BRYCE WOLFE v. TAYLOR MANNION (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Bryce Wolfe appeals from a district court order denying competing motions for primary physical custody, one of which was for purposes of relocation; maintaining joint physical custody in both California and Nevada; and awarding him transportation costs. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, Clark County; Denise L. Gentile, Judge.

Bryce and respondent Taylor Mannion, n/k/a Taylor Clayton, share one minor child, E.W., who was born in March 2022. E.W. is nearly blind and has a growth-hormone deficiency and several developmental delays. In August 2022, Taylor sought joint legal custody and primary physical custody of E.W. Meanwhile, Bryce also sought joint legal and joint physical custody.

In February 2023, the parties mediated and agreed to share joint legal and physical custody of E.W. In April 2023, the district court adopted that agreement through a custody decree. Under that decree, E.W. would reside with her parents on a repeating two-week schedule where each parent had parenting time with E.W. every two or three days (i.e., a 2-2-3 schedule).

Thereafter, Taylor became engaged to a military servicemember who was being transferred to a base near San Diego, California. That prompted Taylor, in February 2024, to ask the district court to award her primary physical custody and child support and grant her permission to relocate with E.W. to California. In her motion, Taylor asserted that maintaining joint physical custody would not be ideal because of E.W.’s medical issues and regular physician and therapist appointments. Bryce opposed Taylor's motion and filed a countermotion seeking primary physical custody and child support. While those motions were pending, Taylor got married.

To resolve the parents’ motions, the district court held an evidentiary hearing in January 2025. Both Taylor and Bryce testified. Despite moving for primary physical custody, Taylor testified that she would be open to continuing to share joint physical custody and suggested that each parent have two weeks on and two weeks off with E.W. She explained that E.W.’s conditions required her to see a neurologist as needed; an ophthalmologist once a year; an endocrinologist quarterly; a pediatrician for well-child visits and sick visits; and to have speech, physical, and occupational therapy twice a week. Taylor, who was a respiratory therapist, recounted finding those specialists and setting up most of those therapies. She estimated that she had attended 90 percent of the therapy sessions whereas Bryce had attended only 60 percent.

Notwithstanding E.W.’s medical needs, Taylor testified that she was not worried about E.W.’s continuity of care if E.W. had, for example, one physical therapist in California and one in Nevada so long as E.W. had insurance in both states. Taylor explained that she was not worried because E.W. had been covered by military insurance since she got married and she would ensure E.W. had all of the therapists and specialists E.W. needed in California just like she did in Nevada.

Taylor testified regarding the benefits of relocating, including that there would be a special-education program in California that would provide E.W. with a teacher for the visually impaired and all of the therapies she would need; Byrce's poor communication skills, including his failure to tell her about an out-of-state trip with E.W. and two medical appointments for E.W.; and his occasional tardiness to custody exchanges. Taylor further testified that Nevada had a preschool program for blind children, but she indicated she did not enroll E.W. in that preschool partly because of her pending relocation motion. And while Taylor could not recall how many therapy appointments E.W. had attended in the past three months as they were on vacation traveling, she indicated E.W. had nonetheless received the necessary therapies as Taylor had performed those therapies herself during that time.

During his testimony, Bryce asserted that—contrary to Taylor's contentions—he had attended about 80 percent of E.W.’s therapy sessions and all of her medical appointments. Additionally, he disputed Taylor's accusations regarding his communication skills and tardiness, explaining that any communication issues occurred a year earlier and had since been resolved. He added that Taylor had similarly been late and had once failed to tell him about one of E.W.’s doctor's appointments and her own out-of-state trip with E.W.

Bryce testified regarding his and Taylor's romantic relationships. Bryce explained that Taylor's history of brief relationships, including where she moved in with new significant others, concerned him because new homes or environments were difficult for E.W. to navigate. He noted that her therapists had stressed the importance of providing stability for E.W. and that even rearranging furniture in the home could confuse and unsettle her. Relatedly, Bryce thought that the preschool for the blind in Nevada could help address E.W.’s conditions.

