MATTHEW WASHINGTON v. WILLIAM REUBART WARDEN AND THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Matthew Washington appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on September 29, 2022. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Hon. Carli Lynn Kierny, Judge.

Washington filed his petition more than five years after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on December 19, 2016. See Washington v. State, 132 Nev. 655, 376 P.3d 802 (2016). Thus, Washington's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Moreover, Washington's petition was successive because he had previously filed two postconviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, one of which was decided on the merits, and it constituted an abuse of the writ as he raised claims new and different from those raised in his previous petitions.¹ See NRS 34.810(1)(b)(2); NRS 34.810(3).² Washington's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause and actual prejudice, see NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b); NRS 34.810(4), or a showing he is actually innocent such that “the failure to consider the petition on its merits would amount to a fundamental miscarriage of justice,” Berry v. State, 131 Nev. 957, 966, 363 P.3d 1148, 1154 (2015).

First, Washington argues the district court erred by denying his claim that he could overcome the procedural bars because the State withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).³ A valid Brady claim can constitute good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars. See State v. Bennett, 119 Nev. 589, 599, 81 P.3d 1, 8 (2003). Generally, demonstrating that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady parallels the good cause showing required to overcome procedural bars, and establishing that the evidence was material under Brady can demonstrate prejudice. Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev. 48, 67, 993 P.2d 25, 37 (2000). To demonstrate prejudice for a Brady violation in a case where the petitioner does not allege or demonstrate he specifically requested the evidence, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Bennett, 119 Nev. at 600, 81 P.3d at 8.

In his petition, Washington argued that the State withheld his cellphone from him and that it contained material and exculpatory evidence. When Washington was arrested, his cellphone was seized by the police. Washington contended the seizure showed that the State withheld his cellphone from him. Washington claimed the text messages on his cellphone from a woman demonstrated he was distracted shortly before the crimes were committed and he did not know the crimes were going to be committed. He also argued the lack of text messages between him and his codefendant Martell Moten demonstrated Washington did not know Moten well and they did not form a plan to commit the crimes together.

We conclude Washington failed to demonstrate the cellphone was withheld. While the cellphone was in the custody of the State, Washington knew the cellphone was with the State as it was seized from him and listed in the discovery provided to trial counsel. Washington failed to allege he requested the cellphone as part of discovery and the State refused to hand over the cellphone or denied knowledge of it. Finally, Washington was the recipient of the text messages at issue. Thus, he knew or should have known the content of the text messages and knew that the State had the evidence. Cf. State v. Huebler, 128 Nev. 192, 197, 275 P.3d 91, 95 (2012) (recognizing that a Brady claim must be raised within a reasonable time after the evidence was disclosed or discovered by the defense).

We further conclude Washington failed to demonstrate the contents of the cellphone were material or exculpatory. Specifically, the text messages between Washington and the woman occurred prior to the instant crimes and regarded unrelated matters. These text messages did not tend to show that Washington did not have, or could not have had, knowledge that the crimes were going to be committed. Further, the lack of text messages between Washington and Moten did not demonstrate Washington lacked knowledge of, or did not participate in, the crimes. We note both Washington and Moten testified at the evidentiary hearing that they spent at least an hour together shortly before the crimes were committed, and therefore the lack of communication via text messages was not exculpatory or material. Because Washington failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial had the allegedly withheld evidence been presented at trial, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this good cause claim.

Second, Washington argues the district court erred by denying his claim that he could overcome the procedural bars because he demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice as he is actually innocent. With his petition, Washington provided an affidavit from Moten stating that Washington had no knowledge of the shooting, was only there to provide Moten with a ride home, and had no idea Moten was using him as a getaway driver. Washington also alleged he is actually innocent based on the allegedly withheld cellphone discussed above.

To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice sufficient to overcome the procedural bars, “a petitioner must make a colorable showing of actual innocence—factual innocence, not legal innocence.” Brown v. McDaniel, 130 Nev. 565, 576, 331 P.3d 867, 875 (2014). “This means that the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of ․ new evidence.” Berry, 131 Nev. at 966, 363 P.3d at 1154 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 537 (2006) (“[A] gateway claim requires new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” (quotation marks omitted)).

The district court held an evidentiary hearing where Washington and Moten testified. The district court found that Moten was not credible given the different versions of events he provided in his voluntary statement to the police, to Washington's investigator, in his two affidavits offered during the postconviction habeas proceedings, and at the evidentiary hearing. Further, the district court found that Moten's and Washington's versions of the getaway from the crime scene were materially different. Thus, given the lack of credibility regarding Moten's testimony, the district court found Washington failed to demonstrate he is actually innocent.

We give deference to the district court's credibility determinations, and conclude the record supports those determinations. See State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. 1170, 1177, 147 P.3d 233, 238 (2006) (“We emphasize that the district court is in the best position to adjudge the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence, and unless this court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, this court will not second-guess the trier of fact.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, as stated previously, the cellphone evidence did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial; thus, Washington necessarily failed to demonstrate that no reasonable juror would have convicted him had the evidence been presented at trial. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Washington's claim that he demonstrated a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural bars. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying the petition as procedurally barred, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Washington v. State, No. 79834-COA, 2020 WL 3497674 (Nev. Ct. App. June 26, 2020) (Order of Affirmance); Washington v. State, No. 75777-COA, 2019 WL 1245600 (Nev. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2019) (Order of Affirmance).

2.   The subsections within NRS 34.810 were recently renumbered. We note the substance of the subsections cited herein was not altered. See 2023 Nev. Stat., ch. 249 § 19, at 1631.

3.   While the district court's order lacks specific findings regarding this claim, we nevertheless conclude that the district court's order and the record on appeal are sufficient for this court to consider this claim on appeal.