DARLENE ANGUIANO v. THE STATE OF NEVADA (2025)

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE

Darlene Anguiano appeals from a district court order denying a postconviction petition for writ of habeas corpus filed on May 11, 2023, and a supplemental petition filed on October 24, 2023. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Monica Trujillo, Judge.

Anguiano contends the district court erred by denying her claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and prejudice resulted in that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome absent counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Warden v. Lyons, 100 Nev, 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting the test in Strickland). To demonstrate prejudice sufficient to invalidate a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); Kirksey v. State, 112 Nev. 980, 988, 923 P.2d 1102, 1107 (1996). Both components of the inquiry—deficiency and prejudice—must be shown, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, and the petitioner must demonstrate the underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v. State, 120 Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the district court's factual findings if supported by substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous but review the court's application of the law to those facts de novo. Lader v. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 (2005).

First, Anguiano claimed counsel was ineffective at sentencing because he failed to present sufficient mitigating evidence about her difficult childhood and her addiction issues. The district court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim, in which Anguiano and trial counsel testified. Thereafter, the district court found that trial counsel made a tactical decision to focus on Anguiano's actions after her arrest to show her commitment to avoiding future criminal conduct.

This conclusion is supported by the record. The record of sentencing reflects that counsel submitted letters from Anguiano's uncle and sister and briefly discussed Anguiano's difficult childhood before focusing on Anguiano's post-arrest conduct. Further, Anguiano testified as to her drug addiction during her allocution. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing held on Anguiano's petition that he chose to focus his mitigation arguments on Anguiano's post-arrest conduct because he believed her actions after being taken into custody best reflected who she was as a person and her dedication to refraining from future criminal conduct. Therefore, Anguiano failed to demonstrate trial counsel's performance was deficient. See Lara v. State, 120 Nev. 177, 180, 87 P.3d 528, 530 (2004) (“[C]ounsel's strategic or tactical decisions will be virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Further, she failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability of a different outcome given that the sentencing court was made aware of her difficult childhood and her addiction issues before sentencing her. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying this claim.

Second, Anguiano claimed counsel was ineffective at sentencing for failing to argue for 2 years, 3 months, and 29 days’ presentence credit for time served. The district court denied this claim, finding that trial counsel's performance was not deficient because he was legally foreclosed from making such an argument. We agree. NRS 176.055 provides that when a sentence of imprisonment is imposed, the district court “may order that credit be allowed against the duration of the sentence, including any minimum term or minimum aggregate term, as applicable, thereof prescribed by law, for the amount of time which the defendant has actually spent in confinement before conviction, unless the defendant's confinement was pursuant to a judgment of conviction for another offense.” NRS 176.055(1) (emphasis added).

When Anguiano was arrested on the instant matter, she was on bail in a separate criminal matter, Case No. C-20-349028-1. Anguiano pleaded guilty in that case and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment approximately two years prior to sentencing in this matter. The judgment of conviction for Case No. C-20-349028-1 was entered on October 26, 2020. Pursuant to NRS 176.055(1), Anguiano was not entitled to presentence credit in the instant matter for time served in prison pursuant to the judgment of conviction entered in Case No. C-20-349028-1. She therefore failed to demonstrate counsel's performance was deficient or resulting prejudice. See Donovan v. State, 94 Nev. 671, 675, 584 P.2d 708, 711 (1978) (concluding “counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failure to submit to a classic exercise in futility” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err by denying his claim.

Anguiano also alleged the district court erred in denying her claim that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered her guilty plea unknowing and involuntary. Specifically, Anguiano alleged trial counsel promised her that she would receive (1) a prison sentence of 8 to 20 years; and (2) 2 years, 3 months, and 29 days’ presentence credit for time served. A guilty plea is presumptively valid, and a petitioner carries the burden of establishing that the plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently. See Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 272, 721 P.2d 364, 368 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hart v. State, 116 Nev. 558, 562 n.3, 1 P.3d 969, 971 n.3 (2000); see also Hubbard v. State, 110 Nev. 671, 675, 877 P.2d 519, 521 (1994). In determining the validity of a guilty plea, this court looks to the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Freese, 116 Nev. 1097, 1105, 13 P.3d 442, 448 (2000). When raising a postconviction claim challenging the validity of a guilty plea, the petitioner must demonstrate a manifest injustice. See Harris v. State, 130 Nev. 435, 448, 329 P.3d 619, 628 (2014); see also NRS 176.165. “A guilty plea entered on advice of counsel may be rendered invalid by showing a manifest injustice through ineffective assistance of counsel.” Rubio v. State, 124 Nev. 1032, 1039, 194 P.3d 1224, 1228-29 (2008). This court will not overturn a district court's determination on manifest injustice absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. Id.

With respect to Anguiano's claim that trial counsel had promised her an 8-to-20-year prison sentence, Anguiano acknowledged in the plea agreement and plea canvass that the State had retained the right to argue for habitual criminal treatment and to argue for not more than an aggregate prison sentence of 30 to 75 years, that she understood the statutory minimum and maximum terms for each count to which she was pleading guilty, that she was entering her plea freely and voluntarily, that no one had coerced her to enter a plea, and that she had not been promised a particular sentence. Further, at sentencing, Anguiano requested the court sentence her to 5 to 20 years in prison. The only evidence Anguiano presented to support her claim that trial counsel had promised she would receive an 8-to-20-year prison sentence was an incomplete copy of the guilty plea agreement bearing trial counsel's handwritten notes; those notes, however, included several different sentencing ranges for the counts enumerated in the guilty plea agreement. As to Anguiano's claim that her decision to plead guilty was influenced by trial counsel's promise that she would receive 2 years, 3 months, and 29 days’ presentence credit for time served, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not recall any conversations with Anguiano regarding presentence credit for time served and did not recall that presentence credit was ever a factor in the plea negotiations.

After considering Anguiano's statements during the plea canvass and sentencing, the multiple sentence range notations in the plea agreement, and trial counsel's testimony, the district court found Anguiano failed to demonstrate trial counsel's performance was deficient or a reasonable probability that she would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial but for trial counsel's purported promises. The district court further found that, because trial counsel's performance was not deficient, Anguiano had not shown her guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered. The record supports the findings of the district court. We therefore conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying this claim. For the foregoing reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.

Bulla, C.J.

Gibbons, J.

Westbrook, J.