GREGORY JAMES RAGER v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Gregory James Rager appeals from a district court order denying a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence filed on December 30, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Nadia Krall, Judge.

In his motion, Rager contended that the crime to which he pleaded was a gross misdemeanor and that the State erred by having him plead guilty to an “upper category offense.” “[A] motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the defendant's extreme detriment.” Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). A motion to correct an illegal sentence may only challenge the facial legality of the sentence: either the district court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence or the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. Id. The district court may summarily deny a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence if the motion raises issues that fall outside of the very narrow scope of issues permissible in such motions. Id. at 708 n.2, 918 P.2d at 325 n.2.

To the extent Rager alleged prosecutorial misconduct, his claim fell outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. To the extent Rager claimed his sentence was illegal because he should have been sentenced to a gross misdemeanor rather than a felony, his claim is barred by the law of the case doctrine. See Rager v. State, No. 90125-COA, 2026 WL 2207799, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. July 30, 2026) (Order of Affirmance) (concluding Rager's offense was a felony and, thus, his sentence was not facially illegal); Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975) (“The law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.” (quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, we conclude Rager was not entitled to relief on these claims.

Rager also appeared to claim that some of his prior felony convictions have been dismissed or reclassified as misdemeanors.  ¹ This claim does not implicate the district court's jurisdiction to impose a sentence, nor does it allege that the sentence imposed was in excess of the statutory maximum. Moreover, Rager did not specify which of his prior convictions were dismissed or reclassified, when they were dismissed or reclassified, or how any mistaken assumption about his criminal record worked to his extreme detriment. Therefore, we conclude Rager was not entitled to relief on this claim.

Rager also appeared to claim that the State withdrew the “complaint,” and that his case was closed, before his sentence was imposed. On its face, this claim fell outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. See Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324 (“A motion to correct an illegal sentence presupposes a valid conviction and may not, therefore, be used to challenge alleged errors in proceedings that occur prior to the imposition of sentence.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). To the extent this claim can be construed as challenging the district court's jurisdiction, it lacked merit. Rager was charged by way of information on October 24, 2019, and there is no indication in the record that the charging document was withdrawn or that the case was closed prior to sentencing. Therefore, we conclude Rager was not entitled to relief on this claim. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Rager's motion, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Rager claimed the State erroneously submitted non-certified judgments of conviction in support of habitual criminal adjudication, Rager's claim fell outside the narrow scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence.