STATE v. WADE (2024)

OPINION

{¶ 1} Defendant-Appellant Steve G. Wade appeals the January 8, 2024 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff-Appellee is the State of Ohio. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On October 26, 2023, the Licking County Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment charging Wade as follows:

{¶ 3} Counts one and two, gross sexual imposition involving a victim less than 13 years of age, felonies of the third degree;

{¶ 4} Counts three and four, corrupting another with drugs, felonies of the fourth degree;

{¶ 5} Count five, corrupting another with drugs, a felony of the second degree;

{¶ 6} Counts six and seven, gross sexual imposition, felonies of the fourth degree.

{¶ 7} Wade pled not guilty to the charges and elected to proceed to a jury trial which took place on January 3-5, 2024. The following evidence was elicited at trial.

{¶ 8} In May of 2022, A.D., the child victim in this matter, disclosed she was the victim of sexual assault by Wade and further disclosed he provided her with alcohol and drugs. She was 13-years-old when she made these disclosures and was and living with her mother, J.W., Wade, and her sister, E.D. Wade's teenaged son lived with them part-time. T. 132.

{¶ 9} The family moved in together Memorial Day weekend 2019 when A.D. was 11 years old. The home was on Fulla Lane in Heath. Initially things were “very good.” Six months later, the family moved to a home on Bluejack Lane in Heath. The family lived there two years before moving to a home on Pheasant Run Drive in Newark. T. 492-496

{¶ 10} A.D. and Wade started watching movies together in the basement of the first home and continued doing so in all three homes. A.D. would also go with Wade to the gun range where he was employed. She started working there part-time as well. T. 133-136, 140.

{¶ 11} The first time Wade touched A.D. inappropriately was in the first Heath home. Wade took A.D. out shooting and when they got home, he gave her alcohol. A.D. fell asleep, but woke up to Wade “cupping” her vagina over her clothing. She was scared to say anything at the time, decided to “let it be,” and went back to sleep. T. 141-143.

{¶ 12} At the Bluejack Lane home, in addition to alcohol, Wade began giving A.D. marijuana in the form of edibles and vape cartridges. A.D. watching movies with Wade began as every weekend event and then in the summer, included some weeknights. They watched movies late at night. Wade would turn off the parental controls on A.D.'s phone which stopped her from using the phone after 10:00 p.m. and text her to ask her to sneak out of her room and come to the basement to watch movies. He would tell her J.W. was in bed for the night and A.D. could sneak out of her room undetected. Wade would then set an alarm so that A.D. could get back to her bedroom before her mother woke up. Wade would sometimes pay A.D. to drink with him. On one occasion at the Newark home he offered her $200 to do 3 or 4 shots with him. Also at the Newark home, Wade began giving A.D. methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as MDMA or molly. He only provided her with MDMA for 4 or 5 months. 147, 170, 188.

{¶ 13} Wade continued to touch A.D. inappropriately during these movie nights. She woke multiple times to Wade touching her vaginal area and breasts. She estimated he touched her more than 60 times. On one occasion after he had given her alcohol, she woke up with no pants on. T. 197-201.

{¶ 14} A.D. did not tell her mother what was happening. She admitted he liked the alcohol and drugs as well as the fatherly attention. She was also afraid to tell her mother because her mother was happier than she had seen her in a long time. T. 202-203.

{¶ 15} A.D. also never said anything to Wade until the last time something happened. On that occasion, A.D. woke in her bed to Wade straddling her with his penis close to her face. When Wade saw A.D. was awake, he backed away and put his penis back in his shorts. When A.D. asked “what the hell are you doing?” Wade replied he was just checking to see if she was asleep. T. 184-185.

{¶ 16} Following that incident, on May 23, 2022, A.D. disclosed the sexual assault and drug use to a school counselor. The counselor in turn contacted Detective Vanoy of the Newark Police Department. Detective Vanoy made arrangements for A.D. and her sister E.D. to be interviewed at Kid's Place, the local children's advocacy center. A.D. disclosed the above outlined information.

{¶ 17} E.D. disclosed an incident wherein she woke to Wade in her room at night kneeling beside her bed and touching her hip and lower abdomen. E.D. yelled at Wade to get out of her room. Wade mumbled something unintelligible and left. E.D. told her mother about this incident, but her mother laughed and said Wade was “just high and looking for his water.” E.D. stated Wade gave her alcohol and marijuana as well, beginning when she was 15-years-old. Wade offered her marijuana more often than she accepted. As with A.D., Wade communicated with E.D. though text messaging. T. 296-305.

