IN RE: THE CONTESTED HEARING OF: JOY A. MODAFFERI (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Joy A. Modafferi appeals from a district court order denying a petition for judicial review. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Nadia Krall, Judge.

Modafferi is licensed with respondent State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Division of Insurance, as a Nevada resident bail agent. She was associated with the bail agency, Be Kind Bail Bonds, LLC. Be Kind was licensed as a resident bail agency from December 2016 through October 18, 2018. John Gari Fulton was also a licensed resident bail agent associated with Be Kind. In August 2017, Fulton signed and filed Be Kind's Initial/Annual List of Managers or Managing Members and State Business License Application for the filing period of November 2016 to November 2017 with the Nevada Secretary of State, listing himself and Modafferi as managers or managing members of Be Kind, and he signed the document in his capacity as a manager.

In September 2018, Modafferi signed and filed Be Kind's annual list with the Secretary of State for the filing period of November 2018 to November 2019 listing only herself as the manager or managing member of Be Kind and signed the document in her capacity as manager.

On October 17, 2018, Fulton also filed Be Kind's annual list with the Nevada Secretary of State for the same filing period and identified himself as the only manager or managing member and sole owner of Be Kind. The next day, Fulton voluntarily surrendered Be Kind's license to respondent. It is unclear if Modafferi was made aware of the surrender at that time, but she later acknowledged she became aware of this sometime in late October 2018.

On October 23, 2018, after Fulton had already surrendered Be Kind's license, Modafferi filed an application for licensure of Be Kind, which listed herself as the sole owner, partner, officer and director, with respondent. On October 30, a program officer for respondent's specialty license department sent an email to Modafferi informing her that the name “Be Kind Bail Bonds, LLC” was not available for use, as another licensee was using or has used the name. In response, Modafferi indicated that she had been the sole custodian for Be Kind for several months. However, the program officer for respondent informed Modafferi that it was unaware of her having ownership of Be Kind because the only owner respondent had on file was Fulton and that there was no information about Modafferi purchasing or otherwise acquiring the assets and liabilities of Be Kind, and the license was voluntarily surrendered on October 18, 2018. Thus, the program officer stated that Be Kind was not licensed and could not legally conduct business unless an owner applied to reactivate that license.

In April 2024, respondent issued a letter of reprimand against Modafferi for violation of NRS 697.090 because she wrote bail bonds under Be Kind's name from October 18, 2018, through March 20, 2019, when Be Kind was not licensed to do business as a resident bail agency. Modafferi appealed the reprimand, and a hearing was held before a hearing officer. The hearing officer issued an order upholding respondent's letter of reprimand. The hearing officer noted that during the hearing, Stephanie Cantor, Chief Compliance Audit Investigator for respondent, testified that as of the date Fulton surrendered Be Kind's license, he was listed in respondent's most recent records as the sole owner of Be Kind. Cantor further testified that despite asking for documentation, such as proof of a sale or transfer of ownership, Modafferi never produced any evidence to verify her ownership interest in Be Kind. The hearing officer further considered Modafferi's testimony that she was unaware that she was not authorized by respondent to write bonds under Be Kind's license and name after the license was surrendered and found that Modafferi lacked credibility. Thus, the hearing officer concluded that, based upon the substantial evidence in the record, Modafferi violated NRS 697.090(1).

Modafferi then petitioned for judicial review, arguing that she has been and remains a licensed bail bond agent who had the authority to write and post bail bonds and that the letter of reprimand was predicated upon the fraudulent actions of Fulton. The district court ultimately issued an order denying Modafferi's petition for judicial review. The court found that the relevant and probative evidence, including Cantor and Modafferi's testimony, demonstrated that Modafferi knew the license for Be Kind had been surrendered and that she was not authorized to write bail bonds using Be Kind's name and yet she did so for some period of time. Modafferi was also aware that the information which respondent had on file was that Fulton was the sole owner of Be Kind. The court further noted that during respondent's investigation, Modafferi was given multiple opportunities to provide information regarding her alleged ownership of Be Kind but did not do so. Thus, the court found that there was no misapplication of NRS 697.090 by respondent in issuing the letter of reprimand. This appeal followed.

