JASON ALTHEIDE v. WILLIAM REUBART TASHEENA COOKE AND MELINA CASTRO (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Jason Altheide appeals from a district court order granting judgment as a matter of law in an inmate civil rights action. Seventh Judicial District Court, White Pine County; Steve L. Dobrescu, Chief Judge.

Altheide is an inmate at Ely State Prison. Altheide was labeled a High-Risk Prisoner on or around April 3, 2019, because he assaulted a warden. Altheide was present at a hearing of his High-Risk Prisoner status and was provided an opportunity to be heard. This placement as a High-Risk Prisoner caused Altheide to be housed in administrative segregation from around April 3, 2019, until around July 10, 2019, when he was transferred to High Desert State Prison. He remained in administrative segregation as a High-Risk Prisoner until November 24, 2021, when his proceeding related to the assault on the warden was finished and he returned to Ely State Prison. He was purportedly still in administrative segregation at Ely State Prison from November 24, 2021, until around July 15, 2022, when he was then placed in a Behavior Modification Unit.

Altheide filed a complaint against respondents Tasheena Cooke, William Reubart, and Melina Castro asserting Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Altheide asserted that he had been diagnosed as seriously mentally ill (SMI) by medical professionals within the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC). Altheide claimed that respondents violated his civil rights when they worked at Ely State Prison by placing him in administrative segregation in violation of NDOC Administrative Regulation 707.01(10)(J) (setting forth that if an inmate's mental health is a threat to self or others, the offender may be placed in administrative segregation and the segregation shall “be temporary until a more suitable placement is identified or the condition is treated”). Altheide's complaint alleged respondents violated rights afforded to him under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution based on false imprisonment and deprivation of procedural due process. Respondents filed an answer and disputed Altheide's allegations.

The case proceeded to a jury trial. During trial, Altheide, respondents, and Dr. Frank Fennell, a psychiatrist who works at Northern Nevada Correctional Center, testified. At the conclusion of Altheide's case, respondents orally moved for judgment as a matter of law under NRCP 50(a), arguing that Altheide failed to demonstrate Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and they were entitled to qualified immunity.

Subsequently, the district court granted respondents’ oral NRCP 50(a) motion and issued a written order granting judgment as a matter of law as to all claims and dismissing the case. The district court found that there was no caselaw that would prohibit the placement of an SMI inmate on High-Risk Prisoner status. Moreover, the court found that there was no caselaw that would support the finding that Altheide's classification status constituted false imprisonment. The court further found that respondents were entitled to deference as prison officials regarding their assessments and operation of prison placements and the use of High-Risk Prisoner status for habitually violent inmates, such as Altheide. The court further found that NDOC Administrative Regulations and Operational Procedures regarding High-Risk Prisoner placement for violent offenders did not qualify as a state created protected liberty interest because it was the appropriate housing placement for habitually violent offenders, making it a normal part of their prison life which did not impose an atypical and signification hardship on Altheide. The district court further found that respondents were entitled to qualified immunity on all claims raised by Altheide. This appeal followed.

Altheide argues that the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law because he was kept in administrative segregation in excess of 30 days as an SMI inmate and later placed in the Behavior Modification Unit, which resulted in violations of his Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Altheide asserts that AR 707.01(10)(J) prevents the nontemporary administrative segregation of inmates that are mentally ill.

Pursuant to NRCP 50(a), “the district court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law if the opposing party has failed to prove a sufficient issue for the jury, so that his claim cannot be maintained under the controlling law.” Nelson v. Heer, 123 Nev. 217, 222, 163 P.3d 420, 424 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo a district court's order under NRCP 50(a). Id. at 222-23, 163 P.3d at 424-25.

To establish an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must demonstrate both a “sufficiently serious” deprivation and deliberate indifference on the part of the prison officials. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). With respect to a Fourteenth Amendment claim, the United States Constitution guarantees all citizens, including inmates, due process of law. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). However, the Constitution protects only certain interests with the guarantees of due process; an inmate's right to procedural due process arises only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. Id. Such interests may arise from the Constitution itself or from state law. Id.

Administrative segregation is “well within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a prison sentence,” and, therefore, freedom from administrative segregation is not, in and of itself, “an interest independently protected by the Due Process Clause.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 468 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). The United States Supreme Court has recognized, however, that under certain circumstances, states may “create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483-84. In Sandin, the Supreme Court concluded that the prison's placement of inmates in disciplinary segregation for a 30-day period did not create a liberty interest of real substance because disciplinary segregation did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [the inmate's] indeterminate sentence,” id. at 485, and, thus, placement in disciplinary segregation did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on inmates’ prison life, see generally id. at 484-87.

