IN RE: the ESTATE OF Sun Myung MOON (2021)

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART AND DISMISSING IN PART

Respondents Richard J. Bach and Daniel M. Davies commenced the underlying proceedings in 2018 and were appointed as co-special administrators (CSAs) of the estate of Sun Myung Moon, primarily to address potential tax issues on the estate's behalf. Steinbronn, an attorney licensed in New York and Virginia who formerly advised the estate and Moon's surviving spouse on various tax matters, was ultimately terminated as counsel for both, but nevertheless proceeded to file a federal tax return on behalf of the estate in 2019, believing he was an executor with a duty to do so under 26 U.S.C. § 2203. He then filed a request for special notice as an interested party in the underlying matter and a petition to suspend and potentially revoke the CSAs’ powers for, among other things, failure to comply with various statutory duties. Steinbronn also filed a petition seeking more than $10,000 from the estate for expenses in connection with the 2019 tax return.

The district court ultimately entered an order denying Steinbronn's requests and striking all of his filings, concluding he was not an interested person in the estate as defined in NHS 132.185 and that he therefore had no standing to appear in the matter. The district court further concluded that Steinbronn was not an executor as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 2203 and that he had no authority to file the federal tax return or act on behalf of the estate in any tax matters. Accordingly, the district court ordered Steinbronn not to interfere with the estate's administration and to refrain from acting on behalf of the estate with respect to any tax matters, and it concluded that he was not entitled to any notice of the proceedings and removed him from the service list for the case. This appeal followed.

After the supreme court transferred the appeal to this court, we granted Steven Jares's request to be added as a respondent in light of Davies's resignation as co-special administrator and Jares's appointment to the position.¹ Jares subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, which we deferred ruling on until the time of final disposition after full briefing. Considering all of the parties’ arguments, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to review the district court's order to the extent it denied Steinbronn's request for over $10,000 in expenses related to the 2019 tax return, and we affirm that portion of the order. However, because Steinbronn fails to show that he was aggrieved by the remainder of the district court's order, he lacks standing to challenge those determinations, and we dismiss the appeal to the extent he makes such challenges.

With respect to the district court's denial of Steinbronn's request for expenses, we have jurisdiction to review that portion of the order, as it constitutes an appealable order “[m]aking a[ ] decision wherein the amount in controversy equals or exceeds, exclusive of costs, $10,000” in an estate matter. NRS 155.190(1)(n). We therefore consider that ruling on its merits. In so doing, we review the district court's factual determinations for an abuse of discretion and its legal conclusions—including its interpretation of statutes—de novo. In re Guardianship of B.A.A.R., 136 Nev. 494, 496, 474 P.3d 838, 841 (Ct. App. 2020).

The district court denied Steinbronn's request for expenses because it concluded that he lacked authority to act on behalf of the estate in tax matters. On appeal, Steinbronn concedes that the CSAs terminated his representation of the estate in connection with tax matters prior to his filing of the federal tax return, but he argues that federal tax law provided him an alternative source of authority. 26 U.S.C. § 2203 defines “executor” as that term is used in connection with the estate tax as “the executor or administrator of the decedent, or, if there is no executor or administrator appointed, qualified, and acting within the United States, then any person in actual or constructive possession of any property of the decedent,” (Emphasis added.) Steinbronn reasons that, in light of the CSAs’ alleged failure to comply with various statutory duties under Title 12 of the Nevada Revised Statutes, they were not “acting” as required for recognition as administrators under 26 U.S.C. § 2203, and since Steinbronn possesses legal files owned by the estate, he qualified as an executor. We disagree.

Steinbronn fails to cite any authority in support of the notion that an administrator's failure to strictly comply with state statutes governing the administration of estates amounts to a complete failure to act under 26 U.S.C. § 2203. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (declining to consider arguments unsupported by relevant legal authority). And Steinbronn concedes that the CSAs were involved in negotiations with the IRS on behalf of the estate as part of an ongoing voluntary disclosure process, which they initiated and participated in by virtue of the authority granted to them as special administrators. We therefore conclude that the CSAs were acting as administrators under 26 U.S.C. § 2203, which precludes recognition of Steinbronn as an executor as that term is defined therein. Thus, Steinbronn has failed to show that the district court erred or abused its discretion in concluding that he was not authorized to act on behalf of the estate and is therefore not entitled to compensation from the estate in connection with the 2019 tax return.

Turning to the remainder of the district court's order, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Steinbronn is not an “interested person” as defined in NRS 132.185, and he is therefore not aggrieved by any of the district court's remaining determinations. See Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 446, 874 P.2d 729, 734 (1994) (“A party is ‘aggrieved’ within the meaning of NRAP 3A(a) when either a personal right or right of property is adversely and substantially affected by a district court's ruling.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). A person is “interested” in an estate matter only if his “right or interest under [the] estate ․ may be materially affected by a decision of a fiduciary or a decision of the court,” and “[t]he fiduciary or court shall determine who is an interested person according to the particular purposes of, and matter involved in, a proceeding.” NRS 132.185. Although Steinbronn claims to be interested because he possesses legal files belonging to the estate, he concedes that the estate owns the files, not him, and he has failed to show that he has any legal interest in the files sufficient to render him a party interested in the estate.² As an uninterested party, Steinbronn fails to demonstrate how the remainder of the district court's order in any way impacts any of his personal or property rights, and as a non-aggrieved party, he lacks standing to challenge those determinations. See Valley Bank of Nev., 110 Nev. at 446, 874 P.2d at 734 (providing that the appellate courts have jurisdiction to entertain an appeal only insofar as the appellant is aggrieved).

Accordingly, we affirm the district court's order to the extent it denied Steinbronn's request for over $10,000 in expenses related to the 2019 tax return, and we dismiss the appeal insofar as it challenges the remainder of the order.

It is so ORDERED.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Davies has not filed an answering brief or otherwise appeared in this appeal.

2.   Steinbronn claims that, although he does not have an ownership interest in the files themselves, he nevertheless has a right to copies of the files and copying costs should the estate demand the originals. But Steinbronn fails to cite any authority demonstrating that a contingent right to copies of legal files and copying costs amounts to an interest in the estate itself. See Edwards, 122 Nev. at 330 n.38, 130 P.3d at 1288 n.38; see also NRS 132.390(1)(b)(2) (providing that a person is interested in an estate if he “[h]as a property right in or claim against the estate of a decedent”). Additionally, we note that the district court's “Order Granting Petition for First and Final Accounting and Order of Final Discharge”—of which we took judicial notice on October 1, 2021, and which closed the underlying matter—confirmed that the CSAs were not taking any action on behalf of the estate with respect to the legal files in Steinbronn's possession.

3.   Insofar as the parties raise arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given the disposition of this appeal.