HAYS COUNTY TEXAS RUBEN BECERRA DEBBIE INGALSBE MICHELLE COHEN MORGAN HAMMER AND WALT SMITH IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES v. LESLIE CARNES JIM CAMP CATHY RAMSEY GABRIELLE MOORE AND KEN PAXTON ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS (2026)

OPINION

In the general election held in Texas on November 5, 2024, voters in Hays County approved $439 million in bonds to fund 31 local road projects in one of the fastest growing counties in the United States. Eight months later, a district court in Travis County declared that bond election void based on claims by four Hays County residents that the Commissioners Court agenda posted on a county bulletin board announcing consideration of setting the bonds for election was insufficient to satisfy the Texas Open Meetings Act (TOMA). For three reasons, we reverse.

First, until last year TOMA required two agenda postings here: one on a courthouse bulletin board and one online. The latter disclosed all the information required by TOMA. Reading the two together (especially the online version most everyone would actually access), we hold the trial court erred by finding a TOMA violation.

Second, even if our reading is incorrect,¹ the four complaining plaintiffs forfeited their TOMA complaint by waiting to file it until voting started. TOMA expressly provides only two remedies: “an action by mandamus or injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a violation or threatened violation of this chapter.”² When either would impede an election, courts are rightfully reluctant to intervene, and will not do so when a complaining party has strategically delayed filing until the election has begun. In this case, two of the four plaintiffs attended the challenged meeting (despite the alleged defect in notice) and opposed the road bonds, but waited to file their TOMA suit until the day early voting started two months later, rendering it too late to correct. Having prevented any possible cure by their own delay, they were not entitled to mandamus relief: “When the record fails to show that petitioners have acted diligently to protect their rights, relief by mandamus is not available.”³ We hold the trial court erred by voiding the election based on a TOMA complaint the plaintiffs forfeited.

Finally, it is also a question of first impression whether the four plaintiffs can revive the same TOMA complaint some months after the election when the County filed suit under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act (EDJA) seeking to validate the bonds. We hold they cannot. They forfeited their complaint by filing it too late “to stop, prevent, or reverse a violation” by mandamus or injunction; since TOMA is “properly read to authorize only those types of relief,” it does not contemplate a third remedy by declaratory judgment holding the bonds invalid.⁴ The trial court erred in doing just that.

It is one thing to set aside a local ordinance for violating TOMA; local officials will simply have to try again. But it is quite another to set aside the results of an election in which 64,599 voters (55.8% of those voting) approved road bonds with plenty of notice about the projects they were voting for. It appears that no Texas court has ever overturned the results of a general election due to a TOMA violation arising not from the election itself, but to an agenda posted months before about whether to hold it. We will not be the first. The trial court erred by declaring void the election order, the election itself, and the bonds that were the purpose of both.

BACKGROUND

Like other fast-growing Texas counties, Hays County must meet increasing demands on its transportation infrastructure. To that end, the Hays County Commissioners Court held meetings on July 2, August 6, and August 13, 2024, during which its members considered and ultimately passed an order calling a bond election to fund 31 transportation projects. Before each of these meetings, the County posted both a physical notice on a bulletin board in the Hays County Government Center,⁵ and an online notice on the Hays County website.⁶ The bulletin-board agenda posting for the July 2 and August 6 meetings listed an item for “the development of a 2024 Hays County Transportation Program, including presentation of potential projects,” and for related funding. But the physical posting for the August 13th agenda stated only the following:

Discussion and possible action to approve an order calling a bond election for November 5, 2024 to be held within Hays County, Texas; designating voter polling places; providing for early voting and election day voting; providing for performance of required administrative duties; providing for conduct of the election and for the conduct of a joint election with various political subdivisions; and providing for other matters related to such election.

Unlike the previous agendas, this one did not mention “Transportation Project” or “roads.” The online agenda was the same but in addition attached the final version of the Order Calling Road Bond Election listing each of the proposed road projects, the official ballot language, the voting times and locations, and the $439 million bond package proposed for “the construction, maintenance, and operation” of roads or turnpikes and “the levying of a tax sufficient to pay the principal of and interest on the bonds.” Despite the alleged deficiency, almost 30 citizens appeared and commented on the proposed bond election at the August 13 meeting, including two of the plaintiffs here. The Commissioners Court unanimously passed the Election Order, and set the election for November 5, 2024, citing “the historically higher voter turnout for presidential elections.” Since elections can be held only on uniform election dates in early May or November,⁷ thwarting this deadline would have postponed action for at least six months.

On October 21, 2024—ten weeks later on the day early voting began—four Hays County residents sued Hays County, its County Judge, and its County Commissioners (the County) alleging the August 13 agenda item on the bond election violated TOMA, as it was “misleading and insufficient to constitute adequate notice of the ‘subject’ of the proposed bond election.” But they did not request immediate relief, and the election proceeded as scheduled on November 5. In the final canvass, voters approved the road bonds by a margin of 64,599 (55.8%) to 51,258 (44.2%). The four plaintiffs shortly thereafter added an election contest to their TOMA lawsuit, asking the court to void the election and enjoin the County from “recognizing and taking further actions in reliance on the November 5, 2024 road bond vote.”

In March 2025, Hays County filed a lawsuit in Travis County to validate the bonds under the EDJA. It requested declarations relating to the November election, including that the August 13 meeting notice complied with TOMA and that the calling of the election and all activities undertaken with respect to it were valid and legal. The four plaintiffs intervened, the district court consolidated the Travis and Hays County suits in Travis County, and the Attorney General was served and timely answered.⁸

After a two-day combined hearing and trial,⁹ the district court granted summary judgment for the four voters declaring void the County's order setting the bond election for November 5th, and declaring void the results of the election because it was “never lawfully ordered.” Based on that summary judgment, three days later the district court denied the County's EDJA petition “in its entirety,” expressly rejecting requests to declare the bonds valid and legal, and declaring its judgment “binding, conclusive, and final” against the County, the Attorney General, and all residents of Hays County or others claiming interests affected by the bonds. The County appeals from those orders.¹⁰

DISCUSSION

I. The County postings did not violate TOMA

As a preliminary matter, we do not believe a TOMA violation occurred here. At the time the County posted its agenda, the Texas Government Code required two postings of county government meetings: one on a bulletin board at the county courthouse (§ 551.049), and one on a county's website (§ 551.056). It is undisputed that the posting on the County's website disclosed details about the road projects, debt, and taxes involved. The Plaintiffs complain instead that (1) the bulletin board posting did not, and (2) requiring online readers to click on a link for details is itself a TOMA violation. While TOMA is generally satisfied by substantial compliance with its notice provisions,¹¹ it appears to be a question of first impression whether the two required postings should be considered together or whether each must comply with TOMA independently.

