THE PEOPLE v. JUSTIN ASHLEY FLINT (2026)

In 2006, Justin Ashley Flint acted as a lookout for his associate, Frank Gonzalez, as Gonzalez attempted to rob Maria Cecilia Rosa, an off-duty Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD) Deputy. During the attempt, Gonzalez shot Rosa, killing her. In 2007, the district attorney charged Gonzalez and Flint with first degree murder and attempted robbery. The court instructed Flint's jury ¹ on the felony-murder rule. The jury convicted Flint on both counts.

In 2019, Flint filed a petition pursuant to Penal Code ² section 1172.6 (former § 1170.95)³ challenging his murder conviction. That section permits defendants convicted under certain theories of homicide invalidated by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015)—including certain felony-murder theories—to file a petition seeking resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Section 1172.6, however, does not afford relief to a defendant convicted under the felony-murder rule “when the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of the peace officer's duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of the peace officer's duties.” (§ 189, subd. (f); see People v. Flint (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 607, 616–618 (Flint).) Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Gonzalez had killed Rosa in the course of her peace officer duties. The court therefore denied Flint's petition.

In this appeal—the third arising out of Flint's pursuit of section 1172.6 resentencing—Flint argues we must reverse the denial of his petition because Rosa lacked peace officer authority while off duty. His argument hinges on the construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c), which provides in pertinent part that “[a] deputy sheriff ․ who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments ․ is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of the officer's respective employment.” (§ 830.1, subd. (c).) Flint contends that under section 830.1, subdivision (c), any deputy initially placed in a custodial assignment lacks off-duty peace officer authority unless and until the deputy transitions to a field assignment. He further contends that, because Rosa remained primarily assigned to the jails during her career, she lacked peace officer authority at the time Gonzalez shot her.

The Attorney General counters that section 830.1, subdivision (c) applies only to a discrete class of so-called “modified” deputies hired for the specific purpose of serving in a limited custodial role and provided more limited training commensurate with that role. The Attorney General further contends that Rosa was not part of this modified deputy class, and that she instead enjoyed the off-duty peace officer authority conferred by section 830.1, subdivision (a). (See § 830.1, subd. (a)(3) [“A ․ deputy sheriff ․ is a peace officer” whose “authority ․ extends to any place in the state ․ [¶] ․ [¶] ․ [a]s to a public offense committed ․ in the peace officer's presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense”].)

We conclude that—construed in light of the broader statutory scheme and the pertinent legislative history—section 830.1, subdivision (c) applies only to deputies (1) hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working exclusively in a custodial assignment, or (2) hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working initially in a custodial assignment prior to completing the full training required to transition to employment as a regular deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (a).

We further conclude that substantial evidence supports that Rosa was not a modified deputy trained, hired, or utilized for this limited purpose. As such, she was acting in the course of her peace officer duties when Gonzalez shot her, and Flint is not entitled to section 1172.6 relief.⁴ (See § 189, subd. (f).)

Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

We summarize only the facts and procedural history relevant to our resolution of this appeal.

A. Trial Proceedings

In 2007, a jury convicted Flint of one count of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted robbery (§§ 211, 664), and found that a principal was armed with a firearm in the commission of both counts. (See Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.) The prosecution alleged that a felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) applied to the murder, but the jury found this allegation “not true.” (See Flint, supra, at p. 611.) The trial court sentenced Flint to 29 years to life in prison. (See ibid.) We affirmed the convictions, but stayed the sentence on the attempted robbery conviction, reducing Flint's sentence to 26 years to life. (See People v. Flint (July 6, 2010, B205374) [nonpub. opn.].)

B. Section 1172.6 Proceedings

1. Senate Bill No. 1437's Changes to the Felony-Murder Rule

A decade later, “[i]n 2018, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.) Among other changes, the bill “restricted the application of the felony-murder doctrine. Prior to the enactment of the law, if a defendant committed one of certain serious felonies in which an accomplice killed someone, the defendant was liable for first degree murder even if the killing was inadvertent and unforeseeable. [Citations.] Under the new law, this is no longer the case. To obtain a conviction for felony murder, the prosecution must prove the defendant was the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill in aiding, abetting, counseling, or soliciting the killing, or was ‘a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Ibid., citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3, enacting § 189, subd. (e)(3).)

“The statute created a single exception to these requirements, for cases where ‘the victim is a peace officer who was killed while in the course of [the peace officer's] duties, where the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of [the peace officer's] duties.’ ” (Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 610, citing Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3, enacting § 189, subd. (f).) “In such a case, the felony-murder doctrine applies as it did before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, with no requirement to show that the defendant was a major participant in the felony or acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Flint, supra, at p. 610.)

