IN RE: POWERED BY PEOPLE AND ROBERT FRANCIS O'ROURKE (2026)

OPINION

In August of 2025, a substantial minority of the members of the Texas House of Representatives briefly left the state, thwarting a quorum and impeding the chamber from conducting business for two weeks. On August 8th, the State sued Relators, Powered by People (“PxP”) and Robert Francis “Beto” O'Rourke, in Tarrant County district court, claiming they violated the DTPA by soliciting political contributions to support allegedly personal expenses of the quorum-breaking members. On that same day but 39 minutes later, Relator PxP sued the Attorney General in El Paso County district court for a protective order arising from the same dispute between the same parties. A swarm of filings, hearings, and orders ensued in both district courts, including two appeals from conflicting orders by the two district courts, each filed in this Court one day apart.

In this petition for writ of mandamus from the Tarrant County district court, Relators challenged four orders issued by that court within days of each other. We initially granted an administrative stay pending further review, and 17 days later granted temporary relief staying the trial court's temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against the Relators' political fundraising activities as a prior restraint of speech.¹ Final disposition was delayed by evolving facts and arguments as the parties filed new pleadings, new briefs, and sought postponement of oral argument.

For purposes of this proceeding, the principal evolution was the State's decision to nonsuit all claims for any injunctive relief on October 22, 2025. For the reasons stated below, that nonsuit rendered moot our review of three of the four orders Relators challenge: (1) granting the State's TRO—a claim it has now nonsuited (see part I); (2) denying expedited discovery that Relators sought for a hearing on a temporary injunction—also nonsuited (see part II); and (3) denying Relators' motion to transfer venue to El Paso County because the State primarily sought injunctive relief—also nonsuited (see part III). On the fourth order, we affirm as modified the Tarrant County court's anti-suit TRO barring Relators from prosecuting this same dispute with the same parties in El Paso because the Tarrant County court obtained dominant jurisdiction by exactly 39 minutes (see part IV).

BACKGROUND

On July 9, 2025, Governor Abbott called a special session of the Texas Legislature to consider several matters, including “a revised congressional redistricting plan in light of constitutional concerns raised by the U.S. Department of Justice.” A group of 54 Democratic members of the Texas House of Representatives who opposed the plan left the State on August 3, 2025, depriving the chamber of a quorum.² Undaunted, on August 15th, Governor Abbott called a second special session immediately following the first.³ Throughout this stalemate, former congressman O'Rourke publicly opposed the redistricting plan and conducted fundraising appeals and rallies to “have the backs” of the absent lawmakers by donating to PxP, a Texas nonprofit corporation he founded operating as a political organization under 26 U.S.C. § 527(e)(1).

Trial court proceedings

The State filed the underlying lawsuit against Relators in Tarrant County on August 8, 2025. It alleged that Relators violated the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA) by claiming to solicit donations for lawful political purposes when they were actually to be used to illegally fund the absent legislators' personal expenses.⁴ The DTPA permits the Attorney General's consumer protection division to file suit to enjoin any person violating the DTPA,⁵ but it is hotly disputed whether this consumer-oriented statute does or could cover deceptive political speech or fundraising.⁶ Noting that Relators had scheduled a fundraising rally to take place in Fort Worth in the near future, the State asserted that a TRO was needed to prevent deceptive acts and to avoid “irreparable injury, loss, or damage.”

The trial court issued a TRO later that same day based on the pleadings, affidavits, and arguments of counsel, finding that Relators' “fundraising conduct constitutes false, misleading, or deceptive acts under the [DTPA] because [they] are raising and utilizing political contributions from Texas consumers to pay for the personal expenses of Texas legislators in violation of Texas law.”⁷ The TRO (originally and as modified a week later) restrained Relators and those in active concert or participation with them from (i) using political funds to pay for out-of-state travel, hotel, or dining expenses, or any fines under legislative rules on unexcused absences; (ii) raising funds for the same purposes; (iii) providing such travel services in-kind; and (iv) removing property or funds from the state pending the lawsuit. The modified TRO set a hearing on the State's request for a temporary injunction for September 2, 2025.

Between those two events on August 8th in Tarrant County, PxP filed suit in El Paso County seeking a protective order against enforcement of a Request to Examine documents (RTE) from the Attorney General dated two days earlier.⁸ The RTE sought communications to or from PxP regarding the quorum break and the “planned or actual travel arrangements, accommodations, or meals outside of Texas” of the absent legislators; it threatened that failure to comply could result in penalties and revocation of PxP's charter.⁹

A flurry of filings and orders too numerous to list ensued in the competing district courts, but the orders relevant for this proceeding are the following:

• On August 11, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to transfer venue to El Paso County, alleging that venue was mandatory there under § 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code; the Tarrant County court denied that motion on August 15th.

• On August 13, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to dissolve the TRO as a prior restraint on speech; after an oral hearing, the Tarrant County court denied that motion on August 19th.

• On August 20, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County an emergency motion for expedited reciprocal discovery needed for the upcoming September 2nd TI hearing; the Tarrant County court denied that motion five days later.

• On August 19, 2025, the trial court in El Paso County signed an anti-suit TRO barring the Attorney General from “initiating, filing, or prosecuting any quo warranto proceeding against [PxP] without leave of this Court.”

• On August 25, 2025, the Tarrant County court responded by signing an anti-suit TRO barring Relators from “seek[ing] to restrain or enjoin the State from initiating, filing, or prosecuting the quo warranto claims alleged by the State in this proceeding [in Tarrant County].”

Meanwhile, the State informed the trial court at an August 19th hearing that the quorum break had ended the day before and the missing legislators had returned to the state. A few days later, the mid-decade redistricting bill that precipitated the crisis passed and was signed by the Governor on August 29th (effective December 5, 2025).¹⁰

Appellate proceedings

On August 25, 2025, Relators filed this mandamus petition challenging the Tarrant County court's subject-matter jurisdiction and four of its orders: (1) denying their motion to dissolve the TRO; (2) denying their motion to transfer venue to El Paso County; (3) denying their request for reciprocal discovery; and (4) granting an anti-suit TRO preventing them from prosecuting related claims elsewhere. The petition noted that “the lawmakers are back, a quorum was established,” and thus “any imminent need to stop fundraising that ostensibly was to support out-of-state Texas Democratic lawmakers is already over.” But the TRO ostensibly barring political fundraising remained in place.

Along with their petition, Relators requested emergency temporary relief in this Court. In response, we issued a series of orders on August 26th, September 3rd, and September 12th that denied dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, stayed further proceedings in the trial court, preserved the trial court's TRO from expiration, and stayed the TRO pending further orders, agreeing as a preliminary matter that it appeared to be an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech.¹¹

At our request, the parties completed expedited briefing on the merits on September 15, 2025. But that was not the end of the briefing. On October 23, 2025, the State filed a letter brief claiming that review of the TRO was moot, as it had nonsuited all claims for injunctive relief the day before, and with the end of the quorum-break “Relators are no longer engaged in (and cannot engage in) the misconduct the State sought to prevent.”¹² Relators responded on November 3, 2025, arguing that the TRO issues were not moot since the State's pending motions for contempt and for leave to file quo warranto in Tarrant County were dependent on them.

We set this case for oral argument on December 18, 2025, but postponed it until March 12, 2026, on the State's unopposed motion due to family leave of its appellate counsel. Both before and after oral argument, the parties continued to file letter briefs adding new objections and arguments on February 27, March 6, March 27, and April 10 of 2026. This opinion addresses what we understand to be the current status of this proceeding.

JURISDICTION

Relators argue that at the time of filing the trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction of the State's suit. The State's original petition asserted jurisdiction based on § 17.47(a) of the DTPA, which authorizes the Attorney General to “bring an action in the name of the state” to enjoin deceptive acts and practices.¹³ Relators argue the Attorney General has no “standing” because his suit did not seek “to protect consumers against deceptive practices related to the purchase or sale of goods or services.” (emphasis added).¹⁴

“[A] legislature may grant standing to a state attorney general to bring suit for injury done to its citizens,” as “the Texas Legislature has done in many contexts.”¹⁵ The DTPA is one of those contexts, and in such cases the Attorney General does not have to personally be deceived by the very acts of which he complains; requirements like standing and alleging a concrete injury are applied to the “claims asserted by an attorney general, rather than to that official personally.”¹⁶

The State's DTPA petition alleges a concrete injury on behalf of unnamed citizens, whether or not that claim might prove invalid. As we explained in our September 12th order, “failure to establish the elements of a DTPA claim does not strip the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief, although such relief could be erroneous.”¹⁷ “[A] plaintiff does not lack standing in its proper, jurisdictional sense simply because he cannot prevail on the merits of his claim; he lacks standing when his claim of injury is too slight for a court to afford redress.”¹⁸

Then on February 27, 2026, Relators asserted that the State's nonsuit of all injunctive relief “introduced a jurisdictional defect into the proceeding below,” because the DTPA “does not permit, and therefore courts have no jurisdiction to hear, a standalone request for civil penalties.”¹⁹ Section 17.47 is titled “Restraining Orders,” and authorizes the Attorney General to file suit on behalf of the State for various remedies, including specifically a “temporary restraining order” in § 17.47(a), and “[i]n addition to the request for a temporary restraining order, or permanent injunction,” civil penalties in § 17.47(c). Relators construe these provisions to authorize civil penalties only in conjunction with injunctive relief, not as a standalone suit.²⁰ Relators point to the title of § 17.47 (“Restraining Orders”) and to the “in addition to the request” for injunctive relief phrase that introduces the provision for civil penalties. Relators point to no court that has adopted this construction, and we are aware of none.

We do not read the text of § 17.47 as limiting civil penalties to cases where injunctive relief is requested. That construction would restrict the remedies available to the State, contrary to the Act's direction that it be “liberally construed ․ to protect consumers.”²¹ Notably, the DTPA uses “in addition to” not only in § 17.47, but also in § 17.43 for the very purpose of making the various remedies in the Act independent rather than contingent and conditional:

Sec. 17.43. Cumulative Remedies. The provisions of this subchapter are not exclusive. The remedies provided in this subchapter are in addition to any other procedures or remedies provided for in any other law; provided, however, that no recovery shall be permitted under both this subchapter and another law of both damages and penalties for the same act or practice.22

Read in context, “in addition to” in § 17.47 is intended to add independent remedies, not limit them by making them mere supplements that must be tied to other remedies as mere adjuncts.²³ For example, § 17.47(d) provides for “such additional orders or judgments as are necessary to compensate ․ or to restore money or property” to claimants, indicating an intent to cover shortfalls in the Act rather than merely bolster other remedies. The civil penalties remedy itself provides for a base civil penalty up to $10,000 and “an additional amount of not more than $250,000” for deceiving persons older than 65.²⁴ Nothing in either provision indicates that the “additional” remedies have no effect unless accompanied by injunctive relief.²⁵

We reject these jurisdictional challenges.

THE CHALLENGED ORDERS

I. The TRO issues are moot

The State argues, and we agree, that the TRO and other injunctive relief pleaded by the State are moot. Three days after the trial court signed the modified TRO here on August 15, 2025, the quorum-breaking legislators returned to Texas and to their legislative duties.²⁶ The redistricting bill passed soon thereafter, and was signed by Governor Abbott on August 29th, effective December 5, 2025.²⁷

By letter dated October 23, 2025, the State informed us that because “Relators are no longer engaged in (and cannot engage in) the misconduct the State sought to prevent,” “the State no longer has any need or basis to seek prospective injunctive relief—either permanent or temporary.”²⁸ Attached to the letter was the State's Second Amended Petition filed the day before in the trial court deleting all claims for “Temporary and Permanent Injunctive Relief Pursuant to the DTPA.” The only substantive claims remaining in the current petition are (1) civil penalties under the DTPA; and (2) leave to seek forfeiture of PxP's charter in quo warranto.

“In civil causes generally, filing an amended petition that does not include a cause of action effectively nonsuits or voluntarily dismisses the omitted claims as of the time the pleading is filed. No hearing is necessary to effect the nonsuit.”²⁹ The plaintiff's right to nonsuit its claims “is unqualified and absolute” and “does not disappear when trial court proceedings are stayed pending interlocutory appeal.”³⁰ “When a case becomes moot on appeal, a court must vacate any previously issued order or judgment associated with it.”³¹ This rule applies even if only part of an order or judgment is moot.³²

Relators agree that the State's claims for prospective injunctive relief are moot, but argue that validity of the TRO itself remains a live controversy, reminding us that “mootness is difficult to establish” unless “intervening events make it impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief.”³³ But we cannot grant injunctive relief the State no longer seeks, nor can we grant Relators more or better relief from a TRO we stayed nine months ago and now vacate.

Relators urge us to address the TRO under the two primary “exceptions” to mootness: (1) capable of repetition, and (2) collateral consequences.³⁴ We decline for the following reasons.

First, we agree mootness may not apply to a party's voluntary abandonment of injunctive pleadings if the change “ ‘provides no assurance’ that the action will not recur.”³⁵ But the capable-of-repetition limit applies only if “a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.”³⁶ Having pleaded a claim relating only to funding quorum-breaking lawmakers, the Attorney General could not simply change his mind here;³⁷ a repeat would require another quorum break by specific lawmakers that Relators would choose to financially support. Quorum-breaks in the Texas Legislature are not unprecedented,³⁸ but fortunately for the viability of popular elections they are rare, and have generally proved ineffective in the end.³⁹ Constitutional law governing re-districting litigation has been unsettled and evolving in recent years, but no one argues another quorum-break is expected in the near future.