In construing a statute, we must “consider the entire text, in view of its structure and of the physical and logical relation of its many parts.”¹² Consistent with that rule, we believe the two sections and two postings required by TOMA should be read together. Notices required by TOMA are intended for “members of the interested public,” not primarily for passersby in a busy county courthouse.¹³ For members of the interested public, the internet is ubiquitous and online searches quick and easy; visiting a county courthouse usually is not. While this case was being litigated, the Legislature recognized this modern reality by amending TOMA to allow counties to post online only.¹⁴ Reading the two statutes on posting and the two postings themselves together, we hold the County's postings did not violate TOMA.

II. If there were a TOMA violation, it was merely voidable and remained valid since it was never timely challenged

TOMA provides that: “An action taken by a governmental body in violation of this chapter is voidable.”¹⁵ By definition, a “voidable” order is not void.¹⁶ Voidable acts and orders “remain effective until set aside.”¹⁷ This rule applies equally to TOMA complaints; for example, if the execution of a contract violates TOMA, the contract “is merely voidable” and “is valid until adjudicated and declared void.”¹⁸ “[A] voidable order must be corrected by direct attack; unless successfully attacked, a voidable judgment becomes final.”¹⁹

TOMA provides that any interested person “may bring an action by mandamus or injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a violation or threatened violation of this chapter.”²⁰ But it does not state a specific deadline for seeking relief. That does not mean TOMA violations can be raised indefinitely; while “mandamus is not an equitable remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles.”²¹ One of those principles is that “equity aids the diligent and not those who slumber on their rights.”²² If the rule were otherwise, acts by public bodies could be challenged decades after they occurred.

Under equitable principles, a variety of practical limits have been recognized as barring relief under TOMA depending on the facts of each case. For example, a government's sale of property becomes final regardless of TOMA complaints once the property is sold and cannot be recovered.²³ Similarly, an order for removal of a Confederate statue became final regardless of TOMA objections once the city sold it at auction, as that made it “impossible for the court to grant effectual relief.”²⁴ And secret negotiations of an airport agreement could not be set aside regardless of a TOMA complaint after the resulting agreement was incorporated into federal law.²⁵ As the Texas Supreme Court wrote 50 years ago: “We have never issued a writ of mandamus ordering a trial judge to set aside a final judgment that was voidable but not void at a time when the judge had no power to do so under the rules.”²⁶ To sum up, if the practical consequences of a voidable order can no longer be voided, the order is no longer voidable.

In the specific context of election disputes, “one basis for denying relief necessarily arises when a challenger unreasonably delays in seeking relief.”²⁷ Texas courts have repeatedly denied last-minute petitions filed on the eve of an election when applicants took too long getting to court.²⁸ That is because “[i]n a mandamus relating to an election proceeding, we must be careful to avoid undue interference with the electoral process and the people's right to self-governance.”²⁹ Timeliness is required at every stage of an election process; once the run-up to an election has begun, “[a]ll parties must move with maximum expedition so that the courts—which also must act quickly when properly called upon—do not themselves contribute to electoral confusion.”³⁰

For example, when Governor Abbott extended the early voting period for the November 2020 general election due to the Coronavirus outbreak, the Texas Supreme Court denied mandamus relief challenging that order because “Relators delayed in challenging the Governor's July 27 proclamation for more than ten weeks after it was issued.”³¹ “Court changes of election laws close in time to the election are strongly disfavored.”³² To be entitled to mandamus relief in the run up to an election, litigants must file their complaints in court “early enough to avoid harm to the larger election,” thus allowing time for “prompt judicial correction.”³³

Once an election has actually begun, judicial intervention is even more strictly limited. A mandamus proceeding like the minority plaintiffs filed here “cannot go forward under settled precedents that sharply limit judicial authority to intervene in ongoing elections.”³⁴ As the Texas Supreme Court wrote in 2022:

Courts at every level, including the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court, have declined to implement even “seemingly innocuous” alterations to election laws on the eve of an election, let alone after one has begun․ Expedition and precision in requesting relief help ensure that courts can never be converted, willingly or otherwise, into a partisan tool for one side or the other. Those requirements reduce the incentives for partisan adversaries to lie in wait with lawsuits that create chaos.35

Finally, after an election has concluded and the results are certified, the Texas Election Code bars courts from invalidating an election absent findings that the “true outcome” is either (i) different from the results of the final canvass, or (ii) cannot be ascertained.³⁶ As the Texas Supreme Court wrote in 2023, “We [ ] have acted to correct misleading ballot language—if the correction can be made without disturbing the election from going forward”; but “[i]n the seventy years since the Legislature endowed the Court with statutory power to address violations of the Election Code, we have not once used it to altogether deprive the voters of an election.”³⁷

At every stage here, the minority voters failed to act diligently in seeking mandamus relief. At least two of them knew about the order for the road bond election the day it was adopted because they were present at the meeting and spoke against it. They failed to seek TOMA relief until 10 weeks later, filing it on the very day early voting began. At that point, the trial court could not intervene to postpone or avoid the election because it had already started.³⁸ And after the election, the election order was final despite any TOMA violation because the losing voters have never alleged, much less proved, that the final canvass was inaccurate or could not be ascertained.

The trial court's judgment set aside the election results despite the absence of such a showing, reasoning that the election was “never lawfully ordered.” But the plaintiffs did not allege any defect in the County's unanimous order for the election to take place, which listed voting dates, places, and times, total bond funding, and the numerous road projects involved. Their sole complaint was that the agenda item posted on a courthouse bulletin board was defective.³⁹ Even if that were so, the election order became final when they failed to file any complaint until the election had started or to actively pursue that complaint until the election was over. Equitable principles do not allow parties to have it both ways—waiting to see how the election turns out and then (1) dismissing their TOMA suit if they won, or (2) tying up the bonds for years in TOMA litigation if they lost.⁴⁰ On these facts, the trial court erred by voiding the election order and the election itself.

