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COURTNEY MADISON, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Courtney Madison appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on October 23, 2024, and supplements. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Carli Lynn Kierny, Judge.
Over the course of a week, Madison and others entered three commercial establishments and a residential apartment operating as a dispensary and robbed, or attempted to rob, several people therein. During the robbery at the dispensary, one of the victims was shot and killed. Madison was charged with 17 felonies, including one count of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Madison was appointed counsel but subsequently elected to represent himself. After a nine-day jury trial, Madison was convicted of 16 of the 17 charges. 1 Madison filed a direct appeal, and the supreme court reversed the sentences for four convictions of burglary while in possession of a firearm and remanded the matter for resentencing. See Madison v. State, No. 85752, 2024 WL 1205860 (Nev. Mar. 20, 2024) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding). Madison received an aggregate sentence of 32 years to life in prison. Thereafter, Madison filed the instant petition and supplements. The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary hearing, and this appeal followed.
In his petition, Madison contended that pretrial counsel was ineffective for failing to (1) challenge the consolidation of the counts, (2) provide him with discovery, or (3) communicate with him. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). A petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).
The district court found that Madison was represented by counsel for a brief period between September 2018 and March 2019, and that Madison began representing himself years before the case proceeded to trial. These findings are supported by the record. 2 Even if pretrial counsel should have performed in the manner alleged, Madison was responsible for developing his defense, and could have corrected any perceived errors, after he elected to represent himself. Therefore, Madison cannot now claim he was denied effective assistance of pretrial counsel. See Cook v. Ryan, 688 F.3d 598, 609-10 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding a petitioner who was represented by counsel for seven months before electing to represent himself could not claim he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because he “could have corrected [the] errors once he decided to represent himself”). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying these claims.
Madison also contended that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several arguments on direct appeal. 3 To demonstrate ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that the omitted issue would have a reasonable probability of success on appeal. Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 998, 923 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1996). Appellate counsel is not required to raise every non-frivolous issue on appeal. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983). Rather, appellate counsel will be most effective when every conceivable issue is not raised on appeal. Ford v. State, 105 Nev. 850, 853, 784 P.2d 951, 953 (1989). “Generally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.” Johnson v. State, 133 Nev. 571, 576, 402 P.3d 1266, 1274 (2017) (quotation marks omitted).
First, Madison claimed appellate counsel should have argued that the trial court erred in declining to provide a duress instruction with respect to Counts 11-16.4 When the State requested that the duress instruction not be given with respect to Counts 11-16, the trial court asked for Madison's response, and Madison stated that he “didn't have any involvement anyway so I guess that would be sufficient” and that he “won't argue that.” Thus, Madison waived this argument, and counsel was not ineffective for declining to raise it. Cf. Sayedzada v. State, 134 Nev. 283, 288, 419 P.3d 184, 190 (Ct. App. 2018) (recognizing a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right), overruled on other grounds by Young v. State, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 47, 577 P.3d 691, 696 (2025); Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095, 1103 (2006) (“Trial counsel need not lodge futile objections to avoid ineffective assistance of counsel claims.”).
Moreover, even if Madison had not waived this claim, he failed to identify any evidence presented at trial that supported a theory of duress as to Counts 11-16. See Rosas v. State, 122 Nev. 1258, 1262, 147 P.3d 1101, 1104 (2006) (stating a defendant is entitled to an instruction on their theory of the case “so long as there is some evidence, no matter how weak or incredible, to support it” (quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by Alotaibi v. State, 133 Nev. 650, 404 P.3d 761 (2017). Therefore, Madison failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel raised this claim. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.
Second, Madison claimed appellate counsel should have argued that his confrontation rights were violated because the State promised him that it would call two people at trial—one of the victims and a homicide detective—who ultimately were not called. However, Madison did not allege that any testimonial statements from these individuals were admitted at trial for the truth of the matter asserted such that he was entitled to confront them. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (stating the Confrontation Clause “applies to witnesses against the accused—in other words, those who bear testimony” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Belcher v. State, 136 Nev. 261, 275, 464 P.3d 1013, 1028-29 (2020) (stating “the Confrontation Clause ․ does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted” (citation modified)). Therefore, Madison failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel raised this claim. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.
Third, Madison claimed appellate counsel should have argued that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct. “When considering claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court engages in a two-step analysis. First, we must determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper. Second, if the conduct was improper, we must determine whether the improper conduct warrants reversal.” Valdez v. State, 124 Nev. 1172, 1188, 196 P.3d 465, 476 (2008). “With respect to the second step of this analysis, this court will not reverse a conviction based on prosecutorial misconduct if it was harmless error.” Id.
Madison contended that the State violated a court order when the prosecutor stated during the examination of a detective, and intentionally elicited testimony from the detective, that Madison was the person shown in surveillance video. Even assuming the prosecutor's conduct was improper, Madison failed to demonstrate any such error would warrant reversal such that this argument was clearly stronger than those presented on direct appeal. The district court found that the references were fleeting and immediately corrected, and this finding is supported by the record. In addition, several witnesses identified Madison from the surveillance video or stills taken therefrom prior to the detective's testimony. Madison also admitted during his testimony that he was in the surveillance video and that he robbed the three commercial establishments for which there was surveillance video. 5 Therefore, Madison failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel raised this claim. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.
Madison also contended that the State improperly argued in closing that he was the person in the surveillance video, that he was the shooter, and that he was guilty of first-degree murder. Madison did not demonstrate that these arguments were improper. See Randolph v. State, 117 Nev. 970, 984, 36 P.3d 424, 433 (2001) (“The State is free to comment on testimony, to express its views on what the evidence shows, and to ask the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.”). Therefore, Madison failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel raised this claim. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.
Fourth, Madison claimed appellate counsel should have argued cumulative error warranted relief. Madison did not demonstrate any trial errors that could be cumulated with the alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, Madison failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability of success on appeal had counsel raised this claim. See Burnside v. State, 131 Nev. 371, 407, 352 P.3d 627, 651 (2015) (noting cumulative error claims require “multiple errors to cumulate”). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Madison's petition, and we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Bulla, C.J.
Gibbons, J.
Westbrook, J.
FOOTNOTES
1. The State voluntarily dismissed a charge of ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person after the jury entered its verdict on the other counts.
2. The record indicates the trial court granted Madison's request for self-representation in April 2019, and that Madison's trial did not begin until August 2022.
3. To the extent Madison raised the issues underlying his claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as independent claims for relief, they were procedurally barred because they could have been raised on direct appeal and Madison failed to demonstrate good cause and actual prejudice to overcome the procedural bar. See NRS 34.810(1)(b). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying these claims.
4. Counts 11-16 concerned the charges related to the burglary of the dispensary, during which three people were robbed and one was killed.
5. To the extent Madison suggests this court should not consider his testimony because he only elected to testify due to the prosecutor's misconduct, we reject this claim. The trial court admonished Madison regarding his right to testify, and Madison indicated he was electing to testify, before the alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurred. Moreover, Madison does not explain why the alleged prosecutorial misconduct would have caused him to testify where several other witnesses had identified him in the surveillance video or stills taken therefrom.
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Docket No: No. 91957-COA
Decided: October 27, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Nevada.
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