DOMINICK ATKINS v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Dominick Atkins appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on September 10, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Erika L. Mendoza, Judge.

In his petition, Atkins claimed counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to request an additional 121 days of presentence credit for time spent on house arrest. He also requested an evidentiary hearing and the appointment of counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005). To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a petitioner must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

As the district court determined, Atkins was not entitled to presentence credits for time spent on house arrest. See NRS 176.055(1) (allowing the district court to award credit against the duration of a sentence for time “actually spent in confinement before conviction”); State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Jackson), 121 Nev. 413, 418-19, 116 P.3d 834, 837 (2005) (holding that “house arrest does not constitute time actually spent in confinement for which the duration of a sentence may be credited” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Atkins failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient or that a request for these credits had a reasonable probability of changing the outcome at sentencing. See Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (holding that counsel is not ineffective for failing to make futile motions). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.

As to Atkins’ request for counsel, the appointment of counsel in this matter was discretionary. See NRS 34.750(1). When deciding whether to appoint counsel, the district court may consider factors, including whether the issues presented are difficult, whether the petitioner is unable to comprehend the proceedings, or whether counsel is necessary to proceed with discovery. Id.; Renteria-Novoa v. State, 133 Nev. 75, 76, 391 P.3d 760, 761 (2017). Here, the issues in this matter were not difficult, Atkins was able to comprehend the proceedings, and discovery with the aid of counsel was not necessary. Thus, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by not appointing counsel.

Having concluded Atkins is not entitled to relief, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.