ANDREW ANTHONY NAPOLITANO JR v. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS JAMES DZURENDA DIRECTOR OF THE NDOC AND WARDEN JOHN HENLEY (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Andrew Anthony Napolitano, Jr., appeals from a district court order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus or, in the alternative, a petition for a writ of prohibition filed on February 27, 2025. First Judicial District Court, Carson City; Hon. Kristin Luis, Judge.

In his petition, Napolitano argued that the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) improperly adopted regulations regarding who is eligible for minimum custody and that the adoption of those regulations violated the separation of powers clause in the Nevada Constitution. A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, NRS 34.160, or to control a manifest abuse or arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion, Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Newman, 97 Nev. 601, 603-04, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981). “A writ of prohibition is the counterpart to a writ of mandamus and may be issued to compel a person or body exercising judicial functions to cease performing beyond its legal authority.” NuVeda, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 137 Nev. 533, 535, 495 P.3d 500, 503 (2021) (quotation marks omitted). “This court will not issue a writ if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.” State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Brown), 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 27, 569 P.3d 637, 639 (2025) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also NRS 34.170 (stating a writ of mandamus will not issue where the petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law); NRS 34.330 (stating the same for a writ of prohibition). A petitioner “carr[ies] the burden of demonstrating that extraordinary relief is warranted.” Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004). “We generally review a district court's grant or denial of writ relief for an abuse of discretion.” Koller v. State, 122 Nev. 223, 226, 130 P.3d 653, 655 (2006).

The district court denied the petition, in part, because Napolitano had a speedy and adequate remedy in the form of a civil rights action. Napolitano does not challenge that finding on appeal; thus, an affirmance on the failure to challenge one of the district court's alternative grounds for denial is warranted. See Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 549, 513 P.3d 1285, 1287 (Ct. App. 2022) (“[W]hen a district court provides independent alternative grounds in support of a decision later challenged on appeal, the appellant generally must successfully challenge all of those grounds in its appellate briefing to obtain a reversal.”). Further, it is well established that a challenge to the conditions of confinement, such as Napolitano's challenge to the NDOC's administrative regulations, can be brought in a civil action. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 475-76 (1995) (challenging conditions of confinement through a civil complaint); Berry v. Feil, 131 Nev. 339, 340-41, 357 P.3d 344, 344-45 (Ct. App. 2015) (determining that the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirement applied to a civil rights complaint filed by an inmate that challenged the conditions of his confinement); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (federal statute authorizing a “civil action for deprivation of rights”). Given the foregoing, the district court properly concluded that Napolitano had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law, such that writ relief was not available to challenge the NDOC's administrative regulations regarding which prisoners are eligible for minimum custody. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Napolitano's petition, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.