Second, Relators argue that the State's remaining claims for civil penalties, quo warranto, and contempt are collateral consequences that prevent mootness. “But a dispute remains live under the collateral-consequences exception only if the otherwise-moot claim itself is the source of a sufficiently concrete collateral consequence. If the consequence would exist regardless, then the case remains moot.”⁴⁰ Here, the State's quo warranto pleading seeks to terminate PxP's charter for “violations of criminal law,” not violations of the TRO.⁴¹ Likewise, the State sought civil penalties “per DTPA violation,” not per TRO violation. The validity of those claims is not before us, because in both claims any consequences would be due to alleged violations of the DTPA, not of the TRO.

We agree that collateral consequences could include subsequent contempt proceedings if the threat is “sufficiently concrete.” Regarding restraints of speech, Texas courts generally do not follow the “collateral bar rule” requiring obedience to such orders until judicial relief is obtained.⁴² The general rule is that a party “may not be held guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a void order.”⁴³ In our order of September 12th we noted several potentially fatal defects in the TRO itself, but held only on the limited evidentiary record there (which has not appreciably changed) that it was “far from clear” that the State had overcome the rule that prior restraints of speech are presumptively unconstitutional.⁴⁴ And since the State conceded the TRO was no longer needed once the quorum-break ended, the TRO was in effect for only 10 days.

The State's motion for contempt was neither heard nor decided by the trial court. As always, we hesitate to decide complaints that have yet to be presented to or ruled on by the trial court.⁴⁵ The same is true for constitutional questions on an unsettled record regarding operations of a separate branch of Texas government.⁴⁶ As we noted last September, “[i]t is a novel question whether expenses for food, transportation, and lodging outside Texas by officeholders who should be on duty in Texas when the Legislature is in session are legitimate political expenses or illegitimate personal ones.” There is also the question here whether the consumer-oriented DTPA even applies to political campaigns. We did not decide these questions then, and cannot decide them now since the TRO itself is moot.

We disagree with today's dissent that these issues can be easily decided on the record we already have. The Texas Constitution prohibits prior restraints of speech, but holds speakers “responsible for the abuse of that privilege.”⁴⁷ The terms and validity of the TRO may be one element of the contempt, quo warranto, and civil penalty issues that remain pending below, but those should be addressed in the first instance by the trial court based on a full record. If the State proceeds with criminal contempt on remand,⁴⁸ and evidence shows the funds raised here were intended to some extent for expenses that were clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt personal in nature, then the TRO may have been overbroad but not necessarily void; but if the funds were intended for what were arguably political expenses then criminal contempt would be improper. Whatever the outcome, an appellate court can then review those issues on a full record by mandamus or a final judgment.⁴⁹

Taking all these factors into consideration, we hold that the likelihood of contempt is not sufficiently concrete to avoid mootness here. As all claims for injunctive relief are moot, we vacate the trial court's TRO.

II. The Discovery order is moot

Relators filed an “Emergency Motion for Reciprocal Expedited Discovery” in the Tarrant County court on August 20th, seeking discovery from the State to prepare for a temporary injunction hearing set for September 2nd. The trial court denied it on August 25th. That injunction hearing was stayed by our order, and the State has now nonsuited that claim. Accordingly, we vacate that order as moot.

III. The Venue order denying transfer to El Paso County is moot

On August 11, 2025, Relators filed in Tarrant County a motion to transfer venue to El Paso County, alleging that venue was mandatory there under § 65.023 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The Tarrant County court denied that motion four days later. Relators argue this was an abuse of discretion. We generally do not review orders granting or denying a motion to transfer venue until a final appeal.⁵⁰ But a statutory exception requires us to do so here.

Both state law and court rules prohibit interlocutory appeal of venue orders.⁵¹ But in 1995 the Legislature added § 15.0642 to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code to authorize mandamus review “to enforce the mandatory venue provisions of this chapter.”⁵² That chapter includes Subchapter B, listing a dozen or so mandatory venue rules, as well as a catch-all rule extending to “any other statute prescribing mandatory venue.”⁵³ Relators argue that § 65.023 is such a statute, requiring mandatory venue in El Paso County where both Relators are domiciled. We thus have mandamus jurisdiction to review whether the Tarrant County court erred by failing to transfer venue.⁵⁴

Section 65.023 provides that “a writ of injunction against a party who is a resident of this state shall be tried in a district or county court in the county in which the party is domiciled.”⁵⁵ The State does not dispute that both Relators are domiciled in El Paso County. But an injunction is a remedy that could be tacked on to a multitude of lawsuits, so Texas courts for at least 60 years have held this mandatory venue provision applies only to suits “in which the relief sought is purely or primarily injunctive.”⁵⁶ The State claims its lawsuit was not primarily injunctive, but instead “primarily seeks to impose civil penalties under the DTPA.” In reviewing this issue, we employ “a commonsense analysis” that asks whether injunctive relief was “the dominant purpose or central focus of the lawsuit” or was “merely ancillary to the primary relief sought.”⁵⁷

The difficulty here is that a “commonsense analysis” of the facts is different today than it was when the TRO was signed. Back then, the parties hotly disputed whether the primary relief the State sought was the injunctive relief rather than the civil penalties, as the State pleaded both. That was a close question because both are listed as remedies in the same DTPA section,⁵⁸ and both provide the same base penalty for violating either a DTPA injunction or the DTPA itself.⁵⁹

But that dispute became moot when the State voluntarily dropped all its claims for injunctive relief. As matters currently stand in the trial court, a “commonsense analysis” could reach only one conclusion: the primary relief sought is not injunctive relief since the State nonsuited all such claims. An appellate court after a final trial would have to “consider the entire record”—including that nonsuit—and a transfer to El Paso County would “in no event be harmless error and shall be reversible error.”⁶⁰ We would not do anyone any favors by transferring these proceedings to a county for a plenary trial that would be certain to be reversed on final appeal.

But we need not ignore the intervening developments under the unusual circumstances here. Courts can do nothing without jurisdiction,⁶¹ so they must consider intervening events that raise a question whether a dispute has been rendered moot. “Events taking place subsequent to the issuance of a temporary injunction” are generally not considered “unless such occurrences render the cause for injunctive relief entirely moot or academic.”⁶² In such cases, they must be considered “for the purpose of determining whether the issue is moot, a jurisdictional question.”⁶³ Viewing the entire record, the Tarrant County court reached the right result even if perhaps for the wrong reason.

