James Stoller et al. v. Diane Mucha et al. (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE # 106

The defendants, Diane Mucha and Daniel Mucha, filed this motion to strike and memorandum in support of the motion on September 10, 2009, in which they move to strike the second, third, sixth and seventh counts of the complaint as well as the corresponding prayers for relief.   In response, the plaintiffs, James Stoller and Sharon Stoller, filed an objection and a memorandum in opposition to the defendants' motion on September 17, 2009.

On July 28, 2009, the plaintiffs filed an eight-count complaint against the defendants.¹  The plaintiffs allege the following facts in their complaint.   On July 27, 2007, the plaintiffs were traveling in a motor vehicle on a road in North Stonington, Connecticut, when Diane Mucha crossed over the center line and struck the plaintiffs' vehicle head-on.   At the time of the incident, Diane Mucha was under the influence of drugs and/or alcohol and operating her cellular telephone.   The defendants both owned the vehicle that Diane Mucha was operating.   As a result of the accident, the plaintiffs sustained multiple injuries.

All four counts at issue allege claims against Diane Mucha alone.   The second and sixth counts allege statutory recklessness claims, and the third and seventh counts allege common law recklessness claims.   The second and third counts are brought by James Stoller, and the sixth and seventh counts are brought by Sharon Stoller.

LAW OF MOTION TO STRIKE

“Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ․ or of any one or more counts thereof, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in any such complaint ․ that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof.”  Practice Book § 10-39(a).   In ruling on a motion to strike, “[t]he role of the trial court [is] to examine the [complaint], construed in favor of the [plaintiff], to determine whether the [plaintiff has] stated a legally sufficient cause of action.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Dodd v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 242 Conn. 375, 378, 698 A.2d 859 (1997).

DISCUSSION

The defendants argue that the second, third, sixth and seventh counts of the complaint do not support causes of action for common law and statutory recklessness because the plaintiffs fail to allege facts in the counts that are separate and distinct from those that they rely on in their claims for negligence.   The plaintiffs respond that the facts alleged are sufficient to support causes of action for common law and statutory recklessness.   Additionally, the plaintiffs argue that a recklessness cause of action is not deficient merely because the same underlying facts are used to allege that the defendants engaged in both reckless and negligent conduct and that the majority of the judges of the Superior Court interpret § 14-295 to require only that plaintiffs plead the general allegations enumerated in the statute.

This court has previously considered and addressed the pleading requirements for both common law recklessness and statutory recklessness under § 14-295.   With respect to common law recklessness, “a complaint is not deficient so long as it utilizes language explicit enough to inform the court and opposing counsel that both negligence and reckless misconduct are being asserted.”   (Internal quotation marks omitted.)   Martin v. Close, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 6001132 (December 11, 2009, Cosgrove, J.).   Regarding statutory recklessness under § 14-295, “a plaintiff successfully pleads a cause of action for statutory recklessness if the plaintiff generally alleges that the defendant has deliberately or with reckless disregard violated one of the enumerated statutes in § 14-295, and the violation was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs injuries.”   Maguire v. Johnson, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 09 5012655 (November 4, 2009, Cosgrove, J.).

In the present case, the allegations in the third and seventh counts address Diane Mucha's state of mind at the time of the accident as well as the conduct that gives rise to the cause of action for common law recklessness.   The plaintiffs allege in the second and sixth counts that Diane Mucha violated several of the statutes enumerated in § 14-295 and that Diane Mucha's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' injuries.   Thus, the plaintiffs have satisfied the pleading requirements for common law recklessness and statutory recklessness under § 14-295.   Accordingly, the motion to strike is denied.

The Court

Cosgrove, J.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. The plaintiffs named Diane M. Mucha, Daniel P. Mucha, DPM Electrical Contractors, LLC and Progressive Northern Insurance Company as defendants in the action.   The pending motion to strike, however, was filed only by Diane Mucha and Daniel Mucha.   Thus, Diane Mucha and Daniel Mucha will be referred to as “the defendants” hereinafter..  FN1. The plaintiffs named Diane M. Mucha, Daniel P. Mucha, DPM Electrical Contractors, LLC and Progressive Northern Insurance Company as defendants in the action.   The pending motion to strike, however, was filed only by Diane Mucha and Daniel Mucha.   Thus, Diane Mucha and Daniel Mucha will be referred to as “the defendants” hereinafter.

Cosgrove, Emmet L., J.