DEON JONES v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Deon Jones appeals from an amended judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a jury verdict, of sex trafficking of a child under 14 years of age, first-degree kidnapping, and sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age.¹ Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Eric Johnson, Judge.

Jones first claims the 50-year aggregate prison sentence imposed by the district court violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Jones appears to argue that Nevada courts should consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when reviewing a sentence and further appears to argue the district court abused its discretion by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The district court has wide discretion in its sentencing decision. See Houk. v. State, 103 Nev. 659, 664, 747 P.2d 1376, 1379 (1987). Generally, this court will not interfere with a sentence imposed by the district court that falls within the parameters of relevant sentencing statutes “[s]o long as the record does not demonstrate prejudice resulting from consideration of information or accusations founded on facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.” Silks v. State, 92 Nev. 91, 94, 545 P.2d 1159, 1161 (1976); see Cameron v. State, 114 Nev. 1281, 1283, 968 P.2d 1169, 1171 (1998). Regardless of its severity, “[a] sentence within the statutory limits is not ‘cruel and unusual punishment unless the statute fixing punishment is unconstitutional or the sentence is so unreasonably disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience.” ’ Blume v. State, 112 Nev. 472, 475, 915 P.2d 282, 284 (1996) (quoting Culverson v. State, 95 Nev. 433, 435, 596 P.2d 220, 221-22 (1979)); see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1000-01 (1991) (plurality opinion) (explaining the Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence; it forbids only an extreme sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the crime).

Here, the sentence imposed is within the parameters provided by the relevant statutes. See NRS 200.320(2)(b); NRS 200.366(3)(c); NRS 201.300(2)(b)(2)(I). We have considered the sentence and the crime, and we conclude the sentence imposed is not grossly disproportionate to the crime and does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment and further conclude Jones has not demonstrated the district court relied on impalpable or highly suspect evidence in imposing sentence. Additionally, we decline Jones’ apparent invitation to review sentencing decisions consistent with the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

Jones also claims NRS 200.366(3)(c) is unconstitutional as applied to him and results in cruel and unusual punishment because the statute allegedly conflicts with established law—particularly 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—“requiring that he be sentenced to the minimum amount of time necessary to punish and rehabilitate” an offender and because the statute precludes the sentencing court from comparing the facts of his case to those in more egregious cases. Because Jones did not object below, he is not entitled to relief absent a demonstration of plain error. See Martinorellan v. State, 131 Nev. 43, 48, 343 P.3d 590, 593 (2015) (stating “all unpreserved errors are to be reviewed for plain error without regard as to whether they are of constitutional dimension”). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that “(1) there was an ‘error’; (2) the error is ‘plain,’ meaning that it is clear under current law from a casual inspection of the record; and (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights.” Jeremias v. State, 134 Nev. 46, 50, 412 P.3d 43, 48 (2018).

In this case, the trial evidence established that Jones met the 13-year-old victim in an apartment complex and, after exchanging messages with her on social media, drove her to a parking lot and had sexual intercourse with her, and then took her to California and required her to engage in prostitution. Jones argues that the district court should have been able to consider certain mitigating factors—including the victim's initiation of communications with him and her misrepresentations to him about her age—to impose a lesser sentence and that a sentence of 35 years to life in prison does not fit the crime.

Although Jones’ sentence of 35 years to life in prison for the sexual assault charge is severe, Jones has not demonstrated that it is grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Cf. Flores-Martinez v. State, No. 79974, 2020 WL 6938804, at *2 (Nev. Nov. 24, 2020) (Order of Affirmance) (rejecting an appellant's as-applied challenge to NRS 200.366(3)(b)). Further, Jones fails to demonstrate NRS 200.366(3)(c) is unconstitutional as applied to him. See Mariscal-Ochoa, v. State, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 42, 550 P.3d 813, 823 (2024) (holding that statutes are presumed to be valid and the burden to demonstrate a statute is unconstitutional rests with the challenger). The legislature is within its power to remove a sentencing court's discretion by creating a mandatory sentencing scheme. Mendoza-Lobos v. State, 125 Nev. 634, 640, 218 P.3d 501, 505 (2009). And sexual offenses committed against children are serious crimes for which harsh punishment imposed by the legislature serves a valid retributive purpose. See, e.g., Mariscal-Ochoa, 140 Nev., Adv. Op. 42, 550 P.3d at 824 (“Sexual assault of a child is undoubtedly a serious crime, and the Legislature has the power to require a harsh punishment.”). We therefore conclude that Jones fails to demonstrate that NRS 200.366(3)(c) plainly violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as applied to Jones.² For the foregoing reasons, we

ORDER the amended judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court corrected a clerical error in the amended judgment of conviction and entered a second amended judgment of conviction on April 15, 2025.

2.   To the extent Jones raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, such claims should be raised in postconviction proceedings in the first instance and are generally not appropriate for review “on direct appeal unless the district court has held an evidentiary hearing on the matter or an evidentiary hearing would be needless. Archanian v. State, 122 Nev. 1019, 1036, 145 P.3d 1008, 1020-21 (2006). Neither of those exceptions exist here. We therefore decline to address this claim.