{¶ 18} E.D. also discussed an incident involving one of her friends, D.P. who stayed at her house for a sleepover. D.P. fell asleep on the basement sofa and E.D. and another friend left her there to sleep for the night. In the morning D.P. was frantically texting the other girls because Wade was lying on the end of the couch with his head and hand on her hip. The other girls came to get D.P. By the time they got into the basement, Wade was standing a few feet away from her. E.D. told her mother about the incident. T. 307-309.

{¶ 19} After the girls were interviewed, Detective Vanoy advised J.W. what was disclosed and J.W. agreed to engage Wade in a recorded phone call and text messaging. Wade made several incriminating statements, blamed alcohol and drugs for his behavior, and vowed to stop drinking and consuming drugs. T. 323-324, 327-336, State's exhibits 3, 8, and 9. Vanoy retrieved voluminous text messages between Wade and A.D. from A.D.'s phone. State's exhibit 2. He also retrieved text messages from E.D.'s phone.

{¶ 20} Wade later agreed to speak with Vanoy. Wade had deleted all of the text messages between himself and A.D. from his phone, but confirmed those taken from A.D.'s phone and consistent with her reports, were accurate. Wade never accused A.D. of lying and in fact stated she is not a liar. Wade initially denied touching A.D., but later stated he could have touched A.D. while under the influence of drugs and alcohol. T. 330-338, 342-349 State's exhibits 3, 8, and 9.

{¶ 21} At trial, J.W. testified on behalf of her husband. She stated she had no concerns about her husband's behavior with A.D., E.D., or D.P. T. 515-518. On cross-examination, she admitted she dismissed complaints from E.D. and believed Wade's excuses, even though she also admitted Wade had lied to her about providing her children alcohol and drugs. T. 520-526.

{¶ 22} Wade testified on his own behalf. He denied both touching A.D. inappropriately and giving her MDMA. He stated the texts between the two regarding MDMA were in response to her curiosity and his educational response. T. 543-545. Wade admitted to providing A.D. and E.D. marijuana, but claimed he was just trying to be a good father by controlling the environment in which the girls experimented with drugs. T. 545-547. He stated that during the phone call with J.W. he only said he may have touched A.D. because there may have been an inadvertent touch that A.D. misconstrued. T. 565-566. As for the incident in the basement with D.P., Wade testified he thought it was E.D. asleep under the blanket, and explained he had sat down on the sofa and fell asleep. T. 578-579. He admitted he began giving A.D. alcohol when she was 11 or 12 years-old and marijuana when she was 12. T. 585-587.

{¶ 23} After hearing the evidence and deliberating, the jury convicted Wade as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Wade to an aggregate total of 6 to 7 years incarceration and classified him as a Tier II sex offender.

{¶ 24} Wade timely filed an appeal and the matter is now before this court for consideration. He raises three assignments of error as follow:

I

{¶ 25} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AS GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY FINDING HIM GUILTY OF CORRUPTING ANOTHER WITH DRUGS AND GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION, AS THOSE VERDICTS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND WERE ALSO AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”

II

{¶ 26} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE ONE SECTION TEN OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION BY PRECLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF HIS EXPERT.”

III

{¶ 27} “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT BY IMPROPERLY SENTENCING HIM TO CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION IN CONTRAVENTION OF OHIO'S SENTENCING STATUTES.”

I

{¶ 28} In his first assignment of error, Wade argues his convictions are against the manifest weight and sufficiency of the evidence. We disagree.

Applicable Law

{¶ 29} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991). “The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jenks at paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). On review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983). See also, State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). The granting of a new trial “should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.” Martin at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.

Wade's Arguments

{¶ 30} Wade makes no sufficiency argument as he does identify any element of the charged offenses that the state failed to prove. Instead he argues the testimony of the child victim was “suspect and not worthy of belief.” Brief of Appellant at 2. He points to the fact that A.D. tested negative for MDMA, that she testified she was initially upset when Wade and her mother became engaged and married, and was unable to pinpoint exact dates when the sexual assaults took place. He further points to his wife's testimony indicating she saw no signs of A.D. being abused and that A.D. was acting normally and even happy after they were interviewed at the Newark Police Department regarding A.D. disclosures. He also cites the testimony of his character witnesses to support his argument that he and his witnesses should be believed over the testimony of A.D.

