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ADAM DEVONE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. MORGAN STANLEY & CO. LLC et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Certified for Publication 10/29/26 (order attached)
Maurice Voce was a barber by trade and a self-taught investor. From the 1980s until his death in 2012 at the age of 93, he traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC, primarily through John R. Privitelli, and built a $19 million fortune. Maurice left that fortune to his three children—Mario Voce, Julia Voce, and Stella Voce—through a series of trust instruments.1 Stella served as sole trustee of the Trusts from approximately October 2007 until Mario, Julia, and Adam DeVone—Maurice's nephew—were added as co-trustees in March 2012. Beginning around 2010, Maurice's children and other family members grew concerned about his declining cognitive health, even as some of the options trading, and the commissions it generated, continued.
DeVone, Mario, and Julia, as co-trustees of the Trusts, and DeVone, as personal representative of Maurice's estate, sued Morgan Stanley and Privitelli for breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse arising from Maurice's decades-long relationship trading options with Privitelli. After the close of plaintiffs’ evidence, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit and entered judgment on both causes of action. Plaintiffs appeal from the judgment.
Plaintiffs challenge three rulings underlying the judgment. First, they argue the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations. Although the court found plaintiffs’ claims timely under the discovery rule, with months of the limitations period still unexpired, plaintiffs contend the court erroneously treated the limitations period as an eroding damages window, projecting the unexpired balance backward from the date of accrual and excluding, as a matter of law, any conduct predating that window. Second, they contend the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on their financial elder abuse claim. They argue the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that defendants knew or should have known that continuing to facilitate Maurice's options trading was likely to harm him given his age and declining cognitive health, regardless of whether his accounts ultimately increased in value. Third, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting nonsuit on their breach of fiduciary duty claim. They principally argue the order rested on the court's erroneous determination that defendants’ fiduciary duty did not extend to tax and estate-planning advice that Privitelli allegedly gave Maurice, because defendants were neither hired nor paid to give such advice.
We agree the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations, and that plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to survive nonsuit on the elder abuse claim and breach of fiduciary duty claim to the extent the latter was based on the court's determination of the scope of defendants’ fiduciary duty. However, we conclude the court properly granted nonsuit as to the distinct theory that defendants breached their fiduciary duty through excessive trading of Maurice's accounts, as plaintiffs failed to offer expert evidence sufficient to support that theory. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part, reverse it in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
A. Maurice's History Trading Options with Morgan Stanley and Privitelli
Maurice began investing in the 1960s and trading options in the 1970s.2 In the 1980s he worked with Joseph Privitelli, a financial advisor then with Dean Witter Reynolds, which later merged with Morgan Stanley. When Joseph died in 1993, his son, John Privitelli, took over Maurice's investment accounts. Maurice was 74 years old at the time. Privitelli worked with Maurice continuously until June 2012, when Morgan Stanley began the process of terminating its business with the Trusts due to a dispute among the co-trustees. Maurice died in August 2012, at the age of 93, leaving an estate that included Morgan Stanley accounts then worth approximately $18 million.
Maurice and the Trusts had two primary accounts with Morgan Stanley: an account containing municipal bonds and other income-focused investments (the “649 Account”), and a trading account in which Privitelli deployed a strategy of buying and selling stock options, including covered calls and uncovered puts (the “850 Account”). (See fn. 2, ante.)
B. The FINRA Arbitration
On June 15, 2014, plaintiffs filed a statement of claim against Morgan Stanley with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”), invoking a binding arbitration agreement and alleging breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. They amended the claim in January 2017, adding four additional counts of fraud. Plaintiffs alleged Morgan Stanley constructed “highly unsuitable portfolios for Maurice” during “the final phase of his life,” including an options trading strategy that, “in addition to being too risky and clearly unsuitable for the 90+ year old Maurice and his trust,” at times involved “repurchasing options contracts previously sold as covered calls for 20 times, 30 times, even 40 times the premium received at the time of the opening transaction.” (Italics omitted.) Maurice allegedly “suffered from dementia” during this period, which “intensified his reliance on” Morgan Stanley, and although Maurice's children had reminded Privitelli of their father's condition, Privitelli dismissed their concerns about the appropriateness of the trading strategy. Apart from options trading, plaintiffs alleged that Morgan Stanley and Privitelli provided negligent tax advice in 2007 regarding Maurice's resignation as a trustee, necessitating a 2011 retitling of trust assets and, because of concerns the delay would draw IRS scrutiny given Maurice's declining health, a split dollar life insurance contract at costs exceeding $700,000.
The parties litigated the arbitration for approximately four years. On January 28, 2019, a three-member FINRA panel unanimously granted Morgan Stanley's motion to dismiss, finding, among other things, that “[t]he records show that Maurice Voce was actively managing his own accounts and was aware of the values of the stocks and highly speculative options he was engaged in trading between 1993 and 1998,” and that Maurice “knew the values and amounts of each trade as well as the commissions charged by Respondent.” The dismissal was not on the merits and was without prejudice to plaintiffs pursuing their claims in court.
C. The Complaint
On April 25, 2019, Mario, Julia, and DeVone, as co-trustees of the Trusts, filed this lawsuit against Morgan Stanley and Privitelli. They filed the operative first amended complaint in July 2019, joined by DeVone in his capacity as personal representative of Maurice's estate. The pleading asserts two causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty (by the Trusts), and financial elder abuse under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15610.30 (on Maurice's behalf by DeVone as his personal representative).3
With respect to both claims, the pleading's allegations largely tracked those plaintiffs asserted in the FINRA arbitration. With respect to both claims, plaintiffs alleged defendants breached their fiduciary duty and committed financial elder abuse by, among other things, engaging in “high frequency options trading” and failing to “reduce Maurice's risk/cost exposure,” “despite [his] age and mental-cognitive impairments.”
D. Trial and the Statute of Limitations Ruling
Trial began with motions in limine on February 29, 2024, and testimony commenced on March 4, 2024.
On March 19, 2024, the trial court held a hearing on the statute of limitations—an issue raised in one of defendants’ in limine motions. In a written ruling, the court found plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse were governed by a four-year limitations period, and that plaintiffs had timely filed suit. However, based on its application of the limitations statutes, the court also held plaintiffs were barred from seeking damages for conduct that occurred on or before September 11, 2010—representing the outer limit of the “remaining 21 months of the unexpired statute of limitations period.”
As explained in its written ruling, the trial court applied the delayed discovery rule, finding plaintiffs “knew or should have discovered” the facts supporting their claims at the “latest” on June 11, 2012, when Morgan Stanley notified plaintiffs it was terminating services on Maurice's accounts, and at the “earliest” on April 10, 2012, when a tax and estate planning attorney advised plaintiffs “to consult litigation counsel concerning the management of [Maurice's] trust accounts by Morgan Stanley.” The court also determined the limitations period was tolled during the pendency of plaintiffs’ FINRA arbitration—from its filing on June 15, 2014 to its conclusion on January 29, 2019—and that the complaint, filed April 25, 2019, was therefore timely.
Having determined the action was timely filed, the trial court then went on to calculate how much of the four-year limitations period had “expired,” net of the tolled interval, as of the filing date. It found that approximately 24 months of the limitations period had “expired” between the June 11, 2012 accrual date and the commencement of the FINRA arbitration on June 15, 2014, and that a further 86 days “expired” between the conclusion of the arbitration on January 29, 2019 and the filing of the complaint on April 25, 2019—together consuming approximately 27 months of the four-year period and leaving approximately 21 months unexpired. Instead of treating those 21 months as a measure of how much time remained for plaintiffs to have filed suit, the court held this “unexpired” period set the outer limit of what conduct could give rise to compensable damages—that is, the court projected the 21-month figure backward from the June 11, 2012 accrual date, arriving at a cutoff of “approximately September 11, 2010.” Based on this application of the limitations statute, the court ruled “[a]ny alleged wrongful acts or omissions occurring before September 11, [2010], are not compensable and cannot be the basis for any liability or damages in this action.”
Applying this same reasoning to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court separately ruled that plaintiffs could not recover damages stemming from the split dollar life insurance policy or other non-trading related conduct, holding those categories of damages were barred on two independent grounds: first, because any related claims “accrued on or before September 11, 2010”; and second, because “Morgan Stanley and John Privitelli were not hired by Maurice Voce nor Trustee Stella Voce for tax advice, estate planning or the payment of or amount of gift taxes,” and Maurice “never paid” defendants for any such advice. (Fn. omitted.)
E. Defendants’ Motion for Nonsuit
At the close of plaintiffs’ case-in-chief, defendants moved for nonsuit. Their written motion first asked the trial court to adopt and incorporate its earlier statute of limitations ruling—narrowing the relevant evidence of liability and damages to the 2010–2012 period and excluding evidence related to the split dollar policy and non-trading breach of fiduciary duty allegations on the ground that defendants were “not hired for tax advice or estate planning.”
With respect to the financial elder abuse claim, defendants argued plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of a “taking,” “wrongful use,” or “harm” as required under section 15610.30, because the 850 account had made substantial capital gains during the compensable 2010–2012 period such that no cognizable harm had been proven. Defendants also argued a Trading Authorization agreement that the Trusts had provided to Morgan Stanley in 2007—granting Maurice authority to direct trades in the accounts “just as if he were the trustee”—estopped plaintiffs from challenging any trades made in reliance on it.
As for the breach of fiduciary duty claim, defendants argued plaintiffs’ theory sounded in “churning” and plaintiffs had failed to offer the sort of expert testimony required to submit an excessive-trading theory to a jury. In support of this ground, defendants pointed to the testimony of plaintiffs’ securities expert, Charles Hartman, who “offered no opinion about the turnover in the account” and, at his deposition, admitted he had “no opinion on ‘churning.’ ”
F. The Nonsuit Ruling
The trial court granted nonsuit on the financial elder abuse claim in an oral ruling from the bench, concluding plaintiffs had failed to present evidence of a taking, wrongful use, intent to defraud, undue influence, or harm. The court found there was “no evidence that Morgan Stanley or Mr. Privitelli took, hid, appropriated, obtained, or retained ․ any of the decedent's property,” emphasizing that “the account only grew in value.”
As for the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the court received supplemental briefing on whether the commissions were “excessive,” before issuing a written ruling granting nonsuit. The court determined plaintiffs offered insufficient evidence of an industry benchmark, standard, or methodology to establish the excessiveness of defendants’ commissions, emphasizing plaintiffs’ expert had disclaimed any opinion on damages or “churning.” In the absence of such testimony, the court concluded a jury would be forced to speculate as to whether the commissions charged were excessive. The court also reasoned that the relevant trading costs were incurred in connection with a “substantial gain” to the account and were “in the best interest of Maurice Voce's investment objectives.” Because “the trust accounts increased in value from 2010 [through] 2012,” the court concluded there was no breach of fiduciary duty, as a matter of law.
The court entered judgment, and this timely appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
A motion for nonsuit tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence before the defendant is put to its own case. Because granting the motion removes the case from the jury, “courts grant motions for nonsuit only under very limited circumstances.” (Carson v. Facilities Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 838 (Carson), citing Campbell v. General Motors Corp. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117.) A trial court must not grant the motion if the evidence presented by the plaintiff would support a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor. (Carson, at p. 838.)
In determining whether the plaintiff's evidence is sufficient, “ ‘the court may not weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must give “to the [plaintiff's] evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, ․ indulging every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence in [plaintiff's] favor.” ’ ” (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 838–839.)
On appeal from a judgment of nonsuit, we are “guided by the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839.) The judgment “ ‘cannot be sustained unless interpreting the evidence most favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant is required as a matter of law.’ ” (Ibid.) “Although a judgment of nonsuit must not be reversed if plaintiff's proof raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjecture, reversal is warranted if there is ‘some substance to plaintiff's evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ.’ ” (Ibid.)
In reviewing a judgment of nonsuit, we may consider “[o]nly the grounds specified by the moving party in support of its motion.” (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839.) Thus, we confine our review of the nonsuit rulings to the grounds defendants asserted below, and do not consider grounds defendants might have but did not raise.
B. The Statute of Limitations Ruling Was Erroneous
1. Governing Law
Statutes of limitations “exist[ ] to promote the diligent assertion of claims, ensure defendants the opportunity to collect evidence while still fresh, and provide repose and protection from dilatory suits once excess time has passed.” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh).) “The duration of the limitations period marks the legislatively selected point at which, for a given claim, these considerations surmount the otherwise compelling interest in adjudicating [valid claims] on their merits.” (Ibid.)
“The limitations period, the period in which a plaintiff must bring suit or be barred, runs from the moment a claim accrues.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191; see Code Civ. Proc., § 312 [an action must “be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued”].) “Traditionally at common law, a ‘cause of action accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements”—those elements being wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’ [Citations.] This is the ‘last element’ accrual rule: ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action.’ ” (Aryeh, at p. 1191.)
“To align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely with the policy goals animating it, the courts and the Legislature have over time developed a handful of equitable exceptions to and modifications of the usual rules governing limitations periods. These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) “The ‘ “most important” ’ of these doctrines, the discovery rule, where applicable, ‘postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397; accord, Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807 (Fox).) “A plaintiff has reason to discover a cause of action when he or she ‘has reason at least to suspect a factual basis for its elements.’ ” (Fox, at p. 807.) Once a plaintiff has that suspicion, she is “required to conduct a reasonable investigation,” and is charged with knowledge of whatever information such an investigation would have revealed. (Id. at p. 808.)
