GARDNER v. STATE (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Gardner contends the district court erred by denying his petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. In his petition, Gardner claimed that (1) his right to due process was violated because the State filed a memorandum in February 2022 indicating that he appeared for certain, unspecified hearings when he was not present at those hearings; (2) the trial court erred by requiring him to go to trial with an attorney with whom he had an irreconcilable conflict; (3) the trial court erred by restricting his cross-examination of the victim; and (4) the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial based on juror misconduct. In denying Gardner's petition, the district court determined that Gardner's first claim was barred pursuant to NRS 34.810(1)(b) and that Gardner's remaining claims were barred pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.

After review, we conclude the district court properly determined that Gardner's claims were barred. Gardner's first claim could have been presented to the trial court or raised on direct appeal and was therefore procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(4). Gardner did not allege good cause in his petition below; thus, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.¹ See Chappell v. State, 137 Nev. 780, 787, 501 P.3d 935, 949 (2021) (stating “a petitioner's explanation of good cause and prejudice for each procedurally barred claim must be made on the face of the petition”).

As to Gardner's remaining claims, the supreme court considered and denied each of them on direct appeal. See Gardner v. State, No. 86735, 2024 WL 3841798, at *1-2 (Nev. Aug. 14, 2024) (Order of Affirmance). Therefore, these claims were barred by the law of the case doctrine. See Clem v. State, 119 Nev. 615, 620, 81 P.3d 521, 525 (2003) (“The law of the case doctrine holds that the law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.”); see also Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975) (“The doctrine of the law of the case cannot be avoided by a more detailed and precisely focused argument subsequently made after reflection upon the previous proceedings.”). Accordingly,² we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Gardner attempts to argue good cause on appeal, we decline to consider any such argument in the first instance. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989) (“This court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”).

2.   Having concluded that Gardner's claims were barred, we further conclude that the district court did not err in declining to appoint counsel or hold an evidentiary hearing. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984) (stating a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing if they raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief); Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032, 1046 n.53, 194 P.3d 1224, 1234 n.53 (2008) (stating a district court may “reject a substantive post-conviction claim without an evidentiary hearing when the claim is procedurally barred and the defendant cannot overcome the procedural bar”); see also NRS 34.750(1) (providing the district court discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel).