CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE WILLIAMS v. JERRY HOWELL WARDEN AND THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Christian Dominique Williams appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on November 8, 2017. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jacqueline M. Bluth, Judge.

Williams was convicted of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon with the intent to promote, further, or assist a criminal gang; and murder with the use of a deadly weapon with the intent to promote, further, or assist a criminal gang following a shooting at a dice game. Among other claims in his petition, Williams claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for not calling Marquis Clemons, an eyewitness to the shooting, who could have offered testimony supporting his claim of self-defense.¹

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

During trial, the State presented evidence that a witness heard Williams talking about taking the victim's guns from him. Williams then joined the victim and several others in a dice game. The victim had won about four hundred dollars. Williams moved behind the victim, pointed a gun at the victim's head, and demanded the victim empty his pockets. The witnesses stated that the victim threw his money on the ground and that Williams and the victim shot each other. The physical evidence also indicated that Williams’ gun was fired inches from the victim's neck, from behind and below his left ear, and that the projectile travelled toward the front of the victim's head. The evidence further established Williams’ consciousness of guilt in that he did not immediately report the shooting as an act of self-defense and instead falsely reported that three Latino men had shot him during an attempted robbery when he sought treatment at the emergency room. See Abram v. State, 95 Nev. 352, 356, 594 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1979) (stating “[d]eclarations made after the commission of the crime which indicate consciousness of guilt, or are inconsistent with innocence may be admissible” as relevant to the issue of guilt).

During the postconviction proceedings, the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing during which Clemons and trial counsel testified. Clemons testified that he spoke with Williams’ trial counsel four or five times leading up to trial, and came to court in anticipation of testifying. Clemons stated he was prepared to testify that he observed a dice game between five or six people that included the victim and Williams. Clemons testified that during the game the victim repeatedly blamed Williams and his associates for the death of a friend. Clemons also testified that the victim then stood, brandished a revolver and fired. Clemons stated he ran for cover, and he next heard another shot and Williams exclaim that he had been shot.

Trial counsel testified that he remembered Clemons would have testified Williams and the victim were throwing dice, the victim made a provocative comment, reached for his pistol, and exchanged gunfire with Williams. Counsel could not specifically remember why he did not call Clemons but acknowledged he generally would not call an available witness if that witness might dispute a defendant's prior testimony or a fact important to the defense. Further, if he could call the witness and the witness was present, he would agree that the failure to do so would have been a strategic decision.

The district court reviewed the evidence produced at trial and concluded that evidence directly contradicted Clemons’ testimony at the evidentiary hearing. The court further concluded that Clemons’ testimony differed from the evidence produced at trial, that Clemons’ testimony would not have been beneficial to Williams, and that Clemons’ testimony would not have made a material difference to the trial's outcome. The court accordingly concluded Williams did not demonstrate prejudice stemming from any failure to present Clemons’ testimony at trial, as Clemons’ testimony was insufficient to show that Williams acted in self-defense. The district court's conclusion that Williams failed to demonstrate prejudice is supported by substantial evidence. Given the foregoing, and particularly the evidence demonstrating the victim was shot from behind, we conclude the district court did not err by determining that Williams did not establish a reasonable probability of a different result at trial had counsel introduced Clemons’ testimony. See Culverson v. State, 106 Nev. 484, 487, 797 P.2d 238, 239 (1990) (providing requirements for justifiable homicide); see also NRS 200.200 (providing the requirements for self-defense to apply). Accordingly, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We only address this claim as Williams’ remaining claims have been addressed in prior appeals. See Williams v. State, No. 75250-COA, 2019 WL 851444 (Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2019) (Order Affirming in Part, Reversing in Part and Remanding); Williams v. State, No. 85376-COA, 2023 WL 3989896 (Ct. App. June 13, 2023) (Order of Reversal and Remand).