“Equitable tolling, in turn, may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192, citing McDonald v. Antelope Valley Community College Dist. (2008) 45 Cal.4th 88, 99–100.) The doctrine applies to arbitrations on the same terms as court proceedings. (Rodriguez v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers (1984) 160 Cal.App.3d 956, 961; Marcario v. County of Orange (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 397, 408.)
2. The Trial Court Misapplied the Statute of Limitations as an Eroding Damages Window
Plaintiffs contend the court erred by treating the statute of limitations not as a threshold test of whether their suit was timely filed, but as a mechanism for shrinking the universe of conduct for which plaintiffs could recover damages. As plaintiffs put it, despite finding their claims timely under the discovery rule, the trial court applied the statute of limitations as an “eroding” damages window that placed an “outside limit” on the period for which plaintiffs could offer evidence to prove their claims. We agree the court misapplied the governing law.
In its written ruling, the trial court expressly found that plaintiffs “either knew or should have known (discovered) the basis for their claims,” at the latest, on June 11, 2012, when Morgan Stanley notified them it was terminating services on Maurice's accounts. The court further found the limitations period was tolled during the pendency of the FINRA arbitration, from June 15, 2014 to January 29, 2019, and that the complaint, filed April 25, 2019, was therefore timely. Under the principles set out above, these findings should have resolved the statute of limitations question in its entirety. A cause of action either accrues, is timely filed, and may proceed—with the plaintiff entitled to seek recovery for the full course of the wrongful conduct underlying that cause of action—or it does not. The statute of limitations defines only the period within which an action must be commenced after accrual; it does not, once the condition for timeliness is satisfied, operate to constrain the scope of actionable conduct. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 312 [an action “can only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of action shall have accrued” (italics added)]; Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 807–815 [discussing the delayed discovery rule and the timeliness of an action when accrual is postponed].)
Asaro v. Maniscalco (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 717 (Asaro) is instructive. Maniscalco—a former trustee and beneficiary—was found liable for breach of fiduciary duty based on his misappropriation of trust assets, including $430,000 in certificates of deposit that he cashed out in January and February 2010, and real property that he conveyed to his own company in September 2010. (Id. at pp. 722–724.) Antoinette—the beneficiary whose community property interest was principally at stake—died in late November 2010, and her nephew—another trust beneficiary—did not file his probate petition against Maniscalco until 2018. (Id. at pp. 724–725.) Maniscalco argued the claims were untimely because his co-trustee knew of the misappropriations when they occurred. (Id. at p. 728.) The Asaro court disagreed, affirming the judgment for the beneficiary in full, including reimbursement of $547,370 to the trust and a statutory penalty of $1,094,740. (Id. at pp. 724–725, 739, 744.)
With respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim— subject to a three-year limitations period running from when “the beneficiary discovered, or reasonably should have discovered, the subject of the claim” (Prob. Code, § 16460, subd. (a)(2))—the Asaro court concluded the claim was timely because the beneficiary “did not have reason to know of his claim more than three years before filing suit.” (Asaro, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 729.) As for the elder abuse claim—subject to a four-year limitations period running from when the plaintiff “discover[ed] or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse” (§ 15657.7)—the reviewing court held the claim timely on two independent grounds: the limitations period was tolled during the beneficiary-victim's lifetime because she lacked the legal capacity to make decisions (Code Civ. Proc., § 352, subd. (a)), and, separately, the nephew who ultimately sued had “no reason to know of a potential cause of action for elder abuse” given Maniscalco's concealment. (Asaro, at pp. 731–732.)
Critically, having determined accrual was postponed and the claims were timely, the Asaro court did not limit recovery to conduct within three or four years of the date suit was filed. (See Asaro, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 729–732.) Rather, it affirmed recovery for misconduct occurring seven or eight years before the claims were filed, because the claims themselves were timely. Had the statute of limitations instead operated as the trial court applied it here—as a backward-measured boundary on compensable conduct—the misappropriation in Asaro would have fallen outside any such boundary and gone uncompensated. That was not the result in Asaro, and nothing in the discovery rule, the law of tolling, or the law governing accrual generally supports treating a single, timely-accrued claim as subject to a second, independent temporal limit on what portions of the underlying conduct may be considered for establishing liability and damages.
The trial court, however, imposed such a limit here. Having calculated that approximately 21 months of the four-year limitations period remained unexpired as of the date of filing, the court did not treat that figure as confirmation of timeliness and stop there. Instead, it projected the 21-month figure backward from the June 11, 2012 accrual date, and ruled that “[a]ny alleged wrongful acts or omissions occurring before September 11, [2010], are not compensable and cannot be the basis for any liability or damages in this action.” This was error.
3. The Continuous Accrual Doctrine Does Not Save the Trial Court's Ruling
Defendants do not defend the trial court's stated reasoning. Instead, they offer a different justification for the September 2010 cutoff—namely, that it reflects a proper application of the “continuous accrual doctrine,” under which each options trade in Maurice's account gave rise to a discrete, separately accruing claim, such that injuries for conduct occurring more than four years before the April 2019 filing date, net of the tolled period for the FINRA arbitration, were time-barred. The record does not support the contention.
Separate and distinct from the discovery rule, the continuous accrual doctrine “posits that a cause of action challenging a recurring wrong may accrue not once but each time a new wrong is committed.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1189.) “Generally speaking, continuous accrual applies whenever there is a continuing or recurring obligation: ‘When an obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis, a cause of action accrues each time a wrongful act occurs, triggering a new limitations period.’ ” (Id. at p. 1199.) Unlike the continuing violation doctrine, which renders an entire course of conduct actionable once any part of it falls within the limitations period, continuous accrual “supports recovery only for damages arising from those breaches falling within the limitations period.” (Ibid.)
Defendants’ attempt to recast the trial court's ruling as a proper application of the continuous accrual doctrine fails because its necessary premise is that plaintiffs knew or should have known of their claims more than four years before they filed this action. As our high court explained in Aryeh, the continuous accrual doctrine exists to prevent “the inequities that would arise if the expiration of the limitations period following a first breach of duty or instance of misconduct were treated as sufficient to bar suit for any subsequent breach or misconduct.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198, italics added.) In other words, the doctrine presupposes a threshold finding that the limitations period would have expired as to the claim considered as a whole, and its purpose is to rescue a plaintiff from that consequence where the underlying “ ‘obligation or liability arises on a recurring basis.’ ” (Id. at p. 1199.)
Contrary to defendants’ premise, the trial court expressly found that “the earliest date that plaintiffs either knew or should have known (discovered) the basis for their claims ․ was at the trustee's meeting held on April 10, 2012,” when plaintiffs’ tax and estate planning attorney “advised the trustees to consult litigation counsel concerning the management of Maurice Voce's trust accounts by Morgan Stanley.” And, when credited with the four-and-a-half-year tolling period during the FINRA arbitration, the court found plaintiffs timely filed their claims. That finding categorically undermines the necessary premise of defendants’ argument.
