amount of $148 per week, and one-half of the weekly work-related child care, which is currently $50, for a total of $198, in accordance with the child support guidelines, to be secured by immediate wage withholding.   In addition, the plaintiff will pay 50 percent and the defendant 50 percent of the unreimbursed medical and dental expenses as provided for in the guidelines.   The definition of a medical and dental expense is to be broadly construed, to include, but not be limited to, medical, dental, orthodontic, hospitalization, optical, pharmaceutical, and psychological and/or psychiatric counseling and/or treatment.

4. Medical Insurance.   The defendant shall provide and maintain medical insurance on behalf of the child for so long as she is able to do so under the terms of her policy.   The plaintiff shall be responsible for his own health insurance.

5. Alimony. Neither party shall pay alimony to the other.

6. Property Division.   The residence at 117 Blackstone Village, Meriden, Connecticut.   The defendant shall have exclusive possession of the property and shall be responsible for the mortgages, credit lines, taxes, insurance, utilities, maintenance and upkeep, and she shall hold the plaintiff harmless for the same.

7. The plaintiff shall retain all right title and interest in his 2008 Jeep Cherokee, his 401k plan, the baseball card collection, family sword and Metro Catering LLC.

8. The defendant shall retain all right, title and interest in her Wachovia checking account and her 401k plan.

9. Liabilities. Each party shall be responsible for the remaining liabilities listed on their respective financial affidavits and will indemnify and hold the other harmless therefrom.

10. Life Insurance.   The plaintiff shall be required to maintain the existing life insurance on his life.   He shall name Caden and the defendant as beneficiaries in equal shares so long as he has a child support obligation both as to current orders and as to any arrearage that may accrue.

11. College Education.   The court shall reserve jurisdiction under General Statutes § 46b-56c and make orders with respect to the educational expenses for Caden.⁴

12. Tax Indemnification.   Each of the parties will indemnify and hold the other harmless with respect to any deficiency found by reason of that parties' income or deductions.

13. Counsel Fees. The parties shall each be responsible for their own respective counsel fees incurred as a result of this matter.   The parties shall share equally in the fees incurred for the GAL in connection with her work on behalf of the child.

14. Provided they are current on any child support obligations, the parties will alternate taking the child as a tax deduction for federal and state income tax purposes, with the plaintiff having the child in 2010 and in the even numbered years thereafter.   The defendant shall have the child in 2011 and in odd numbered years.

15. For so long as the parties have a child support obligation to each other, the parties will annually exchange their W-2s, 1099s, K-1 and similar forms by February 15 each year, and will provide each other with their federal tax returns within five days of filing.

16. Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are necessary and as presented to them by the other party to effectuate these orders within four days of presentment.

These orders are effective immediately.

THE COURT

HARRY E. CALMAR, JUDGE

FOOTNOTES

FN1. General Statutes § 46b-56 provides in relevant part:  “(a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint under section 46b-45, the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p.   Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable ․“(b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests.   Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to:  (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a;  (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions regarding the child's health, education and religious upbringing;  (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child;  or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.“(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers ․“(e) In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46b-84 ․“(g) A parent not granted custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown ․“(i) As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child.”.  FN1. General Statutes § 46b-56 provides in relevant part:  “(a) In any controversy before the Superior Court as to the custody or care of minor children, and at any time after the return day of any complaint under section 46b-45, the court may make or modify any proper order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation and support of the children if it has jurisdiction under the provisions of chapter 815p.   Subject to the provisions of section 46b-56a, the court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent or to a third party, according to its best judgment upon the facts of the case and subject to such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable ․“(b) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsection (a) of this section, the rights and responsibilities of both parents shall be considered and the court shall enter orders accordingly that serve the best interests of the child and provide the child with the active and consistent involvement of both parents commensurate with their abilities and interests.   Such orders may include, but shall not be limited to:  (1) Approval of a parental responsibility plan agreed to by the parents pursuant to section 46b-56a;  (2) the award of joint parental responsibility of a minor child to both parents, which shall include (A) provisions for residential arrangements with each parent in accordance with the needs of the child and the parents, and (B) provisions for consultation between the parents and for the making of major decisions regarding the child's health, education and religious upbringing;  (3) the award of sole custody to one parent with appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent where sole custody is in the best interests of the child;  or (4) any other custody arrangements as the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child.“(c) In making or modifying any order as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of the following factors:  (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child;  (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child;  (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child;  (4) the wishes of the child's parents as to custody;  (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child's siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child;  (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders;  (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents' dispute;  (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child;  (9) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments;  (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child's family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household;  (11) the stability of the child's existing or proposed residences, or both;  (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child;  (13) the child's cultural background;  (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child;  (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120;  and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b.   The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers ․“(e) In determining whether a child is in need of support and, if in need, the respective abilities of the parents to provide support, the court shall take into consideration all the factors enumerated in section 46b-84 ․“(g) A parent not granted custody of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic, medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown ․“(i) As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child.”

FN2. In 2002 the plaintiff purchased (the defendant cosigned the loan), a Dodge Stratus for $24,000.   He then installed an $8,000 stereo system.   The parties undertook an additional Tweeter loan of $500 per month..  FN2. In 2002 the plaintiff purchased (the defendant cosigned the loan), a Dodge Stratus for $24,000.   He then installed an $8,000 stereo system.   The parties undertook an additional Tweeter loan of $500 per month.

FN3. Time and time again, the plaintiff has made poor judgments concerning Caden's care.   He has fallen asleep with Caden's crib side down, prioritizes his online work during their time together and been reluctant to break away from the NFL when his young son's interests were clearly elsewhere.   He does not yet fully appreciate the developmental importance of age based care..  FN3. Time and time again, the plaintiff has made poor judgments concerning Caden's care.   He has fallen asleep with Caden's crib side down, prioritizes his online work during their time together and been reluctant to break away from the NFL when his young son's interests were clearly elsewhere.   He does not yet fully appreciate the developmental importance of age based care.

FN4. The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact..  FN4. The Court finds it is more likely than not that the parents would have provided support to the child for higher education or private occupational school if the family were intact.

Calmar, Harry E., J.