The dissent is not correct that we give “a free pass” to bond issuers once an election starts. We hold only that TOMA plaintiffs do not get a free pass to lodge complaints about elections at their leisure; they must act while a court still has jurisdiction to do something about it. Nobody gets a free pass on timeliness when elections are involved; “All parties must move with maximum expedition,”⁴¹ and if they fail to do so “relief by mandamus is not available.”⁴²

III. Absent any valid objection, the trial court had no discretion to deny the County's EDJA suit

The EDJA does not state what an issuer must prove to be entitled to judgment. It lists what an EDJA petition must allege,⁴³ and what declarations a judgment may include.⁴⁴ The County carried its burden to present prima facie evidence that the bond election and bonds were legal and valid by presenting testimony of its witnesses and 200 pages of exhibits including certified copies of every official action the County took. As most relevant here, the County Clerk certified that the August 13th “Meeting and deliberation of the aforesaid public business, including the subject of the Order, was posted and given in advance thereof in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 551” (i.e., TOMA). That shifted the burden of going forward to all other interested parties to file any objections—or lose them.⁴⁵ Except for the four TOMA plaintiffs, no one else did. The EDJA does not require analysis of untimely complaints, any more than it requires analysis of complaints that were never raised at all; it expressly bars anyone from contesting the validity of bonds and their issuance on “any matter that could have been raised in the action.”⁴⁶ Any other rule would “frustrate the ostensible purpose of the [EDJA], which is to speedily pass judgment on the legality of public debt.”⁴⁷ The Plaintiffs could not have raised their TOMA complaint here because they forfeited it by their earlier strategic delay, and no one else who could have raised it actually did raise it (including the Attorney General ⁴⁸ ). On these facts, the trial court erred by denying the County's EDJA petition in its entirety.

The dissent agrees the plaintiffs cannot contest the results of that election, but would declare the road bonds invalid anyway because the order setting the election was invalid because the agenda notice for the County meeting adopting that order was invalid because the notice posted on a bulletin board at the county courthouse was invalid—even though the notice posted online was not.⁴⁹ But “[w]hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.”⁵⁰ The sole statutory remedy for a TOMA defect in a meeting notice is “mandamus or injunction to stop, prevent, or reverse a violation.”⁵¹ Once the voting starts, a voidable TOMA defect (if the agenda notice was one) is no longer voidable but final, and those whose delay made it so do not get a second chance to complain about it in a collateral action.

The dissent claims the County had the burden to prove its bulletin-board agenda notice complied with TOMA, but neither the dissent nor the Attorney General point to a state law that says so. Texas law lists many requirements for bond election orders,⁵² and for public notice of the election itself,⁵³ but proof that the election order did not violate TOMA is not among them. The sole basis for this claim is that the County asked for such a declaration; but one cannot fault the County for seeking favorable declarations as to both the EDJA and TOMA when the two cases were consolidated, just as the EDJA intends.⁵⁴ Nor is posting an agenda on a bulletin board a “public security authorization” since it neither authorizes nor approves issuance of bonds but provides notice of a hearing on the issue.⁵⁵ But in all events, remedies for TOMA are limited to mandamus or an injunction; construing the EDJA to add an obstacle that disgruntled taxpayers may use to cancel the electoral choices of their neighbors would simply construe one statute to defeat another; this we cannot do.⁵⁶

The dissent would have us avoid this key question because “no one asked” whether a TOMA complaint may be “revived” in an EDJA suit. But the first argument in both of the County's briefs was that even if its notice violated TOMA, that could not invalidate the bonds because the Plaintiffs never claimed the bond election canvass was invalid.⁵⁷ It is instead the Plaintiffs who make no argument to support invalidating the County's bonds—their brief does not mention or cite the EDJA a single time. The dissent never explains how the same delay that bars the Plaintiffs from succeeding in an election contest does not bar them from getting the same result in the EDJA suit, a remedy that TOMA does not contemplate.

The County's petition in the EDJA case requested a declaration that the bonds, “when issued and executed pursuant to the requirements provided by law, including approval by the Attorney General and registration of the Bonds with the Comptroller of Public Accounts, will constitute valid and incontestable obligations.” Any defect in the bulletin-board notice was not an impediment to that burden because once the voting began, that notice and the election order that followed became final and were no longer voidable under Texas law.⁵⁸ Although the EDJA requires the Attorney General to raise any matters that could render the bonds “invalid or unauthorized,”⁵⁹ his answer here said he “takes no position” on any “potential defects” in the agenda notice. Nor did anyone else. On this record, the County was entitled to the permanent injunction provided by the EDJA against “any person” contesting “any matter that could have been raised in the action.”⁶⁰

The EDJA was enacted to stop “the age old practice allowing one disgruntled taxpayer to stop the entire bond issue by simply filing suit.”⁶¹ Construing the EDJA to allow revival of a barred TOMA complaint in a later EDJA action would be incongruous by reviving that age-old practice. As far as possible, we must harmonize the EDJA and TOMA to avoid such incongruities, not to open a back door to re-create them. In the specific context of bond elections, we hold that a TOMA complaint carefully timed to prevent any pre-election remedy provided by TOMA cannot be reasserted to obtain a post-election remedy. Accordingly, the trial court erred by failing to enter an order validating the bonds.⁶²

CONCLUSION

Acts violating TOMA are voidable; free and fair elections are not. The alleged TOMA violation here was at most a voidable act, and remained valid because the TOMA plaintiffs waited to act until it was too late for any court to address. Ignoring the governing rules here would frustrate not just one state statute but two: (a) the EDJA because it was intended to stop “the age old practice” allowing losing voters to stop infrastructure projects approved by the winning majority;⁶³ and (b) the Election Code because it was intended to stop election contests that could not change the “true outcome” the voters chose.⁶⁴

This Court was created “to give special attention to those cases the Legislature has defined as critical to the State's interests”⁶⁵ ; allowing a “disgruntled taxpayer” to stop critical infrastructure through strategic litigation is one of those interests, as the Legislature expressly intended to stop it when it adopted the EDJA. Open government will suffer no loss by restricting TOMA to the two remedies it allows and declining to go further than the Legislature provided. Accordingly, we hold the trial court had no basis to void the County's election order, or the election itself, or deny the County's EDJA suit. We reverse and remand to the trial court to enter the proper orders in accordance with this opinion.

DISSENTING OPINION

The Court's opinion decides a “question of first impression” that no one asked—whether a TOMA complaint concerning an election order may be “revived” when the party that ordered the election later seeks a declaration under the Expedited Declaratory Judgment Act (EDJA) that it complied with TOMA. No party raised this issue because Appellant Hays County specifically asks this Court to declare its election order did not violate TOMA. Yet, under the Court's opinion, if a plaintiff in an EDJA action, like the County in this case, requests a specific finding that it did not violate TOMA, no defendant or intervenor in the EDJA action can argue against that finding unless it earlier filed a successful action to stop the bond election. That cannot be the law.

Procedure matters. Hays County filed an action under the EDJA, and it was therefore Hays County's burden to prove that it ordered the election in a valid manner. Appellees, as intervenors in Hays County's EDJA action, had the right to challenge that finding in the EDJA suit as a defensive matter. That does not change just because Appellees also filed a separate election contest and did so too late. Because the Court ignores these procedural realities and what I believe was a violation of TOMA, I dissent.

BACKGROUND

The road projects in the 2024 Hays County Transportation Program were controversial and drew a lot of public interest.¹ Prior to the August 13 meeting approving the election order, the Commissioners Court discussed the 2024 Hays County Transportation Program and how to fund it at two separate meetings—a July 2, 2024, meeting and an August 6, 2024, meeting. Before each of these meetings, the Commissioners Court posted a physical notice in the Hays County Government Center, Tex. Gov't Code § 551.049,² and an online notice on the Hays County website, id. § 551.056(b). Under the miscellaneous sections of each agenda, the Commissioners Court provided notice regarding discussion of the 2024 Hays County Transportation Program. Specifically, the agenda for the July 2 meeting provided notice of a “[d]iscussion regarding the development of a 2024 Hays County Transportation Program, including a presentation of potential projects and discussion of funding strategies.” Similarly, the August 6 agenda provided notice of a “[d]iscussion and possible action regarding the development and funding of the 2024 Hays County Transportation Program, including potential projects, the issuance of debt, and bond election procedures.”

Before the August 13 meeting—the meeting in question in this appeal—Hays County again posted two written notices of the meeting, one physical and one online. Again, located under the “miscellaneous” section of the notice was agenda item K.2., which stated:

“Discussion and possible action to approve an order calling a bond election for November 5, 2024 to be held within Hays County, Texas; designating voter polling places; providing for early voting and election day voting; providing for performance of required administrative duties; providing for conduct of the election and for the conduct of a joint election with various political subdivisions; and providing for other matters related to such election.”

Unlike notices for previous meetings, this notice mentioned nothing about a “Transportation Program” or roads generally. Appellees contend that this notice was insufficient under TOMA.

Months after the election order was approved, but prior to the election, a group of Hays County residents—Appellees in this Court—filed suit in Hays County, seeking mandamus and injunctive relief. They asserted claims under TOMA and sought a declaration voiding the election order. The election occurred as scheduled in November, and the voters approved Proposition A by a margin of over 13,000 votes. Appellees later amended their claims to include an election contest under the Election Code, seeking to set aside the election results based on the TOMA violation. This is the proceeding on which the Court's opinion focuses.

In March 2025, Appellants filed the underlying bond validation suit in Travis County under the EDJA, seeking declarations that, among other things, the August 13 meeting notice complied with TOMA and that the calling of the election and all activities undertaken with respect to the election were legal and valid. To fully understand why the Court's opinion is wrong in this case, the nature of the underlying EDJA suit must first be understood.

ANALYSIS

A. The County seeks a declaration that it did not violate TOMA.

After the election, Hays County filed suit under the EDJA seeking declarations as to the validity and legality of the bonds. The trial court denied relief under the EDJA because it had granted Appellees summary judgment and declared the election order and the election void. Hays County asks this Court to reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment making all required findings under the EDJA, including that (1) the August 13 notice complied with TOMA and that (2) the County legally and validly adopted the election order. Yet, the County also argues that even if there was a TOMA violation, the bond election cannot be declared void. Recognizing the tension between the EDJA suit and the election contest claim—and how a TOMA violation could impact the outcome of this appeal—the Attorney General submitted briefing post-oral argument, explaining that to validate the bonds in the EDJA suit, the order calling the bond election must be declared legally valid under the EDJA.

The EDJA “permits issuers of bonds and other public securities to resolve certain disputes regarding their securities as to all interested parties on an expedited basis.” City of Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2020). Under the EDJA, an issuer may seek a declaratory judgment as to the legality and validity of each “public security authorization.” Tex. Gov't Code § 1205.021(2). A public security authorization means “an action or proceeding by an issuer taken, made, or proposed to be taken or made in connection with or affecting a public security.” Id. § 1205.001(3). “In the public securities context, authorization has long referred to the initial actions or approvals needed to ensure the proper issuance of public securities.” City of Conroe, 602 S.W.3d at 452. Accordingly, “a public security authorization must have an authorizing connection with or effect on the public securities.” Id. at 453. Here, the County is an “issuer” under the EDJA, and the bonds it seeks to validate are “public securities.”

The adoption of an order calling a tax bond election in compliance with state law is a prerequisite to holding a bond election. See Tex. Gov't Code §§ 1251.003(a), (c); Tex. Elec. Code §§ 3.001, .005(c), .009. Thus, I agree with the Attorney General that the calling of an election has an “authorizing connection” with bonds and is a “public security authorization” under Chapter 1205. See City of Conroe, 602 S.W.3d at 453. As a result, to validate a tax bond under the EDJA, an issuer must obtain findings, as the County requests in this case, that the order calling the bond election is legally valid and did not violate TOMA.