Next, Bryce testified that it would be in E.W.’s best interest to remain in Nevada because all of her extended family lived in Nevada, all of her medical providers were in Nevada (except for one provider in Utah), and her life up to that point had revolved around Nevada. With regard to Taylor's suggestion that the parties maintain joint physical custody after she relocated to California, Bryce acknowledged it would be feasible to do so until E.W. became of school age. However, he opined that such an arrangement would not be in E.W.’s best interest and that her therapist had advised against it. Bryce further added that, if the court awarded joint physical custody, he did not see a need for child support.¹

As to parenting time, Bryce believed that neither a two-week-on, two-week-off nor a three-week-on, one-week-off schedule would be in E.W.’s best interest. He asserted that requiring E.W. to frequently travel back and forth to California, which would result in her spending eight to ten hours in a car, would be problematic. He noted that when he took E.W. out of state, the drive was hard on her and he had to stop the car and calm her down. Bryce added that the preschool for blind toddlers would not enroll E.W. under a two-two schedule and that a three-one schedule would not work because it would prevent E.W. from consistently seeing the same therapists. He feared that E.W. would make progress in the three weeks E.W. was with him but would regress in the one week she was with Taylor.

Bryce, however, had difficulty suggesting a parenting-time schedule that would work. Indeed, at one point, he told the court “it would be up to what you decide” because he “do[es]n't set custody ․ for a living.” Eventually, Bryce suggested that Taylor's parenting time include approximately six weeks during the summer, a week around Christmas, every other spring break, and some weekends, possibly every other month.

In March 2025, the district court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In it, the court denied both parents’ motions for primary physical custody and effectively denied Taylor's motion to relocate. As to relocation, the court found that Taylor proved that there was a sensible, good-faith reason for the move and the move was not intended to deprive Bryce of his time with E.W. See NRS 125C.007(1)(a). However, the court found that Taylor failed to show that relocation was in E.W.’s best interests or that there was an actual advantage to relocation. See NRS 125C.007(1)(b)-(c).

With regard to custody, the district court found that Taylor's marriage and relocation from Nevada to California constituted a substantial change in circumstances under Hayes v. Gallacher, 115 Nev. 1, 972 P.2d 1138 (1999). But the court found that all of the NRS 125C.0035(4) best-interest factors were either neutral or inapplicable, including the factor regarding E.W.’s physical, developmental, and emotional needs. See NRS 125C.0035(4)(g).

In reaching that conclusion, the district court acknowledged that both parents were involved in obtaining E.W.’s medical care and both attended her doctor appointments and therapy sessions. The court further found that all but one of E.W.’s physicians were located in Nevada. However, the court noted Taylor's testimony that she was not worried about continuity of care when E.W. was with her in California or with Bryce in Nevada so long as insurance covered E.W. in each state. Importantly, the court emphasized that both parents’ testimony indicated that they would ensure E.W. was provided with what she needed while in their care. In this regard, the court noted Taylor's testimony that the special-education program in California would provide E.W. with a teacher for the visually impaired and all of the therapies she would need. Ultimately, the district court found that “[n]either party presented any evidence that the other [wa]s not fully capable of providing for the physical, developmental, or emotional needs of the child” and that “each parent [wa]s fully committed to the care of [E.W.]”

Because the district court found all of the best-interest factors inapplicable or neutral, the court found that neither parent established that they should have primary physical custody of E.W. The court explained that both parents demonstrated they could care for E.W., including her special needs, at least 146 days per year, see NRS 125C.003(1)(a), and had resources available to address E.W.’s special needs for extended periods of time through the preschool for blind toddlers in Nevada and the special-education program with specialists in California. Further, the district court found that each parent could ensure E.W. received weekly therapies and could be involved in her quarterly and annual medical appointments. The court explained that, based on the evidence before it, it was not persuaded that E.W. had to have her weekly therapies, schooling, or consistent surroundings.

The district court found that, so long as E.W. “is with either parent, ensuring she receives the necessary attention to address her needs,” and her therapies are not interrupted on a regular basis, she would adjust to having one home in Nevada and one in California, just as she adjusted to having two homes in Nevada. While the court recognized that it was “not optimal that” the parents would not reside in the same state, it nevertheless found that the parents could continue to share custody, which would benefit E.W. and be in her best interest. The court explained that Taylor lived in “close proximity,” so she could still participate in E.W.’s medical appointments in Nevada, and that Taylor had good reason to visit Nevada when her, her new husband's, and Bryce's family all lived there. Further, the court explained that E.W. was not yet in a school program that required her to remain in one location for an extended period of time, so the parents could operate outside of the typical school schedule. Finally, the court noted that Taylor had suggested a two-week-on, two-week-off parenting-time schedule, while Bryce had objected out of concern that frequent travel would be disruptive and difficult for E.W. to understand or endure. To address Bryce's concern about frequent travel, the court ordered the parents to have a one-month-on, one-month-off parenting-time schedule.