Senate Bill No. 1437 “also created a special procedural mechanism for those convicted under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as amended.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) This mechanism, now codified in section 1172.6, allows “defendants previously convicted of felony murder who ‘could not be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes’ in the law to petition to vacate their convictions and be resentenced.” (Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 610.) If the defendant establishes a prima facie claim for relief, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1); Strong, supra, at p. 708.) At the hearing, the trial court acts as an independent fact finder, and the prosecution bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder under the amended law. (See § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 123 (Guiffreda).) “If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

2. Flint's Section 1172.6 Petition

In January 2019, Flint filed a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6. (See Flint, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 611.) The trial court found that Flint had failed to make a prima facie case for relief and denied the petition. (Ibid.) Flint appealed. (Ibid.) We reversed, explaining the trial court had reached its conclusion by weighing the evidence and exercising discretion, which the court could not do at the prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 612.) We directed the court to issue an order to show cause and hold further proceedings in conformance with our opinion. (Id. at p. 618.)

Following remand, the court issued an order to show cause and held an evidentiary hearing. (People v. Flint (Oct. 31, 2024, B333482) [nonpub. opn.].) At the hearing, Flint did not challenge Rosa's off-duty authority as a peace officer. (Ibid.) Rather, “Flint asserted, and the prosecution and the court agreed, that the issue to be decided was whether, for purposes of section 189, subdivision (f), Flint knew or reasonably should have known that Rosa was a peace officer engaged in the performance of her duties at the time Gonzalez shot her.” (People v. Flint, supra, B333482, italics added.) The court found “ ‘[b]ased on the totality of the evidence’ ” presented at the hearing—which included the reporter's transcript from Flint's 2007 trial, certain trial exhibits, and live testimony from sheriff's deputies—that “ ‘[the prosecution] ha[d] proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Flint was aware, before the shooting, that Deputy Rosa was a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of her duties.’ ” (Ibid.)

Flint again appealed, arguing for the first time that Rosa “was a deputy described in subdivision (c) of section 830.1, which created ‘a new lower-tier category of custodial peace officer,’ with ‘limited custodial duties, more limited training than other sheriff's deputies, and limited peace officer powers.’ ” (People v. Flint, supra, B333482, quoting People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 348, 356 (Orosco).) He argued that Rosa therefore had no peace officer authority while off duty and thus was not killed “in the course of her duties” for purposes of section 189, subdivision (f). (People v. Flint, supra, B333482.) Because Flint had failed to raise this argument before the trial court, we reversed and directed the court on remand to hold a further evidentiary hearing to determine whether Rosa was, at the time of her murder, acting “in the course of [her] duties” as a peace officer. (§ 189, subd. (f); see § 830.1, subds. (a) & (c); People v. Flint, supra, B333482.)

3. September 2025 Evidentiary Hearing

Following remand, in September 2025, the court held the further evidentiary hearing on Flint's resentencing petition. At the outset of the proceeding, the court summarized its understanding of the scope of the hearing:

“By way of background, the Sheriff of [Los Angeles] County went to [the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST)], I think it was [in] 1996, to request that a new classification of personnel be created to facilitate staffing shortages․ [¶] The Legislature's intent was not to detract, or take away, from peace officer powers pursuant to [section] 830.1[, subdivision] (a), but solely to create a new category of personnel that would have limited, or modified, peace officer duties. [¶] [Section] 830.1[, subdivision] (c) states[,] in pertinent part, that a deputy sheriff who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments is not a peace officer outside of his or her custodial assignment. [¶] The Legislature clearly meant that a deputy who is hired for the purpose of working exclusively, or initially, in a custodial facility will have that limited power; otherwise, construing it to mean that any deputy who initially works in a custodial facility has limited power, I think would lead to an absurd result, because then, necessarily, no current sheriff[’s] deputy would be a full deputy, because everyone, I think, initially has an assignment in a custodial facility. [¶] And so I think that the scope of today's hearing, therefore, is just to determine whether or not Deputy Rosa was hired as a full deputy with full [POST] training pursuant to [section] 830.1[, subdivision] (a).” (Capitalization added.)