It is also worth recognizing that continuous accrual is—by design—a doctrine that operates in a plaintiff's favor. It operates not only as a vehicle for preserving a plaintiff's ability to recover for recent wrongs notwithstanding the staleness of earlier ones, but it also exists to ensure that a defendant engaged in “long-standing misfeasance” does not “obtain immunity in perpetuity from suit even for recent and ongoing misfeasance.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198.) Defendants’ attempt to invoke the doctrine to confine, rather than expand, the conduct for which plaintiffs may recover inverts its purpose.
Having said this, we must also be clear about the limits of what we decide at this stage. Before any determination can be made about whether the continuous accrual doctrine applies, the trier of fact must first determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of delayed accrual under the discovery rule and, if so, when they knew or should have known of the facts giving rise to their claims. As we explain below, the trial court improperly took that question from the jury, despite conflicting evidence on this disputed question of fact. If the jury finds plaintiffs filed their lawsuit more than four years after they should have discovered their claims, plaintiffs may nonetheless seek to prove that defendants’ alleged liability arose on a recurring basis, such that new causes of action accrued each time a wrongful act occurred, triggering a new limitations period under the continuous accrual doctrine. (See Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1199.) Because application of the delayed discovery rule and the continuous accrual doctrine depend on the resolution of disputed factual issues, these are matters for a jury—not the court—to decide. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807; CACI Nos. 454 & 455.)
4. The Trial Court Improperly Decided Accrual as a Matter of Law Despite Conflicting Evidence
Independent of its misapplication of the statute of limitations, the trial court's accrual finding was itself erroneous because it resolved disputed factual questions that should have been submitted to the jury.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, the resolution of which is “normally a question of fact.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112 (Jolly); Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1191; see CACI No. 454.) It becomes a question of law only “where the uncontradicted facts ․ are susceptible of only one legitimate inference.” (Jolly, at p. 1112; Aryeh, at p. 1191.) The same rule governs application of the discovery rule: whether a plaintiff knew or should have known the facts supporting her claim is a question for the trier of fact where the evidence is disputed or subject to conflicting inferences; it may be decided by the court only when reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion. (See Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807; CACI No. 455.)
Critically, what matters under the discovery rule is not simply whether a plaintiff knew of the transactions later alleged to be wrongful, but whether the plaintiff had “ ‘reason at least to suspect a factual basis for [the] elements’ ” of the claim—that is, reason to suspect wrongdoing, not merely reason to be aware of the underlying facts. (Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 807.) Knowledge that a transaction occurred and knowledge that it was wrongful are related but distinct inquiries, and evidence bearing on the former does not necessarily resolve the latter as a matter of law.
In making their case for application of the continuous accrual doctrine—which, as discussed, requires a threshold determination that plaintiffs’ claims were untimely—defendants catalogue substantial evidence that would support an earlier accrual-date finding than the one the trial court made. For example, defendants point to evidence that Maurice was “fully in control of his options trading, was aware of the costs and the performance, and had no memory lapses or other cognitive issues” before 2010; that he received trade confirmations reflecting the commissions on each transaction; that he kept his own detailed trading log; and that he wrote a letter in 1992 (when he was over 70 years old) confirming his understanding of the risks and costs of options trading generally. Defendants also point to evidence that Stella and, later, the trustees had access to Maurice's account statements and trade confirmations, as well as the power to terminate his Trading Authorization or stop the trading altogether, but never did so. And, defendants cite evidence that a principal with a different brokerage firm (who worked with DeVone) had advised Maurice in 2007 that Morgan Stanley's commissions were excessive and that Maurice's options trading was risky.
A jury could find this evidence sufficient to place Maurice and the Trusts on inquiry notice of the wrongdoing plaintiffs later alleged, well before the date the trial court identified for its discovery and accrual finding. A jury could equally find that Maurice's acceptance of ordinary market risk, and his own tracking of trade-by-trade costs, reflected an engaged investor's comfort with a strategy he had chosen, without any reason to suspect his fiduciary was acting wrongfully in administering it. Both are permissible inferences, and because the evidence would support both later and earlier accrual findings under the delayed discovery rule, the question should have gone to the jury rather than being resolved by the court before the close of plaintiffs’ case. The trial court erred in deciding the accrual question as a matter of law. (See Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807; CACI Nos. 454 & 455.)
C. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Nonsuit of the Elder Abuse Claim
Defendants contend the statute of limitations ruling was at most harmless error because plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to establish a wrongful taking under the Elder Abuse Act, regardless of the period considered. As they argued in their motion for nonsuit, defendants maintain Maurice was not harmed by the commissions charged on his options trades, or by the trades themselves, because his accounts increased in value over the relevant period and, in any event, plaintiffs ratified the trading activity by keeping the Trading Authorization in place, even after Maurice's evident cognitive decline. In granting nonsuit, the trial court reached the same conclusion on the former point, finding Maurice “was not harmed, and, in fact, the account only grew in value.” This was error, and it rendered the statute of limitations ruling prejudicial. As we will explain, proof of a wrongful taking under the Elder Abuse Act does not require evidence of a net financial loss, and the evidence plaintiffs presented—including evidence excluded under the statute of limitations ruling—was sufficient to reject the ratification defense and to support a jury finding of liability.
The Elder Abuse Act is a remedial statute, reflecting the Legislature's findings that elders are “a class of persons who are particularly vulnerable to abuse” and that the state “ ‘has a responsibility to protect’ ” them. (Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 841, 858 (Mahan), quoting § 15600, subd. (a).) Since 1991, the Act has been structured around encouraging private civil enforcement of laws against elder abuse—a purpose the Legislature pursued by attaching heightened remedies, including mandatory attorney's fees and costs, “designed to provide incentives for ‘interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons.’ ” (Mahan, at p. 858, quoting § 15600, subd. (j).) Courts accordingly construe the Act's financial abuse provisions liberally, resolving close questions “in favor of” the class of elders the statute is designed to protect. (Mahan, at pp. 860–861.)
An elder is any person residing in this state, who is 65 years of age or older. (§ 15610.27.) Financial elder abuse occurs when a person or entity “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder ․ for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both.” (§ 15610.30, subd. (a)(1).) The statute defines “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains” broadly: an elder is deprived of property, and thus the property has been taken within the meaning of the statute, whenever the elder “is deprived of any property right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder.” (Id., subd. (c).) Commissions generated by a wrongful transaction constitute a taking regardless of whether they are paid directly by the elder or by a trust or account administered on the elder's behalf. (See Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 865, citing Wood v. Jamison (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 156, 164–165 [finder's fee paid by lender sufficient].)