All orders, including the election order, must be accompanied by a certificate confirming that the action was held in full compliance with TOMA. See 1 Tex. Admin. Code § 53.3(a)(12). If an election order was called in violation of TOMA, this implicates whether the “public security has been authorized to be issued in conformity with law,” a determination that the Attorney General must make before approving the public security. Tex. Gov't Code § 1202.003(b).

In its EDJA suit, the County seeks declarations that the August 13 notice was given in accordance with TOMA and that “the Commissioners court legally and validly approved the order calling the bond election to place Proposition A on the ballot for the November 2024 General Election.” The County cannot obtain these required declarations to validate the bonds if there was a TOMA violation in calling the election. As such, the TOMA issue is dispositive in this case.

This conclusion is important because it essentially renders Appellees' election contest, in which they seek to set aside the results of the bond election, unnecessary to decide given the required findings in the EDJA suit. Although the Court's position about the lateness of Appellees' claim would likely be correct if this appeal involved only an election contest, it misses the nature of the underlying EDJA suit. To be sure, one of the claims on which the trial court granted summary judgment is an election contest; but ruling on that issue is not required in this appeal because of the EDJA relief sought by Appellants. Appellants ask us to render judgment for them under the EDJA, including declaring that the County did not violate TOMA.

The majority holds that Appellees' TOMA challenge was untimely (an argument that was never made on appeal or to the trial court), and that because the election occurred before adjudicating the TOMA issue, the election order cannot be declared void. But this holding flips the burden in the EDJA suit and ignores all the requirements an issuer must meet for public securities to be approved for issuance in Texas. As a practical matter, under the Court's reasoning, an issuer would never have to certify or prove it complied with TOMA in calling an election, because an election always occurs before an issuer seeks approval of its public securities—whether in an EDJA suit or through the administrative process with the Attorney General. In other words, under the Court's logic, issuers get a free pass on their obligations under TOMA so long as the election occurs before a challenger successfully raises a TOMA violation. Not only would this conclusion erode trust in our local governments, but it would also undermine the current state of public securities law in Texas. The effect of the Court's opinion is to cabin relief under TOMA to emergency, pre-election relief that is waived if the election is not stopped. Under the Court's opinion, Appellees cannot even raise TOMA compliance as a defensive issue in an EDJA action. That cannot be the law.³

B. The notice violated the Texas Open Meetings Act.

Open government is important—a core purpose of TOMA is to enable the public to have access to the actual decision-making process of its governmental bodies. City of San Antonio v. Fourth Ct. of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1991); Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Austin Ind. Sch. Dist., 706 S.W.2d 956, 960 (Tex. 1986). As such, TOMA requires “openness at every stage of [a governmental body's] deliberations” because the citizens of Texas are entitled to know not only what government decided but also to observe how and why every decision is enacted. See Acker v. Tex. Water Comm'n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 300 (Tex. 1990); see also Tex. Gov't Code § 551.002 (providing that every “regular, special, or called meeting of a governmental body shall be open to the public”).

Consistent with these principles, a county commissioners court “shall give written notice of the date, hour, place, and subject of each meeting held by the governmental body.” Tex. Gov't Code § 551.041. It must “post notice of each meeting on a bulletin board at a place convenient to the public in the county courthouse.” Id. § 551.049(1). It must also “concurrently post notice of [the] meeting and the agenda for the meeting on [its] Internet website.” Id. § 551.056(b).

The dispute in this case is whether the “subject” of the notice for the August 13 meeting was sufficient. Generally, a notice is sufficient under TOMA if it informs a reader that “some action” will be considered regarding “the topic for consideration.” Cox Enters., 706 S.W.2d at 958. The adequacy of the notice is determined by comparing it to the action taken at the open meeting. In re City of Amarillo, No. 07–22–00341–CV, 2023 WL 5279473, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.). A notice need not provide exacting detail of all issues to be decided. Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). “As long as a reader is alerted to the topic for consideration, it is not necessary to state all of the consequences which may flow from consideration of the topic.” Cox Enters., 706 S.W.2d at 958. General notice in certain cases is enough for substantial compliance with TOMA even though the notice is not as specific as it could be. Id. (citing Lower Colorado River Auth. v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. 1975) and Tex. Tpk. Auth. v. City of Fort Worth, 554 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. 1977)). Anything less than full disclosure, however, is insufficient. Id. at 960.

The Texas Supreme Court has outlined the spectrum of notices from multiple that were sufficient to one that was not. In City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, the court held a notice sufficient. See 820 S.W.2d at 766. There, the city council posted a notice stating it would consider “[a]n Ordinance determining the necessity for and authorizing the condemnation of certain property in County Blocks 4180, 4181, 4188, and 4297 in Southwest Bexar County for the construction of the Applewhite Water Supply Project.” Id. at 764. A property owner challenged the sufficiency of the notice. The Texas Supreme Court held the notice sufficient, reasoning that “[a]ny readers interested in that project had more than sufficient notice that the [c]ity [c]ouncil would be considering action relating to it.” Id. at 766. Further, “readers who did own property in those blocks were on notice of some risk that their land might be condemned. That [was] all [TOMA] require[d].” Id. Although the city could have given more particularized notice so that the individual property owners had notice that their particular tracts of land were the subject of the proposed condemnation ordinance, the notice itself was sufficient to meet the “subject” requirement under TOMA. Id.⁴

Five years before City of San Antonio, the Texas Supreme Court concluded a notice was insufficient under TOMA. In Cox Enterprises, the board of a school district posted notice of a closed executive session that listed only general topics such as “personnel” and “litigation.” 706 S.W.2d at 957. The topics considered, however, were the hiring of a superintendent and a major desegregation lawsuit that had lasted for years. Id. at 959. Relying on guidance from an Attorney General Opinion, the Texas Supreme Court held the school board did not provide full and adequate notice, “particularly where the subject slated for discussion was one of special interest to the public.” Id. (relying on Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. H–1045 (1977)). The selection of the superintendent was “not in the same category as ordinary personnel matters” and a major desegregation lawsuit that had lasted years and would have a long-lasting impact was not in the same category as the more “common litigation.” Id.

