WILLIAM TYS MULDROW WILLIAM MULDROW III v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER VACATING JUDGMENT AND REMANDING

William Tys Muldrow appeals from an amended judgment of conviction, entered pursuant to a guilty plea, of attempted establishing or possessing a financial forgery laboratory. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Danielle K. Pieper, Judge.

Muldrow signed a guilty plea agreement which provided that the State would have no opposition to probation but that Muldrow stipulated to a prison sentence of 24 to 60 months if, among other things, he “fail[ed] to appear at any subsequent hearing in the instant case” or if “an independent magistrate, by affidavit or declaration review, or a grand jury confirms probable cause against [him] for any new criminal charge” (collectively, the Stipulated Sentence Provision). While he was out of custody on his own recognizance, Muldrow was arrested and charged with a new offense, and the State moved the district court to revoke his release based on the arrest. Muldrow did not appear for two hearings the district court set on the matter although he did appear for the previously scheduled sentencing hearing. Because the record did not clearly demonstrate that Muldrow's absence from the two hearings satisfied the condition in the Stipulated Sentence Provision, we vacated Muldrow's judgment of conviction and remanded this matter to the district court. See Muldrow v. State, No. 87712-COA, 2024 WL 4455879 (Nev. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2024) (Order Vacating Judgment and Remanding). On remand, the district court conducted a hearing, determined Muldrow's absence from the two hearings satisfied the Stipulated Sentence Provision, and reimposed the stipulated prison sentence of 24 to 60 months. In doing so, the district court made no findings regarding whether Muldrow had notice of those two hearings.¹

Muldrow appeals to this court again, this time asserting the district court erred by determining the Stipulated Sentence Provision was satisfied where he did not have notice of either hearing on the State's motion to revoke. A district court's sentencing discretion is generally not bound by the terms of a plea agreement. Van Buskirk v. State, 102 Nev. 241, 244, 720 P.2d 1215, 1217 (1986). However, guilty plea agreements are subject to general contract principles. State v. Crockett, 110 Nev. 838, 842, 877 P.2d 1077, 1079 (1994). Thus, a plea agreement is construed from its plain language and enforced as written. Burns v. State, 137 Nev. 494, 497, 495 P.3d 1091, 1097 (2021).

The record shows that the State filed a notice of motion and motion to revoke Muldrow's own recognizance release and that the district court entered a notice setting a hearing on the motion to be held prior to the scheduled sentencing hearing. Muldrow did not appear at the first hearing on the State's motion to revoke, but because the district court was concerned Muldrow may not have received notice of the hearing, it continued the matter to allow time for counsel to get in touch with Muldrow. At the second hearing, although Muldrow's counsel participated, Muldrow once again was not present; defense counsel represented that he attempted to contact Muldrow without success.

At the hearing held on remand from this court, Muldrow argued his absence from the two hearings did not trigger the Stipulated Sentence Provision because he had not received notice of either hearing and because he had appeared at the sentencing hearing, which was the only post-plea hearing of which he had notice. In support of this claim, Muldrow's counsel asserted that “I don't see that there are notes [in the law firm's internal calendaring system] regarding attempts to notify Mr. Muldrow” of either the first or second hearing. And there is nothing in the record to support that Muldrow had actual notice of those hearings.

The due process clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that no state “shall deprive any person of ․ liberty ․ without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1, and the Nevada Constitution likewise provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of․ liberty ․ without due process of law,” Nev. Const, art. 1, § 8. Because the record does not demonstrate that Muldrow received notice of either of the two hearings on the State's motion to revoke and because his absence from those hearings was the basis for the district court's determination that the Stipulated Sentence Provision was satisfied, we conclude the district court abused its discretion by imposing the stipulated sentence. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment and remand this matter to the district court; on remand, should the district court be inclined to sentence Muldrow pursuant to the Stipulated Sentence Provision, it must determine whether Muldrow had notice of either of the two hearings that satisfied due process. For these reasons, we

ORDER the amended judgment of conviction VACATED and REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The district court made no determination if Muldrow committed a new offense because the State abandoned this argument as the basis for enforcement of the Stipulated Sentencing Provision in the first appeal.