BAHAM v. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING LLC CWALT 2005 2005 (2022)

AMENDED ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 2

Baham filed two complaints seeking injunctive relief against respondents to prevent them from foreclosing on his home. The district court consolidated the actions and ultimately granted respondents’ motion to dismiss Baham's complaints on multiple grounds, including that they were barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion and that Baham's request for injunctive relief was moot in light of the fact that respondents had already completed their foreclosure sale. The district court also denied Baham's request for leave to amend, concluding amendment would be futile. Baham then filed a motion for reconsideration, followed by a notice of appeal from the dismissal order. While this appeal was pending, the district court summarily denied the motion for reconsideration.

With respect to the substance of the district court's order of dismissal, we note that Baham wholly fails in his informal brief to address the aforementioned legal grounds relied upon by the district court; instead, he sets forth various reasons why he believes respondents lacked authority to foreclose. In light of Baham's failure to set forth any argument whatsoever concerning the specific grounds relied upon by the district court, he fails to demonstrate that the court erred in dismissing the case. See Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 156, 161 n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) (providing that issues not raised on appeal are deemed waived); Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that the appellate courts need not consider claims unsupported by cogent argument); see also AED, Inc. v. KDC Invs., LLC, 307 P.3d 176, 181 (Idaho 2013) (providing that when a district court sets forth multiple grounds for its decision, the appellant must successfully challenge all of them in order to prevail).

To the extent Baham contends reversal is warranted because the district court should have granted his motion for reconsideration, we disagree. The only argument Baham provides on this point—aside from the general arguments concerning respondents’ authority to foreclose referenced and rejected above—is that the district court supposedly violated his due-process rights by failing to hold a hearing on the motion for reconsideration or include specific findings of fact and conclusions of law in the order denying it. But these are not requirements a district court must follow when ruling on such a motion. See NRCP 52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state findings or conclusions when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 or 56 or, unless these rules provide otherwise, on any other motion.”); EDCR 2.23(c)-(d) (providing that a court may rule on a motion without hearing oral argument, and if it chooses to do so, it must remove the motion from the calendar and enter a minute order reflecting the same). And Baham's due-process rights were not violated, as he was able to submit his motion to the district court, and he received notice of both respondents’ grounds for opposing it and the district court's ultimate decision on the matter.³ See Wilson v. Pahrump Fair Water, LLC, 137 Nev., Adv. Op. 2, 481 P.3d 853, 859 (2021) (providing that procedural due process is satisfied when parties receive notice and an opportunity to be heard). Consequently, we reject Baham's arguments on this point, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

3.   Additionally, we note that Baham fails to articulate any cogent challenge to the arguments respondents presented in their opposition below, upon which the district court presumably relied. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38.