{¶ 31} But the jury also heard the extensive testimony of A.D. regarding the sexual assaults, viewed the voluminous texts from Wade to A.D. discussing drugs and alcohol, encouraging her to sneak out of her room at night to watch movies and use alcohol and drugs with him, and even offering her money to do so. The texts and a video between Wade and A.D. corroborated her report that Wade gave her marijuana, MDMA, and alcohol. State's exhibit 2. The jury heard A.D.'s report of the last incident wherein she woke to Wade in her bed straddling her with his penis near her face, and that this was the incident that prompted her come forward and report Wade's behavior. T. 137-184. During a recorded phone call with his wife and also in his interview with Detective Vanoy, Wade stated that if A.D. stated he had touched her inappropriately, he did. State's Exhibits 3, 8 and 9.

{¶ 32} The jury also heard that Wade's wife, J.W., dismissed a report from A.D.'s sister when she reported she woke to Wade lying on the floor beside her bed at 2:00 a.m. and touching her hip and lower abdomen. It heard that J.W. laughed about the incident and told A.D.'s sister that Wade “was just high and looking for his water.” T. 301-305. When questioned about the incident on cross examination, J.W. acknowledged that she simply told Wade to stay out of the girls' bedrooms at night. T. 521. J.W. further testified that she had no concerns about Wade's behavior with A.D.'s friend who fell asleep in the basement alone during the sleep over. T. 516-517.

{¶ 33} Further, while Wade points to the testimony of his character witnesses, one testified that giving 11,12, and 13-year-old children drugs and alcohol and lying to one's spouse is not “upstanding” behavior. T. 457, 463. Another character witness was unaware that Wade had provided his step daughters with alcohol and drugs. T. 469.

{¶ 34} Contrary to Wade's argument, the evidence in this matter was overwhelming. Wade's texts demonstrate classic grooming behavior. He created a coconspirator relationship between himself and A.D. built on permitting her to secretly break rules, providing her with illicit substances, and progressing to Wade engaging in sexual contact with A.D. which was escalating at the time of A.D.'s disclosure. He made incriminating statements regarding sexual contact with A.D. in his interview with Vanoy and during the recorded phone calls and texts with his wife. Against that background, the jury could have easily dismissed J.W.'s testimony as that of a parent unwilling to face reality, Wade's testimony as incredible, and his character witness's testimony as uninformed.

{¶ 35} Upon review of the entire record, we find Wade's convictions are supported by the evidence and that the jury did not lose its way in convicting Wade as charged.

{¶ 36} The first assignment of error is overruled.

II

{¶ 37} In his second assignment of error, Wade argues the trial court abused its discretion when it struck the testimony of his expert witness, Nick Barreiro. We disagree.

The Record

{¶ 38} At the beginning of Barreiro's testimony, counsel for Wade referenced a “sample doorbell that we also got from Ring door.” T. 424. This was video from Wade's own Ring doorbell which was used as a comparison or control by Barreiro to gauge the authenticity of a second Ring video which allegedly showed A.D. recanting her allegations. T. 430-431. The state objected, indicating it had never received the sample video. At a sidebar, counsel for Wade stated he did not have the sample video. T. 426-432. The court called a recess to address the matter.

{¶ 39} During the hearing that followed, the state indicated it “objected to Mr. Barreiro's expert report as it contains comparisons to evidence that was never turned over to the Prosecution through reciprocal discovery by the defense.” T. 428. The state asked that “everything related to that sample Ring video” be stricken. T. 429. Barreiro advised the court he had received the sample video directly from Wade, not Wade's counsel. T. 432. The trial court sustained the objection and then took a recess to consider whether Barreiro would testify at all. After consideration the trial court found:

I'm going to disqualify Mr. Barreiro from his testimony here today in its entirety since you didn't provide that discovery to the State, and it appears to me that your client has gone around you to undermine the discovery here to be provided in fabricating his video, it would appear to me, based upon – I've never seen a case where the Defendant provides something directly to the expert without it going through his counsel and without it being provided to opposing counsel. You're obligated to provide it. It hasn't been provided. I will disqualify Mr. Barreiro's testimony entirely. He has nothing to testify about since he used discovery that wasn't provided, wasn't shared, and can't be duplicated.

{¶ 40} T. 432-434.

Exclusion Under the Rules of Discovery

{¶ 41} Crim.R. 16(H) provides:

(H) Discovery: Right to Copy or Photograph. If the defendant serves a written demand for discovery or any other pleading seeking disclosure of evidence on the prosecuting attorney, a reciprocal duty of disclosure by the defendant arises without further demand by the state. A public records request made by the defendant, directly or indirectly, shall be treated as a demand for discovery in a criminal case if, and only if, the request is made to an agency involved in the prosecution or investigation of that case. The defendant shall provide copies or photographs, or permit the prosecuting attorney to copy or photograph, the following items related to the particular case indictment, information or complaint, and which are material to the innocence or alibi of the defendant, or are intended for use by the defense as evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the victim, within the possession of, or reasonably available to the defendant, except as provided in division (J) of this rule:

(1) All laboratory or hospital reports, books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, buildings or places;

(2) Results of physical or mental examinations, experiments or scientific tests;

(3) Any evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the defendant, or is material to punishment, or tends to support an alibi. However, nothing in this rule shall be construed to require the defendant to disclose information that would tend to incriminate that defendant;

(4) All investigative reports, except as provided in division (J) of this rule;

(5) Any written or recorded statement by a witness in the defendant's case-in-chief, or any witness that it reasonably anticipates calling as a witness in surrebuttal.