A taking is deemed to be “for a wrongful use” if the person or entity charged with the taking “knew or should have known that [the] conduct [was] likely to be harmful to the elder.” (§ 15610.30, subd. (b).) This was not always the governing standard. Before 2008, subdivision (b) required a showing that the defendant acted in “ ‘bad faith.’ ” (Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 860.) The Legislature amended the statute, replacing that subjective standard with the objective, foreseeability-based standard now in place—asking not whether the defendant intended harm, but whether the defendant “ ‘knew or should have known’ ” that the conduct in question was “ ‘likely’ ” to cause it. (Id. at pp. 859–860, fn. 18, citing Stats. 2008, ch. 475, § 1.) This objective foreseeability standard is inherently forward-looking—it asks what a defendant knew or should have known at the time the challenged conduct occurred and is not necessarily concerned with what result the conduct ultimately produced.
Contrary to the Elder Abuse Act's foreseeability standard, defendants’ and the trial court's focus on the capital gains earned in Maurice's trading account rests on a backward-looking assessment of what result the challenged conduct produced. Defendants argue plaintiffs “failed to prove a taking, a wrongful use, or intent to defraud and harm” because the account was “profitable,” emphasizing “Maurice's total gains from 2010 to 2012 were approximately $4,204,744 (net of commissions).” But this contention speaks to how the trading performed in hindsight—not to what defendants “knew or should have known” when they engaged Maurice in options trades and charged commissions for them. (§ 15610.30, subd. (b).) Under the Elder Abuse Act, a defendant who exposes an elder to a foreseeable risk of harm does not escape liability merely because the risk did not materialize. This follows from the Act's remedial design. In amending the “ ‘wrongful use’ ” standard, the Legislature not only aimed to encourage private enforcement but also to deter wrongful conduct by making a defendant answerable for what it “ ‘knew or should have known’ ” about the likelihood of harm before any taking occurred. (Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at p. 860 & fn. 18.) A rule that measured wrongfulness only by outcome would render the statute's foreseeability standard hollow and undermine its deterrent function.
Mahan is not to the contrary. There, an elderly couple sued an insurance agent for financial elder abuse, alleging the agent induced them to surrender an existing life insurance policy in favor of a costlier, more limited replacement policy, generating commissions for the agent and forcing the couple to feed additional cash into their trust to sustain it. (Mahan, supra, 14 Cal.App.5th at pp. 846–847, 849–853.) Defendants emphasize that the scheme in Mahan resulted in the loss of the original policy's accumulated cash value and years of increased premium costs to sustain the costlier replacement—the sort of net financial harm that defendants argue is absent here. (See Mahan, at pp. 853–854.) But the Mahan court's holding did not rest on an allegation that the couple ended up in a worse financial position, even though their pleading alleged that they did. Rather, the reviewing court held the agent's commissions could themselves constitute a taking or deprivation under the Elder Abuse Act because the agent allegedly knew or should have known the scheme was likely to result in harm—specifically, the agent's statement that the couple “ ‘could just borrow against [their] real estate’ ” showed the agent's awareness that the couple would need to tap other assets to cover the dramatically increased costs the scheme would impose, and the agent had allegedly failed to mention a pricing option that would have made the surrender unnecessary altogether while pursuing his own $100,000 commission. (Id. at pp. 865–866.) Those allegations concerned what the agent knew and represented at the time—not the couple's resulting financial position. (See id. at pp. 866–867.)
Arace v. Medico Investments, LLC (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 977 (Arace) is also instructive. A jury found the defendant in Arace liable for financial elder abuse but awarded no economic or noneconomic damages for the claim. (Id. at pp. 982–983.) The defendant challenged the award of attorney fees, arguing the plaintiff could not be deemed the prevailing party on the elder abuse claim because she had “recover[ed] no damages” for the abuse. (Id. at p. 983.) The reviewing court rejected the contention, concluding an award of attorney's fees and costs under section 15657.5 was nonetheless mandatory: “Under the plain language of the statute, an award of attorney fees is a mandatory form of relief regardless of whether the plaintiff is awarded any other form of relief.” (Arace, at p. 983, italics added, citing § 15657.5 [“Where it is proven by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant is liable for financial abuse, as defined in Section 15610.30, in addition to compensatory damages and all other remedies otherwise provided by law, the court shall award to the plaintiff reasonable attorney's fees and costs.”].)4 Arace confirms that liability for financial elder abuse, including the “wrongfulness” element of the claim, is not defeated by the absence of a net monetary recovery when liability is otherwise established.
Measured against the governing wrongfulness standard, we conclude plaintiff's evidence—including evidence the trial court excluded under its erroneous statute of limitations ruling—was sufficient to permit a jury to find that defendants knew or should have known that taking commissions based on an uncovered options trading strategy was likely to be harmful to Maurice. The trading strategy placed Maurice at significant risk of sustaining large losses and, according to plaintiffs’ evidence, it was therefore inappropriate for someone of his advanced age, yet he was responsible for paying commissions to defendants regardless of how the account ultimately performed.
The record shows Morgan Stanley itself recognized—more than a decade before the conduct primarily at issue—that Maurice's age warranted restricting the very trading strategy later challenged in this action. In 1998, Morgan Stanley sent a letter to Maurice memorializing restrictions that would limit his trading account to a conservative, covered-call strategy and cap his uncovered options positions. Privitelli agreed that Maurice's age—79 years old at the time—likely was a motivating factor for that restriction. Indeed, the evidence showed that in September 1999, Morgan Stanley generated an internal communication stating that “because of [Maurice's] age,” the firm “ ‘thought it would be prudent to reign in exotic stuff’ ”—a reference to uncovered options. But despite recognizing the risk, the same internal communication shows the firm carved out a special exception for Privitelli's branch. A jury crediting this evidence could reasonably infer that Morgan Stanley's own compliance division recognized a connection between Maurice's advanced age and the risk of the strategy Privitelli continued to pursue in Maurice's account for another decade.
The nature of that risk was not merely theoretical, and the record shows it materialized over the course of Privitelli's relationship with Maurice in ways that, a reasonable jury could find, should have put defendants on notice that the strategy was not suitable for someone of Maurice's advanced age. As Privitelli himself explained, selling an uncovered put obligates the seller to buy the underlying stock if its price falls below the strike price, and Maurice's typical trades of 10 to 20 options at a time obligated him to purchase 1,000 to 2,000 shares when this occurred. (See fn. 2, ante.) When Maurice could not fund that obligation in cash, he carried the shortfall on margin. Privitelli acknowledged that positions held on margin were “more at risk” to market fluctuations. In fact, the record shows that in February 2009—after Maurice's account had fallen by nearly half its value over the preceding year—Morgan Stanley issued a margin call demanding Maurice put additional money into the account to cover the shortfall on his borrowed positions. The margin debt was ultimately paid off through a $900,000 loan that the Trusts were forced to obtain. Privitelli agreed that the roughly $900,000 in margin debt that Maurice's account carried in 2009—approximately eight percent of its total value—“could have very well” been created by the options trading strategy.
