WILLIAM EDWARD HAWS III v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

William Edward Haws, III, appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of lure or attempt to lure a child with the use of computer technology to engage in sexual conduct and possession of visual pornography of a person under the age of 16, first offense. Second Judicial District Court; Egan K. Walker, Chief Judge.

Haws argues the district court abused its discretion at sentencing by considering the psychosexual evaluation for more than just probation eligibility. The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998).

The aggregate sentence imposed of 48 to 180 months in prison is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. See NRS 200.730(2)(a); NRS 201.560(4)(a). And Haws does not allege that the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. Instead, Haws argues the district court erred by considering the psychosexual evaluation and the risk assessment contained therein when it imposed sentence. Haws contends the district court's consideration of a psychosexual evaluation is limited to determining whether a defendant is eligible for probation. Haws fails to cite statutes or caselaw to support his contention that the district court's consideration of a psychosexual evaluation is so limited. See Maresca v. State, 103 Nev. 669, 673, 748 P.2d 3, 6 (1987) (“It is appellant's responsibility to present relevant authority and cogent argument.”). Further, the district court is allowed to consider any reliable and relevant evidence at sentencing, see NRS 176.015(6), and Haws does not allege the psychosexual evaluation was unreliable or irrelevant. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Haws, and we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.