Defense counsel disputed the court's interpretation of the statutory language, but both parties agreed with the court's characterization of the hearing's scope. In addition, defense counsel lodged a standing objection “to any witness ․ testifying that a particular officer satisfies, or meets, the definition of ․ an officer under [sections] 830.1[, subdivision] (a) or 830.1[, subdivision] (c)” because “that's an issue of statutory construction.”

The prosecution then introduced 14 exhibits, including the sheriff's deputy job bulletin in effect when Rosa applied to the LASD, records reflecting Rosa's training as a deputy sheriff, and Rosa's performance evaluations. The prosecution also called two witnesses: Investigator Brian Steinwand and Commander Bryan Aguilera. The defense did not call any witnesses, but it introduced four exhibits—consisting of more of Rosa's performance evaluations and documents describing the duties of patrol-assigned and custody-assigned deputies—that it used to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.

Investigator Steinwand, a retired sergeant with LASD, testified that Rosa worked with his homicide task force in 2004 and 2005. Rosa's role “was to assist homicide investigators with their investigations in several ways, but ․ her main role was to monitor wire intercepts that were coming in related to homicide[ ] investigations, or other cases that were being investigated via wiretap.” He further testified that this work was not within the “custodial division” of LASD; rather, “[it was] within ․ the detective bureau of [LASD].” Finally, Investigator Steinwand testified that he “could not accept the [section 830.1, subdivision] (c) classification [deputies] to ․ help with [these types of] investigations.”

Commander Aguilera, an “almost 23-year veteran” of LASD then serving in the custody division, testified that he previously served as captain of the personnel admission bureau, “which is essentially the human resources arm of [LASD]” and is “responsible for hiring and all department records.” He explained that the POST training for a full sheriff's deputy—training identified as “academy basic” in LASD personnel files—is approximately 720 hours. In contrast, modified deputies hired pursuant to section 830.1, subdivision (c) received a “maximum of 297 hours of academy training.” And the full and modified deputy training academies “were completely bifurcated.” In addition, Commander Aguilera testified that LASD hired and trained modified deputies only between 1997 and 1999, and that “[t]he start date of the last academy that included modified deputies was on February 23rd, 1999.” When the prosecutor asked whether “any deputies that were hired on or after August 1st, 1999 ․ [were] hired, appointed, or employed to perform duties exclusively ․ or initially relating to custodial assignments,” Commander Aguilera responded, “No.”

Finally, Commander Aguilera opined that Rosa could not have been hired or trained as a modified deputy because her personnel records reflect that she was hired in July 2000 and completed the “academy basic” training required of full deputies. He further opined that other materials and entries in Rosa's personnel file were inconsistent with the possibility that she was employed as a section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputy: Rosa's performance evaluations reflected that she had assisted the major crimes bureau with prostitution sweeps “in the field, [i.e.,] not in custody,” had been “loan[ed] to the homicide task force,” and had served as a member of the “noncompliance team,” arresting absconding inmates out in the field. Commander Aguilera added that “[it] is a very common practice for [LASD] to take individuals and temporarily assign them somewhere else without permanently moving them, because of the way that the county and [LASD] has to deal with items and the movement of personnel.”

At the close of evidence, defense counsel reiterated his argument that Rosa was not acting as a peace officer within the meaning of section 189, subdivision (f) when Gonzalez shot her because she qualified as a modified deputy subject to section 830.1, subdivision (c).

The court rejected defense counsel's argument and denied Flint's petition. In doing so, the court elected not to rely on the witnesses’ opinion testimony concerning Rosa's classification for purposes of section 830.1. Instead, the court relied exclusively on the prosecution's exhibits in finding “beyond all doubt” that Rosa was employed as a full sheriff's deputy pursuant to section 830.1, subdivision (a). As a result, the court found, Rosa “was a full peace officer conferred with the authority to effectuate an arrest outside of a custodial setting” when Gonzalez shot her, and Flint was not entitled to section 1172.6 relief.

Flint timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Overview of the Statutory Scheme Governing the “Peace Officer” Designation

“ ‘Prior to 1968, the designation of peace officers and the description of their powers were dispersed throughout the codes.’ [Citation.] ․ [Citation.] By adopting chapter 4.5 [of the Penal Code], the Legislature brought those scattered statutes together in one place and exclusively ‘define[d] peace officers, the extent of their jurisdiction, and the nature and scope of their authority, powers and duties.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Pennington (2017) 3 Cal.5th 786, 792 (Pennington).)

