AMICA v. CT (2009)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (# 110)

Neither the complaint nor any special defense refers to the so called “Pipe Safe Protection Plan,” hereafter the plan.   It first appeared in the plaintiff's objection to this motion and is now the controlling issue.

At oral argument the parties relied on the terms of the plan in support of their respective positions.   As framed by the parties, the dispositive issue for this Court, as a matter of law, is whether or not the plan language expressly and unequivocally precludes the subrogation claim made in this action.

The following facts are not in dispute or are clear from the plain and unambiguous language of the plan:

1.  The plan covers only the cost of repair of the pipe itself.

2. It does not cover consequential damages such as those sought here.

3. The subrogating plaintiff seeks reimbursement only for consequential damages.   It did not reimburse its insured for repair of the pipe itself.

4. The plan expressly limits any responsibility of the defendant to pipe repair and it expressly excludes any responsibility on the part of the defendant for any consequential damages.

5. By its clear and unequivocal terms the defendant is not responsible for the damages sought here.   The plaintiff not having paid for pipe repair, has no basis for subrogation as a matter of law.

6. Even if a duty to inspect and repair can somehow be extrapolated from what is plain and unambiguous language to the contrary, damages are still expressly limited to repair of the water pipe itself.   Accordingly, any duty to inspect is moot.

The plaintiff's claim for ambiguity in the Plan language is without merit.   In this regard this Court's analysis is informed by Auto Glass Express, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co. 293 Conn. 218 (2009).

Ordinarily the parties' intent is a question of fact.  Bristol v Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284 Conn. 1, 7, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).   Where a party's intent is expressed clearly and unambiguously in writing, however, “the determination of what the parties intended ․ is a question of law [over which our review is plenary].”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Id.;  see also Mercer Electric Mfg. Co. v Connecticut Electric Mfg. Co., 87 Conn. 691, 694, 89 A. 909 (1914) (interpretation of party's written offer legal question to be decide by court).  “The intent of the parties as expressed in [writing] is determined from the language used interpreted in the light of the situation of the parties and the circumstances connected with the transaction ․ [T]he intent of the parties is to be ascertained by a fair and reasonable construction of the written words and ․ the language used must be accorded its common, natural, and ordinary meaning and usage where it can be sensibly applied to the subject matter of the [writing].   Where the language of the [writing] is clear and unambiguous, the [writing] is to be given effect according to its terms.   A court will not torture words to import ambiguity where the ordinary meaning leaves no room for ambiguity ․ Similarly, any ambiguity in a [written instrument] must emanate from the language used in the [writing] rather than from one party's subjective perception of the terms.”  (Internal quotation marks omitted.)  Connecticut Light & Power Co. v Lighthouse Landings, Inc., 279 Conn. 90, 109-10, 900 A.2d 1242 (2006).  Id., PP 225-26.

Subrogation is not available here because the plaintiff has paid for damages for which the defendant is not responsible as a matter of law.   There can be no subrogation here under the express exclusion of consequential damages.   The plaintiff has not paid for damage to the pipe itself which is the only exposure the defendant has under the plan.   The plaintiff stands in the shoes of its insured and has no greater rights.

The briefs of the parties make no distinction between the first count in negligence and the second count in recklessness.   The defendant has moved for summary judgment on both.   The plaintiff's opposition is based solely on a claim of ambiguity and does not further address the second count making the Court's forgoing analysis applicable to both.

Motion granted.

Joseph A. Licari, Jr. Judge

Licari, Joseph A., J.