Several Texas courts of appeals have addressed the sufficiency of an open meeting notice's subject since these seminal cases.⁵ For example, in In re City of Amarillo, the city posted an agenda with a notice of a “discussion and consideration of an ordinance authorizing the issuance of the [city] Texas Combination Tax and Revenue Notes, Series 2022A resolving other matters incident and related thereto including the approval of a paying agent/registrar agreement and a purchase contract.” 2023 WL 5279473, at *2. The city also attached 197 pages of related documents to the agenda. Id. at *1. The purpose of the notes was a $260.5 million plan for renovating and expanding a civic center complex—a project that had previously been rejected by voters in a bond election two years prior. Id. The court held the notice was insufficient because the notice failed to “adequately inform the reader that the purpose of the anticipation notes would be to revive [a] previously-voter-rejected civic center project.” Id. at *5. Relying on Cox Enterprises, the court concluded the notice was required to be more specific because the civic center project was of special interest to the general public. Id.

Guided by these cases, I would conclude the August 13 notice was insufficient under TOMA. The summary judgment evidence showed that certain road projects in Hays County were controversial and strongly opposed, such as the SH 45 project that would extend into Travis County to connect to I-35, and the extension of the FM 150 project. Additionally, the $439 million in bonds was a significant amount that would roughly double the County's debt. In light of the expected public interest and the controversial road projects included in the bond package, the general notice of a “discussion and possible action to approve an order calling a bond election,” particularly after describing it as the “Hays County Transportation Program” in prior meeting notices, does not fully disclose the purpose of the order calling the bond election. The fact that a few citizens still attended the meeting, as the Court points out as if that somehow matters, does not make it compliant with TOMA; “no harm, no foul” might work on the basketball court, but it is not a legal principle that saves an insufficient notice under TOMA. See In re City of Amarillo, 2023 WL 5279473, at *6 (concluding citizen attendance at a meeting did not excuse city from its legal obligations to the general public).

There are countless reasons why a county may want to call for a bond election, and there are situations where a general description is likely sufficient. This is not one of them. Here, similar to the circumstances in Cox Enterprises and In re City of Amarillo, an interested reader had no way of knowing that the agenda's reference to a “bond election” pertained to $439 million in bonds for 31 road projects, some of which were controversial. To be certain, the notice did not have to provide a detailed description of the road projects. But under these circumstances, the notice needed to say more than just a “bond election” with no description of the subject included.

The County argues, and the Court accepts, that the draft road bond election order provided online was part of the notice itself and essentially cured any defect in the agenda's notice. Online, the county posted the same agenda item as on the physical notice, stating “discussion and possible action to approve an order calling a bond election,” but it was hyperlinked. If a reader clicked on this agenda item, the reader would be taken to another page that contained the same language, and that also included an attachment labeled the “Order Calling Road Bond Election.” The attached draft road bond election order detailed (1) the amount of the proposed bond issuance; (2) the proposed 31 transportation projects; (3) the general location of the proposed transportation projects; (4) draft language for Proposition A; and (5) draft ballot language to be included on the ballot for the 2024 election.

Admittedly, most of the Texas Supreme Court's writings on TOMA preceded the internet. In the decades since Cox Enterprises and City of San Antonio, the Legislature has amended TOMA to address the practical realities of the internet in public communication. For instance, in 2005, the Legislature amended Section 551.056 to require certain governmental bodies, including counties, to concurrently post notice of a meeting on the internet website of the governmental body in addition to a physical notice. Act of June 17, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 340, § 1, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 982, 983 (codified at Tex. Gov't Code § 551.056(b)). Although not applicable in this case, the Court notes that the Legislature recently amended Section 551.049 to now give a county the option to only post online. Act of May 22, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 475, § 2, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1094, 1094 (codified at Tex. Gov't Code § 551.049(2)).⁶

These changes, however, do not excuse a governmental entity from providing sufficient notice if it also posts multiple pages of supporting documentation online. The statute addresses the notice provided, not the documents that may be attached to the notice, whether by hyperlink or otherwise. Although the County provided the draft election order online by hyperlink, the agenda item's notice itself is not sufficient to put a reader on notice of the subject of the bonds. If the notice is insufficient, someone reading the agenda item may never click the hyperlink to reach the additional details. Supporting documents provided online do not necessarily cure insufficient notice in the agenda, in my opinion. Indeed, the Texas Supreme Court has cautioned, pre-internet, that too much detail can overwhelm the reader and prove even less informative. City of San Antonio, 820 S.W.2d at 766. The notice the County provided online is the same notice it posted at the courthouse, and they were both insufficient to comply with TOMA under existing case law.

C. A Call for Review.

This case is important to the state's jurisprudence. If allowed to stand, this Court's opinion creates a procedural mess. Under the majority's analysis, once an election goes forward and a vote in favor of bond issuance occurs, no one can allege a violation of TOMA unless they previously stopped the election from going forward. Otherwise, their claim is not timely. Under the Court's logic, that is true even if the party seeking approval of the bonds files a suit seeking a declaration of compliance with TOMA under the EDJA and the party challenging the bonds immediately intervenes and contends, as a defensive matter, that a TOMA violation occurred. That would have been the procedural posture here had the Appellees not sought to consolidate their previous suit filed in Hays County with the County's suit in Travis County. If the only claim pending in Travis County had been the County's EDJA suit, how could anyone reason that Appellees' claimed TOMA violation was late? Of course, it would not have been.

Yet, under the majority's reasoning, that is the conclusion—Appellees were somehow late solely because they had not previously stopped the election from happening. That cannot be the law. Otherwise, the EDJA and its required declarations are meaningless because no one can challenge the required declaration that the election order was valid after the election has already occurred (which, not incidentally, is when a suit under the EDJA must be filed). The Court also ignores the very relief the County seeks—a declaration that it did not violate TOMA in ordering the election. The Appellees, as intervenors in the trial court, certainly had the right and ability to challenge, as a defensive matter, the County's entitlement to that declaration regardless of when they filed their election contest.