“Chapter 4.5 [of the Penal Code] contains over 100 sections and subdivisions authorizing public agencies to confer the status and powers of a peace officer on the members of a host of state and local personnel categories, subject to an intricate array of conditions and limitations. [Citations.] In this statutory scheme, only the Attorney General and special agents and investigators of the Department of Justice are defined as peace officers categorically, simply by reference to their office or job title and without further conditions. [Citation.] Most deputy sheriffs and municipal police officers are peace officers so long as they are formally appointed to and actually employed in that capacity. [Citations.] In contrast, the Legislature has defined the vast majority of peace officers by reference to their ‘primary duties’ or ‘primary function,’ and has also imposed geographic, temporal, and other limitations on these officers’ authority.” (Pennington, supra, 3 Cal.5th at pp. 792–793.)

As relevant here, section 830.1, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part that “[a] sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff, employed in that capacity, of a county, ․ is a peace officer. The authority of these peace officers extends to any place in the state, as follows: [¶] ․ [¶] (3) As to a public offense committed or for which there is probable cause to believe has been committed in the peace officer's presence, and with respect to which there is immediate danger to person or property, or of the escape of the perpetrator of the offense.” (§ 830.1, subd. (a)(3).) Section 832.3, in turn, requires “any sheriff, undersheriff, or deputy sheriff ․ who is first employed after January 1, 1975,” to “complete a course of training prescribed by [POST] before exercising the powers of a peace officer,” subject to certain exceptions. (See § 832, subd. (a).)

In 1996, via Assembly Bill No. 574 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 574), the Legislature enacted subdivision (c) of section 830.1 “to create a new, lower-tier category of custodial peace officer specifically for the [LASD].” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) “The Legislature has since expanded the statute to many other counties.” (Id. at p. 357.) Subdivision (c) provides, in pertinent part:

“A[⁵ ] deputy sheriff of the County of Los Angeles ․ who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments with responsibilities for maintaining the operations of county custodial facilities, including the custody, care, supervision, security, movement, and transportation of inmates, is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of the officer's respective employment and for the purpose of carrying out the primary function of employment relating to the officer's custodial assignments, or when performing other law enforcement duties directed by the officer's employing agency during a local state of emergency.” (§ 830.1, subd. (c).)

“When it enacted subdivision (c) of section 830.1, the Legislature also amended section 832.3 to exempt this new category of custodial peace officer from the full course of training required for regular sheriff's deputies by [POST], and it substituted more limited training requirements.” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 357, citing § 832.3, subd. (e).) “The Legislature also enacted a new provision stating that custodial deputy sheriffs described in section 830.1, subdivision (c) ‘shall complete’ the full POST training ‘prior to being reassigned from custodial assignments to duties with responsibility for the prevention and detection of crime and the general enforcement of the criminal laws of this state.’ ” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 357, quoting § 832.3, subd. (e)(3).)

B. Section 830.1, Subdivision (c) Applies Only to Deputies Hired, Trained, and Utilized for the Limited Purpose of Working Exclusively or Initially in a Custodial Assignment

Flint contends we must reverse the denial of his resentencing petition because the plain language and legislative history of section 830.1, subdivision (c) compel the conclusion that Rosa was a modified deputy without off-duty peace officer authority. Interpreting the statute independently, we disagree. (See People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639, 657 [“ ‘[t]he proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de novo’ ”].)

“ ‘ “Our fundamental task in construing” ’ ” section 830.1, subdivision (c), “as with any statute, ‘ “is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.” ․ We begin as always with the statute's actual words, the “most reliable indicator” of legislative intent, “assigning them their usual and ordinary meanings, and construing them in context.” ’ [Citation.] If the words appear susceptible of more than one reasonable construction, we look to other indicia of legislative intent, bearing in mind the admonition that ‘[t]he meaning of a statute may not be determined from a single word or sentence’ [citation] and that apparent ‘ambiguities often may be resolved by examining the context in which the language appears and adopting the construction which best serves to harmonize the statute internally and with related statutes[.]’ [Citations.]” (Pennington, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 795; see Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1393 (conc. opn. of Cuéllar, J.) [“understanding whether [a statute's] meaning is plain is not a project well served by reading statutory provisions as isolated fragments”].)

