EDWARD SAMADANI v. DOWNEY HYUNDAI INC (2026)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Edward Samadani appeals from district court orders granting default judgment and denying NRCP 60(b) relief. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Maria A. Gall, Judge.

Samadani filed a complaint against respondent Downey Hyundai, Inc., (Hyundai), which generally alleged Hyundai intentionally misrepresented the condition of a vehicle listed for sale on an online auction site, and Samadani relied upon that misrepresentation when purchasing the vehicle. Relevant here, Samadani asserted a claim for violation of Nevada's Deceptive Trade Practices Act. After Hyundai failed to file a responsive pleading, Samadani obtained a clerk's entry of default and filed a motion for default judgment, seeking his actual damages for repairing the vehicle, attorney fees, and costs.

The district court subsequently entered a minute order scheduling a prove-up hearing. The minute order advised the court “conducts its prove-up hearings like a bench trial, where witnesses testify, evidence is admitted, and exhibits are marked.” Samadani subsequently filed a supplemental brief requesting an award of punitive damages and emotional distress damages.

At the prove-up hearing, Samadani testified concerning his purchase of the vehicle, the condition of it when he received it, and having to take the vehicle to a mechanic for repairs. After the district court reminded counsel of the need to introduce supporting exhibits, and demonstrated how to lay a foundation, Samadani moved to admit, among other exhibits, exhibit 4, which consisted of a service note issued to Hyundai by another car dealership that had inspected the vehicle before it was sold to Samadani. The service note allegedly demonstrated that only two weeks before selling the vehicle, Hyundai learned the vehicle had significant issues and was unsafe to drive based on the other dealership's inspection. However, the court denied Samadani's request to admit exhibit 4 because Samadani did not have an affidavit from the custodian of records of the dealership that prepared the service note authenticating the document. The court subsequently entered default judgment and awarded Samadani his actual damages, attorney fees, and costs but denied his request for punitive and emotional distress damages. Samadani then filed a motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to NRCP 60(b), which included an authentication affidavit for the service note. The district court denied the motion and Samadani now appeals.

On appeal, Samadani contends the district court abused its discretion first by excluding exhibit 4 and again by denying his motion for post-judgment relief despite attaching an authentication affidavit. Samadani further contends the court erred by denying his request for punitive damages because exhibit 4 demonstrates Hyundai knowingly misrepresented the condition of the vehicle.

Assuming, without deciding, the district court abused its discretion by excluding exhibit 4, we conclude affirmance is nevertheless warranted as Samadani failed to demonstrate he was entitled to punitive damages. “A plaintiff is not automatically entitled to punitive damages” and must demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, the defendant “is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice, express or implied.” Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 556, 581, 138 P.3d 433, 450-51 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Powers v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 114 Nev. 690, 705, 962 P,2d 596, 604 (1998) (holding that “a plaintiff is never entitled to punitive damages as a matter of right”). “Clear and convincing evidence is beyond a mere preponderance of the evidence.” King v. St. Clair, 134 Nev. 137, 139, 414 P.3d 314, 316 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For punitive damages, “[f]raud means an intentional misrepresentation, deception or concealment of a material fact known to the person with the intent to deprive another person of his rights or property[.]” Bongiovi, 122 Nev. at 581, 138 P.3d at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted). Intentional misrepresentation requires a “false representation that is made with either knowledge or belief that it is false or without a sufficient foundation.” Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 225, 163 P.3d 420, 426 (2007) (defining intentional misrepresentation) (emphasis added). Here, even considering exhibit 4, we conclude Samadani failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Hyundai knowingly made a false statement or otherwise believed its advertisement was false or without a sufficient foundation.

Notably, exhibit 2, which appears to be a confirmation of purchase, contains an announcement section which only states “Green Light/Guaranteed” but there was no testimony as to what these terms indicated or otherwise represented. While Samadani testified he relied upon those representations, he failed to explain what those representations were, e.g., whether “Green Light/Guaranteed” is a representation guaranteeing the condition or quality of the vehicle. Similarly, exhibit 4, on its own, is insufficient to establish Hyundai's knowledge of the alleged conditions, which is required to obtain punitive damages. See id. (holding intentional misrepresentation requires a showing that the defendant knew or believed it was making a false representation). For example, there is nothing on the face of the document confirming that Hyundai received this invoice or was otherwise informed of the alleged issues. Despite containing a designated space for the customer's signature, it does not appear that Hyundai or its agent signed the invoice. At most, exhibit 4 confirms that Hyundai declined further diagnosis but it is unclear if Hyundai was specifically informed of the issues or was aware of the alleged severity of the issues.

And although we do not decide whether the district court correctly declined to admit exhibit 4 as unauthenticated or hearsay, we do note that Samadani's testimony was insufficient to establish Hyundai's knowledge of the invoice or alleged vehicle problems as he admittedly lacked personal knowledge of the transaction between Hyundai and the dealership. See Nev. Indep. v. Whitley, 138 Nev. 122, 127, 506 P.3d 1037, 1043 (2022) (holding “[a] lay witness may testify on a matter if the witness has personal knowledge of the matter to which he or she is testifying”). Notably, Samadani testified only that when cleaning the vehicle, he located a service ticket tag indicating a third-party dealership had serviced the vehicle prior to purchase. Samadani then contacted the dealership, which confirmed it serviced the vehicle, and Samadani's counsel then obtained exhibit 4 through “informal discovery.” However, Samadani did not present any testimony to show he had personal knowledge as to what Hyundai was told or knew regarding the vehicle. Further, there was no testimony demonstrating Hyundai did not take the vehicle for a road test, a second opinion, or otherwise preform any diagnostic tests or repairs in-house. Accordingly, we conclude that even when considering exhibit 4, Samadani failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is entitled to punitive damages.

Finally, Samadani contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to award emotional distress damages. This court reviews a damages award for abuse of discretion and will affirm so long as it is supported by substantial evidence. See Blige v. Terry, 139 Nev. 607, 615, 540 P.3d 421, 430 (2023). We conclude Samadani has failed to provide cogent argument or relevant legal authority supporting his claim for emotional distress damages and thus need not consider this argument. See Edwards v. Emperor's Garden Rest., 122 Nev. 317, 330 n.38, 130 P.3d 1280, 1288 n.38 (2006) (providing that this court need not consider claims that are unsupported by cogent arguments or relevant legal authority).

Notably, the district court repeatedly asked Samadani during the prove-up hearing whether there was any legal authority stating emotional distress damages were available for deceptive trade practices claims. In response, Samadani's counsel stated he believed there was a legal basis, although he did not identify it, and further noted it was “up to the court” to decide if pain and suffering damages were available for a deceptive trade practices claim. And in its order denying post-judgment relief, the district court again questioned whether emotional distress damages were available for a deceptive trade practices claim. Despite this, on appeal Samadani still does not identify a legal basis providing that emotional support damages are available for this type of claim. Instead, Samadani contends the exclusion of exhibit 4 warrants reversal because it “formed the basis for Mr. Samadani's claim of emotional harm[.]” Accordingly, we conclude Samadani failed to provide cogent argument or relevant legal authority supporting his request for emotional distress damages and thus we affirm the district court's denial of those damages.

Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.  ¹

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Insofar as Samadani raises arguments that are not specifically addressed in this order, we have considered the same and conclude that they do not present a basis for relief.