STATE EX REL PHELPS v. HALL (2024)

OPINION

{¶1} Relator-Appellant Marcia J. Phelps, Clerk of the Licking County Municipal Court, appeals the January 9, 2024, decision of the Licking County Common Pleas Court denying her motion for summary judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents-Appellees Jeff Hall, Mayor of Newark and the members of Newark City Council.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

{¶2} The relevant facts and procedural history, as set forth in the record, are as follows:

{¶3} On May 4, 2020, Relator Marcia J. Phelps, the elected Clerk of the Licking County Municipal Court, appeared before the Newark City Council Personnel Committee seeking increased salaries for her employees. She spoke in favor of Ordinance 20-16 and told council she had recently lost five employees to other city departments and courthouse offices for higher pay. The Committee voted to table the ordinance.

{¶4} On September 8, 2020, Relator tried again before the Personnel Committee. The Committee, after consideration of her request, tabled the ordinance for two weeks.

{¶5} On October 5, 2020, the Committee met again to discuss the ordinance tabled at the September meeting. After meeting in executive session, the Committee voted to table the ordinance.

{¶6} On January 18, 2022, Ordinance 20-16-C was reintroduced. The same day, City Council met and tabled the ordinance until February 22, 2022.

{¶7} On February 22, 2022, the ordinance was replaced by Ordinance 20-16-D. The ordinance was voted down 9-1.

{¶8} On December 6, 2022, Relator put forward Ordinance 22-50 to the Personnel Committee. It was similar to the ones that preceded it. The Committee voted 5-0 to not send the ordinance to full City Council.

{¶9} On December 30, 2022, Relator Marcia J. Phelps, Clerk of the Licking County Municipal Court, filed a Petition/Complaint for Writ of Mandamus. The Respondents (in their official capacities) are the Mayor of Newark and the members of Newark City Council. Relator is requesting a writ of mandamus compelling respondents to provide additional appropriations in the amount of $64,140.00.

{¶10} On July 14, 2023, by agreement of the parties, the mandamus action was submitted for decision by the court on cross-motions for summary judgment.

{¶11} By Decision filed November 16, 2023, the trial court dismissed the mandamus action, finding “the raises sought by relator are not supported by the evidence presented to the court.” The court further found that Relator's “proposed pay increases of 6.5 percent and 11 percent are out of line with other pay increases given to city employees. Respondents have the responsibility of funding all city departments, including safety forces. The increases proposed by relator could affect the city's relations with union employees.” The trial court also requested counsel for Respondents to prepare a final judgment entry and submit it to the court.

{¶12} By Judgment Entry filed January 9, 2024, the trial court denied Relator's motion for summary judgment, granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment and dismissed Relator's complaint for mandamus, for the reasons set forth in the November 16, 2023, Decision.

{¶13} Relator-Appellant now raises the following assignments of error for review:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

{¶14} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO GRANT A WRIT OF MANDAMUS COMPELLING RESPONDENTS TO FULLY FUND RELATOR'S BUDGETARY REQUEST WHEN THAT REQUEST WAS REASONABLE AND DID NOT SIGNIFY AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

{¶15} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO GRANT THE PRESUMPTION OF REASONABLENESS TO RELATOR'S BUDGETARY REQUEST.

{¶16} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO IDENTIFY HOW RELATOR'S BUDGETARY REQUEST SIGNIFIED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

{¶17} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO REQUIRE RESPONDENTS TO MEET THE BURDEN OF PROOF DEMONSTRATING THAT RELATOR'S BUDGETARY REQUESTS WERE UNREASONABLE OR CONSTITUTED AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

{¶18} “V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY OVERWEIGHING THE FUNDING REQUESTS OF OTHER, NON-JUDICIAL BODIES WITHIN MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT.

{¶19} “VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY ENGAGING IN SPECULATION REGARDING POTENTIAL DAMAGED FUNDING ISSUES ACROSS THE CITY OF NEWARK.

{¶20} “VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW BY FAILING TO CONSIDER LONG-STANDING PRECEDENT THAT DICTATES THAT THE FUNDING OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM AND ITS ATTENDANT ARMS IS MANDATED OVER ALL OVER DEPARTMENTS RELYING ON THE SAME FUNDING SOURCE.”

I. – VII.

{¶21} Because we find that the issues raised in Appellant's assignments of error are closely related, for ease of discussion we shall address the assignments of error together. In each of her seven assignments of error, Relator-Appellant argues the trial court erred in failing to grant her writ of mandamus. We disagree.