In addition, as outlined in this opinion, the Texas Supreme Court has not reviewed an alleged violation of TOMA in decades, prior to the advent of the internet. Admittedly, reasonable minds may differ under the facts of this case about whether a TOMA violation occurred given the County's online posting, which included a draft copy of the election order by hyperlink. These new technological nuances in TOMA compliance should be addressed going forward so that entities that must comply with TOMA are not left to guess what type of notice is sufficient. I urge the Texas Supreme Court to review this case and provide such guidance.

CONCLUSION

This case is a procedural mess, and the Court's opinion only makes it messier. Yes, Appellees filed an election contest and likely did so too late. But no, that does not preclude Appellees from participating in the County's EDJA suit and contending that the County is not entitled to its requested declaration that its election order complied with TOMA. Appellees have a right to challenge the declaration the County seeks. Because the Court ignores these realities, I dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Tex. Comm'n on Env't Quality v. Maverick Cnty., 642 S.W.3d 537, 549 (Tex. 2022) (holding court of appeals may address alternate grounds so appeal need not “bounce back and forth” if the Texas Supreme Court disagrees).

2.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 551.142(a) (emphasis added).

3.   In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis added).

4.   Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590 S.W.3d 544, 555 (Tex. 2019) (holding TOMA does not waive immunity for declaratory relief). As the only TOMA complaint here was forfeited by strategic delay, whether other TOMA complaints might be raised in an EDJA suit is not before us.

5.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 551.049.

6.   Id. § 551.056(b).

7.   See TEX. ELEC. CODE § 41.001(a).

8.   Appellees moved to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which this Court treated as a motion to transfer under Rule 27a. We denied the motion because the Attorney General is required to be named and served as an interested party in a bond-validation suit under Chapter 1205 of the Government Code and must take specific actions in response. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 1205.042(a), 1205.063. Here, the Attorney General filed a trial brief submitting guidance on the TOMA issues and contending that one part of the road projects involving extension of SH45 impermissibly extended into a neighboring county. The Third Court of Appeals agreed with our decision to deny the transfer. We thus have exclusive jurisdiction over the EDJA suit under subpart (d)(1) of Government Code § 22.220.

9.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1205.061(b) (“The court may: (1) order a joint trial on all issues pending in any other proceeding in a court in this state and the consolidation of the proceeding with the action under this chapter; and (2) issue necessary or proper orders to effect the consolidation that will avoid unnecessary costs or delays or a multiplicity of proceedings.”).

10.   Both orders merged into the court's Final Judgment. See Bonsmara Nat. Beef Co., LLC v. Hart of Tex. Cattle Feeders, LLC, 603 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Tex. 2020) (“When a trial court renders a final judgment, the court's interlocutory orders merge into the judgment.”).

11.   See Cox Enters., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Austin ISD, 706 S.W.2d 956, 958 (Tex. 1986).

12.   Pub. Util. Comm'n of Tex. v. Luminant Energy Co. LLC, 691 S.W.3d 448, 461–62 (Tex. 2024) (quoting Scalia, Antonin; Garner, Bryan A. SCALIA AND GARNER'S READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 167 (2012)).

13.   City of San Antonio v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 820 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Tex. 1991) (emphasis added).

14.   See Acts 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., Ch. 475 (H.B. 5534), § 2 (eff. September 1, 2025) (requiring either physical or online posting, not both).

15.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 551.141 (emphasis added).

16.   See Voidable, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2024) (“Valid until annulled ․ This term describes a valid act that may be voided rather than an invalid act that may be ratified.”).

17.   Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chem. Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007).

18.   Love Terminal Partners v. City of Dallas, 256 S.W.3d 893, 897 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

19.   Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 863 (Tex. 2010) (emphasis added).

20.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 551.142(a) (emphasis added).

21.   In re Walker, 683 S.W.3d 400, 402 (Tex. 2024).

22.   Id.

23.   TOMA Integrity, Inc. v. Windermere Oaks Water Supply Corp., 2019 WL 2553300, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 21, 2019, pet. denied) (holding water board's property sale could not be set aside for violating TOMA after it was sold to a third party, as “there is no action on the merits that a court could take that would affect the parties' rights or interests”).

24.   Return Lee to Lee Park v. Rawlings, 2020 WL 7693112, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 28, 2020, pet. denied) (holding city council vote to remove Confederate statue could not be set aside for violating TOMA after it was sold to a third party, making it “impossible for the court to grant effectual relief”).

25.   Love Terminal Partners, 256 S.W.3d at 897.

26.   Plains Growers, Inc. v. Jordan, 519 S.W.2d 633, 644–45 (Tex. 1974) (emphasis added).

27.   Walker, 683 S.W.3d at 402.

28.   See id. at 402–03 (denying mandamus relief where Relator knew of potential duplicates in petition signatures but waited to file until one month after deadline for ballot applications had closed); In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 766 (Tex. 2022) (denying mandamus relief where original petition for mandamus was filed in Supreme Court after filing deadline for election had closed); In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d 642, 644–45 (Tex. 2020) (denying mandamus relief where Relators delayed filing for more than ten weeks and after election processes were underway); Guerra v. Rios, 2025 WL 945566, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 28, 2025, pet. denied) (reversing temporary injunction voiding election where Relator delayed challenging alleged TOMA violation for two months until shortly before early voting began); In re Cnty. of Hidalgo, 655 S.W.3d 44, 51–52 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2022, no pet.) (granting mandamus relief where Real Parties knew of county's refusal to use city's library as polling location but delayed filing for two months until eve of early voting); see also In re Travis Cnty. Republican Party, 702 S.W.3d 328, 329 (Tex. 2024) (Blacklock, J., concurring in part in denial of petition) (“This Court has said again and again that we cannot grant election-eve mandamus relief that could disrupt the voting process unless we know with certainty how our action will affect an impending election.”).

29.   In re Anthony, 642 S.W.3d 588, 589 (Tex. 2022).

30.   In re Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d 762, 765 (Tex. 2022).

31.   In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d 642, 644–45 (Tex. 2020).

32.   Id. at 645–46.

33.   Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 767 (emphasis added).

34.   Id. at 764 (emphasis added), 766–67 (denying petition to prevent voting based on redistricting map where “[t]he period for ballot access has closed” and ballots “must be finalized very soon to comply with deadlines for mailing ballots to military and overseas voters” because granting relief “would necessarily disrupt the ongoing election process”).

