AARON SLEDGE v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2023)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Aaron L. Sledge appeals from an order of the district court denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on May 31, 2019, and later-filed supplements. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Lynne K. Simons, Chief Judge.

Sledge argues the district court erred by denying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

Sledge was convicted of home invasion for forcibly entering the apartment where his girlfriend resided. In his petition, Sledge claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether he had permission from the leaseholder to enter the apartment. Sledge contended that the leaseholder had in fact granted him permission to enter the apartment.

The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which Sledge and counsel testified. In particular, counsel testified that Sledge never stated he had permission to enter the apartment and that Sledge never offered any evidence to suggest he had permission to enter the apartment. Rather, Sledge maintained he was not present at the scene of the crime and that someone else had entered the apartment. Counsel further testified that (1) Sledge stated jail calls between him and the victim would support his claim of actual innocence; (2) counsel obtained these jail calls; and (3) in one of the jail calls, the victim stated that someone other than Sledge had entered the apartment.

The district court implicitly found counsel's testimony to be credible, and this court will not “evaluate the credibility of witnesses because that is the responsibility of the trier of fact.” Mitchell v. State, 124 Nev. 807, 816, 192 P.3d 721, 727 (2008). Sledge did not provide counsel with any information to suggest that Sledge had permission to enter the apartment. Rather, Sledge maintained he was not present at the scene of the crime and provided counsel with information to support an actual-innocence defense. In light of these circumstances, Sledge failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient for failing to investigate whether he had permission to be there or that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial but for counsel's alleged deficiency. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691 (recognizing “the need for further investigation may be considerably diminished or eliminated altogether” when a defendant provides counsel with information to “support a certain potential line of defense”). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Gibbons, C.J.

Bulla, J.

Westbrook, J.