The crux of the parties’ dispute concerns the meaning of the phrase “deputy sheriff ․ who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments.” (§ 830.1, subd. (c), italics added.) Flint contends the language means that any sheriff's deputy whose first assignment is to the jails qualifies as a modified deputy who lacks off-duty peace officer authority “until she is reassigned to a role that involves the performance of general law enforcement duties.” The Attorney General contends that the language means that only deputies hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working in the jails—whether exclusively or initially—qualify as modified deputies subject to section 830.1, subdivision (c). Because the usual and ordinary meaning of “employed” can encompass both (1) the hiring and training process and (2) an employee's ultimate assignment or duties, we find each construction reasonable on its face. (See, e.g., “employ,” Black's Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) [defining “employ” as: “1. To make use of. [¶] 2. To hire. [¶] 3. To use as an agent or substitute in transacting business. [¶] 4. To commission and entrust with the performance of certain acts or functions or with the management of one's affairs”].) We therefore turn to other indicia of legislative intent to construe section 830.1, subdivision (c).

We conclude that—viewed in the context of the broader statutory scheme and the pertinent legislative history ⁶ —the Attorney General's construction best harmonizes the statute internally and with related statutes. (See Pennington, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 795.) “The Legislature enacted subdivision (c) of section 830.1 in 1996 against the backdrop of subdivision (a), which already conferred peace officer status on all deputy sheriffs employed in that capacity. The Legislature did not amend subdivision (a) when it added subdivision (c).” (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) And nothing in the legislative history supports that the Legislature intended to strip fully trained sheriff's deputies then-assigned to the jails of their off-duty peace officer authority.

Rather, the legislative history supports that “[t]he original purpose of [section 830.1,] subdivision (c)” was to hire an entirely new category of modified deputies who would receive more limited training tailored specifically to a limited custodial assignment. (Orosco, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 356.) The August 7, 1996 Conference Committee Report Analysis for Assembly Bill No. 574, for example, provides in pertinent part:

“The Los Angeles County Sheriff indicates that deputy sheriff[s] initially hired are currently being assigned to custodial duties for 4–6 years.” (Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Conf. Rep. Com. Analysis, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) Aug 7, 1996, italics added.) “[This bill would] allow the county to provide part of the regular peace officer training—plus training for custodial personnel—to deputy sheriff[s] exclusively or initially assigned to custodial duties in the county․ Those sheriff's deputies would then be required to complete the remainder of the basic peace officer training prior to being reassigned to regular peace officer patrol duties․ [¶] This conference report would specifically include those ․ deputies assigned to custodial duties and trained pursuant to this bill as peace officers with powers extending anywhere in this state when performing his or her primary duties or when directed by the county to perform other peace officer duties during a local state[ ]of[ ]emergency.” (Ibid., italics added & underscoring omitted.)

In addition, the Legislature's contemporaneous amendment of section 832.3 to exempt this new category of modified deputies from the full POST basic training required of regular deputies supports the Attorney General's construction. (See § 832.3, subd. (e)(1).) We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended section 830.1, subdivision (c) to apply only to deputies hired and utilized for the express purpose of serving as modified deputies and who, as a result, received the more limited training created for modified deputies. (See § 832.3, subd. (e)(1).)

None of Flint's arguments persuades us to adopt his competing construction. First, Flint asks us to consider two 1996 letters to the Governor (one from Assembly Bill No. 574's author and one from the then-Sheriff of Los Angeles County) that he contends support his interpretation of section 830.1, subdivision (c). We decline to do so, as neither letter bears any indicia that its contents reflect the views of the Legislature as a whole. (See Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 30 [“ ‘the statements of an individual legislator, including the author of a bill, are generally not considered in construing a statute, as the court's task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature as a whole in adopting a piece of legislation’ ”].)

Second, Flint contends that the 1996 Legislative Counsel's Digest for Assembly Bill No. 574 supports his construction because it uses the phrase “any deputy” and the word “assignments” in describing the effect of the bill: “This bill would provide that any deputy sheriff of a county of the first class who is employed to perform duties exclusively or initially relating to custodial assignments ․ is a peace officer whose authority extends to any place in the state only while engaged in the performance of the duties of his or her respective employment.” (Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 1996, Summary Dig., p. 391.) This description, however, merely repeats the ambiguous language of the statute, and we therefore reject Flint's argument that the 1996 digest sheds any light on the proper construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c). We likewise reject Flint's argument concerning the Legislative Digests for amendments to the subdivision enacted in 2000 through 2004. He argues that the digests support his construction because they refer only to a deputy sheriff's “assignment” and omit the word “employed.” (See, e.g., Legis. Counsel's Dig., Assem. Bill No. 1931 (2003–2004 Reg. Sess.) 6 Stats. 2004, Summary Dig., p. 254.) But because the Legislature enacted these amendments for the limited purpose of adding new counties to the list in section 830.1, subdivision (c), we are not persuaded that the 2000 through 2004 digests illuminate the 1996 Legislature's intent in originally enacting the subdivision.

Third, Flint argues that the Attorney General's construction renders the word “initially” superfluous. But under the Attorney General's reading, the word “initially” retains independent significance: It refers to deputies originally hired and trained as modified deputies who may eventually be permitted to complete the full POST basic training required to become regular deputies. (See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 130, 133, fn. 3 (2002) [“[the] legislative history ․ explains the phrase ‘or initially relating to’ in subdivision (c) of section 830.1 as referring to officers who would not be expected to perform custodial assignments on a permanent basis but rather would be expected to transfer into regular peace officer assignments after a period of, for example, five or six years”].) Flint's surplusage argument thus fails.

Fourth, Flint contends that a July 2002 Attorney General opinion supports that the Legislature intended for a deputy's assignment—and not the deputy's level of training—to dictate whether the restrictions in section 830.1, subdivision (c) apply to that deputy. The Attorney General opinion, however, supports that level of training is a critical distinguishing factor between regular and modified deputies: “The Legislature was advised at the time [it considered Assembly Bill No. 574] that these [modified] officers would receive only part of the usual training given to peace officers and ‘would then be required to complete the remainder of the basic peace officer training prior to being reassigned to regular peace officer patrol duties.’ [Citation.] Hence, it is apparent that the Legislature's limitations placed upon the exercise of peace officer powers in section 830.1, subdivision (c), were in recognition of the fact that these deputies would not be receiving full peace officer training until reassigned to other duties.” (85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 130, 132–133, italics added.)

Fifth, and finally, Flint contends that the Attorney General's construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c) is at odds with the Legislature's purpose in enacting Assembly Bill No. 574. Flint argues that “[t]he issue that led the Legislature to pass [the bill] is that, after completing the [full POST basic] course in the academy, LASD deputies would then spend the first four[ ]to[ ]six years of their careers ‘assigned to custodial duties,’ ” and “the skills they needed for ․ patrol assignments were no longer ‘fresh’ when it came time for them to transfer [to patrol].” Flint further argues that certain statutes and regulations governing deputies’ training—namely, section 832.3, subdivision (e), section 13510, subdivision (d), and section 1005, subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) of title 11 of the California Code of Regulations—underscore that the Legislature enacted section 830.1, subdivision (c) for the purpose of ensuring that jail-assigned deputies receive fresh training prior to transitioning to a patrol assignment.

We are not persuaded. We reiterate that nothing in the legislative history supports that the Legislature believed that fully trained, regular deputies working in the jails should be stripped of their off-duty peace officer status. Rather, the legislative history reflects that the cost savings section 830.1, subdivision (c) was expected to generate were of equal (if not greater) concern to the Legislature. (See Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc., Conf. Rep. Com. Analysis, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1996 [“These ․ amendments are expected to initially save approximately $6 million in training costs and to also ensure that when deputies are assigned to patrol duties, the relevant training will be ‘fresh’ for that type of assignment” (italics added)]; Governor's Off. of Planning and Research, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) (Sept. 9, 1996) p. 3 [“Los Angeles County, facing a significant fiscal cris[is], has recently sought innovative ways to cut its budget. The sponsor [of the bill] stated that the bifurcation of POST training would save the County approximately $6 million in costs”]; see also Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34 Cal.4th 915, 934, fn. 19 [an enrolled bill report may be “instructive on matters of legislative intent”].)

Indeed, the initial draft of Assembly Bill No. 574 did not include any provisions concerning sheriff's deputies or their training. (See Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Feb. 17, 1995.) The original bill merely proposed (1) including Los Angeles County safety police officers and park rangers within the category of peace officers required to complete certain POST training requirements, and (2) allocating funds to facilitate that training. (See ibid.) The California State Sheriff's Association opposed this initial version of the bill (see Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 4, 1995), but transitioned to a “ ‘soft’ oppos[ition]” stance in response to the final version of the bill that included section 830.1, subdivision (c)’s cost-saving measures (see Governor's Off. of Planning and Research, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.) (Sept. 9, 1996) p. 4).