{¶ 42} Crim.R. 16(L)(1) permits the trial court to “make orders regulating discovery,” and if “at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule ․ the court may ․ prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed, or it may make such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.”

{¶ 43} “A trial court must inquire into the circumstances surrounding a discovery rule violation and, when deciding whether to impose a sanction, must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of discovery.” City of Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The purpose of discovery rules is to prevent surprise and the secreting of evidence favorable to one party. The overall purpose is to produce a fair trial.” Id. at 3, 511 N.E.2d 1138.

{¶ 44} Because the imposition of discovery sanctions is discretionary, we review the trial court's decision for an abuse of discretion. State v. Darmond, 135 Ohio St.3d 343, 2013-Ohio-966, 986 N.E.2d 971, ¶ 20, 33. “Abuse of discretion” means an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Huffman v. Hair Surgeon, Inc., 19 Ohio St.3d 83, 87, 482 N.E.2d 1248 (1985). Most instances of abuse of discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are unconscionable or arbitrary. AAAA Ent., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redev. Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). An unreasonable decision is one backed by no sound reasoning process which would support that decision. Id. “It is not enough that the reviewing court, were it deciding the issue de novo, would not have found that reasoning process to be persuasive, perhaps in view of countervailing reasoning processes that would support a contrary result.” Id.

Wade's Arguments

{¶ 45} Wade first attempts to blame the State for his failure to provide the Ring sample video to the State in discovery. He argues the State should have known it needed to request the sample video from the defense based on the expert's report, which the State received well ahead of trial. But the reverse is true. Once counsel for Wade realized Barreiro's report contained reference to a video that counsel himself did not possess, counsel had an obligation to investigate the matter and provide the video to the State. Crim.R. 16(H) makes this duty clear; “If the defendant serves a written demand for discovery ․ a reciprocal duty of disclosure by the defendant arises without further demand by the state.” Crim.R. 16(A) provides “․ Once discovery is initiated by demand of the defendant, all parties have a continuing duty to supplement their disclosures.”

{¶ 46} Wade cannot, therefore, blame the State for his own violation of the criminal rules.

{¶ 47} Wade next argues that the trial court's sanction was too harsh, failed to consider less severe sanctions, and infringed on his right to present a complete defense.

{¶ 48} “An abuse of discretion can be found where the reasons given by the court for its action are clearly untenable, legally incorrect, or amount to a denial of justice, or where the judgment reaches an end or purpose not justified by reason and the evidence.” State v. Brook, 2024-Ohio-3074, 2024 WL 3761965, ¶ 67 (5th Dist.) citing Tennant v. Gallick, 2014-Ohio-477, 2014 WL 602264, ¶35 (9th Dist.); In re Guardianship of S.H., 2013-Ohio-4380, 2013 WL 5519847, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.); State v. Firouzmandi, 2006-Ohio-5823, 2006 WL 3185175, ¶54 (5th Dist.).

{¶ 49} Wade did not argue for or suggest any lesser sanction during the hearing. Further, it appears the trial court understood that the sample video was of no evidentiary value independent of the admission of the original video, and therefore Barreiro had “nothing to testify about.” T. 434. But even if we assumed, arguendo, that the trial court erred in striking the testimony of Barreiro we find the error harmless as the introduction of the video through Barreiro was, in any event, inadmissible hearsay.

Exclusion as Hearsay

{¶ 50} Harmless error is described as “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Crim.R. 52(A). Overcoming harmless error requires a showing of undue prejudice or a violation of a substantial right.

{¶ 51} Per his proffer and his argument here on appeal, the Ring video allegedly shows A.D. recanting her allegations against Wade which “completely undercut her testimony that Wade had provided her with alcohol and drugs and touched her sexually.” Appellant's brief at 6. We have reviewed the video proffered by Wade and note it shows A.D. walking towards and through her front door. She is not speaking, yet a voice can be heard. It is unclear what is being said or who is speaking. Defendant's exhibit F.

