ISAIAH JEFFERSON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Isaiah Jefferson appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of sex trafficking of a child under 18 years of age. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Hon. Scott N. Freeman, Judge

Jefferson argues the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, NRS 176.165, and “a district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just,” Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 604, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2015). In determining whether there is a fair and just reason to permit withdrawal of a guilty plea, the district court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281. We review the district court's decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 191, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004). A defendant moving to withdraw his guilty plea must allege specific factual allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

In his motion, Jefferson first claimed he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because he did not understand that he would be required to register as a sex offender. A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and a petitioner carries the burden of establishing the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). “A court must be able to conclude from the oral canvass, any written plea memorandum and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the memorandum (i.e., did the defendant read it, have any questions about it, etc.) that the defendant's plea was freely, voluntarily and knowingly made.” Id. at 1106, 13 P.3d at 448.

The written guilty plea agreement provided that Jefferson understood he would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to NRS Chapter 179D. During the entry-of-plea hearing but prior to Jefferson's plea canvass, Jefferson's counsel, David Houston, Esq., represented to the district court that he advised Jefferson of the prison sentence he faced and that Jefferson would have to register “as a sex offender for the rest of his life.” During Jefferson's plea canvass, Jefferson represented that he read and understood the plea agreement and did not have any questions about it. Jefferson specifically represented that he understood he would be required to register as a sex offender. In light of these circumstances, Jefferson failed to overcome the presumption that his plea was validly entered. Therefore, Jefferson failed to demonstrate this constituted a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.

Jefferson also claimed in his motion that he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because he pleaded guilty during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic and, following the entry of his plea, Mr. Houston passed away. Jefferson failed to allege specific facts demonstrating how these occurrences impacted his guilty plea or otherwise provided a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea. Therefore, Jefferson failed to demonstrate this constituted a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea.

On appeal, Jefferson also argues he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because the attorney who replaced Mr. Houston advised Jefferson that he was unable to withdraw his plea, creating a potential conflict. Jefferson did not make this argument below, and we decline to consider it for the first time on appeal. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989).

Finally, Jefferson argues he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because the attorney who replaced Mr. Houston was ineffective for informing Jefferson that the attorney could not assist with withdrawing Jefferson's plea, for failing to advise Jefferson that he had a right to conflict free counsel to assist him with withdrawing his plea, and for failing to inform the district court he was unable to assist Jefferson with withdrawing his plea and moving for the appointment of substitute counsel. Jefferson raised this claim for the first time in his reply brief. Thus, we decline to consider it. See LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 277 n.7, 321 P.3d 919, 929 n.7 (2014); see also NRAP 28(c) (stating a reply brief is “limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief’).

Because Jefferson failed to demonstrate a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the presentence motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.