BILLY RAY RILEY v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Billy Ray Riley appeals from a district court order denying an “amended petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to NRS 34.360 to NRS 34.500 and NRS 34.7261(b) [sic] and oral argument at hearing” filed on December 30, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Carli Lynn Kierny, Judge.

On appeal, Riley argues the district court erred by construing his petition as a postconviction habeas petition filed pursuant to NRS 34.724. On October 7, 2025, Riley filed a “writ of habeas corpus pursuant to NRS 34.720(1) to 34.830 and NRS 34.726.1(b) [sic] and oral argument at hearing.” The State filed a response arguing, among other things, that Riley failed to verify the petition as required by NRS 34.730. After the district court issued a minute order denying Riley's October petition, but before it had entered its written order, Riley filed the instant “amended petition.” Riley indicated that this petition was filed pursuant to “NRS 34.360 to NRS 34.500” as well as NRS 34.726, and that it cured the alleged defective verification. Riley also claimed that his sentence is illegal because the State failed to file a notice of intent to seek habitual criminal treatment before the jury entered its verdict.¹

Given this history and the fact that Riley's underlying claim challenged the validity of his judgment of conviction or sentence, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by construing Riley's petition as a postconviction habeas petition.² See NRS 34.724(2)(b) (stating a postconviction habeas petition “[c]omprehends and takes the place of all other common-law, statutory or other remedies which have been available for challenging the validity of the judgment of conviction or sentence, and must be used exclusively in place of them”). Moreover, Riley does not challenge the district court's determination that his postconviction habeas petition was procedurally barred.³ See Hung v. Genting Berhad, 138 Nev. 547, 549, 513 P.3d 1285, 1287 (Ct. App. 2022) (recognizing an appellant forfeits an issue by failing to timely raise the issue in their briefing on appeal). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying the petition, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Riley raised this same claim in his October 7, 2025, petition, and the district court entered its written order denying that petition as procedurally barred on January 6, 2026.

2.   To the extent Riley was trying to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to NRS 34.360, Riley's claim regarding notice of habitual criminality was not within the scope of such a petition. See NRS 34.360 (providing that a person “may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of [his] imprisonment or restraint”). And the cause of Riley's imprisonment, as reflected in the record before this court, is an October 11, 2023, amended judgment of conviction of second-degree murder and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.

3.   Contrary to Riley's assertion, his claim does not implicate the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1); NRS 171.010; Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 183, 251 P.3d 163, 168 (2011) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to render a judgment in a particular category of case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 123, 178 P.3d 154, 163-64 (2008) (holding a “district court's authority to impose a habitual criminal sentence” is premised on “the State's filing of an allegation of habitual criminality”).