The record also contains evidence that Privitelli continued to collect commissions from Maurice in connection with the options strategy after receiving notice of Maurice's cognitive decline. In December 2010, Privitelli received an email from plaintiffs describing Maurice's memory lapses, disorientation, and declining health. And, Privitelli testified that, as of January and February 2011, and again in March and April of that year, he was “on notice” of Maurice's cognitive impairment, yet still executed specific trades on Maurice's instructions “while [Maurice] was cognitively impaired.”
The record also shows that notice of Maurice's cognitive impairment triggered a recognized institutional obligation on defendants’ part. Plaintiffs’ securities expert testified that firms like Morgan Stanley customarily have escalation protocols in place that require their financial advisors to “ ‘elevate’ ” reports of a client's diminished capacity to management, and the advisors have “no discretion” to withhold the information. Brian Krueger, a Market Executive with Morgan Stanley, agreed that “as a fiduciary in the security space,” a financial advisor like Privitelli would have been “trained to identify and escalate concerns about diminished capacity,” and that Morgan Stanley was subject to securities-industry notices requiring it to “train [its] financial advisors to spot and escalate” such concerns. Privitelli agreed the obligation applied to him. Asked directly whether the reports of Maurice's cognitive impairment “had to be escalated to risk management or some supervisor,” he answered, “Sure. It should have been.”5 Viewing all this evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, a reasonable jury could find defendants knew or should have known the continued options trading and related taking of commissions by defendants were likely to harm Maurice, given his advanced age and cognitive impairments.
Finally, there was evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer defendants had a financial incentive to continue the options trading strategy notwithstanding the risks they knew or should have known it posed to Maurice. Plaintiffs’ expert testified that options positions—unlike an ordinary equity purchase—are inherently short-lived and must be periodically replaced. He explained that “unlike a common stock that you usually buy, pay one commission, and then you hold onto it for a while,” an options position “expires,” is “generally replaced,” and “every time it's replaced,” the customer gets “a new commission charge.” In other words, plaintiffs’ expert testified, “it's the cumulative effect of the transactions that drives up a new commission over and over and over again.” By contrast, a more conservative buy-and-hold or covered-call strategy—the very strategy Morgan Stanley itself had once imposed on Maurice's account because of his age—would not have required the same volume of transactions, and accordingly would have generated fewer commissions than the uncovered options strategy that Privitelli continued to pursue.
Notwithstanding this evidence, defendants argue the nonsuit ruling is supported by a different ground that they presented in their motion. As an independent ground for nonsuit, defendants argued the Trading Authorization that Stella executed in 2007, and that plaintiffs never revoked when they became co-trustees, estopped plaintiffs from challenging any trades defendants made in reliance on it.6 They contend charging Maurice commissions on option trades he authorized and the trustees ratified could not constitute a wrongful taking of any property under the Elder Abuse Act.
Ratification does not support nonsuit on this record, because the evidence raised disputed issues of fact regarding defendants’ reliance on the Trading Authorization. By its terms, the Trading Authorization would “remain in full force and effect until revoked either by me/us [the trustees] or by Morgan Stanley.” (Italics added.) On cross-examination, Krueger agreed this reciprocal revocation provision gave Morgan Stanley “the right to revoke the Trading Authorization if it deemed it in the client's best interest not to take trading decisions from” an impaired customer. He later agreed, without qualification, that “Morgan Stanley had the right to revoke the Trading Agent Authorization [at] any time for any reason or no reason at all.” A jury could reasonably find plaintiffs’ failure to revoke the Trading Authorization is no more probative of ratification than Morgan Stanley's own failure to exercise the identical right, and that the latter was evidence of defendants’ wrongful conduct once they were on notice of Maurice's decline.
To be clear, none of this evidence compels a finding of liability. Defendants presented substantial contrary evidence, including evidence that the family authorized and even encouraged continued trading, as well as Privitelli's testimony that Maurice continued to understand and direct his trades throughout the relevant period. But the nonsuit standard does not ask whether defendants’ evidence was sufficient or even more persuasive. It asks whether plaintiffs’ evidence, credited and viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would have been sufficient to support a jury verdict in their favor. (See Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 838–839.) On this record, we conclude plaintiffs’ evidence was sufficient to support their financial elder abuse claim. The trial court erred in granting nonsuit.
D. The Court Erred in Part in Granting Nonsuit on the Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim rested on two distinct theories. The first, addressed to the options trading, was that defendants engaged Maurice in “excessive trading” or “churning” to generate commissions beyond what a properly managed account would have incurred. The second theory was that defendants’ fiduciary obligations extended beyond the trades themselves to encompass tax and estate-planning matters, including gift-tax advice that Privitelli allegedly gave Maurice regarding gifts to his children, resulting in $640,000 of interest and penalties; and the procurement of a split dollar life insurance policy, which, together with related professional fees, generated alleged damages exceeding $700,000. The trial court's written nonsuit ruling addressed only the first theory, as the court had already foreclosed the second in its earlier statute of limitations ruling, which barred these categories of damages both because any related claims purportedly “accrued on or before September 11, 2010” and because defendants “were not hired ․ for tax advice, estate planning or the payment of or amount of gift taxes.” (Fn. omitted.)7 We conclude the court correctly granted nonsuit as to the excessive trading theory, but erred in excluding evidence and granting nonsuit as to the other breach of fiduciary duty theories.
1. The Trial Court Properly Granted Nonsuit as to the Excessive Trading Claim
To establish a breach of fiduciary duty, “the plaintiff must show the existence of a fiduciary relationship, its breach, and damage proximately caused by that breach; the absence of any one of these elements is fatal to the cause of action.” (LaMonte v. Sanwa Bank California (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 509, 517 (LaMonte).) Unlike financial elder abuse, which can be established by proof of a wrongful taking regardless of net financial loss (see Part C, ante), a breach of fiduciary duty claim requires proof of actual damage proximately caused by the breach. (Id., at p. 517.) We agree with the trial court that plaintiffs failed to prove damages caused by defendants’ purported excessive trading of Maurice's account.
Plaintiffs argue the court's nonsuit ruling erroneously “presumed the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim is excessive trading, i.e., ‘churning.’ ” But plaintiffs’ own submissions below confirm this “presumption” was accurate. In their supplemental brief addressing damages for breach of fiduciary duty “arising from a stockbroker's excessive trading,” plaintiffs relied principally on Nesbit v. McNeil (9th Cir. 1990) 896 F.2d 380 (Nesbit) for the proposition that “excessive commissions on the churned securities [are] independently compensable, despite the increase in value of the account.” (Italics and boldface omitted.) (See id. at pp. 385–386.) That is obviously a churning theory, and it is the theory plaintiffs alleged in their complaint and pursued at trial with respect to their breach of fiduciary duty claim. As the trial court correctly recognized, this theory required proof that the volume of trading was excessive in light of Maurice's investment objectives—proof that ordinarily can be presented only through expert testimony. (See Shad v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (9th Cir. 1986) 799 F.2d 525, 530 [churning can be identified only by analyzing the entirety of a broker's management of an account, and, without expert testimony placing statistical measures of trading activity in context, a jury cannot meaningfully evaluate the transactions].) Plaintiffs’ securities expert, however, disclaimed any opinion on churning, both at deposition and at trial, and plaintiffs offered no other expert testimony establishing that the commissions charged were excessive relative to any industry benchmark, standard, or methodology. Absent such testimony, the jury would have had no basis beyond speculation to conclude the trading was excessive. (Ibid.; Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839 [“if plaintiff's proof raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjecture,” nonsuit must be affirmed].)