The statutes and regulations on which Flint relies likewise fail to support his argument that the Legislature enacted section 830.1, subdivision (c) “to address problems stemming from” jail-assigned deputies’ purportedly “obsolete” training. Section 832.3, subdivision (e)(3) provides in pertinent part that “[a] deputy sheriff who has completed the [full POST basic training] and has been hired as a deputy sheriff described in subdivision (c) of Section 830.1 shall be eligible to be reassigned from custodial assignments to duties with the responsibility for the prevention and detection of crime and the general enforcement of the criminal laws of this state within three years of completing the training.” (§ 832.3, subd. (e)(3).) And section 13510, subdivision (d) permits local agencies to establish training requirements that exceed POST's minimum standards. (See § 13510, subd. (d).) Flint contends that, read together, these subdivisions reflect the Legislature's understanding that some modified deputies will receive the full POST basic training, and that we therefore should not look to a deputy's level of training in determining whether an officer is a modified deputy. Flint further contends that section 832.3, subdivision (e)(3)’s requirement that modified deputies transition to a field assignment within three years of completing the full POST basic training—a requirement first added to the subdivision in 2016 (see Stats. 2015, ch. 207 (Assem. Bill No. 1168) (2015–2016 Reg. Sess.))—demonstrates that the Legislature was and remains uniquely concerned with preventing jail-assigned deputies’ patrol-related training from growing stale.

Flint's first argument fails because the Legislature's expectation that some modified deputies eventually will go on to complete the full POST basic training is entirely consistent with the Attorney General's construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c) as applying only to deputies hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working exclusively or initially in a custodial assignment. Indeed, as set forth, ante, this appears to have been the Legislature's purpose in including the word “initially” in the subdivision.

Flint's second argument fails because all deputies are subject to certain laws that appear intended to prevent their training from growing stale. (See, e.g., § 832, subd. (a) [“[e]very person described in this chapter as a peace officer shall satisfactorily complete an introductory training course prescribed by [POST]”]; § 832, subd. (e)(1) [“[a] person completing the training described in subdivision (a) who does not become employed as a peace officer within three years from the date of passing the examination described in subdivision (a), or who has a three-year or longer break in service as a peace officer, shall pass the examination described in subdivision (a) prior to the exercise of the powers of a peace officer”]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 11, § 1008 [imposing certain training-related time restrictions on any officer seeking requalification for employment as a peace officer].) Thus, although we agree that the statutory scheme as a whole reflects a legislative concern with ensuring that deputies’ training remains fresh, Flint identifies nothing in the scheme supporting that this concern is unique to jail-assigned deputies, or that the Legislature enacted section 830.1, subdivision (c) in response to such a concern.

We reach a similar conclusion with respect to subdivisions (a)(1) and (d) of section 1005 of title 11 of the California Code of Regulations. Flint contends that the current and 2006 versions of these provisions—which exempt deputies assigned to the jail from certain continuing training requirements related to field work—demonstrate that the Legislature did not intend even fully trained deputies assigned to the jails to wield off-duty peace officer authority. Flint further contends that Rosa's failure to complete the continuing training required of patrol-assigned deputies demonstrates that she qualified as a modified deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (c). Flint, however, ignores that the current version of section 1005 distinguishes between modified deputies employed pursuant to section 830.1, subdivision (c) and regular deputies assigned to work in the jails: Subdivision (a)(7) of section 1005 identifies “jail deputies” as those governed by section 830.1, subdivision (c). (See Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subd. (a)(7) [“[e]very jail deputy (section 830.1, subd. (c)) shall satisfactorily complete [certain training courses]”].) Section 1005, subdivision (a)(1), in turn, exempts both (1) “jail deputies” (i.e., modified, section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies) and (2) other officers whose “assignment remains custodial”—such as regular deputies initially assigned to the jails— from certain field training requirements. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subds. (a)(1)(A) & (B).) Each exemption has independent significance only if we treat modified deputies as a category of officers distinct from other deputies assigned to the jails. (See Fischl v. Pacific Life Ins. Co. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 108, 121 [“we interpret regulations the same way we interpret statutes”]; Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 783 [“ ‘ “[s]tatutes must be interpreted, if possible, to give each word some operative effect” ’ ”].) The regulation thus implicitly recognizes that not all jail-assigned deputies are modified, section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputies.

Flint likewise ignores that both the current and 2006 versions of section 1005 of title 11 of the California Code of Regulations draw a distinction between the training a deputy requires to wield plenary peace officer authority and the training a deputy requires to serve in a patrol assignment. Subdivision (a)(1) provides, in pertinent part: “Every peace officer ․ shall complete the regular basic course [i.e., the full POST basic training] before being assigned duties which include the exercise of peace officer powers․ [¶] (A) Field Training Program Requirement [¶] Every peace officer, ․ following completion of the regular basic course and before being assigned to perform general law enforcement uniformed patrol duties without direct and immediate supervision, shall complete a POST-approved field training program.” (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 11, § 1005, subds. (a)(1) & (a)(1)(A), capitalization omitted & italics added.) These distinctions in section 1005 support that the Legislature (1) understands that modified deputies and jail-assigned regular deputies are separate categories of officers, and (2) intends that a regular deputy who completes the full POST basic training will wield plenary peace officer authority, even if that deputy has not yet been assigned to a patrol position and remains assigned to the jails.

Accordingly, we conclude that section 830.1, subdivision (c) applies only to modified deputies—i.e., those deputies expressly hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working in a custodial assignment.

C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Finding that Section 830.1, Subdivision (c) Did Not Apply to Rosa

Having construed section 830.1, subdivision (c), we now turn to determining whether substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Rosa did not fall within the subdivision. (See Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 125 [an appellate court reviews a trial court's factual findings following a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing for substantial evidence].) “ ‘Our job on review is different from the trial judge's job in deciding the petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt standard, our job is to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a rational fact finder's findings beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.]” (Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)

Substantial evidence supports the court's finding here that Rosa was not a modified deputy hired, trained, and utilized for the limited purpose of working in a custodial assignment: Commander Aguilera testified that LASD terminated the limited training program for modified deputies before Rosa even applied to the department. The LASD job bulletin in effect when Rosa applied to the department provided that deputy sheriff appointees would “be required to serve two ․ mandatory assignments—the first assignment will be in the custody division; the second, in field operations (patrol).” (Capitalization omitted & italics added.) Rosa's personnel file reflects that she completed the full POST basic training required of regular sheriff's deputies. And Rosa's performance evaluations reflect that she completed several field assignment rotations, including prostitution sweeps.⁷

Flint contends that Rosa's participation in field work is not dispositive because the July 2002 Attorney General opinion supports that modified deputies can “perform[ ] non-custody related functions” without changing their modified status. (See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 130.) Flint further contends that other evidence—namely, Rosa's purported failure to complete certain continuing training requirements for patrol deputies—supports that she qualified as a modified deputy under section 830.1, subdivision (c). But the non-custody related functions the Attorney General opinion addresses—which include participation in community outreach events—are not analogous to the field work Rosa performed. (See 85 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 130.) And in reviewing for substantial evidence, “ ‘[w]e cannot reweigh the evidence.’ ” (People v. Player (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th 931, 963, review granted on unrelated issue July 8, 2026, S296683.)

We therefore conclude substantial evidence supports that Rosa was not a modified section 830.1, subdivision (c) deputy, but rather a regular section 830.1, subdivision (a) deputy vested with off-duty peace officer authority. As such, Rosa was “killed while in the course of [her] peace officer's duties,” and Flint is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. (See § 189, subd. (f).) Accordingly, we affirm the denial of his resentencing petition.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Flint's section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district attorney tried Gonzalez separately. Gonzalez received the death penalty, which the Supreme Court affirmed. (People v. Gonzalez (2021) 12 Cal.5th 367.)

2.   Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3.   For consistency, we refer only to the current statutory designation.

4.   Flint does not challenge any other elements of his conviction. (Cf. People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 [a section 1172.6 petition “puts at issue all elements of the [challenged homicide] offense under a valid theory”].)

5.   When originally enacted, section 830.1, subdivision (c) referred to “any deputy sheriff,” rather than “a deputy sheriff.” (Assem. Bill No. 574 (1995–1996 Reg. Sess.), capitalization omitted.) Neither party contends this change is material in construing the statute's meaning.

6.   The Attorney General argues that Flint forfeited any arguments concerning Assembly Bill No. 574 by failing to present them (and related legislative history materials) to the trial court. But as set forth, ante, Flint argued his proposed construction of section 830.1, subdivision (c) at the evidentiary hearing. Further,“[t]he interpretation of a statute ․ is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented ․ in the trial court.” (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699.) We therefore take judicial notice of the legislative history materials cited in this opinion. (See Quelimane Co. v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 26, 45, fn. 9 [“The court will take judicial notice of the legislative history of a statute in order to ascertain the purpose of and meaning of an ambiguous statute. [Citation.] This includes reports of Senate and Assembly committees”].)

7.   Because we do not rely on the opinions offered by Investigator Steinwand or Commander Aguilera that Rosa qualified as a section 830.1, subdivision (a) deputy, we need not address Flint's argument that such opinions were improper.

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

We concur: BENDIX, J. WEINGART, J.