TRAVIS FAY SMITH v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Travis Fay Smith appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of duty to stop at the scene of a crash involving death and reckless driving resulting in death. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Hon. Lynne K. Jones, Judge.

On appeal, Smith contends the information did not allege sufficient facts to support the charge of reckless driving. Specifically, Smith argues that an allegation of speeding is insufficient to demonstrate that he acted with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. See NRS 484B.653. Smith pleaded guilty to felony reckless driving where the State argued Smith was driving approximately 90 miles per hour in a 35 miles per hour zone. As a result, he may not raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. See Webb v. State, 91 Nev. 469, 470, 538 P.2d 164, 165 (1975); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).

Smith argues that, pursuant to Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), and Zalyaul v. State, 138 Nev. 760, 520 P.3d 345 (2022), his guilty plea did not foreclose his ability to challenge the sufficiency of the information. We disagree. In Class, the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant's guilty plea did not preclude the defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. Id. at 178-82. In so holding, the supreme court stated that the defendant's claim did not “contradict the terms of the indictment or the written plea agreement” and did not “focus upon case-related constitutional defects that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea,” but rather “challenge[d] the Government's power to criminalize [the defendant's] (admitted) conduct.” Id. at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). And in Zalyaul, the Nevada Supreme Court held that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over criminal charges filed against a 21-year-old adult for delinquent acts committed as a 14-year-old child. 138 Nev. at 760, 520 P.3d at 347.

Here, Smith does not challenge the constitutionality of the reckless driving statute, nor does his claim implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court. Rather, Smith contends only that the facts alleged were insufficient to demonstrate that he had the requisite intent for a reckless driving charge.¹ However, by entering his guilty plea, Smith admitted not only that he committed the acts alleged in the information but also that these acts were sufficient to establish the legal elements of the crime charged. See Righetti v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 133 Nev. 42, 48, 388 P.3d 643, 648 (2017) (stating “a defendant who pleads guilty without the benefit of a negotiated agreement necessarily admits all of the factual and legal elements included in the charging document”).² Thus, neither Class nor Zalyaul control this matter, and Smith may not now rebut his own admission. Therefore, we decline to consider this argument.

Smith also argues that his convictions for violating the duty to stop at the scene of a crash and for felony reckless driving violate his constitutional right against double jeopardy because the latter is a lesser-included offense of the former. Smith concedes that he did not raise this claim below; therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 272-73, 321 P.3d 919, 926 (2014). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that: “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning that it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected [their] substantial rights.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). “[A] plain error affects a defendant's substantial rights when it causes actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice (defined as a ‘grossly unfair’ outcome).” Id. at 51, 412 P.3d at 49.

“The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against ․ multiple punishments for the same offense.” Jackson v. State, 128 Nev. 598, 604, 291 P.3d 1274, 1278 (2012); see U.S. Const. amend. V; Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8(1). If the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit multiple punishments if “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932); see also LaChance, 130 Nev. at 273, 321 P.3d at 926 (“A person cannot be convicted of both a greater- and lesser-included offense.”).

Here, each of Smith's convictions required proof of a fact that the other did not. Regarding Smith's conviction for violating the duty to stop at the scene of a crash, the State was required to prove that Smith failed to stop his vehicle at the scene of the crash or that he failed to “remain at the scene of the crash until [he] fulfilled the requirements of NRS 484E.030.”³ NRS 484E.010. Felony reckless driving requires no such proof. See NRS 484B.653(9). Likewise, to obtain a conviction for felony reckless driving, the State was required to prove that Smith operated his vehicle “in willful or wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property.” NRS 484B.653(9). A violation of the duty to stop at the scene of a crash requires no such proof. See Carter v. State, 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 34, 588 P.3d 1270, 1274 (2026) (discussing NRS 484E.010 and NRS 484E.030); see also NRS 484E.010. Therefore, reckless driving is not a lesser-included offense of duty to stop at the scene of a crash.

We reject Smith's claim that this case is analogous to Kelley v. State, 132 Nev. 348, 371 P.3d 1052 (2016). In Kelley, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the crime of misdemeanor reckless driving is a lesser-included offense of felony eluding a police officer. Id. at 350-51, 371 P.3d at 1054. The supreme court's holding was based on the specific language of the felony eluding statute, NRS 484B.550(3), which required that a person operate their vehicle “in a manner which endangers or is likely to endanger any other or the property of any other person.” Id. at 351, 371 P.3d at 1054. NRS 484E.010 contains no such language. To the extent Smith claims NRS 484E.010 “implicitly” requires a finding of recklessness because leaving the scene of a known accident is necessarily reckless, he fails to demonstrate such a legal proposition is clear under current law. Therefore, Smith fails to demonstrate plain error, and we conclude he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Smith also argues the district court erred by relying on “impalpable information” in imposing his sentence. Smith concedes that he did not object on this ground below; therefore, we review this claim for plain error. See Jeremias, 134 Nev. at 50, 412 P.3d at 48. The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

Smith contends the district court improperly considered impact letters from non-victims in imposing sentence. After review, we conclude Smith has waived this claim. At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had read the impact letters submitted by the State and indicated that it was not sure all of the letters were authored by “victims” as defined in NRS 176.015. The court then asked defense counsel if they had any objection to the court considering the letters, and counsel stated, “we have no problem with that.” In light of this record, we conclude Smith has waived any challenge to the district court's consideration of the letters on appeal. See Ford v. State, 122 Nev. 796, 805, 138 P.3d 500, 506 (2006) (recognizing that a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right).

Even assuming Smith has not waived this claim, and that the district court erred in considering this evidence (or portions thereof),  ⁴ Smith nonetheless fails to demonstrate plain error. Smith does not allege how this error affected his substantial rights,⁵ and the record does not indicate that the district court's sentencing decision was based on any improper material contained within the letters. Therefore, we conclude Smith is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Smith also contends that the district court improperly considered his prior traffic citations in imposing sentence. Smith does not demonstrate that the district court considered impalpable or highly suspect evidence, let alone that any such error is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record. “Few limitations are imposed on a judge's right to consider evidence in imposing a sentence, and courts are generally free to consider information extraneous to the presentencing report.” Denson v. State, 112 Nev. 489, 492, 915 P.2d 284, 286 (1996). “Possession of the fullest information possible concerning a defendant's life and characteristics is essential to the sentencing judge's task of determining the type and extent of punishment.” Id. Smith does not contend that he did not receive the traffic citations identified in the presentence investigation report. Moreover, Smith does not cite, and we have not found, any authority that prohibits a sentencing court from considering a defendant's prior traffic citations at sentencing.⁶ Therefore, Smith fails to demonstrate the district court plainly erred in considering this evidence, and we conclude he is not entitled to relief on this claim.

For the foregoing reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Smith's contention that the charging document alleges facts consistent with another crime (vehicular manslaughter) does not change the fact that Smith challenges the sufficiency of the information with respect to the crime charged.

2.   In the guilty plea memorandum, Smith affirmed that he understood he was admitting “the facts which support all the elements of the offenses by pleading guilty” and that the State “possesse[d] sufficient evidence which would result in my conviction.”

3.   NRS 484E.030 requires a driver involved in a crash that resulted in injury or death to provide certain information to the police and to any person injured in the crash, as well as to render reasonable assistance to any person injured in the crash.

4.   We note that, even if certain individuals did not constitute a victim for the purposes of NRS 176.015, the district court could still consider their letter if it determined the evidence was reliable and relevant. See NRS 176.015(6).

5.   Smith's general claim that the “sheer number” of letters was “troublesome” is insufficient to demonstrate actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice.

6.   Contrary to Smith's argument, NRS 176.145 neither limits the evidence a district court may consider at sentencing nor precludes the Division of Parole and Probation from including information regarding a defendant's prior traffic citations in a presentence investigation report. See NRS 176.145(3) (“The Division may include in the report any additional information that it believes may be helpful in imposing a sentence ․”).