DERRICK BRADLEY v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Derrick Bradley appeals from a judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joseph Hardy, Jr., Judge.

Bradley argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by denying his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.¹ A defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, NRS 176.165, and “a district court may grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for any reason where permitting withdrawal would be fair and just,” Stevenson v. State, 131 Nev. 598, 604, 354 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2015). In considering the motion, “the district court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether permitting withdrawal of a guilty plea before sentencing would be fair and just.” Id. at 603, 354 P.3d at 1281. We give deference to the district court's factual findings if they are supported by the record. Id. at 604, 354 P.3d at 1281. The district court's ruling on a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea “is discretionary and will not be reversed unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion,” State v. Second Jud. Dist. Ct. (Bernardelli), 85 Nev. 381, 385, 455 P.2d 923, 926 (1969). To warrant an evidentiary hearing, a defendant must raise claims supported by specific factual allegations that are not belied by the record and, if true, would entitle him to relief. Hargrove v. State, 100 Nev. 498, 502-03, 686 P.2d 222, 225 (1984).

In his motion below, Bradley asserted he did not adequately understand the guilty plea agreement due to the lack of time he had to analyze the agreement before pleading guilty. He contended that during the canvass, he insisted he was innocent several times and wanted to proceed to trial. He also alleged that counsel who represented him at the time of the plea was ineffective.

A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and a petitioner carries the burden of establishing the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). In determining the validity of a guilty plea, this court looks to the totality of the circumstances. State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448 (2000). “A court must be able to conclude from the oral canvass, any written plea memorandum and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the memorandum (i.e., did the defendant read it, have any questions about it, etc.) that the defendant's plea was freely, voluntarily and knowingly made.” Id. at 1106, 13 P.3d at 448.

Bradley did not specifically identify in his motion which aspects of the plea agreement he did not understand. The record reflects that Bradley was afforded time to discuss concerns and aspects of the plea both before and during the hearing. Although Bradley indicated confusion several times during the hearing, the court allowed him to consult with counsel each time and following each discussion, he indicated his desire to waive his right to a jury trial and move forward with the negotiated plea. Moreover, at the plea canvass, Bradley acknowledged he had reviewed the written plea agreement with counsel, he understood it, and he signed it after his counsel answered all of his questions concerning the plea agreement. In the written plea agreement, Bradley acknowledged that he understood the charge and potential penalties he faced, he understood his trial rights and agreed to waive those rights, he discussed defense strategies with counsel and that counsel answered all of his questions, and that he believed accepting the plea bargain and entering a guilty plea was in his best interest.

Based on this, there is no indication the stress or pressure Bradley felt went beyond that normally experienced by defendants during pretrial plea discussions. See Stevenson, 131 Nev. at 604, 354 P.3d at 1281 (recognizing “time constraints and pressure from interested parties exist in every criminal case”); see also Miles v. Dorsey, 61 F.3d 1459, 1470 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Although deadlines, mental anguish, depression, and stress are inevitable hallmarks of pretrial plea discussions, such factors considered individually or in aggregate do not establish that [a defendant's] plea was involuntary.”). In light of these circumstances, Bradley failed to overcome the presumption that his plea was validly entered, and the district court reasonably concluded that he failed to present a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea.

Bradley also argues the district court abused its discretion b failing to consider the totality of the circumstances when denying his motion. We disagree. While the district court did not explicitly state it had considered the totality of the circumstances prior to orally denying Bradley's motion, the district court instead discussed the circumstances surrounding Bradley's plea and indicated it considered his motion and the State's opposition, both of which referenced a totality of the circumstances standard. And, in consideration of the aforementioned information, the district court announced its decision to deny Bradley's motion. Moreover, Bradley did not identify any specific circumstances the district court failed to consider that would have affected its decision. In light of the foregoing, Bradley does not demonstrate the district court failed to consider the totality of the circumstances when evaluating Bradley's motion. For these reasons, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bradley's presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Bradley waived his direct appeal as part of the plea agreement. Bradley's motion alleged he had a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea because it was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. Because Bradley challenges the validity of his plea in this appeal, we do not apply the waiver contained in the plea agreement. See Aldape v. State, 139 Nev. 388, 389, 535 P.3d 1184, 1188 (2023) (providing that one of the elements for determining whether a defendant has waived his direct appeal by way of a waiver clause is whether “both the waiver and plea agreement were entered into knowingly and voluntarily”).