NATHANIEL TRAVON MARTIN NATHANAEL TRAVON MARTIN v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Nathaniel Travon Martin appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a jury verdict, of robbery and burglary of a business. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Monica Trujillo, Judge.

First, Martin argues the district court erred by allowing him to waive his right to counsel and represent himself at trial. Martin argues his waiver was not knowing and voluntary because he was not competent to waive his right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment provides a criminal defendant with the right to counsel, but a defendant may waive this right and represent himself if this waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Miles v. State, 137 Nev. 747, 749-50, 500 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2021); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 (1975). For the waiver to be knowing and intelligent, the defendant must “be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835. The record must “establish that [the defendant] knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may waive his right to counsel even if he lacks legal skills and experience, and a district court may not deny a defendant his right to self-representation because he may ultimately conduct his own defense to his own detriment. Id. at 834-36.

Competency to stand trial is different from the competency to represent oneself at trial, and “a court may deny a defendant's request to self-represent where the defendant, in the opinion of the court after a Faretta canvass, lacks the competence to conduct their own defense.” Duckket v. State, 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 583 P.3d 241, 246 (2026). This court gives “deference to the district court's decision to allow the defendant to waive his right to counsel.” Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 55, 176 P.3d 1081, 1085 (2008).

We conclude the district court sufficiently considered Martin's specific circumstances and properly weighed all relevant factors before permitting Martin to represent himself. See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 177 (2008) (recognizing that the district court “will often prove best able to make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized circumstances of a particular defendant”). The district court was aware of Martin's prior competency proceedings, and Martin informed the district court that he had anxiety, attention deficit hyperactive disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Martin expressed an understanding of the judicial process, an ability to respond appropriately to the district court and follow court rules, and a clear understanding of the right he was waiving and of the responsibility he assumed by choosing to represent himself.

While Martin had been found incompetent to stand trial previously during the pendency of the case, Martin was treated and found to be competent prior to the district court granting his motion to represent himself. Martin does not explain why he was initially found incompetent to stand trial, and the record does not contain the competency evaluations performed on Martin. Thus, we assume those records support the decision of the district court to allow Martin to represent himself. See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007); see also NRAP 30(b)(3) (stating that “appellant's appendix to the opening brief must include those documents required for inclusion in the joint appendix under this Rule, and any other portions of the record necessary to determination of issues raised in appellant's appeal”); Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980) (“The burden to make a proper appellate record rests on appellant.”). Martin argues that ADHD can cause executive function issues but fails to specifically allege how it affected his executive function or how it caused him to be incompetent to represent himself. Martin points to one answer that he gave to the district court that is fairly nonsensical, but the remainder of Martin's statements and answers were logical and indicated he understood (1) the right he was waiving; (2) the dangers of representing himself; and (3) the consequences he was facing. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding Martin knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, and we conclude Martin fails to demonstrate he was not competent to conduct his own defense. Accordingly, we conclude Martin is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Second, Martin argues the State presented insufficient evidence that he committed a burglary of a business because the State failed to prove he had the requisite intent when he entered the business. Specifically, Martin argues he entered the business with the intent to get a refund he was owed and not with the intent to commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person or any felony. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction. Washington v. State, 132 Nev. 655, 661, 376 P.3d 802, 807 (2016).

The State presented evidence that Martin rented a storage unit but, before moving in his belongings, he changed his mind and sought a refund. The storage facility would only refund him $38 rather than the $78 Martin paid because of fees and proration. The State presented evidence and testimony from the victim that Martin called the storage facility several times. In the days before the altercation, the victim testified that Martin called and demanded a full refund and said, if he did not get it, the victim was “going to have a bad day.” On the day of the altercation, Martin went to the storage facility. The victim testified that he told Martin he could not receive a refund of the full $78 and that Martin would have to speak with management to get more than $38. Martin was angry and started yelling. The victim testified he offered Martin $40 from the petty cash drawer but told Martin that was the most he could give. Martin attacked the victim, took $501 in cash as well as checks made out to the storage facility, and fled. He was arrested within 10 minutes of the altercation with the missing money and checks on him.

Any rational juror could have found from the evidence presented that Martin committed burglary of a business. See NRS 205.060(1)(b). “[I]ntent can rarely be proven by direct evidence of a defendant's state of mind, but instead is inferred by the jury from the individualized, external circumstances of the crime, which are capable of proof at trial.” Sharma v. State, 118 Nev. 648, 659, 56 P.3d 868, 874 (2002); see NRS 193.200 (“Intention is manifested by the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the person accused.”). Here, the jury could reasonably infer from the evidence presented, particularly the threat Martin made before appearing at the storage facility and his actions while in the storage facility, that Martin had the requisite intent to commit grand or petit larceny, assault or battery on any person, or any felony when he entered or remained in the building. See NRS 205.060(1)(b). Therefore, we conclude Martin is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Third, Martin argues the victim improperly testified that Martin was mentally unstable because the victim was not an expert and the statement was based on speculation. Martin claims the district court should have sua sponte struck the comment or should have given a limiting instruction. Martin did not object to this statement at trial; thus, this claim is forfeited. However, this court may review the claim for plain error. To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that: “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning that it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018). “[A] plain error affects a defendant's substantial rights when it causes actual prejudice or a miscarriage of justice (defined as a ‘grossly unfair’ outcome).” Id. at 51, 412 P.3d at 49.

Martin fails to demonstrate the statement by the victim was improper. “A lay witness may testify to opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of the witness; and ․ helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue.” Richt v. State, 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 32, 588 P.3d 1256, 1264 (2026) (quotation marks omitted). Here, the victim testified about his observations of Martin's behavior prior to the altercation. The victim testified Martin came in, demanded his money, appeared agitated, and was pacing. In response to a question about how he was feeling in the moment, the victim stated, “Yeah. I'm scared. I'm angry. I'm shaken up. You're in shock. You don't know if he has a knife. You don't know if he has a gun. He's mentally unstable. Like, all of this stuff is going on in your head and so that's all the feelings I felt.” The victim's statement was rationally based on his perception and was proper lay testimony. See Richt, 142 Nev., Adv. Op. 32, 588 P.3d at 1265 (“The distinction between expert and lay testimony hinges on whether the testimony concerns information within the common knowledge of or capable of perception by the average layperson or ․ requires some specialized knowledge or skill beyond the realm of everyday experience.” (cleaned up)). Therefore, we conclude Martin fails to demonstrate that any error was clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record or that the alleged error affected his substantial rights. Accordingly, we conclude Martin is not entitled to relief on this claim.

Finally, Martin argues the doctrine of cumulative error mandates reversal. We disagree. Although “[t]he cumulative effect of errors may violate a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial even though errors are harmless individually,” Hernandez v. State, 118 Nev. 513, 535, 50 P.3d 1100, 1115 (2002), Martin has not demonstrated any errors to cumulate. Therefore, he is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Chaparro v. State, 137 Nev. 665, 673-74, 497 P.3d 1187, 1195 (2021) (holding a claim of cumulative error lacked merit where there were no errors to cumulate); see also United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[A] cumulative-error analysis should evaluate only the effect of matters determined to be error, not the cumulative effect of non-errors.”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.