As for child support, the district court determined that, in light of the parties’ “similar” incomes, it would not modify the existing base child support obligation, which was set at $0. Nevertheless, citing NAC 425.150(1)(e) (2020) (amended effective July 2025), the court adjusted that baseline amount, ordering Taylor to pay Bryce $100 per month in transportation costs because it was her choice to relocate that caused Bryce to have to arrange for E.W. to travel between California and Nevada every month.

Bryce subsequently sought reconsideration of the district court's custody and parenting-time decisions, but did not separately challenge the court's $100 transportation-related child support award. The court denied that request. This appeal followed.

The district court did not violate Bryce's due process rights

Bryce contends that the district court violated his right to due process by awarding “an unpled long-distance joint physical custody schedule, without timely notice” when Taylor raised that possibility for the first time at the evidentiary hearing.² Taylor responds that Bryce was on notice that an award of joint physical custody was possible when he moved to modify custody because the court would have to resolve his request according to E.W.’s best interest. Further, Taylor argues that Bryce “fully litigated” relocation and custody, as evidenced by the fact “[h]e was represented by counsel, presented evidence, cross-examined witnesses, and proposed alternative parenting schedules in the event relocation were granted.”

We review whether a party's due-process rights were violated de novo. Eureka County v. Seventh Jud. Dist. Ct., 134 Nev. 275, 279, 417 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2018). “Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Martinez v. Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d 863, 868 (2024) (citation modified). “A party's due process rights may be violated if the parties are not provided notice that the court will be considering a specific issue ․” Id.

Here, Nevada's custody statutes put Bryce on notice that joint physical custody could have been awarded in response to his and Taylor's competing motions for primary physical custody. When physical custody is at issue, the district court's “sole consideration ․ is the best interest of the child.” NRS 125C.0035(1). And district courts may award joint or primary physical custody to parents so long as the custody award serves that best interest. See, e.g., NRS 125C.0035(1); NRS 125C.003(1).

Contrary to Bryce's claim, Nevada therefore “allows a district court to modify its custody order consistent with a child's best interest upon the application of one of the parties and does not limit courts to a particular remedy.” Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Martinez, the supreme court determined that a mother's due process rights to notice and an opportunity to respond were not violated when the district court awarded the father more parenting time after she moved to limit his parenting time. Id. at 867-69. The supreme court explained that the mother “put the specific issue of [parenting time] before the district court” and that “[a]warding increased [parenting time] after a hearing regarding custody and [parenting time] [wa]s squarely within the scope of parental outcomes.” Id. at 868. Likewise, here, the issues of custody and parenting time were squarely before the district court on the parties’ competing motions for primary physical custody and thus Bryce had notice that both joint and primary physical custody were possible outcomes of the evidentiary hearing.

Further, Bryce had an opportunity to be heard on that issue at the hearing. Taylor testified that she was looking for a long-distance, joint physical custody arrangement where each parent had E.W. for two weeks. In response, Bryce testified that such an arrangement would be possible until E.W. was school age, and he explained why he believed it would not be in her best interest. He also offered testimony on possible parenting-time arrangements and told the court “it would be up to what you decide” because he “do[es]n't set custody ․ for a living.” The fact that the district court ultimately disagreed with Bryce and found an award of joint physical custody was in E.W.’s best interest does not change the fact that Bryce had an opportunity to be heard on this issue. Where Bryce had both notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter of custody, we conclude that his due process argument is without merit.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by maintaining joint physical custody or by modifying the parenting-time schedule

Bryce challenges the district court's decision to maintain joint physical custody and modify the parenting-time schedule because he contends there was no substantial change in circumstances and E.W.’s best interest was not served by the modification. Taylor responds that a parent's relocation may constitute a substantial change in circumstances under Hayes and that substantial evidence supported the court's finding that maintaining joint physical custody was in E.W.’s best interest.

“[W]e will not disturb the district court's custody determinations absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 241 (2007). “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence or is clearly erroneous.” Bautista v. Picone, 134 Nev. 334, 336, 419 P.3d 157, 159 (2018). Substantial evidence “is evidence that a reasonable person may accept as adequate to sustain a judgment.” Ellis, 123 Nev. at 149, 161 P.3d at 242. This court does not reweigh evidence or witness credibility. Id. at 152, 161 P.3d at 244; Roe v. Roe, 139 Nev. 163, 171, 535 P.3d 274, 285 (Ct. App. 2023). “[A] court may modify a joint ․ physical custody arrangement only when (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child,[³ ] and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification.” Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. 1, 5, 501 P.3d 980, 983 (2022) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Killebrew v. State ex rel. Donohue, 139 Nev. 401, 403-05, 535 P.3d 1167, 1170-71 (2023).

Substantial change in circumstances

Bryce contends that while Taylor's marriage and desire to move to California affected her welfare, it did not constitute a substantial change in circumstances affecting E.W.’s welfare. But as Taylor points out, our supreme court recognized in Hayes that a parent's relocation can constitute a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification.

In Hayes, a mother married a man in the United States Air Force who received orders to transfer to a base in Japan. 115 Nev. at 3, 972 P.2d at 1139. The mother petitioned the district court to relocate with the children from Nevada to Japan and the children's father filed a countermotion for primary physical custody in the event she moved to Japan. Id. The district court denied the mother's petition and granted primary physical custody to the father if the mother moved to Japan. Id. On appeal, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed that decision, concluding that “[t]he relocation proposed [t]here significantly impair[ed] the [father's] ability to exercise the responsibilities he had been exercising” and therefore “constitute[d] substantially changed circumstances.” Id. at 7, 972 P.2d at 1141.

Thus, contrary to Bryce's contention, under Hayes, a parent's marriage and subsequent relocation can, in fact, constitute a substantial change in circumstances. Id.; see also Bryant v. Sorget, No. 89717-COA, 2025 WL 2496107, at *3 (Nev. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2025) (affirming a district court's decision that a mother's relocation back to Nevada was a substantial change in circumstances). And while common sense suggests that a move to Japan is more inhibitive than a move to California, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Taylor's move with E.W. would nevertheless significantly impair Bryce's ability to exercise his parental responsibilities. Namely, during the period under the prior custody order when both Bryce and Taylor lived in Nevada, Bryce had parenting time with E.W. every two or three days and was able to attend 60 or 80 percent of her therapies. But Bryce testified that the commute between California and Nevada would take several hours, which supports the conclusion that relocation would impair Bryce's ability to maintain that same level of involvement. As a result, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district court's reliance on Hayes to find that Taylor's relocation constituted a substantial change in circumstances affecting E.W.’s welfare.

Best-interest analysis

Bryce contends that the district court abused its discretion by finding that joint physical custody and a monthly, long-distance parenting-time schedule were in E.W.’s best interest. For support, Bryce argues that the district court's best-interest determination is inconsistent with several of the court's other findings and the parents’ own representations that joint physical custody was not in E.W.’s best interest. Bryce also faults the court for failing to “truly and adequately” consider E.W.’s condition, limitations, and treatment needs.

Taylor responds that the district court considered E.W.’s stability, continuity of care, developmental needs, and the feasibility of preserving meaningful relationships with both parents following relocation. She adds that those findings are entitled to deference because they were grounded in the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. According to Taylor, Bryce's arguments amount to an impermissible request for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the district court.

Nevada affords “district court[s] ․ wide discretion in custody matters,” Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 868, including when determining parenting time, Roe, 139 Nev. at 172, 535 P.3d at 285. And “the sole consideration of the court is the best interest of the child.” NRS 125C.0035(1). “In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider and set forth its specific findings concerning, among other things,” the 12 factors set forth in NRS 125C.0035(4). Nevada “does not mandate that any factors be given controlling weight, which allows the district court discretion in determining how much weight to assign to the factors based on the facts and circumstances of the case.” Roberts v. Andrino, No. 89438, 2025 WL 3119014, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 4, 2025) (Order of Affirmance).

While Bryce raises several points in opposition to the district court's best-interest findings, the heart of his argument is that he believes the court should have weighed the evidence differently. As noted, we do not reweigh evidence or determine witness credibility. And although Bryce contends that the court's order was internally inconsistent—for instance, determining it was not in E.W.’s best interest for Taylor to have primary physical custody over E.W. in California while permitting Taylor to have joint physical custody over E.W. in California—we disagree. The court found that none of the best-interest factors favored either parent when both parents had the ability and resources to care for E.W.’s special needs, including ensuring she received her twice-weekly therapies, and could be involved in her periodic medical appointments. Further, the court found that joint physical custody remained in E.W.’s best interest when the parents lived in close enough proximity to share physical custody and E.W. was not yet constrained by a school schedule. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Bryce's inconsistency argument does not provide a basis for relief.

To the extent Bryce is alternatively arguing that the district court did not adequately consider E.W.’s physical, developmental, and emotional needs, see NRS 125C.0035(4)(g), such that its best-interest findings were not supported by substantial evidence, that argument also fails. Bryce testified that E.W. needed stability because rearranging furniture could confuse and unsettle her, E.W. needed to consistently see the same therapists to continue making progress, and that commuting to and from California would be difficult on E.W. But at the evidentiary hearing, Bryce did not present any evidence, beyond his testimony, to support these assertions.⁴ In fact, neither parent presented evidence regarding E.W.’s specific needs such as what her therapies entailed, whether she should be limited to having one set of therapists, or whether the therapists in Nevada were better for her than those in California.

Further, although Taylor testified that E.W. missed three months of therapy before the hearing because of their travels, the district court found E.W. was not harmed by missing those therapies. Taylor testified that she performed E.W.’s therapies herself during that time. And Taylor, the parent with medical training, testified that she was not worried about E.W.’s continuity of care between Nevada and California because she would make sure E.W. had the therapists and specialists she needed. Likewise, Bryce's testimony indicated that he would also ensure E.W.’s needs were met, as demonstrated by his testimony that he attended all of E.W.’s medical appointments and about 80 percent of her therapies. While the court was given limited information regarding E.W.’s needs, as noted above, we conclude that substantial evidence nonetheless demonstrated that both parents were able to care for E.W.’s needs during their parenting time, which supports the district court's joint-physical-custody award.

And while Bryce testified that he believed it would be hard on E.W. to travel for parenting time every two weeks and that a three-week-on, one-week-off schedule would not work because of E.W.’s twice-weekly therapies, he did not propose an alternative schedule that would give Taylor parenting time outside of holiday and academic breaks. At the hearing, Bryce even told the court to choose a schedule for him. Despite this statement, Bryce now challenges the district court's adoption of a monthly parenting-time schedule. But that decision was supported by Bryce's own testimony that a shorter parenting-time schedule would not be in E.W.’s best interest and thus this argument does not provide a basis for relief.

While we appreciate Bryce's concern for E.W.’s welfare, “[t]he district court enjoys wide discretion in custody matters,” Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 868, and we will not disturb its child custody determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. And here, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in its custody determination.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Bryce $100 in transportation-related child support

Byrce contends that the district court failed “to apply the correct statutory framework” by awarding transportation costs independent from child support in violation of our supreme court's directive to the contrary in Martinez. He maintains that the court set transportation costs at $100 per month while simultaneously declining to modify child support. He further asserts that the district court failed to make any findings regarding the actual cost of transporting E.W. to and from California or the parties’ respective household incomes and resources.

“We review decisions regarding child support for an abuse of discretion.” Romano, 138 Nev. at 7, 501 P.3d at 985. The calculation and award of child support, including adjustments to the base child support obligation, is governed by Chapter 425 of the Nevada Administrative Code. See NAC 425.005-.170; NRS 125B.080.

In addressing child support, the district court found that, given that the parties would share joint physical custody and their “incomes are similar in nature,” their baseline child support obligation would not be modified and would instead remain at $0. The court further explained that “[i]f a court wishes to deviate from [the] baseline [child support] obligation,” it may adjust the amount of support based on the factors set forth in NAC 425.150. Then, citing NAC 425.150(1)(e), which permits an adjustment of the base child support obligation to account for transportation costs, the court found that Taylor's relocation would result in Bryce incurring costs to bring the child to and from California and awarded him $100 in transportation-related child support to account for his “time, gasoline, and wear and tear on his vehicle.”

In challenging the district court's child support determination, Bryce first argues that the court failed to properly apply Martinez because it awarded transportation costs while simultaneously declining to modify child support. But Bryce's argument misunderstands the district court's handling of the child support and transportation costs issues and thus, it does not provide a basis for relief.

In Martinez, the supreme court recognized that transportation costs “cannot be considered separately from a parent's overall child support obligation.” 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 866. And here, the district court expressly considered whether to award such costs as part of its overall child support determination, in a section of the court's order entitled, “Child Support.” In particular, after concluding that the baseline child support obligation would remain at $0, the court recognized that it could deviate from the baseline obligation and adjust the support award based on the factors set out in NAC 425.150. Thereafter, the court determined that the baseline child support obligation should be modified based on NAC 425.150(1)(e) to account for the transportation costs Bryce would incur in transporting the child to and from California. Thus, contrary to Bryce's position on appeal, the district court properly applied Martinez and resolved the transportation costs issue as part of the overall child support determination, awarding Bryce $100 in transportation-related child support.⁵

Turning to Bryce's arguments regarding the amount of transportation-related child support that the district court awarded, he maintains that the $100 award is not supported by the record, that it is insufficient to compensate him for his time, fuel, and wear and tear on his vehicle, and that the court failed to make adequate findings to support the amount of its award. Bryce's arguments on these points do not provide a basis for relief.

Notably, Bryce had the opportunity to present evidence regarding his claimed costs to transport the child during the proceedings on his motion for reconsideration, yet he failed to do so. Indeed, his motion for reconsideration does not even address transportation costs or child support. As a result, the record does not contain evidence to support Bryce's contentions regarding the purported insufficiency of the $100 transportation costs award. And, absent an adequate record on which to review this issue, we cannot conclude that the $100 award was insufficient. See Carson Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Nev., 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981) (recognizing that appellate review is limited to the record actually considered by the district court and that it is the “responsibility of appellant to make an adequate appellate record”).

Additionally, while the district court did not make specific findings regarding the exact amounts it deemed adequate to cover mileage, fuel, and the wear and tear on Bryce's vehicle from transporting the child, the court's order contained sufficient general findings to support its $100 award. As a result, the order satisfied the requirements of NAC 425.100(3) (2020) (amended effective July 2025) (providing that, if the support obligation deviates from the obligation established by the child support guidelines, “the court must ․ [s]et forth findings of fact as to the basis for the deviation from the guidelines”). Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Bryce has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in awarding him $100 in transportation-related child support.

In sum, Bryce fails to identify a basis for reversing the district court's custody and parenting-time decisions or its award of transportation-related child support.⁶ Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.⁷

Bulla, C.J

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Bryce did not present evidence or arguments regarding what the parties’ child support obligation would be in the event the court awarded joint physical custody. He likewise presented no evidence pertaining to the potential cost of transporting the child under those circumstances.

2.   While Bryce also argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order the parties to maintain joint physical custody when the parties’ motion practice and briefing only sought primary physical custody, that argument lacks merit. Under NRS 3.223(1)(a), the family courts have “original, exclusive jurisdiction in any proceeding ․ [b]rought pursuant to,” among other chapters, NRS Chapter 125C. Here, both parties’ motions sought to modify custody pursuant to NRS Chapter 125C and thus the court had subject matter jurisdiction to resolve those motions. See Landreth v. Malik, 127 Nev 175, 184, 251 P.3d 163, 169 (2011) (discussing the jurisdiction of the family courts). Further—as discussed below—the district court was not constrained to only grant the specific relief requested by the parties.

3.   Our supreme court has not expressly addressed whether a substantial change in circumstances is necessary to modify a parenting-time schedule, as opposed to modifying a custody arrangement. See Martinez, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 73, 559 P.3d at 865, 867-68, 870 (affirming the district court's modification of a parenting-time schedule despite the district court finding that there was no substantial change in circumstances to support modifying the overall custody arrangement). On appeal, both parties presume such a showing is required and focus their arguments on whether a substantial change occurred. Because we conclude there was a substantial change in circumstances, we do not address whether a substantial change is required to modify a parenting-time schedule. Cf. State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane), 138 Nev. 896, 900, 521 P.3d 1215, 1221 (2022) (recognizing the Nevada appellate courts “follow the principle of party presentation” and thus “rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral arbiter of matters the parties present” (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008))).

4.   While Bryce attempted to present expert testimony with his motion for reconsideration, the district court declined to consider that evidence as it found it should have been introduced at the hearing. On appeal, Bryce challenges the court's refusal to consider this evidence and argues the court should have required that expert testimony be presented at the hearing. Because he cites no authority to support these arguments, however, we do not consider them. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (stating that the appellate courts need not consider assertions that are not supported by relevant authority and cogent argument).

5.   While the district court's order states that transportation costs “must be considered independently when making the support determination,” this statement simply suggests that the court deemed transportation costs to be an independent factor to consider as part of the overall child support determination. And, as outlined above, when considered in its entirety, the district court's analysis of this issue makes clear that it correctly included these costs as part of the parties’ overall child support award.

6.   To the extent Bryce challenges the child support determination by arguing that the district court failed to apply the “income and household resources factors” contained in NAC 425.150(1), and that NAC 425.150(1)(e) does not permit transportation cost adjustments for “visitation” unless one parent is awarded primary physical custody, Bryce failed to raise any argument on these points in the district court, and thus we decline to consider them. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) (“A point not urged in the trial court ․ is deemed to have been [forfeited] and will not be considered on appeal.”).

7.   Insofar as Bryce raises other arguments not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.