PAUL MCCREARY v. NEVADA PAROLE BOARD (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Paul McCreary appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on August 26, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Bita Yeager, Judge.

In his petition, McCreary challenged the revocation of his parole and the decision not to reinstate him on parole. McCreary argued the revocation of his parole violated his due process and equal protection rights and violated the double jeopardy clause. It appears McCreary premised these claims on an allegation that the district court ultimately dismissed the charge that led to his revocation.

The district court found McCreary's claims fell outside the scope of a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We agree. Postconviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are limited to challenges to the judgment of conviction or sentence or to “the computation of time that the petitioner has served pursuant to a judgment of conviction.” See NRS 34.720. And the supreme court has allowed challenges to the revocation of parole in postconviction habeas petitions where the challenge relates to the deprivation of credits based on an untimely parole revocation hearing. See generally In re Smith, 138 Nev. 133, 506 P.3d 325 (2022); see also Howard v. State, No. 87843, 2026 WL 318309 (Nev. Feb. 5, 2026) (Order of Reversal and Remand). McCreary's postconviction habeas petition does not challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence, nor does it challenge the computation of time served. Further, he does not allege he was deprived of credits based on an untimely parole revocation hearing. Therefore, his claims were outside the scope of a postconviction habeas petition, and we conclude the district court did not err by denying the petition.

To the extent McCreary's petition could be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to NRS 34.360  ¹ based on his allegations that his constitutional rights were violated, see Hornback v. Warden, 97 Nev. 98, 100, 625 P.2d 83, 84 (1981) (considering a parole revocation challenge raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus), we conclude no relief is warranted. As to McCreary's argument that his due process rights were violated by the revocation proceedings, none of his claims implicate the due process protections for parole revocations. See Anaya v. State, 96 Nev. 119, 122, 606 P.2d 156, 157 (1980) (stating that “[p]arole and probation revocations are not criminal prosecutions; the full panoply of constitutional protections afforded a criminal defendant does not apply”); see also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-89 (1972) (setting forth the limited due process rights required for parole revocation proceedings). As to McCreary's equal protection and double jeopardy claims, he does not allege with specific facts how those rights were violated. See Vickers v. Dzurenda, 134 Nev. 747, 748, 433 P.3d 306, 308 (2018) (“At the heart of the Equal Protection Clauses is the idea that all people similarly situated are entitled to equal protection of the law.”); see Moor v. Palmer, 603 F.3d 658, 660 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Parole revocation is not a criminal penalty for violating the terms of parole,” but rather “is simply a continuation of the punishment for the original crime.”). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.  ²

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   NRS 34.360 states “[e]very person unlawfully committed, detained, confined or restrained of his or her liberty, under any pretense whatever, may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such imprisonment or restraint.”

2.   For the above reasons, we conclude the district court did not err by declining to appoint counsel.