FINN v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

First, Finn argues the district court imposed an illegal sentence because he was not adjudicated guilty at the end of the plea canvass.² Finn fails to demonstrate the district court was required to adjudicate him guilty at the conclusion of the guilty plea canvass. After thoroughly canvassing Finn regarding the charge and listening to the factual rendition provided by the State and agreed to by Finn, the district court accepted Finn's pleas. Finn fails to cite any law to support his claim that the district court was required to also adjudicate Finn guilty at the conclusion of the guilty plea canvass. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (stating that “it is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument”). Further, the district court adjudicated Finn guilty at the sentencing hearing and in the judgment of conviction. See NRS 176.105(1)(c). Therefore, Finn fails to demonstrate his sentence was illegal or that he is otherwise entitled to relief on this claim.

Second, Finn argues the district court erred by sentencing him as a habitual felon because the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence were contained in the same judgment of conviction. He contends that his prior convictions all occurred on the same date, September 15, 2015, and were all charged in the same indictment. Thus, he asserts that his prior convictions were one criminal episode which comprised three different felony offenses.

“[W]here two or more convictions grow out of the same act, transaction or occurrence, and are prosecuted in the same indictment or information, those several convictions may be utilized only as a single ‘prior conviction’ for purposes of applying the habitual criminal statute.” Rezin v. State, 95 Nev. 461, 462, 596 P.2d 226, 227 (1979). While Finn's three prior felony convictions were contained within one judgment of conviction, filed on September 15, 2025, he fails to demonstrate that all three convictions grew out of the same act, transaction or occurrence. See LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 279, 321 P.3d. 919, 930 (2014) (holding that two convictions filed on the same date were separate convictions for habitual criminal purposes because they involved different crimes committed on different dates). For Finn's prior convictions, the State alleged Finn committed seven robberies at six different locations between the dates of April 13, 2014, and May 12, 2014. To resolve those charges, Finn pleaded guilty to committing two robberies and one burglary while in possession of a firearm. Given these facts, we conclude Finn does not demonstrate that the district court erred by considering the prior felony convictions as separate convictions for purposes of sentencing in this matter, despite the fact they were contained in the same judgment of conviction. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by finding that Finn's prior convictions should not be counted as one prior conviction for purposes of adjudication as a habitual felon under NRS 207.012.

Third, Finn appears to argue that he was under the influence of his drug addiction when he committed the prior offenses, so they should be considered as one “act, transaction or occurrence.” Finn fails to provide any relevant authority in support of this contention. See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. Thus, Finn fails to demonstrate that his prior convictions should be considered as one because he suffered from drug-related issues. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by finding that Finn's prior convictions should not be counted as only one prior conviction. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

2.   To the extent Finn argues that when he entered his Alford plea he did not understand the application of the habitual felon statute, see NRS 207.012, that claim is not properly raised in the first instance on direct appeal as it challenges the validity of his guilty plea and the alleged error does not appear clearly from the record. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 367-68 (1986); as limited by Smith v. State, 110 Nev. 1009, 1010-11 n.1, 879 P.2d 60, 61 n.1 (1994).