Relators also argue that mandatory venue lay in El Paso because actions “to stay proceedings in a suit shall be brought in the county in which the suit is pending.”⁶⁴ But the State did not seek to stay a suit pending in El Paso; it sought to stay Relators from pursuing that suit. Relators' contrary argument here actually cuts both ways; PxP too would have had to file its anti-suit TRO in Tarrant County, which it failed to do.⁶⁵ The solution to competing anti-suit orders is not to stymie either court from hearing them.

Here, no other basis for enforcing mandatory venue is cited by the parties other than those we have rejected. Accordingly, the State's nonsuit thus renders moot Relators' motion to transfer venue to El Paso County, and we dismiss that portion of their petition because we lack power to do anything else.

IV. The Anti-Suit TRO from Tarrant County was proper

Just as the impasse in the Texas Legislature was ending, the parties created a judicial impasse in the Texas courts. “It is not unusual for parties with a choice of forums to prefer one over another, and when more than one party can sue on the same subject matter, they may choose different courts.”⁶⁶ Here, the State filed suit in Tarrant County, and the Relators filed suit in El Paso County, both involving the same parties and the same dispute about Relators' political fundraising. Each side sought to restrain the other from proceeding in the other county, and the trial courts in each county granted both. The problem is that “once a matter is before a court of competent jurisdiction, ‘its action must necessarily be exclusive’ because it is ‘impossible that two courts can, at the same time, possess the power to make a final determination of the same controversy between the same parties.’ ”⁶⁷

Unlike Texas lawmakers, Texas lawsuits generally cannot leave the State. As a court of appeals with statewide jurisdiction, we can review suits by or against the State from both trial courts.⁶⁸ Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to settle this matter—subject of course to ultimate review by the Texas Supreme Court.

On August 19, 2025, Relators obtained an anti-suit TRO from the El Paso County district court barring the Attorney General “from initiating, filing, or prosecuting any quo warranto proceeding against [PxP] without leave of this Court.” As the only county where the Attorney General had filed such a proceeding was Tarrant County, that order sought to bar the State's suit in that court. In response, on August 25, 2025, the State sought and obtained an anti-suit TRO from the district court in Tarrant County, barring Relators from “[i]nitiating, filing, or prosecuting” any proceeding that would interfere with the State's quo warranto suit in Fort Worth. If both sides complied with these orders, nothing further could happen in either court.

Anti-suit injunctions are often appealable in Texas,⁶⁹ most often “to address a threat to the court's jurisdiction.”⁷⁰ In such circumstances, the rule established by the Texas Supreme Court has been that “where inherently interrelated suits are pending in two counties, and venue is proper in either county, the court in which suit was first filed acquires dominant jurisdiction.”⁷¹ This analysis proceeds in three steps: (1) whether the competing suits are inherently interrelated; (2) whether venue is proper in both counties; and (3) which suit was filed first.⁷² If (1) is not true, both courts may proceed. If (2) is not true, only the county with proper venue may proceed. But if both are true, issue (3) governs which court has dominant jurisdiction and “may protect its jurisdiction by enjoining the parties to a suit subsequently filed in another court of this state.”⁷³

Neither side denies that these cases are inherently interrelated. The petitions filed in these two courts 600 miles apart address whether PxP's solicitation of political contributions to support the expenses of the quorum-breaking lawmakers was lawful. The State's brief asserts that the two lawsuits “are clearly interrelated,” and PxP's brief asserts that conflicting filings and orders by the two courts “have created a complete quagmire” and “chaos.” Since each court has enjoined one side from proceeding in the other court, the two are inherently interrelated.

But the parties disagree whether venue was proper in both counties. This again creates some tension with the general rule that venue orders are not subject to interim appellate review. Yet there is no way to resolve the impasse here without reviewing whether venue is proper in both counties, as that is a key prerequisite for dominant jurisdiction: “unless venue would be proper in both [counties], the concept of ‘dominant jurisdiction’ is inapplicable.”⁷⁴ Accordingly, we must decide whether either county had proper venue to settle which anti-suit injunction is proper.

The State does not dispute that El Paso County could be a proper venue for the DTPA claims, as it is the county where both Relators are domiciled.⁷⁵ But the State argues that Tarrant County could also be a proper venue for its DTPA claims, under both (i) the DTPA's venue provision authorizing suit wherever a defendant “has done business, or in the district court of the county where the transaction occurred”;⁷⁶ and (ii) the general venue statute's provision that suit may be brought “in the county in which all or a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.”⁷⁷ The State points to Relators' fundraising rally and statements made in Tarrant County on August 9th, which it alleges constitute actions violating the DTPA and a substantial part of the events giving rise to its claims. Relators vigorously defend their conduct as constitutionally protected, but they do not claim the rally and statements the State alleges did not actually occur in Tarrant County. Accordingly, the Tarrant County court did not abuse its discretion by finding venue in Tarrant County was proper also.

This leaves only the question of which was filed first, a matter here decided not by a calendar but by a stopwatch. The State filed its DTPA suit in Tarrant County on August 8, 2025—precisely at 2:46 pm Central Daylight Time. PxP filed its suit in El Paso County on the same day—precisely at 2:25 pm Mountain Daylight Time. Due to the different time zones, the latter was filed 39 minutes after the former, so the Tarrant County suit was filed first and obtained dominant jurisdiction by a matter of minutes. The Tarrant County court thus did not abuse its discretion by enjoining Relators from pursuing the same claim in the second-filed case.⁷⁸

Yet due to an intervening order by our Court, we instruct the Tarrant County court to modify its anti-suit TRO in one respect. We recently addressed the Attorney General's interlocutory appeal from the El Paso County anti-suit TRO, which complained that it was an implicit denial of the State's plea to the jurisdiction and its statutory right of interlocutory appeal.⁷⁹ On June 12, 2026, we abated that appeal and directed the trial court to rule on that jurisdictional plea before proceeding further.⁸⁰ Accordingly, we direct the Tarrant County court to modify its anti-suit TRO to allow Relators and the State to appear on that limited issue to comply with this Court's June 12th order.

CONCLUSION

“When a case becomes moot on appeal, a court must vacate any previously issued order or judgment associated with it.”⁸¹ Because the State has unequivocally nonsuited its claims for DTPA injunctive relief against Relators, we lift our previous stay orders and vacate the trial court's TRO against them, as well as the associated orders denying discovery and transfer for mandatory venue. We deny relief on Relator's remaining claim challenging the Tarrant County court's anti-suit TRO as modified by this opinion.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

“A case is not rendered moot simply because some of the issues become moot during the appellate process; rather, if only some claims or issues become moot, the case remains ‘live,’ at least as to other claims or issues that are not moot.” Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 877 (Tex. 2025) (citation modified). Because the State has filed a now-pending motion for criminal contempt, the issue of whether the temporary restraining order (TRO) is valid is still live. While I agree with much of the majority opinion, I disagree that Relators' challenge to the validity of the TRO is moot. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from Part I of The Challenged Orders section and join the reminder of the opinion.