Alternatively, plaintiffs argue proof of churning was unnecessary to establish a breach of fiduciary duty for the period after defendants were on notice of Maurice's cognitive decline, because, as they put it, “any and all trading allowed in that time period was improper and a breach of fiduciary duty” without regard to whether the commissions charged were excessive. (Italics and boldface omitted.) The argument overlooks the requirement that plaintiffs prove concrete damage to establish their breach of fiduciary duty claim. Unlike the Elder Abuse Act, under which the commissions themselves may constitute a wrongful taking regardless of the account's net performance, breach of fiduciary duty requires proof of a net loss. (See LaMonte, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.) Proof that trading occurred after notice of Maurice's decline may have established a breach, but it does not, without more, establish that the commissions generated by that trading caused harm, given the undisputed evidence that the trades during this period resulted in net capital gains for Maurice's account. Rather, to establish harm independent of the gains, plaintiffs needed to show the commissions were excessive relative to an industry benchmark, standard, or methodology—that is, they need to prove churning. (See Nesbit, supra, 896 F.2d at pp. 385–386.) They failed to do so. The trial court did not err in granting nonsuit as to this theory. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 581c, subd. (b) [“If it appears that the evidence presented, or to be presented, supports the granting of the motion [for nonsuit] as to some but not all of the issues involved in the action, the court shall grant the motion as to those issues and the action shall proceed as to the issues remaining.”].)
2. The Court Erred in Granting Nonsuit as to Plaintiffs’ Other Theories Based on Its Erroneous Scope of Fiduciary Duty and Statute of Limitations Rulings
Although not expressly stated in the nonsuit ruling, the parties agree the trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ other breach of fiduciary duty theories based on the court's earlier ruling that defendants’ fiduciary duty did not extend to the tax and estate-planning conduct and that the challenged conduct fell outside the compensable 2010 to 2012 period identified in the statute of limitations ruling. In explaining its rationale for limiting the scope of defendants’ fiduciary duty, the court stated defendants “were not hired ․ nor paid” for tax advice or estate planning and, therefore, they could not be charged with a fiduciary duty. We conclude the court erred in resolving this issue as a matter of law. Whether a professional's fiduciary obligations extend beyond the terms of a formal retention depends on the facts of the relationship as a whole—including the parties’ course of dealing, the extent to which the client was induced to rely on the professional beyond the formal scope of the engagement, and instances in which the professional actually rendered the broader advice at issue—not solely on whether the professional was formally engaged and compensated for the specific conduct. (See Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 425 (Rosenthal); Duffy v. Cavalier (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1517, 1535 (Duffy); Brown v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 938, 960–962 (Brown).)
“ ‘Fiduciary’ and ‘confidential’ relationships are relationships existing between parties to a transaction wherein one party is duty bound to act with the utmost good faith for the benefit of the other. Such a relationship ordinarily arises when one party reposes a confidence in the integrity of the other, and the other voluntarily accepts that confidence.” (Brown, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 959–960.) “ ‘[B]efore a person can be charged with a fiduciary obligation, he must either knowingly undertake to act on behalf and for the benefit of another, or must enter into a relationship which imposes that undertaking as a matter of law.’ ” (City of Hope National Medical Center v. Genentech, Inc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 375, 386.) “An agent is a fiduciary as a matter of law. [Citation.] A stockbroker is a fiduciary, as well.” (Brown, at p. 960; Duffy, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1531; Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc. (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 690, 709 (Twomey).) “ ‘ “The essence of a fiduciary or confidential relationship is that the parties do not deal on equal terms, because the person in whom trust and confidence is reposed and who accepts that trust and confidence is in a superior position to exert unique influence over the dependent party.” ’ ” (Brown, at p. 960.) Fiduciary obligations “generally come into play when one party's vulnerability is so substantial as to give rise to equitable concerns underlying the protection afforded by the law governing fiduciaries.” (City of Hope, at p. 389.) “While it is impossible to identify a single set of factors giving rise to a fiduciary relationship [citation], some reasons generally used to demonstrate that a party to such a relationship is vulnerable include advanced age, youth, lack of education, ill health, and mental weakness.” (Brown, at p. 960.)
Here, the “question is not whether there is a fiduciary duty, which there is in every broker-customer relationship; rather, it is the scope or extent of the fiduciary obligation, which depends on the facts of the case.” (Duffy, supra, 215 Cal.App.3d at p. 1535; accord Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 425 [“Granting the existence of a fiduciary relationship between securities brokers and their customers, the scope of the duty varies with the facts of the relationship.”].) Courts assessing that question look to the facts of the parties’ course of dealing as a whole—not to any single formal document. Relevant considerations include the duration and regularity of the professional's contact with the client; the degree of control the professional exercised, or was permitted to exercise, over the client's affairs; whether the professional was aware of circumstances—such as advanced age, declining health, or diminished capacity—that made the client particularly likely to rely on the professional's guidance; whether the professional had access to the client's broader financial information, beyond what the formal engagement required; and whether the professional actually rendered advice, or performed services, extending beyond the formal scope of the engagement. (See Brown, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960–962; Duffy, at pp. 1534–1535; Twomey, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d at pp. 713–714, 717.) No single factor is dispositive, and a professional's formal retention for a narrower purpose does not foreclose a finding that the professional's own conduct expanded the relationship beyond it. (See, e.g., Twomey, at p. 717.) Where the underlying facts bearing on the scope of a fiduciary duty are disputed or subject to conflicting inferences, the issue is one for the trier of fact to resolve. (See In re Marriage of Kamgar (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 136, 144 [existence and scope of a fiduciary duty is reviewed de novo as a question of law, but “to the extent the [trial] court's decision ․ ‘turned on the resolution of conflicts in the evidence or on factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence,’ ” the underlying factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence].)
