DANNY LEE WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Danny Lee Williams appeals from a district court order denying a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence filed on February 4, 2025. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Hon. Kathleen Drakulich, Judge.

Williams argues the district court erred by denying his motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence. “[A] motion to modify a sentence is limited in scope to sentences based on mistaken assumptions about a defendant's criminal record which work to the defendant's extreme detriment.” Edwards v. State, 112 Nev. 704, 708, 918 P.2d 321, 324 (1996). A motion to correct an illegal sentence may only challenge the facial legality of the sentence: either the district court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence or the sentence was imposed in excess of the statutory maximum. Id. A motion to correct an illegal sentence “presupposes a valid conviction” and may not be used “as a vehicle for challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence based on alleged errors occurring at trial or sentencing.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

In his motion, Williams claimed his sentence was illegal or at variance with NRS 207.010 because the sentencing court adjudicated him a habitual criminal based on “minor property crimes that were remote in time.” Williams’ claim that the sentencing court erred in relying upon specific prior convictions to adjudicate him a habitual criminal does not implicate the facial legality of his sentence. See, e.g., Reed v. State, No. 90389-COA, 2026 WL 806704, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2026) (Order of Affirmance); Steinhauer v. State, No. 88706-COA, 2024 WL 5220212, at *1 (Nev. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2024) (Order of Affirmance). Specifically, Williams’ claim does not implicate the district court's jurisdiction to impose a habitual criminal sentence, see Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 124, 178 P.3d 154, 163-64 (2008) (stating “the district court's authority to impose a habitual criminal sentence [is premised] on the State's filing of an allegation of habitual criminality”), nor does it allege that his sentence exceeds the maximum sentence permitted by statute.¹ Therefore, Williams’ claim fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Moreover, Williams failed to demonstrate that the sentencing court relied on a mistaken assumption about his prior convictions. Williams contended that the sentencing court assumed his prior convictions for receiving stolen property were “major” rather than “minor” crimes because the stolen property he received—two pickup trucks—was actually of “nominal value.” The district court determined, based off the sentencing hearing transcript, that the sentencing court properly considered Williams’ property crimes and history. Williams has not included a copy of the sentencing hearing transcript in his appendix on appeal. Thus, we presume this documentation supports the district court's decision. See Greene v. State, 96 Nev. 555, 558, 612 P.2d 686, 688 (1980) (“The burden to make a proper appellate record rests on appellant.”); see also Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (“When an appellant fails to include necessary documentation in the record, we necessarily presume that the missing portion supports the district court's decision.”). In light of the foregoing, Williams failed to demonstrate the sentencing court relied on mistaken assumptions about his criminal record that worked to his extreme detriment.

Williams also argues the sentencing court abused its discretion in adjudicating him a habitual criminal and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Williams did not clearly raise these claims in his motion below. See State v. Wade, 105 Nev. 206, 209 n.3, 772 P.2d 1291, 1293 n.3 (1989) (“This court will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.”). Moreover, these claims fell outside the scope of claims permissible in a motion to modify or correct an illegal sentence, see Edwards, 112 Nev. at 708, 918 P.2d at 324, and were also barred by the law of the case doctrine, see Williams v. State, Docket No. 34778, at *4-5 (Order of Affirmance, Aug. 28, 2002) (concluding the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating Williams a habitual criminal and that the sentence imposed does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment); Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Williams’ motion, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Williams claimed his sentence exceeded the maximum sentence permitted by statute, his claim was barred by the law of the case doctrine. See Williams v. State, Docket No. 34778 (Order of Affirmance, Aug. 28, 2002) (concluding that Williams’ sentence is “within the parameters provided by the relevant statute”); see also Hall v. State, 91 Nev. 314, 316, 535 P.2d 797, 799 (1975) (“The law of a first appeal is the law of the case on all subsequent appeals in which the facts are substantially the same.” (quotation marks omitted)).