I.

Four days after the trial court entered the TRO restraining certain actions of Robert Francis O'Rourke, Powered by People (jointly, Relators), and certain people affiliated with them, the State filed a Motion for Contempt asserting that Relators “repeatedly violated and continue to violate, at least two subsections of the TRO ․” The motion is still pending and the State confirmed at oral argument that the State was “not disavowing” the contempt motion. The majority concludes that despite the pending criminal contempt motion, Relators' challenge to the validity of the TRO is moot. I disagree.

“A case becomes moot when there ceases to be a justiciable controversy between the parties or when the parties cease to have ‘a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.’ ” State ex rel. Best v. Harper, 562 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001)). “Mootness occurs when events make it impossible for the court to grant the relief requested or otherwise ‘affect the parties’ rights or interests.’ ” Id. (quoting Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012)). Further, “[m]ootness is difficult to establish. The party asserting it must prove that intervening events make it ‘impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party.’ ” Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 876 (quoting In re Dallas Cnty., 697 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2024)).

Recognizing that a case is moot when a court cannot grant effectual relief, the majority concludes that the Court cannot grant injunctive relief that the State is no longer seeking, nor can it “grant Relators more or better relief from a TRO we stayed nine months ago and now vacate.” Ante at 12. But as the Texas Supreme Court has explained, relief is effectual when “it would resolve a live dispute and affect the plaintiff's rights ․” Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 876. And as the majority recognizes, a party “may not be held guilty of contempt for refusing to obey a void order.” Ante at 13 (quoting In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex. 2021)). In this case, the Relators argue that the TRO is void, and the State argues that the TRO is not void. Our prior order in this case recognized that the order itself is likely void for noncompliance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Accordingly, there is a live dispute on the question of whether the TRO is void.

Our sister courts have consistently recognized that a challenge to an expired injunction is not moot when there is a pending contempt motion. Emps. Mut. Cas. Co. v. Coxsey, 718 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, writ dism'd) (“We find that the pending contempt motion prevents us from concluding that the appeal before us has become moot.”); Propst v. Propst, No. 13-18-00291-CV, 2019 WL 5609964, at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburgh Oct. 31, 2019, no pet.) (“[T]he existence of the pending contempt motion forestalls a mootness determination ․”); Cool World & Can, Inc. v. State, No. 01-01-00966-CV, 2002 WL 31319965, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Oct. 17, 2002, no pet.) (“[I]f the injunction is valid, appellants are subject to being held in contempt of court. Therefore, the appeal is not moot.”). None of these courts appeared to find the question particularly difficult. This Court should not be the first to hold to the contrary.

The majority additionally points out that the motion for contempt has not been heard or decided by the trial court, and we hesitate to decide complaints on which the trial court has not ruled. Ante at 14. That may be so. But the question to be resolved here is not whether Relators violated the TRO and should be held in contempt. It is whether the TRO already issued by the trial court, and on which the State seeks to base a contempt order is valid or void. That question can and should be resolved by this Court.

II.

Having concluded that the challenge to the validity of the TRO is not moot, I would first address the State's argument that the TRO is not void. This Court addressed this issue in the September 12, 2025 order on Relators' Motion for Emergency Relief seeking a stay of the TRO and concluded that the TRO failed to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. As we explained in that order, Rule 683 requires that a temporary restraining order shall “set forth the reasons for its issuance [and] shall be specific in terms ․” Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. The Rule 683 requirements “are mandatory and must be strictly followed.” In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d at 722 (quoting InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d at 641). An order that fails to meet these requirements is subject to being declared void. Id.

Under Rule 683, every temporary restraining order must “set forth the reasons why the court deems it proper to issue the writ to prevent injury to the applicant in the interim; that is, the reasons why the court believes the applicant's probable right will be endangered if the writ does not issue.” Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 553 (Tex. 1953); see also State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971) (“[I]t is necessary to give the reasons why injury will be suffered if the interlocutory relief is not ordered.”). The required explanation of why injury will result if the interlocutory relief is not ordered may not be conclusory. In re Cnty. of Hidalgo, 655 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, orig. proceeding). Rather, to comply with Rule 683, an order must provide specific reasons why injury will result in the absence of a temporary injunction. In re Chaumette, 456 S.W.3d 299, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding); see Caniglio v. Woods, 593 S.W.3d 856, 857 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.) (vacating a temporary injunction that failed to “adequately recite specific reasons supporting the finding of irreparable harm, as required by Rule 683”).

The TRO in this case fails to comply with the Rule 683 requirements. The TRO states

The Court finds that harm is imminent to the State, and if the Court does not issue this order, the State will be irreparably injured. Specifically, Defendants' fundraising conduct constitutes false, misleading, or deceptive acts under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46(a), (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(7), and (b)(24), because Defendants are raising and utilizing political contributions from Texas consumers to pay for the personal expenses of Texas legislators, in violation of Texas law. Because this conduct is unlawful and harms Texas consumers, restraining this conduct is in the public interest. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a); see also TEX. CONST. art. III, § 5.

[MR 710] The TRO's conclusion that the State will be irreparably injured is conclusory as there are no specific reasons or any evidence supporting that finding. See Hidalgo, 655 S.W.3d at 53. I would hold that the TRO is void for failing to satisfy the requirements of Rule 683.

I would also address Relators' argument that the TRO is invalid as an unconstitutional prior restraint under the Texas Constitution.¹

The Texas Constitution provides that “[e]very person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. “[T]his fundamental right recognizes the ‘transcendent importance of such freedom to the search for truth, the maintenance of democratic institutions, and the happiness of individual men.’ ” Kinney v. Barnes, 443 S.W.3d 87, 90 (Tex. 2014) (quoting TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8 interp. Commentary (West 2007)). Judicial orders “ ‘forbidding certain communications’ that are ‘issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur’ ” are prior restraints. Id. (quoting Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993)). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, “prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”² Id. (quoting Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976)); see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 469 (2007) (“The freedom of speech ․ guaranteed by the Constitution embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.” (quoting First Nat. Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))).

Similarly, Texas courts view “pre-speech sanctions” with such skepticism that they are “presumptively unconstitutional.” Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 90 (citing Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 9 (Tex. 1992)); see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”). Accordingly, “[t]he proponent of such restraints ․ ‘carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.’ ” Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 94 (quoting Org. for a Better Aus. v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)). With the “presumptively unconstitutional” concept in mind, the Texas Supreme Court adopted a test to determine whether a prior restraint withstands constitutional scrutiny. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10. A prior restraint is only valid “where there are specific findings supported by evidence that (1) an imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial process will deprive litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and (2) the judicial action represents the least restrictive means to prevent that harm.” Id.

The TRO in this case expressly restrains Relators, “their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those persons or entities in active concert or participation with” Relators from the following:

i. Using political funds for the improper, unlawful, and non-political purposes of (1) funding out-of-state travel, hotel, or dining accommodations or services to unexcused Texas legislators during any special legislative session called by the Texas Governor, or (2) funding payments of fines provided by Texas House rules for unexcused legislative absences;

ii. Raising funds for non-political purposes, including to (1) fund out-of-state travel, hotel, or dining accommodations or services to unexcused Texas legislators during any special legislative session called by the Texas Governor, or (2) fund payments of fines provided by Texas House rules for unexcused legislative absences, through the ActBlue platform or any other platform that purports to exist for political fundraising purposes; ․

iii. Offering, conferring, or agreeing to confer, travel, hotel, or dining accommodations or services (or funds to support such accommodations or services) to unexcused Texas legislators during any special legislative session called by the Texas Governor as consideration for a violation of such legislators' Constitutional duties; [and]

[iv.] [R]emoving any property or funds that belong to, or are being held for, Defendant Powered by People and/or Defendant O'Rourke, from the State of Texas during the pendency of this lawsuit.

The State claims that Relators' political speech was not restrained by the TRO in any way because the TRO only restrained “conduct.” Despite the restraints on raising and using funds, the State claims that “Relators were and remain free to make any political statements they want ․ and were free to raise funds as they did prior to August 2025.” Contrary to the State's argument, the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected a circuit court's conclusion that expenditure limitations should be viewed as regulating conduct and not speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1976) (per curiam). As both the Texas and United States Supreme Courts have recognized, “expenditure limitations ‘operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion of public issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution.’ ” Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 41 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 410–11 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Political speech is the primary object of First Amendment protection․ And that free exchange [of political information] should receive the most protection when it matters the most—during campaigns for elective office.”).

Further, “[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment.” United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (plurality opinion). And “solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech ․, and for the reality that without solicitation the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease.” Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (quoting Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980)). Accordingly, the TRO's restrictions on Relators' solicitation and expenditure of funds are prior restraints on speech.

The State also claims that the TRO does not constitute a prior restraint because it does not restrain protected speech. The State asserts that the “narrowly tailored” TRO in this case regulates fraudulent and deceptive conduct, citing Reynolds v. Murphy, 188 S.W.3d 252, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied) for the proposition that “the First Amendment does not protect fraudulent or deceptive speech.” [Id.] But the State overlooks that in the context of a prior restraint, the only misleading speech that renders the bar on prior restraints inapplicable is misleading or deceptive commercial speech. See Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 394–95 (Tex. App. —Austin 2000, no pet.) (explaining that because of the nature of commercial speech, restraints are appropriate to prevent deceptive speech (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979))); Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 172 n.120 (1998) (“Schemes that restrain speech before a court makes a final adjudication that the speech is unprotected risk restraining protected speech as well as unprotected speech. When that risk is borne by speech that is fully protected—such as nonobscene movies or nonlibelous newspaper articles—the prior restraint cases hold that this is too grave a restraint on free speech. But when the risk is borne by commercial speech, which even when protected is considered to be of lower value than noncommercial speech, then the First Amendment cost of erroneous temporary restraint is considerably less.” (citation omitted)); cf. Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 94 n.11, 99 (holding that the Texas Constitution does not permit prior restraints on speech related to statements that have been adjudicated defamatory even though defamatory language is not protected by the constitution and recognizing that “we cannot divorce the type and quality of speech at issue ․ from the constitutionality of restraining it”).

And in order for a court to conclude that an injunction restrains misleading or deceptive commercial speech, evidence must support a finding that the speech was commercial and misleading and therefore not protected by the constitution. See Marketshare Telecom, L.L.C. v. Ericsson, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 908, 919 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (“[M]isrepresentations in commercial speech can only be restrained if ․ the applicant first establishes that commercial speech that was false and misleading has actually been uttered. We do not find support in the law for the position that a party can be generally prohibited from making misrepresentations without that type of proof.”); Minton, 33 S.W.3d at 394–96 (considering testimony from a temporary injunction hearing and record evidence to conclude that the enjoined speech was made in a commercial context and caused deception and confusion and therefore the prohibition against prior restraints was inapplicable).

The parties disagree over the type of speech restrained here, but regardless, the State failed to present any evidence that it was false or misleading. See Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sur. Bank, N.A., 156 S.W.3d 125, 130–31 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (holding that a temporary injunction was a prior restraint and rejecting an argument that the prior restraint was permissible when the enjoined speech was commercial because the record did “not establish that the speech at issue here was false or misleading, [so] its classification as commercial speech or noncommercial speech is not controlling”). In the TRO, the trial court stated that Relators'

fundraising conduct constitutes false, misleading, or deceptive acts under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE §§ 17.46(a), (b)(2), (b)(5), (b)(7), and (b)(24), because [Relators] are raising and utilizing political contributions from Texas consumers to pay for the personal expenses of Texas legislators, in violation of Texas law.

But there is no evidence to support those findings. The evidence in support of the original temporary restraining order was simply a proclamation of Governor Abbott calling an “extraordinary session of the 89th Legislature.” And at the hearing in support of its request for a modification of that order, the State introduced evidence of a video of a rally hosted by PxP and a video of an interview of O'Rourke by California Governor Gavin Newsom. The State does not explain how this evidence supports the trial court's findings. Without such evidence, the prohibition on prior restraint applies.

Significantly, nothing in this dissent should be construed as saying that it is lawful for elected representatives to spend campaign funds to support their expenses while fleeing the state and deserting their responsibilities as elected officials. If a court ultimately determines that such spending is unlawful, those responsible could be punished after the fact. But the question of whether any such expenditures would be lawful is not before us today. As noted above, under Davenport, the TRO is unconstitutional as a prior restraint unless evidence supports findings that “(1) an imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial process will deprive litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and (2) the judicial action represents the least restrictive means to prevent that harm.” Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10. The trial court found that “harm is imminent to the State, and if the Court does not issue this order, the State will be irreparably injured.” But aside from stating that Relators' fundraising conduct “harms Texas consumers,” the TRO does not contain specific findings of imminent and irreparable harm, nor does the State point to evidence that would support such findings. Additionally, the TRO does not contain a finding, nor is there evidence to support, that it represents the least restrictive means to prevent the harm. See Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex. 1993) (“Freedom of expression may not be restricted solely on grounds that its exercise will have the effect of producing imminent and irreparable harm. Restraints may be imposed only if the injunctive relief granted encompasses the least restrictive means of protecting against the alleged harmful effect.”); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 797 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (“[A]n injunction against speech is the very prototype of the greatest threat to First Amendment values, the prior restraint.”). The State failed to carry its heavy burden to justify the prior restraint in this case.

