JAYSHAWN BAILEY v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING

Jayshawn Bailey appeals from a district court order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus filed on March 20, 2025, and a petition to establish factual innocence filed on March 25, 2025. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michelle Leavitt, Judge.

In his mandamus petition, Bailey contended he was factually innocent and requested that the district court either direct the supreme court to reverse and vacate its order denying a petition to establish factual innocence or release him from custody. “A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act by an inferior state tribunal, . . . but the action being compelled must be one already required by law.” Min. Cnty. v. State, Dep't of Conservation & Nat. Res., 117 Nev. 235, 242, 20 P.3d 800, 805 (2001) (emphasis added) (cleaned up); see also NRS 34.160. A writ of mandamus will not issue, however, if the petitioner has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. NRS 34.170. A petitioner bears the burden of proving that extraordinary relief is warranted, Pan v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 222, 228, 88 P.3d 840, 844 (2004), and we review a district court's order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus for an abuse of discretion, Chittenden v. Just. Ct. of Pahrump Twp., 140 Nev. 47, 52, 544 P.3d 919, 927 (Ct. App. 2024).

Bailey's petition did not seek to compel the performance of an act by an inferior state tribunal. Moreover, Bailey had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy with which to pursue his claim of factual innocence in the form of his factual-innocence petition. See NRS 34.900-.990. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for a writ of mandamus.

Turning to Bailey's factual-innocence petition, Bailey claimed the State altered the transcript and audio recording of his interrogation. A court reviewing a petition to establish factual innocence must first determine whether the petition meets the pleading requirements of NRS 34.960(2)-(3). NRS 34.960(4). The court must “provide a written explanation of its order to dismiss or not to dismiss the petition based on the requirements set forth in subsections 2 and 3.” NRS 34.960(6). If the court does not dismiss a petition for failing to satisfy the aforementioned pleading requirements, it must order the State to file a response. NRS 34.970(1).

Here, the district court “denied” the petition because it did not “comply with the statute.” The district court did not issue a separate order explaining its reasons for declining to dismiss the petition based on the pleading requirements set forth in NRS 34.960(2)-(3), nor did it order the State to file a response, as it would have been required to do before it could properly deny the petition on the merits. Thus, the district court “denied” the petition for failing to meet the pleading requirements of NRS 34.960 rather than on the merits. The district court's denial of the petition was in error because, upon concluding the petition did not satisfy the pleading requirements of NRS 34.960,¹ the district court's resolution of the petition was limited to dismissal of the petition without prejudice.² NRS 34.960(4)(a); see also Sanchez v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 561 P.3d 35, 38 (2024). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMAND this matter to the district court to dismiss Bailey's petition to establish factual innocence without prejudice.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We make no determination with respect to the merits of the district court's conclusion. See generally Sanchez v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 78, 561 P.3d 35 (2024).

2.   We note that the district court may, under certain circumstances, waive the requirements of NRS 34.960(3). See NRS 34.960(4)(b)(2).