FASTHORSE v. STATE (2021)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Fasthorse filed his petition more than one year after issuance of the remittitur on direct appeal on May 8, 2018. See Fasthorse v. State, Docket No. 72306-COA (Order of Affirmance, April 11, 2018). Thus, Fasthorse's petition was untimely filed. See NRS 34.726(1). Fasthorse's petition was procedurally barred absent a demonstration of good cause—cause for the delay and undue prejudice. See id.

To the extent Fasthorse alleged he had good cause because the courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction and his actions constituted civil rather than criminal offenses, Fasthorse was not entitled to relief. Fasthorse's claim did not implicate the jurisdiction of the courts. See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6(1); NRS 171.010; Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev. 175, 183, 251 P.3d 163, 168 (2011) (“Subject matter jurisdiction is the court's authority to render a judgment in a particular category of case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Fasthorse's claims were always available to be raised. Because Fasthorse failed to state why he was unable to raise these claims in a timely filed postconviction petition, they did not constitute good cause to excuse the procedural bars. See Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 253, 71 P.3d 503, 506 (2003) (“[A] claim or allegation that was reasonably available to the petitioner during the statutory time period would not constitute good cause to excuse the delay.”). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying Fasthorse's petition as procedurally barred, and we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.