AARON CHRISTOPHER HINE v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Aaron Christopher Hine appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on March 28, 2018, and supplemental pleadings. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Danielle K. Pieper, Judge.

Hine argues the district court erred by denying several claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

For Hine's convictions, the testimony and evidence adduced at trial established that on May 18, 2015, victims Lee Hardy and Dominique Browning-Palmer (Palmer) and Palmer's two children were sitting on a couch in Hardy's apartment when Hine, who was a longtime acquaintance of both Hardy and Palmer, began banging on the apartment door. When Hardy opened the door to let Hine in, Hine immediately began shooting a firearm at Hardy. Hardy attempted to evade the gunfire by running into the apartment bedroom and crawling under the bed. Hine pursued Hardy into the bedroom and told him, “Stop running, I am trying to kill you.” After shooting Hardy several times, Hine paused before leaving the apartment, looked Palmer in the eyes, aimed the firearm at her chest, and pulled the trigger.

In his petition, Hine first claimed counsel was ineffective in preparing for trial because he did not adequately communicate with Hine regarding possible defenses and did not confirm Hine understood the consequences of proceeding to trial on the serious criminal charges he was facing. At the evidentiary hearing, Hine did not present any evidence regarding what information he was unable to communicate to counsel or what counsel failed to communicate to him. Thus, he failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient. Further, he failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome, particularly considering the strength of the evidence against him. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Second, Hine claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to present either a voluntary or involuntary intoxication defense. Pursuant to NRS 193.220, “whenever the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular species or degree of crime, the fact of the person's intoxication may be taken into consideration in determining the purpose, motive or intent.” While voluntary intoxication can negate specific intent, a defendant “must show not only the defendant's consumption of the narcotics, but also the intoxicating effect of the substances imbibed and the resultant effect on the mental state pertinent to the proceedings.” Nevius v. State, 101 Nev. 238, 249, 699 P.2d 1053, 1060 (1985). For involuntary intoxication, a defendant must show that they had to take the intoxicating substance against their will, that their intoxication was the result of the intoxicating substance and not by some other substance or mixture of substances, and that they were so mentally deficient so as not to “know or understand the nature and capacity of [their] act, or that [they] could not appreciate the wrongfulness of [their] act.” Grey v. State, 124 Nev. 110, 122 n.22, 178 P.3d 154, 162 n.22 (2008).

At the evidentiary hearing, the only evidence Hine presented of his alleged consumption of an intoxicating substance was his own testimony that he consumed 40 Xanax on the day of the shooting and that a witness claimed to have injected him with a street drug to revive him after he passed out. Hine did not provide any expert evidence regarding the intoxicating effect of using the alleged quantity of Xanax or the street drug, or the resultant effect they had on his mental state. He also presented no admissible evidence that his alleged intoxication was the result of an intoxicating substance he was compelled to take. Thus, he failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient where counsel did not present a defense around Hine's purported intoxication. Further, Hine did not demonstrate the jury would have reached a different conclusion on those charges which required specific intent; as discussed above, the trial testimony established that Hine entered the apartment, that he immediately began shooting, that he told Hardy, “Stop running, I am trying to kill you,” and that he intentionally aimed his firearm at Palmer before shooting her in the chest. These actions were sufficient for a jury to conclude, notwithstanding his alleged intoxication, that Hine had the specific intent required to commit the crimes of attempted murder, burglary, discharging a firearm at or into an occupied structure, vehicle, aircraft or watercraft, and discharging a firearm from within a structure or vehicle. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Third, Hine claimed counsel was ineffective for failing to present expert testimony to support a voluntary intoxication defense. Hine did not present an expert at the evidentiary hearing to show what testimony would have been presented at trial to support a voluntary intoxication defense. He therefore failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient in this regard or a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's purported error. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Fourth, Hine claimed counsel was ineffective for rejecting a voluntary intoxication jury instruction. Given that there was no evidence adduced at trial regarding Hine's consumption of Xanax, his injection with an unidentified street drug, or their effect on his mental state, Hine did not show counsel's performance was deficient for rejecting a voluntary intoxication jury instruction or a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's purported error. See Williams v. State, 99 Nev. 530, 531, 665 P.2d 260, 261 (1983) (“A defendant in a criminal case is entitled, upon request, to a jury instruction on his or her theory of the case, so long as there is some evidence ․ to support it.”). Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Fifth, Hine asserted counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation before trial. Hine alleged he told counsel that he took 40 Xanax on the day of the shooting and that there was a percipient witness to that fact. He further alleged, based on information acquired four years after trial, that the witness who saw him consume the 40 Xanax revived him by injecting him with a street drug when he passed out. Hine asserted that, had counsel investigated the witness, he would have learned about Hine's alleged injection with a street drug, a fact which would have opened the door to a voluntary and/or involuntary intoxication defense that would have negated the specific intent required for some of his charges.

Even assuming counsel's performance was deficient in this regard, Hine did not demonstrate what the results of a better investigation would have been or how the investigation would have affected the outcome of trial and therefore failed to demonstrate prejudice. See Molina v. State, 120 Nev. 185, 192, 87 P.3d 533, 538 (2004) (providing that a petitioner alleging an attorney should have conducted a better investigation must demonstrate what the results of a better investigation would have been and how it would have affected the outcome of the proceedings). As noted above, Hine failed to present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing that a voluntary and/or involuntary intoxication defense would have been available to him, such as expert testimony regarding the effects of taking a large quantity of Xanax or being injected with an unnamed street drug. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Sixth, Hine claimed counsel was ineffective at trial because he did not call any witnesses who could have testified regarding his state of mind or his use of Xanax and subsequent injection with a street drug on the day of the incident. Even assuming trial counsel was deficient in this regard, Hine failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for counsel's errors given the weight of the evidence discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Finally, Hine asserted the cumulative effects of counsel's errors warrants relief. Even if multiple instances of deficient performance could be cumulated for purposes of demonstrating prejudice, see McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259 & n.17, 212 P.3d 307, 318 & n.17 (2009), Hine failed to demonstrate trial counsel's alleged errors, considered cumulatively, would have entitled him to relief, see Mulder v. State, 116 Nev. 1, 17, 992 P.2d 845, 854-55 (2000) (stating the relevant factors to consider in evaluating a claim of cumulative error). Thus, the district court did not err in denying this claim.

Having considered Hine's contentions and concluded they lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.