{¶22} More specifically, Appellant herein contends that the trial court failed to consider the actual needs of the Licking County Municipal Court in evaluating the reasonableness of her budget request, and further that the trial court failed to analyze whether she abused her discretion under the totality of the circumstances.

Standard of Review

{¶23} Appellate review of a motion for summary judgment in a mandamus action is de novo. State ex rel. Phelps v. McClelland, 159 Ohio St.3d 184, 2020-Ohio-831, 149 N.E.3d 500, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 17. “While the general rule is that standard of review in a mandamus case is abuse of discretion, where the lower court grants summary judgment, this Court reviews the decision de novo.” State ex rel. Ames v. Brimfield Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 11th Dist. Portage, 2019-Ohio-4926, 149 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 10, citing State ex rel. Manley v. Walsh, 142 Ohio St.3d 384, 2014-Ohio-4563, 31 N.E.3d 608, ¶ 17, citing State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 8-9.

{¶24} “ ‘Summary judgment is appropriate when an examination of all relevant materials filed in the action reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ’ ” State ex rel. Anderson v. Vermillion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 9, quoting Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C).

{¶25} Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy only granted with caution and when the right is clear. State ex rel. Mobley v. O'Donnell, 2020-Ohio-251, 2020 WL 430569, ¶ 15 (10th Dist.), quoting PNP, Inc. v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 2013-Ohio-4344, 2013 WL 5451650, ¶ 13, (10th Dist.) citing State ex rel. Rittner v. Bumb, 2007-Ohio-5319, 2007 WL 2874331, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.). “A relator seeking a writ of mandamus must establish (1) a clear legal right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent official or governmental unit to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” Walsh at ¶ 18, citing State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6. “[M]andamus is available to correct an abuse of discretion by the board in its determination concerning disability-retirement benefits.” State ex rel. Hulls v. State Teachers Retirement Bd., 113 Ohio St.3d 438, 2007-Ohio-2337, 866 N.E.2d 483, ¶ 27, citing State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 14 (2002) (“The determination by the [State Teachers Retirement System] and its retirement board [the State Teachers Retirement Board] of whether a person is entitled to disability retirement benefits is reviewable by mandamus because R.C. § 3307.62 does not provide any appeal from the administrative determination.”).

{¶26} In a mandamus case, petitioner holds the burden to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that the writ be granted. State ex rel. Doner v. Zody, 130 Ohio St.3d 446, 2011-Ohio-6117, 958 N.E.2d 1235, ¶ 55. Accordingly, the board's decision must be supported by “some evidence.” State ex rel. Altman-Bates v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 148 Ohio St.3d 21, 2016-Ohio-3100, 68 N.E.3d 747, ¶ 22, citing State ex rel. Nese v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. of Ohio, 136 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-1777, 991 N.E.2d 218, ¶ 26-27. “A clear legal right to the requested relief in mandamus exists ‘where the board abuses its discretion by entering an order which is not supported by “some evidence.” ’ ” State ex rel. Marmaduke v. Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund, 2015-Ohio-2491, 2015 WL 3857080, ¶ 8 (10th Dist.), quoting Kinsey v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police & Firemen's Disability & Pension Fund of Ohio, 49 Ohio St.3d 224, 225, 551 N.E.2d 989 (1990).

{¶27} It is well settled that mandamus is an appropriate vehicle for enforcing a court's funding order.” State ex rel. Donaldson v. Alfred, 66 Ohio St.3d 327, 329, 612 N.E.2d 717 (1993). Municipal courts and their divisions have inherent power to order funding that is reasonable and necessary to the courts' administration of their business. State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St.2d 120, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973).

R.C. § 1901.31(H)

{¶28} The hiring and compensation of deputy clerks is controlled by R.C. § 1901.31(H). Under that provision, deputy clerks “may be appointed by the clerk and shall receive the compensation, payable in either biweekly installments or semimonthly installments * * * out of the city treasury, that the clerk may prescribe.” This provision allows the clerk to set the salaries of the deputy clerks and imposes a duty upon the city to appropriate funds for deputy-clerk salaries.

{¶29} Because the statute grants the clerk the discretion to determine the amount of a deputy clerk's compensation, the Ohio Supreme Court said that the burden is on the funding authority to demonstrate that the clerk's salary request is unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Williams-Byers v. S. Euclid, 163 Ohio St.3d 478, 2020-Ohio-5534, 171 N.E.3d 264, citing State ex rel. Durkin v. Youngstown City Council, 9 Ohio St.3d 132, 134, 459 N.E.2d 213 (1984). The city's financial resources may be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the request. State ex rel. Britt v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 18 Ohio St.3d 1, 3-4, 480 N.E.2d 77 (1985).