I would hold that the issue of the validity of the TRO is not moot due to the State's pending motion for contempt and that the TRO is void and an unconstitutional prior restraint. Because the majority holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip at *23 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.10.

2.   Kayla Guo, Texas House Democrats Flee the State in Bid to Block GOP's Proposed Congressional Map, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, (Aug. 3, 2025), https://www.texastribune.org/ 2025/08/03/texas-democrats-quorum-break-redistricting-map/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2026).

3.   The Governor of the State of Texas, Proclamation No. 41-4224, 50 Tex. Reg. 5503, 5509 (2025).

4.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.46(a), (b); TEX. ELEC. CODE § 253.035(a) (“A person who accepts a political contribution as a candidate or officeholder may not convert the contribution to personal use.”); TEX. PENAL CODE § 36.08(f) (gifts accepted by member of legislature prohibited).

5.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a) (“Whenever the consumer protection division has reason to believe that any person is engaging in, has engaged in, or is about to engage in any act or practice declared to be unlawful by this subchapter, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, the division may bring an action in the name of the state against the person to restrain by temporary restraining order, temporary injunction, or permanent injunction the use of such method, act, or practice.”).

6.   Cf. Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 678 (Tex. 1996) (holding fraud claim arising from religious fundraising could not be based on alleged statements of religious doctrine or belief, but could be based on alleged promises to perform particular acts).

7.   In particular, “(1) TEXAS PENAL CODE, § 36.01(3); (2) TEXAS ELECTIONS CODE, § 253.035; (3) Rule 5, § 3 of the House Rules of Procedure; and (4) TEX. PEN. CODE §§ 36.08, 36.10.”

8.   See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 12.152; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 176.6(e) (providing that persons affected by a subpoena may move for a protective order “either in the court in which the action is pending or in a district court in the county where the subpoena was served”).

9.   See TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE § 12.155.

10.   Act of Aug. 26, 2025, 89th Leg, 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 180.

11.   In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *2 (Tex. App.—15th Dist., Aug. 26, 2025, order), (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID =10931b5b-4ce5-474b-afa7-6b384b753c5b&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5c71bc79-a779 -44ec-ae51-37f057cbda7f); In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, (Tex. App.—15th Dist., Sept. 3, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?Media VersionID=6469c62c-dc76-4378-9e88-48566d2262fc&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID= 6d7af280-5b41-402c-8dd2-c840ce76f9f9); In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *23 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/ SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15& DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f).

12.   State's Letter Br. 1 (Oct. 23, 2025).

13.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a).

14.   See id. § 17.45(1), (2), (4).

15.   Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 426–27 (Tex. 2007).

16.   Id. at 426 (emphasis added).

17.   In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip at *11 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID= 21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f; see also Pike v. Tex. EMC Mgmt., LLC, 610 S.W.3d 763, 774 (Tex. 2020) (“Whether a plaintiff has established his right ‘to go forward with his suit’ or ‘satisfied the requisites of a particular statute’ pertains ‘in reality to the right of the plaintiff to relief rather than to the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court to afford it.’ ” (cleaned up) (quoting Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76–77 (Tex. 2000)); Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 127–28 & n.4 (2014); Evolution Fast Food One, LP v. HVFG, LLC, 720 F.Supp.3d 251, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

18.   Pike, 610 S.W.3d at 774.

19.   Relators' Letter Br. 1 (Feb. 27, 2026).

20.   Id.

21.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.44(a).

22.   Id. § 17.43 (emphasis added).

23.   Cf. Ditech Servicing, LLC v. Perez, 669 S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. 2023); AIC Mgmt. v. Crews, 246 S.W.3d 640, 644 (Tex. 2008).

24.   TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(c).

25.   See Texas v. Google LLC, 787 F. Supp.3d 357, 427 (E.D. Tex. 2025) (“Texas's statutory scheme [in the DTPA] separately provides for equitable relief and legal relief, and the authorization to seek civil penalties does not require that the State obtain injunctive or other equitable relief.” (footnote omitted)).

26.   Blaise Gainey, Texas House Democrats return to Capitol after two-week walkout, will have DPS escorts, August 18, 2025, https://www.kut.org/politics/2025-08-18/texas-democrats-return-to-austin-redistricting-california-congressional-maps (last visited Aug. 31, 2026).

27.   Act of Aug. 26, 2025, 89th Leg, 2nd C.S., ch. 1, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1, 180.

28.   State's Letter Br. 1 (Oct. 23, 2025).

29.   FKM P'ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Houston Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 632 (Tex. 2008).

30.   Morath v. Lewis, 601 S.W.3d 785, 787–88 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis in original); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 162.

31.   Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. N.J., 644 S.W.3d 189, 192 (Tex. 2022).

32.   See id. (vacating moot portion of trial court's judgment but leaving remainder in place); Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys. v. Ferrell, 248 S.W.3d 151, 153–54 (Tex. 2007) (vacating trial court's order as to nonsuiting plaintiff as moot, but reversing and dismissing remaining plaintiffs' claims on other grounds); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 56.2 (“If a case is moot, the Supreme Court may, after notice to the parties, grant the petition and, without hearing argument, dismiss the case or the appealable portion of it without addressing the merits of the appeal.”) (emphasis added).

33.   Relators' Post-Submission Br. 1 (Apr. 10, 2026) (quoting Abbott v. Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d 681, 689 (Tex. 2022)).

34.   Tex. Dep't of Fam. & Protective Servs. v. Grassroots Leadership, Inc., 717 S.W.3d 854, 883 (Tex. 2025).

35.   See Paxton v. Annunciation House, Inc., 719 S.W.3d 555, 590 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Matthews ex rel M.M. v. Kountze ISD, 484 S.W.3d 416, 419–20 (Tex. 2016)).

36.   Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 884 (emphasis in original).

37.   Cf. id. at 880–81.

38.   See Hayden Betts, Denying quorum has been a Texas political strategy since 1870, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE, August 3, 2025, https://www.texastribune.org/2025/08/03/texas-quorum-breaks-history/ (citing breaks in 1979, 2001, and 2021) (last visited Aug. 31, 2026).

39.   Id.

40.   Grassroots Leadership, 717 S.W.3d at 883 (emphasis in original).

41.   The State complained that PxP “persisted” in violating criminal law after the initial TRO but did not allege that violation of the TRO itself was sufficient for forfeiture.

42.   See Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. 1993) (plurality opinion); id. at 36–37 (Phillips, C.J., concurring); cf. id. at 64–65 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (holding protesters could not disregard TROs infringing free speech rights “without first exhausting all available efforts to have them set aside”). Relators here made reasonable efforts to exhaust all available efforts.

43.   In re Luther, 620 S.W.3d 715, 722 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Ex parte Shaffer, 649 S.W.2d 300, 301–02 (Tex. 1983)).

44.   In re Powered by People, No. 15-25-00140-CV, slip op. at *10 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. Sept. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersion ID=21eb09d1-5ce7-4e9a-8a9f-7d1ac8ddb0b4&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=5054af02-cb 93-4439-81bd-1302c841da7f).

45.   See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).

46.   Cf. In re Abbott, 2026 WL 1354754, at *2 (Tex. May 15, 2026) (declining to resolve disputes in other branches that they can resolve for themselves).

47.   TEX. CONST. art. I, § 8. The State's motion for contempt and the video recording in record of the Fort Worth rally on August 9th suggest that far from being intimidated by the TRO here, O'Rourke reveled in it: “There are no refs in this game; f*** the rules, we are gonna win whatever it takes. We're gonna take this to em' in every way that we can.”

48.   Civil contempt is “coercive in nature,” so it is no longer available for the nonsuited TRO. See In re Reece, 341 S.W.3d 360, 365 (Tex. 2011).

49.   See, e.g., In re Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 728 (Tex. 2020) (holding mandamus was available to review finding of criminal contempt for violating an ambiguous order).

50.   See In re AstraZeneca Pharm. LP, 726 S.W.3d 573, 578–79 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. 2025, orig. proceeding).

51.   See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(6).

52.   See Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 138, § 5, 1995 TEX. GEN. LAWS 978, 981 (codified at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.0642).

53.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.016; see id. § 15.001(b) (defining “proper venue” as “the venue required by the mandatory provisions of Subchapter B or another statute prescribing mandatory venue”) (emphasis added).

54.   See In re Fox River Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 596 S.W.3d 759, 763, 765 (Tex. 2020) (analyzing applicability of mandatory venue in TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023 in mandamus proceeding pursuant to § 15.0642); Wagner v. Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d 277, 288 (Tex. 2021) (“[I]nterlocutory review of a trial court's failure to enforce a mandatory venue provision is available only through a writ of mandamus.”).

55.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 65.023(a).

56.   Ex parte Coffee, 328 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. 1959); see In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 761; In re Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Tex. 1998).

57.   In re Fox River, 596 S.W.3d at 763 (holding injunctive relief was ancillary to primary goal of removing general partner and recovering monetary damages); see also In re Cont'l Airlines, 988 S.W.2d at 736 (holding suit for declaratory and injunctive relief over flights at Love Field was primarily for declaration of rights rather than injunction); Brown v. Gulf Television Co., 306 S.W.2d 706, 709 (Tex. 1957) (holding suit to remove television antenna interfering with airport runway and seeking damages as alternative relief was primarily injunctive).

58.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(a), (c).

59.   See id. § 17.47(e) (“Any person who violates the terms of an injunction under this section shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 per violation, not to exceed $50,000.”); (c) (providing for “a civil penalty to be paid to the state in an amount of ․ not more than $10,000 per violation,” plus “an additional amount of not more than $250,000” if the act or practice sought “money or other property from a consumer who was 65 years of age or older”).

60.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.064(b).

61.   Kelley v. Homminga, 706 S.W.3d 829, 833 (Tex. 2025) (“When a court lacks jurisdiction over a case, the only correct disposition is dismissal because the court lacks power to do anything else.”).

62.   Univ. of Tex. v. Morris, 344 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. 1961); see also TEX. GOV'T CODE § 22.220(c) (“Each court of appeals may, on affidavit or otherwise, as the court may determine, ascertain the matters of fact that are necessary to the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.”).

63.   Sabine Offshore Serv., Inc. v. City of Port Arthur, 595 S.W.2d 840, 841 (Tex. 1979).

64.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.012.

65.   It appears that § 15.012, like its counterpart in § 65.023(b) of the same Code, was directed not at dominant-jurisdiction disputes but “ ‘to protect the judgments and processes of one court from interference by another by direct attack’ and to ‘prevent[ ] a defeated party from proceeding from one court to another, after his defeat, or in the hope of avoiding defeat.” Campbell v. Wilder, 487 S.W.3d 146, 149 (Tex. 2016) (quoting Carey v. Looney, 251 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Tex. 1923)).

66.   Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 252 (Tex. 2001).

67.   Id. (quoting Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063, 1071 (Tex. 1926)).

68.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 22.201(p), .220(d)(1).

69.   Westlaw reports 167 Texas appellate opinions dating back to 1966 that include the term.

70.   Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 512 (Tex. 2010).

71.   In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320, 322 (Tex. 2016).

72.   See id. at 322–23.

73.   Gannon v. Payne, 706 S.W.2d 304, 305–06 (Tex. 1986).

74.   Gonzalez v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 615, 622 (Tex. 2005).

75.   See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE § 17.47(b).

76.   Id.

77.   TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 15.002(a)(1).

78.   Proper venue for a quo warranto action is not entirely clear. The Civil Practice and Remedies Code says the attorney general or a local prosecutor “may petition the district court of the proper county” for leave to file an information in the nature of quo warranto, but it does not define the “proper county.” See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 66.002(a). We need not decide that matter here because venue for the State's DTPA claim is sufficient for all related claims. See id. § 15.005 (“In a suit in which the plaintiff has established proper venue against a defendant, the court also has venue of all ․ actions arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences.” (emphasis added)).

79.   Ken Paxton v. Powered by People, No. 15-25-00141-CV, slip op. at *1 (Tex. App.—15th Dist. June. 12, 2025, order) (available at https://search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?Media VersionID=0d2666dc-5e7c-490d-a443-f52643e3c280&coa=coa15&DT=Order&MediaID=ad9bf 106-c7d4-436c-af71-0377e2a43c13).

80.   See id. at *3–4 (citing Paxton v. City of Austin, 2026 WL 1445577 (Tex. May 22, 2026)).

81.   N.J., 644 S.W.3d at 192.

1.   I disagree with the State's assertion that Relators waived any claim that the TRO violated the Texas Constitution by not raising it in the trial court. In their Emergency Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order, Relators cited Texas cases construing the Texas Constitution as well as United State Supreme Court cases construing the Federal Constitution.

2.   In interpreting the Texas Constitution, Texas courts “should borrow from well-reasoned and persuasive federal procedural and substantive precedent when this is deemed helpful, but should never feel compelled to parrot the federal judiciary.” Kinney, 443 S.W.3d at 92 (quoting Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 20 (Tex. 1992)).

Scott A. Brister Chief Justice