{¶ 52} Regardless, Wade did not confront A.D. with the video during her testimony. Instead, Wade attempted, unsuccessfully, to introduce the video thorough his wife, Detective Vanoy, and Barreiro to demonstrate A.D. was lying. In other words, Wade attempted to introduce “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.” Evid.R. 801(C). The video was therefore inadmissible through any of these witnesses. Because the jury would not see the original Ring video of A.D., Barreiro's testimony as to whether or not the video had been tampered with was irrelevant.

{¶ 53} Finally, as noted in our discussion of Wade's first assignment of error, the evidence in this matter was overwhelming.

{¶ 54} Accordingly, we conclude that even if we assume the trial court abused its discretion in striking the testimony of Barreiro, Wade suffered no undue prejudice nor a violation of a substantial right and any error is therefore harmless.

{¶ 55} The second assignment of error is overruled.

III

{¶ 56} In his final assignment of error Wade argues his consecutive sentences are contrary to law. We disagree.

{¶ 57} This court reviews felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 22; State v. Howell, 2015-Ohio-4049, 2015 WL 5722820 (5th Dist.) ¶ 31. Subsection (G)(2) sets forth this court's standard of review as follows:

(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or (C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing court.

The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for resentencing. The appellate court's standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion. The appellate court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly and convincingly finds either of the following:

(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;

(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.

{¶ 58} “Clear and convincing evidence is that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ but not to the extent of such certainty as is required ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ in criminal cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 59} R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) governs consecutive sentences and states the following:

(4) If multiple prison terms are imposed on an offender for convictions of multiple offenses, the court may require the offender to serve the prison terms consecutively if the court finds that the consecutive service is necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish the offender and that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and to the danger the offender poses to the public, and if the court also finds any of the following:

(a) The offender committed one or more of the multiple offenses while the offender was awaiting trial or sentencing, was under a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17, or 2929.18 of the Revised Code, or was under post-release control for a prior offense.

(b) At least two of the multiple offenses were committed as part of one or more courses of conduct, and the harm caused by two or more of the multiple offenses so committed was so great or unusual that no single prison term for any of the offenses committed as part of any of the courses of conduct adequately reflects the seriousness of the offender's conduct.

(c) The offender's history of criminal conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to protect the public from future crime by the offender.

{¶ 60} “R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) requires an appellate court to defer to a trial court's consecutive-sentence findings, and the trial court's findings must be upheld unless those findings are clearly and convincingly not supported by the record.” State v. Gwynne, 173 Ohio St.3d 525, 2023-Ohio-3851, 231 N.E.3d 1109, ¶ 5. When imposing consecutive sentences, a trial court must state the required findings at the sentencing hearing. State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.3d 659, ¶ 29. Because a court speaks through its journal, the court should also incorporate its statutory findings into the sentencing entry. Id. While a trial court is required to make the findings mandated by R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) at the sentencing hearing and incorporate its findings into its sentencing entry, “it has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” Id. at ¶ 37. As long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine the record contains evidence to support the findings, consecutive sentences should be upheld. Id. at ¶ 29.

{¶ 61} As the state notes, Wade did not object during the sentencing hearing to the imposition of consecutive sentences, thereby forfeiting all but plain error. State v. Wilson, 2013-Ohio-1520, 2013 WL 1619148 (10th Dist.) ¶ 8. An error not raised in the trial court must be plain error for an appellate court to reverse. State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978) at paragraph one of the syllabus; Crim.R. 52(B). In order to prevail under a plain error analysis, appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the proceeding clearly would have been different but for the error. Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. Notice of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id. at paragraph three of the syllabus.

{¶ 62} Wade concedes the trial court made the appropriate findings in its sentencing judgment entry but challenges the court's findings on the record. On the record the trial court stated:

I also find, Mr. Wade, that consecutive sentences are necessary to – they are not disproportionate to the seriousness of your conduct or the danger that you pose to the public, and, further, that they are – one single sentence would not be sufficient punishment here. I find the harm is so great or unusual that a single sentence would not adequately reflect the seriousness of your conduct.

{¶ 63} T. 716.

{¶ 64} While the trial court did not recite the precise language from R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) it was not “required to give a talismanic incantation of the words of the statute, provided that the necessary findings can be found in the record and are incorporated into the sentencing entry.” Bonnell at ¶ 37. We find the imposition of consecutive sentences in this case was not contrary to law. We further find the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and the record contains evidence to support the trial court's findings under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4). Wade is therefore unable to establish error plain or otherwise.

{¶ 65} The final assignment of error is overruled.

{¶ 66} The judgment of the Licking County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

King, J.

Wise, P.J. and Baldwin, J. concur.