{¶30} As set forth above, Respondents have a mandatory duty to provide the funding requested, unless respondents demonstrate the request is unreasonable or an abuse of discretion. Durkin, supra, 9 Ohio St.3d at 134, 459 N.E.2d 213.

{¶31} The issue of evaluating the reasonableness of a budgetary demand is succinctly addressed and discussed in our opinion in State ex rel. Smith v. Culliver, 186 Ohio App.3d 534, 2010-Ohio-339, 929 N.E.2d 465 (5th Dist.):

This presumption of reasonableness emanates from the separation of powers doctrine. [T]he power to control what a court spends, or to totally regulate the process of obtaining funds, ultimately becomes the power to control what the court does. Such a principle is an anathema to an independent judiciary. On the other hand a tripartite balance of power exists that must be respected. To this extent it is axiomatic that a court should cooperate, whenever possible, with the legislative budget process. Moreover, a court does not have unfettered discretion to act without reason in making its budget. In the spirit of separation of powers we have promulgated a test of ‘reasonableness and necessity’ to maintain the sovereignty of our respective powers when a budget conflict arises.

{¶32} Culliver, ¶ 32, citing State ex rel. Arbaugh v. Richland Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1984), 14 Ohio St.3d 5, 6, 470 N.E.2d 880 (1984). “The ‘reasonableness and necessity’ test seeks to maintain the respective sovereignty of each branch of government when a budget conflict arises.” Culliver, at ¶ 19, citing Arbaugh at 6, 470 N.E.2d 880. “It necessarily entails a determination as to whether, in this case the clerk of the municipal court, abused his discretion in requesting budgetary amounts.” Culliver, at ¶ 19, State ex rel. Britt v. Board of County Commrs. Franklin County, 18 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3, 480 N.E.2d 77 (1985).

{¶33} Upon our review of the entire record before us, it is clear that the trial court had before it ample evidence as to the unreasonableness of Appellant's budget request considerations.

{¶34} Here, Respondents provided evidence that the Clerk's proposed pay increases of 6.5% and 11% were unreasonable. The Clerk's annual reports failed to indicate that there had been a substantial increase in work, but rather the number of new civil and criminal filings is still below the pre-COVID levels. The Clerk's justification of increased workload was therefore not supported by the annual reports from the Municipal Court.

{¶35} Further, the Clerk asserted that the requested increases would bring the salaries in parity with other similarly situated municipal clerk positions. However, under the 2020-2022 Policy for Hourly Non-bargaining employees, the rate of pay for the deputy clerks, was $20.62 to $22.40 per hour, or $42,890 to $46,592 annually. The rate of pay for the senior deputy clerk, under the existing policy was $20.98 to $22.77 per hour, or $43,638 to $47,361 annually. During the course of this litigation, evidence in the form of correspondence from other local municipal court clerks in Akron, Bellevue, Bowling Green, Chillicothe, Fairfield, Findlay, Lawrence, Mount Vernon, Newton Falls, Norwalk, and Sidney was provided to the court. The deputy clerk pay range for those municipalities, as set forth in their correspondence, was: Akron starting pay of $18.63/hr.; Bellevue $20.00 to $22.40/hr.; Bowling Green $19.16 to $24.00/hr.; Delaware current pay of $21.00/hr.; Fairfield $20.00/hr.; Findlay starting pay of $19.99/hr.; Lawrence $15.00 to $18.09/hr.; Mount Vernon $19.25 to $23.05/hr.; Newton Falls $16.00 to $23.00/hr.; Norwalk $18.13 to $22.72/hr.; Sidney $45,000 - $62,000/year. Respondents therefore provided evidence that the salaries were comparable with those of similar municipal clerk's offices.

{¶36} Respondents also provided evidence that the City provided the same raises to all employees as those raises negotiated through AFSCME Local 2963, which in this case was ultimately 4%. Respondents also provided evidence that providing the requested 6.5% and 11% raises in addition to the negotiated AFSCME raises could have caused problems and interfered with the ongoing union negotiations.

{¶37} This Court finds from the evidence adduced, that Respondent's provided evidence as to the unreasonableness of Relator's request and that the trial court did not err in granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment and denying the writ of mandamus in this matter.

{¶38} Accordingly, Appellants' seven assignments of error are overruled.

{¶39} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Licking County, Ohio, is affirmed.

Wise, P. J.

Baldwin, J., and King, J., concur.