When a protectable liberty interest is identified, it is a matter of federal law what process is due to protect that interest under the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause. Howlett ex rel. Howlett v. Hose, 496 U.S. 356, 375 (1990) (“The elements of, and the defenses to, a federal cause of action are defined by federal law.”); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 1985) (explaining that what process is due to protect a liberty interest is a question of law). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that, when prison officials are initially determining whether an inmate should be. administratively segregated, due process requires that the inmate be informed of the charges against him or the reasons for segregation, that prison officials hold an informal nonadversary hearing within a reasonable time following segregation, and that the inmate be allowed to present his views. See Toussaint v. McCarthy (Toussaint I), 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir.1986), overruled in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. Due process also requires periodic review of the segregation decision, but the intervals at which that review occurs is at the discretion of prison officials, and the Ninth Circuit has upheld periodic reviews that occurred every 120 days as comporting with due process. Toussaint v. McCarthy (Toussaint II), 926 F.2d 800, 803 (9th Cir. 1990).

In this case, Altheide generally asserts that respondents violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. However, with respect to his due process claim, he fails to demonstrate that his placement in administrative segregation created an atypical and significant hardship on his prison life. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (concluding that the inmate had no liberty interest in being free from disciplinary segregation because it did not “present a dramatic departure from the basic conditions” of the inmate's prison life). The Ninth Circuit has noted that “administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence.” May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has further rejected claims that an inmate's segregation violated the Eighth Amendment because the plaintiff “failed to allege facts establishing the deprivation of adequate food, drinking water, sanitation, or personal hygiene items.” Id. Although Altheide argues that his administrative segregation was for an extended period of time, in excess of the 30-day segregation period discussed in Sandin, the Ninth Circuit has also concluded that an indeterminate sentence in administrative segregation, without more, does not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Anderson v. Cnty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (9th Cir. 1995). Insofar as Altheide relies on NDOC Administrative Regulation 707.01(10)(J) to assert that mentally ill inmates are only to be placed in administrative segregation temporarily, a violation of prison policy does not establish a constitutional violation. See Case v. Kitsap Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy.” (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, while Altheide similarly challenges his placement in the Behavior Modification Unit when he was released from High-Risk Prisoner status on July 15, 2022, he fails to demonstrate that this resulted in a “significant hardship on [him] in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.

Next, to the extent Altheide argues respondents violated his due process rights by failing to timely conduct a hearing of his High-Risk Prisoner status, this is belied by the record. Specifically, Altheide asserts that respondents violated NRS 209.369(3)(b) by failing to conduct a hearing within 15 days of the April 1, 2019, incident. See NRS 209.369(3)(b) (explaining that upon the filing of a disciplinary action against an offender inmate that may result in the sanction of disciplinary segregation of the offender, the prison shall “hold a hearing concerning the charges against l the offender not later than 15 days after the alleged violation or not later than 15 days after the completion of the investigation of the alleged violation, whichever is later”). The record shows that Altheide learned of the reasons administrative segregation was being considered and was present at the initial review of his placement at a hearing on April 3, 2019, and was given the opportunity to present his views. Thus, Altheide fails to demonstrate that he was not afforded all that is procedurally required for administrative segregation placement. See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484; see also McFarland v. Cassady, 779 F.2d 1426, 1426-28 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that a hearing was provided “within a reasonable time” where the hearing occurred five weeks after the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation); Lisle v. McDaniels, 681 F. App'x 611, 613 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding due process was satisfied with regard to High-Risk Prisoner status because appellant is only constitutionally entitled to “some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views, as well as to periodic status reviews” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Furthermore, insofar as Altheide asserts that the district court erred in determining that respondents were entitled to qualified immunity as to his claims, we are not persuaded by his argument in this regard. “Qualified immunity is a federal, judicially created doctrine that immunizes state, local, and federal officials from liability for discretionary functions unless (1) the official violated a federal constitutional right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time the challenged conduct occurred.” Mack v. Williams, 138 Nev. 854, 871, 522 P.3d 434, 450 (2022); Grosjean v. Imperial Palace, Inc., 125 Nev. 349, 359-60, 212 P.3d 1068, 1076 (2009) (“Generally, qualified immunity applies to protect state officials from civil liability for damages resulting from discretionary acts, so long as those acts do not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Nevada Supreme Court has explained “if no constitutional violation exist[s] even if the allegations are taken as true, the inquiry ends, and a finding of qualified immunity is appropriate.” Butler ex rel. Biller v. Bayer, 123 Nev. 450, 458, 168 P.3d 1055, 1061-62 (2007). Here, as established above, Altheide is unable to establish a violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, Altheide fails to demonstrate an error in the district court's determination that respondents were entitled to qualified immunity as to his claims.

Therefore, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.