ABOURAMADAN v. CHATEAU NIGHTCLUB LLC LLC (2021)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Abouramadan was forcibly removed from the premises of respondent Chateau Nightclub, LLC, by its security personnel, and later brought several tort claims against it and respondent Chateau Management, LLC (collectively referred to as Chateau), in connection with the incident.¹ The matter eventually proceeded to trial, and the jury found in favor of Chateau. The district court then entered judgment on the jury verdict. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Abouramadan seeks reversal by raising numerous issues concerning the underlying trial. For example, Abouramadan argues that a juror should have been stricken, that certain evidence and testimony was improperly admitted or excluded, that a witness presented false testimony, that he was not permitted to cross-examine a witness, that Chateau's counsel engaged in misconduct, that the jury used the incorrect verdict form, and that the jury reached an inconsistent verdict. We are unable to fully evaluate Abouramadan's arguments, however, because they concern what transpired at the trial in this matter, and Abouramadan did not provide this court with a copy of the trial transcript.² As a result, we presume that the missing transcript supported the challenged decisions, including the entry of judgment on the jury verdict.³ See Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll Sys. Of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603,172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (noting that it is appellant's burden to ensure that a proper appellate record is prepared and that, if the appellant fails to do so, “we necessarily presume that the missing [documents] support[ ] the district court's decision”). Consequently, Abouramadan has not established a basis for relief, and we therefore

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.⁴

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record demonstrates that, although Spendthrift Holdings, LLC, and Metta World Peace, f/k/a Ron Artest, were named as defendants in Abouramadan's complaint, they did not appear below, and, therefore, are not proper parties to this appeal. See Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440, 448, 874 P.2d 729, 735 (1994) (explaining that a person who does not appear below is not a party to that action). As a result, the clerk of the court shall amend the caption for this case to conform to the caption on this order.

2.   While Abouramadan filed a transcript request form, he never provided us with the transcripts he sought, requested that the court reporter be compelled to prepare them, or otherwise acted to ensure this court received a copy of the transcript. See NRAP 9(b)(1)(B) (requiring pro se litigants who request transcripts and have not been granted in forma pauperis status to file a copy of their completed transcript with the clerk of court).

3.   Although Abouramadan also asserts that the district court improperly denied his request for sanctions against Chateau based on its purported failure to preserve certain video surveillance footage, it is unclear from the record on appeal whether the sanctions request was resolved before or during the trial. But as with the other issues raised by Abouramadan that are discussed above, we cannot fully evaluate his argument concerning his sanctions request because he did not provide this court with a transcript from the relevant proceeding, see id., and there is nothing in the record to suggest that this request was resolved in the manner that Abouramadan contends.

4.   To the extent Abouramadan challenges the district court's post-judgment orders awarding Chateau attorney fees and costs, those challenges are not properly before us. An order granting attorney fees and costs is independently appealable as a special order after final judgment, see NRAP 3A(b)(8) (providing for appeals from special orders entered after a final judgment); Smith v. Crown Fin. Servs., 111 Nev. 277, 280 n.2, 890 P.2d 769, 771 n.2 (1995), and Abouramadan did not file notices of appeal from the orders awarding Chateau attorney fees and costs.Insofar as Abouramadan raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered them and conclude that they either do not present a basis for relief or need not be reached given our disposition of this appeal.