Brown is instructive. The Browns argued a bank representative's fiduciary duty extended beyond her formal role to require her to explain an arbitration clause before they signed a new account agreement. (Brown, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 941–943.) The bank maintained no such duty could exist because a broker's fiduciary obligations do not arise until after an agreement is executed, and do not require disclosures at the time of execution. (Id. at p. 960.) The Brown court rejected that argument because it “overlook[ed] the unique factual circumstances of [the] case.” (Ibid.) As the reviewing court recounted, the representative had been the Browns’ relationship manager for six months before the transaction at issue; she knew of the husband's declining health and limited vision; she worked biweekly at the Browns’ home; she had access to all of their financial information and managed their financial paperwork; she had introduced them to an estate attorney and an accountant; she gave them investment advice; and she had urged them to retain a particular broker to handle their portfolio. (Id. at pp. 960–961.) None of this course of dealing was reflected in, or required by, any formal engagement or fee arrangement. Nevertheless, the Brown court found it sufficient to support a finding that the representative “knowingly induced” a vulnerable, elderly couple “to rely on [her] to handle their financial affairs,” creating a fiduciary relationship. (Ibid.) Separately, the court concluded the same evidence, together with proof the representative had assisted with “even rudimentary financial tasks” and sought to make the Browns comfortable at the signing, was sufficient to support a finding that the scope of the relationship embraced a duty to explain the contract's material terms. (Id. at pp. 961–962; see also Twomey, supra, 262 Cal.App.2d at p. 717 [rejecting argument that fiduciary relationship could not encompass “duties owing to a discretionary account because there was no written authorization for such an account,” explaining the trier of fact “was entitled to look at the substance and not the form of the transaction in determining the duty owed by defendants to plaintiff with respect to the frequency of the transactions in her account”].)
Plaintiffs contend “the nature and duration of [d]efendants’ fiduciary relationship with Maurice presented a prima facie case that the scope of that fiduciary duty extended beyond mere options trading” and embraced matters including allegedly erroneous tax advice that Privitelli gave Maurice about gifts made to his children and the retitling of trust assets that required plaintiffs hastily to procure a split dollar life insurance policy to mitigate estate taxes at significant additional expense. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we agree the trial court erred in determining the scope of the fiduciary duty based solely on the formal terms of defendants’ hiring and compensation.
The evidence showed Privitelli communicated with Maurice “pretty much daily” over their decades-long relationship, Maurice was a “big client” of Privitelli's, and Privitelli was Maurice's primary financial advisor “as far as his account value.” Privitelli held a Certified Financial Planner certification throughout his relationship with Maurice, and his training covered some estate-planning matters, including training specific to marital and residual trusts. Privitelli acknowledged that, under the CFP designation, he owed a fiduciary duty independent of his role as Maurice's stockbroker, and he regularly identified himself by the designation in written communications with Maurice, never disclaiming that the designation applied to their relationship. Privitelli also testified that he was allowed to give at least some tax and estate planning advice to his clients at Morgan Stanley, and he was the only professional advising Maurice who had a CFP certification. Critically, in a conversation with the Trusts’ estate planning attorney, Privitelli admitted that he had in fact given Maurice tax advice—counseling Maurice that there was no need to file tax returns for gifts purchased for his children with trust assets because the children were trust beneficiaries.
As with the evidence discussed in connection with the financial elder abuse claim, we do not hold this evidence compels a finding extending the scope of defendants’ fiduciary duty to tax and estate planning matters. Rather, we hold only that it was sufficient, when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, to preclude resolving the question against them as a matter of law. (See Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839.) The trial court erred in resolving the scope question solely by reference to the absence of a formal retention or payment for tax and estate-planning services, without regard to evidence of the course of dealing between Maurice and Privitelli. (See Brown, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at pp. 960–962.)
The trial court also erred to the extent it excluded evidence of these alleged breaches based on its erroneous statute of limitations ruling. For the reasons already discussed, the question of whether the statute of limitations bars plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty claim based on this non-trading conduct and, if so, whether plaintiffs are entitled to the benefit of delayed accrual under the discovery rule, is a matter that must be submitted to the jury. (See Fox, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 806–807; CACI Nos. 454 & 455.)
DISPOSITION
The portion of the judgment dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claim based on alleged excessive trading is affirmed. The judgment is reversed in all other respects, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Plaintiffs Adam DeVone, Julia Voce, Mario Frank Voce, and Voce Family Trust are awarded costs.
Filed 10/29/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION FOR PUBLICATION
THE COURT:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on October 8, 2026, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. Upon request by appellants and nonparties to this action, and good cause appearing, it is ordered that the opinion shall be published in the Official Reports.
Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(b), this opinion is certified for publication.
ADAMS, P. J. HANASONO, J. ASHWORTH, J.*
FOOTNOTES
1. To avoid confusion we refer to Maurice and the Voce children by their first names. The trusts are the Voce Family Trust, the Voce Residuary Trust, and the Restated Voce Marital Trust. We refer to them collectively as the “Trusts.”
2. An option is a contract giving its holder the right, but not the obligation, to buy (a “call”) or sell (a “put”) a security at a specified price (the “strike price”) within a specified period. Options contracts can either be “covered” or “uncovered.” For example, in a “covered call,” the option seller already owns the underlying stock and sells a call against it—if the stock rises above the strike price, the seller is obligated to sell the shares at that price, but because the seller holds the shares, the loss (if any) associated with the transaction is limited to the difference between the original purchase price of the shares and the strike price for the covered call. An “uncovered” or “naked” option, by contrast, is sold without any offsetting position in the underlying security. A seller of a naked put, for example, profits so long as the underlying security does not decline sharply, but if it does, the seller may be obligated to purchase the stock at the strike price notwithstanding a substantial decline in the stock's actual value—a loss bounded only by the fact that the underlying security's price cannot fall below zero. Because a naked option seller holds no offsetting position, this risk is not limited in the way the risk on a covered position is.
3. Unless otherwise designated, statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. Section 15610.30 is part of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (the Elder Abuse Act, § 15600 et seq.).
4. Although section 15610.30 does not specify that a financial elder abuse claim requires a showing of harm, the Arace court noted that the standard jury instruction for the claim (see CACI No. 3100) includes a requirement that the plaintiff prove he was “harmed” in order to establish liability. (Arace, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 983, fn. 4.) The reviewing court nonetheless rejected the defendant's argument that the jury could not have found the plaintiff established her claim for financial elder abuse without awarding damages for the claim. Because the jury had also been instructed that “ ‘each item of damages may be awarded only once, regardless of the number of legal theories alleged,’ ” the Arace court found it was “equally arguable that the jury did not believe it could award ․ damages under both the financial abuse and the neglect causes of action.” (Ibid.)
5. Although he testified at trial that he believed he had spoken to a manager about Maurice's “situation,” Privitelli was impeached with his earlier deposition testimony indicating he did not forward plaintiffs’ email about Maurice's cognitive impairments to risk management.
6. Although the trial court did not rely on this ground in granting nonsuit, it was properly raised in the motion, and we accordingly consider it. (Carson, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 839.)
7. As discussed, in their motion for nonsuit, defendants requested the court adopt its statute of limitations ruling, including its finding with respect to the scope of defendants’ fiduciary duty.
FOOTNOTE. Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
HANASONO, J. FN* Retired Judge of the El Dorado Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
We concur: ADAMS, P. J. ASHWORTH, J.*
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Docket No: B339219
Decided: October 08, 2026
Court: Court of Appeal, Second District, California.
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