Modafferi argues that the district court erred in denying her petition for judicial review. She asserts that respondent wrongfully claimed that she violated NRS 697.090, which was solely based on her allegedly writing bail bonds on an inactive license for Be Kind. She argues that she had full authority to write and post bail bonds, as she remained a licensed resident bail agent, and there was no evidence indicating that her license was ever removed. She contends that since she has an individual license in her name and that she was appointed by the surety as an authorized producer to write bail bonds for Be Kind, she was fully authorized to operate and conduct the business of Be Kind. Conversely, respondent argues that Modafferi violated NRS 697.090 and knew Be Kind did not have a valid license, yet she chose to continue writing bonds under that name. Thus, respondent asserts that the district court properly denied the petition for judicial review as the hearing officer's decision was supported by substantial evidence.

“When reviewing a district court's denial of a petition for judicial review of an agency decision, this court engages in the same analysis as the district court.” Dept. of Corrs. v. Ludwick, 135 Nev. 99, 101, 440 P.3d 43, 45 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review the agency's decision to determine whether it was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, or affected by an error of law. Id. Factual findings are overturned only if they lack substantial evidence, or “evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Nev. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd. v. Smith, 129 Nev. 618, 624, 310 P.3d 560, 564 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); NRS 233B.135(4). We “will not reweigh the evidence or revisit a[ ] [hearing] officer's credibility determination.” Elizondo v. Hood Mach., Inc., 129 Nev. 780, 784, 312 P.3d 479, 482 (2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reviewing an agency decision, “[t]he burden of proof is on the party attacking or resisting the decision to show that the final decision is invalid.” NRS 233B.135(2).

Statutory interpretation requires, first and foremost, that we adhere to the plain text of a statute where that text is clear. McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors of Carson City, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986). NRS 697.090(1) sets forth that a person shall not act in the capacity of a bail agent unless that person is qualified and licensed as provided in NRS Chapter 697. See also NRS 0.039 (setting forth general definitions for the NRS and defining “person” to mean “a natural person, any form of business or social organization and any other nongovernmental legal entity”). NRS 697.100(2) further provides that a corporation may be licensed as a bail agent or bail enforcement agent if “(a) [t]he corporation is owned and controlled by an insurer authorized to write surety in this State or a subsidiary corporation of such an insurer; or (b) [o]wnership and control of the corporation is retained by one or more licensed agents.”

Thus, NRS 697.090’s plain language states that a person shall not act in the capacity as a bail agent without being licensed to do so and NRS 697.100(2) discusses when a corporation may be licensed as a bail agent or bail enforcement agency. Here, there is no dispute that Modafferi has an individual license enabling her to issue bails bonds. However, there are separate licensing requirements for issuing bails bonds in the name of a corporation. To do so, a licensed agent such as Modafferi must have an ownership interest in the corporation. Given this legal framework, despite Modafferi's arguments to the contrary, we are not persuaded that the relevant statutes authorize her to rely on her individual licensure status to circumvent the licensure requirements for a corporation thereby allowing her to write bail bonds in Be Kind's name. See City of Henderson v. Wolfgram, 137 Nev. 755, 757, 501 P.3d 422, 424 (2021) (providing that this court will avoid statutory interpretations that lead to absurd results).

Insofar as Modafferi argues that the letter of reprimand was predicated on Fulton fraudulently changing the Nevada Secretary of State's records for Be Kind and then surrendering the license for the entity to respondent, we are not persuaded by this argument. Even if Fulton improperly changed the status of Be Kind, the record nevertheless supports that Modafferi had communications with respondent in October and November 2018 regarding the status of Be Kind's license. Modafferi was informed that respondent's records reflected that Fulton was the owner of Be Kind and therefore was authorized to surrender Be Kind's license. Additionally, the record supports that Modafferi was instructed to provide proof of her ownership of Be Kind and still failed to provide such evidence. Thus, substantial evidence supports the hearing officer's findings that Modafferi knew she was not permitted by respondent to write bail bonds using Be Kind's name but continued to do so. To the extent Modafferi's arguments ultimately challenge the hearing officer's weighing of the competing evidence and credibility determinations in respondent's favor, those determinations are not subject to appellate reweighing. See NRS 233B.135(3) (providing that a reviewing court “shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of evidence on a question of fact”); City Plan Dev. v. Lab. Comm'r, 121 Nev. 419, 426, 117 P.3d 182, 187 (2005) (“An administrative decision based on a credibility determination is not open to appellate review.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Thus, based on the reasoning set forth above, we conclude Modafferi has not demonstrated that the hearing officer's decision was clearly erroneous, an abuse of discretion, or affected by an error of law.

Therefore, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.