35.   Id. at 765.

36.   TEX. ELEC. CODE § 221.012. An election on a ballot measure may be contested if the contested election is declared void. See id. § 233.001. But as noted above, a TOMA violation is voidable rather than void.

37.   In re Morris, 663 S.W.3d 589, 593–94 (Tex. 2023).

38.   See Khanoyan, 637 S.W.3d at 766 (denying mandamus because “any relief that we theoretically could provide here would necessarily disrupt the ongoing election process”).

39.   Plaintiffs never claimed the County's online posting was insufficient.

40.   Tex. Co. v. State, 281 S.W.2d 83, 91 (Tex. 1955) (“He who seeks equity must do equity.”).

41.   Id.

42.   In re Hotze, 627 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex. 2020) (emphasis added).

43.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1205.024 (listing its authority to issue bonds; their purpose; the bond election results; its authorization to take actions or make expenditures; maximum bond amounts; interest rate; and “any other pertinent matter”).

44.   See id. § 1205.151.

45.   See id.

46.   Id. § 1205.151(c) (emphasis added).

47.   Paxton v. City of Austin, No. 24-1078, 2026 WL 1445577, at *3 (Tex. May 22, 2026).

48.   The Attorney General objected to validation of one part of the bond package related to extending SH45 into Travis County. Hays County no longer complains of that part of the judgment, so that part of the bond package has been withdrawn.

49.   Even the online posting would not satisfy the dissent despite all the “supporting documents provided online,” apparently because TOMA prevents asking interested citizens to simply click on a hyperlink or open an attachment. But we need not and do not decide whether online links fail to comply with TOMA because the more important issue is whether a major election can be disregarded based on a strategically untimely complaint.

50.   Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 230 (2023); accord, In re Merrill Lynch Trust Co. FSB, 235 S.W.3d 185, 194 (Tex. 2007).

51.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 551.142(a).

52.   TEX. ELEC. CODE § 3.009.

53.   Id. §§ 4.001–.009.

54.   See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1205.061(b).

55.   Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 453 (Tex. 2020).

56.   See In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys., 464 S.W.3d 686, 716 (Tex. 2015) (“To the extent possible, we will construe the different provisions in a way that harmonizes rather than conflicts.”).

57.   The County also argued that a TOMA violation is voidable and remains “valid unless and until adjudicated and declared to be void”; that “superseding events” could render a TOMA challenge “moot” (citing the airport agreement case noted above); that the unchallenged election results rendered this TOMA complaint “moot”; and that “delaying the filing of a petition for mandamus relief may waive the right to mandamus unless the relator can justify the delay,” which Plaintiffs could not do here since they waited until early voting started to file their complaint.

58.   The Plaintiffs' pleading in the EDJA suit named only themselves as intervenors and “interested persons.” See TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1205.062.

59.   TEX. GOV'T CODE § 1205.063(a).

60.   Id. §§ 1205.044, .151(c) (emphasis added).

61.   Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3 v. Hidalgo Cnty. Irrigation Dist. No. 1, 669 S.W.3d 178, 184 (Tex. 2023).

62.   The dissent implies that the County had a burden to disprove the TOMA complaint as it was part of a “public security authorization.” That undefined statutory term generally applies to the “initial actions or approvals needed to ensure the proper issuance of public securities” and “must have an authorizing connection with or effect on the public securities.” Conroe v. San Jacinto River Auth., 602 S.W.3d 444, 453 (Tex. 2020). But an agenda on a bulletin board is neither an action nor an approval to issue bonds; it provides notice of a debate. Regardless, it cannot void the election here as it was not timely raised.

63.   Hidalgo Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 3, 669 S.W.3d at 184.

64.   TEX. ELEC. CODE § 221.012.

65.   Kelley v. Homminga, 706 S.W.3d 829, 834 (Tex. 2025).

1.   For instance, one portion of the bond package related to extending SH 45 into the boundaries of Travis County. The Attorney General objected to validation of that portion of the bond package. Appellants have withdrawn their appeal of the trial court's ruling with regard to that portion of the bond package.

2.   The Texas Legislature amended Section 551.049 in the 89th Regular Session. Act of May 22, 2025, 89th Leg., R.S., ch. 475, § 2, 2025 Tex. Gen. Laws 1094, 1094. All references to section 551.049 in this opinion are to the pre-amendment version, which was in effect at the time of the notice.

3.   By the Court's logic, a party should not be able to raise as a defense a theory on which limitations would have run if made as an independent claim. But that is not the law—even if limitations would bar a claim for recovery, that same claim can still be raised defensively. See Morris-Buick Co. v. Davis, 91 S.W.2d 313, 314 (Tex. [Comm'n Op.] 1936); Tamimi Global Co., Ltd. v. Kellogg Brown & Root, L.L.C., 483 S.W.3d 678, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). An example is fraud as a defense to a contract claim. A party can raise that defense even if its time has expired for filing an independent claim to recover for fraud related to the contract. See Syrian Am. Oil Corp., S.A. v. Pecten Orient Co., 524 S.W.3d 350, 364 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

4.   See also Texas Turnpike Authority v. City of Fort Worth, 554 S.W.2d 675, 676 (Tex. 1977) (concluding open meeting notice of considering a request “to determine feasibility of a bond issue to expand and enlarge the Dallas-Fort Worth Turnpike” sufficient); Lower Colorado River Authority v. City of San Marcos, 523 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tex. 1975) (concluding open meeting notice of “changes in electric power rates for electric power within the boundaries of the [city]” sufficient).

5.   See, e.g., Creedmoor Maha Water Supply Corp. v. Barton Springs-Edwards Aquifer Conservation Dist., 784 S.W.2d 79, 85–87 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ denied); Markowski v. City of Marlin, 940 S.W.2d 720, 724–26 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ); Burks v. Yarbrough, 157 S.W.3d 876, 881–84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); City of Laredo v. Escamilla, 219 S.W.3d 14, 19–20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, pet. denied); In re City of Amarillo, No. 07–22–00341–CV, 2023 WL 5279473, at *4–6 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug. 16, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.).

6.   “Electronic display” includes a county's public internet website. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 82.051(a)(2).

Scott A. Brister Chief Justice