RAY HENDERSON v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Ray Henderson appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of residential burglary, theft, and grand larceny of a firearm. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Bita Yeager, Judge.

Henderson argues the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him to an aggregate term of 5 to 20 years in prison despite his substantial mitigation evidence. Further, he claims the sentence imposed is greater than necessary to serve sentencing goals. He also argues the district court abused its discretion by sentencing him more harshly than his codefendants and by imposing more restitution.¹ Henderson also claims the district court should not have imposed the same sentence it imposed prior to Henderson successfully litigating a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. Finally, Henderson contends his sentence is cruel and unusual when viewed in light of his individualized mitigation and the sentencing outcomes imposed for his similarly situated codefendants.

The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). Regardless of its severity, “[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not ‘cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.’ ” Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime).

The consecutive sentences of 30 to 120 months for burglary and theft and the concurrent sentence of 30 to 120 months for grand larceny of a firearm are within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes, see NRS 205.060(2)(d); NRS 205.0835(2)(d); NRS 205.226(2), and Henderson does not allege that those statutes are unconstitutional. Henderson also does not allege the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The district court stated it considered the sentencing memorandum, and Henderson presented evidence regarding his: stable employment; commitment to lawful living and reintegration into society; plans to pursue higher education; and criminal history, including the lack of violent behavior, substance abuse, or gang affiliation. The district court noted that Henderson's criminal history was more severe than that of his codefendants. The State provided additional receipts for restitution that were not available at the sentencing of Henderson's other codefendant, and the district court therefore imposed a higher restitution obligation on Henderson. Finally, Henderson fails to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion by imposing the sentence that was originally imposed prior to Henderson successfully prosecuting a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. We have considered the sentence and the crime, and we conclude the sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the crime, it does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and the district court did not abuse its discretion when imposing sentence. Therefore, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Westbrook, J.

Gibbons, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In his reply brief, Henderson argues that the State failed to present competent evidence to support its request for restitution and that the district court thus abused its discretion by imposing the amount of restitution. This claim was not raised in Henderson's opening brief, and we decline to consider it on appeal. See LaChance v. State, 130 Nev. 263, 277 n.7, 321 P.3d 919, 929 n.7 (2014); see also NRAP 28(c) (stating a reply brief is “limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief”).