DONALD ROBIN BARREN v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Donald Robin Barren appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on May 20, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Monica Trujillo, Judge.

Barren contends the district court erred by denying his claims that the trial court erroneously acted as a fact finder in sentencing him as a habitual criminal and that his rights were violated with respect to his September 20, 2022, parole revocation hearing. Barren filed his petition more than 17 years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on December 12, 2007. See Barren v. State, Docket No. 46247 (Order of Affirmance, Sep. 25, 2007). Thus, Barren's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Moreover, Barren's petition was successive because he had previously filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was decided on the merits, and it constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different from those raised in his previous petition.  ¹ See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(3). Barren's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice. See NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(4).

Barren did not allege good cause to overcome the procedural bars.² Thus, Barren's petition was procedurally barred. See Chappell v. State, 137 Nev. 780, 787, 501 P.3d 935, 949 (2021) (stating “a petitioner's explanation of good cause and prejudice for each procedurally barred claim must be made on the face of the petition”). In addition, Barren's claims regarding a prior parole revocation hearing were outside the scope of a postconviction habeas petition, which is limited to challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction or sentence or the computation of time served pursuant to a judgment of conviction. See NRS 34.720; NRS 34.724(1); see also McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 247, 212 P.3d 307, 310 (2009) (recognizing that “a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus is limited in scope”). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by denying the petition.³ See State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074 (2005) (“Application of the statutory procedural default rules to post-conviction habeas petitions is mandatory.”). Accordingly,⁴ we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   See Barren v. State, No. 52076, 2009 WL 3190969 (Nev. Sep. 3, 2009) (Order of Affirmance).

2.   We also note that Barren's petition did not substantially comply with the statutory form for a postconviction habeas petition. See NRS 34.735.

3.   The district court construed Barren's petition as a time-computation petition. However, Barren did not challenge the computation of time served pursuant to his judgment of conviction, his petition did not substantially comply with the statutory form for a time-computation petition, and he did not allege that he had exhausted his administrative remedies as would be required in such a petition. See NRS 34.724(2)(c); NRS 34.810(2); NRS 34.733. After review, we conclude the district court erred by construing the petition as a time-computation petition. Nonetheless, for the reasons stated herein, we conclude the district court properly declined to grant relief. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev. 294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason).

4.   To the extent Barren raises arguments not specifically addressed herein, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given our disposition.